




ADVERTIMENT. La consulta d’aquesta tesi queda condicionada a l’acceptació de les següents 
condicions d'ús: La difusió d’aquesta tesi per mitjà del servei TDX (www.tesisenxarxa.net) ha 
estat autoritzada pels titulars dels drets de propietat intel·lectual únicament per a usos privats 
emmarcats en activitats d’investigació i docència. No s’autoritza la seva reproducció amb finalitats 
de lucre ni la seva difusió i posada a disposició des d’un lloc aliè al servei TDX. No s’autoritza la 
presentació del seu contingut en una finestra o marc aliè a TDX (framing). Aquesta reserva de 
drets afecta tant al resum de presentació de la tesi com als seus continguts. En la utilització o cita 
de parts de la tesi és obligat indicar el nom de la persona autora. 
 
 
ADVERTENCIA. La consulta de esta tesis queda condicionada a la aceptación de las siguientes 
condiciones de uso: La difusión de esta tesis por medio del servicio TDR (www.tesisenred.net) ha 
sido autorizada por los titulares de los derechos de propiedad intelectual únicamente para usos 
privados enmarcados en actividades de investigación y docencia. No se autoriza su reproducción 
con finalidades de lucro ni su difusión y puesta a disposición desde un sitio ajeno al servicio TDR. 
No se autoriza la presentación de su contenido en una ventana o marco ajeno a TDR (framing). 
Esta reserva de derechos afecta tanto al resumen de presentación de la tesis como a sus 




WARNING. On having consulted this thesis you’re accepting the following use conditions:  
Spreading this thesis by the TDX (www.tesisenxarxa.net) service has been authorized by the 
titular of the intellectual property rights only for private uses placed in investigation and teaching 
activities. Reproduction with lucrative aims is not authorized neither its spreading and availability 
from a site foreign to the TDX service. Introducing its content in a window or frame foreign to the 
TDX service is not authorized (framing). This rights affect to the presentation summary of the 
thesis as well as to its contents. In the using or citation of parts of the thesis it’s obliged to indicate 








IMPACT OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING 
SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTED IN EUROPE ON THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF HIGH SPEED SERVICES 
 
Author:  
Marta Sánchez Borràs 
MSc Civil Engineer 
 
 
PhD Supervisor:  
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Andrés López Pita 





PhD Programme in Territory Planning and Transport Infrastructures  
E.T.S. d’Enginyers de Camins, Canals i Ports de Barcelona (ETSECCPB) 




REAL DECRETO 1393/2007, de 29 de octubre, por el que se establece la ordenación 
de las enseñanzas universitarias oficiales 
(Publicado en el BOE núm. 260 de Martes, 30 de octubre de 2007) 
 
CAPÍTULO V – Enseñanzas de Doctorado 





1. Se podrá incluir en el anverso del título de Doctor o Doctora la mención “Doctor 
europeo”, siempre que concurran las siguientes circunstancias: 
 
a) Que, durante el periodo de formación necesario para la obtención del título de 
doctor, el doctorando haya realizado una estancia mínima de tres meses fuera de 
España en una institución de enseñanza superior o centro de investigación de un 
estado miembro de la Unión Europea, cursando estudios o realizando trabajos de 
investigación que le hayan sido reconocidos por la universidad. 
 
b) Que parte de la tesis doctoral, al menos el resumen y las conclusiones, se haya 
redactado y sea presentado en una de las lenguas oficiales de la Unión Europea 
distinta a cualquiera de las lenguas oficiales en España. 
 
c) Que la tesis haya sido informada por un mínimo de dos expertos pertenecientes a 
alguna institución de educación superior o instituto de investigación de un Estado 
miembro de la Unión Europea distinto de España. 
 
d) Que, al menos, un experto perteneciente a alguna institución de educación superior 
o centro de investigación de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea distinto de 
España, con el título de doctor, y distinto del responsable de la estancia 
mencionada en el apartado a) y los mencionados en el apartado c), haya formado 
parte del tribunal evaluador de la tesis. 
 
 
2. La defensa de la tesis ha de ser efectuada en la propia Universidad en la que el 
















European railways have been immersed since the nineties in a restructuring process aimed 
at improving the effectiveness, quality and economic efficiency of the provision of railway 
services, as well as stimulating the growth of railway markets. This reform has involved a 
separation between infrastructure management and operation and the introduction of rail 
infrastructure charges to regulate the use, by railway undertakings, of the infrastructure 
managed by infrastructure managers. 
 
Rail infrastructure charges aim, in essence, at recovering costs. Nevertheless, they can 
have an influence on the usage of the infrastructure, especially in corridors where 
competition between modes exists. Therefore, special attention should be paid to their 
definition and amount to ensure that they do not counteract the important effort that the 
European Union is making to help finance and build a European high speed network 
aimed at strengthening railways and redressing modal share imbalances. 
 
In Europe, legislation requires transparent and non discriminatory rail access charges, 
based on the principles of short run marginal social cost although mark ups are permitted 
where necessary to meet financial requirements. However, it does not specify how these 
principles should be implemented.  
 
This dissertation has three main tasks. Firstly, it calculates the amount of rail infrastructure 
charge for European high speed lines/services based on the marginal cost. Secondly, it 
characterises the rail infrastructure charging systems applied to European high speed 
lines/services, in order to detect if mark ups above the marginal cost of wear and tear are 
being applied to those services and if so, how they are applied. Finally, it quantifies the 
impacts on traffic volumes and mode split resulting from bringing the current levels of rail 
infrastructure charges (applied in the European high speed network) to the level of 
marginal cost of maintenance and renewals and to the optimal Ramsey mark up. 
 
According to the results obtained, current levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented 
in Europe have a negative impact on the competitiveness of the high speed passenger 
services that run on the European railway network, particularly in the cases where the rail 
market share is currently low (below 80-85%). Thus, mark ups would not have been 
imposed after careful consideration of their consequences on the market position of 
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Since the nineties, European railways are immersed in a restructuring process aimed at 
improving the effectiveness, quality and economic efficiency of the provision of railway 
services, as well as stimulating the growth of railway markets. This growth of railway 
markets should alleviate congestion in roads and in air space, as well as promote 
sustainable development1, by facilitating a shift from road and airways towards more 
environmental friendly modes of transport such as rail transport. 
 
The aforementioned reform has involved a separation between infrastructure management 
and operation and the introduction of rail infrastructure charges to regulate the use, by 
railway undertakings, of the infrastructure managed by infrastructure managers. 
 
Rail infrastructure charges are aimed, in essence, at recovering costs. Nevertheless, they 
can have an influence on the usage of the infrastructure, especially in corridors where 
competition between modes exists. Therefore, special attention should be paid on their 
amount and definition.  
 
In Europe, legislation requires transparent and non discriminatory rail access charges, 
based on the principles of short run marginal social cost but with mark ups permitted 
where necessary to satisfy financial requirements. However, it does not specify how these 
principles should be implemented. As a result of that, the application of the directive on 
infrastructure charges in the different European countries has given rise to a large 
spectrum of charging systems.  
 
In recent years, the European Commission (EC), the European Conference of Ministers of 
Transport (ECMT) and some Regulatory Bodies, among other entities, have done an 
important research effort in the European rail infrastructure charging framework, in order 
to analyse the implementation procedure of the European legislation concerning charging 
for the use of rail infrastructure and to estimate the marginal costs, on which rail pricing 
systems should be based. However, there is an interest in appropriate and efficient mark 
ups above marginal cost which has still not been tackled.  
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While, as a general rule, urban or rural transit services lose money and have to be 
subsidised, intercity trains and especially high speed railways are able to generate cash 
surpluses. Therefore, high speed railways would be one market segment where the 
application of mark ups should be permitted.  
 
Mark ups above marginal costs applied to high speed railways are unknown, but the 
frequent railway undertakings’ complaints on the level of infrastructure charges may be 
hinting at the fact that the level of mark ups above marginal cost charged to high speed 
railways could be having a negative impact on the use of the European high speed 
network.  
 
Given that the European Union is making an important effort to help finance and, 
consequently, build a European high speed network for strengthening railways and 
redressing modal share imbalances, it is of great interest to know if current charging levels 






The main objective of this PhD Thesis is to determine the impacts and, therefore, the 
consequences that current levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented in the 
European framework have on the competitiveness of the high speed passenger services 
that run on the European railway network. 
 
Reaching this main objective requires reaching three consecutive main sub-objectives: 
 
• To characterise the order of magnitude of a rail infrastructure charge for European 
high speed lines/services based on the marginal cost, which is the charging 
principle required by the European legislation. 
 
• To characterise the rail infrastructure charging systems applied to European high 
speed services/lines, in order to detect if mark ups above the marginal cost of wear 
and tear are being applied to those services and if so, how they are applied. 
 
• To quantify the impacts on traffic volumes and mode split resulting from bringing 
the current levels of rail infrastructure charges (applied in the European high speed 
network) to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals and to the 
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III. CONTENTS AND STRUCTURE  
 
The contents of this document have been structured into seven chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 focuses on the introduction of rail infrastructure charges in the European Union. 
On a first stage, it tackles the reasons of their introduction in the European railway context 
and revises the principles of infrastructure pricing. On a second stage, it analyses the 
legislative pricing framework established by the European Commission. It ends with an 
estimation of the order of magnitude that rail infrastructure charges should have according 
to the legislative framework previously analysed. This last stage implies an in-depth 
revision of the estimation of marginal costs, on which European rail infrastructure pricing 
systems should be based. 
 
In chapter 2 a state of the art of the main characteristics of rail infrastruture charging 
systems implemented in Europe are presented. Special emphasis is put on the analysis of 
cost allocation to charges for infrastructure use, in order to analyse the cost categories and 
variables used by the different pricing systems implemented in the European railway 
network. This analysis allows distinguishing special characteristics on the implementation 
of mark ups above marginal costs in pricing systems applied in networks where high 
speed lines are in operation. On the basis of these first results, the objective of this PhD 
Thesis is explicitly formulated. 
 
The methodology established and the assumptions made for reaching the aforementioned 
objective are presented in chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 4 presents an in-depth analysis of the structure and value of the charges for the 
use of rail infrastructure implemented in European countries with high speed lines in 
operation. Special attention is paid to the application of mark ups above marginal cost for 
high speed lines, in qualitative and quantitative terms. The search for similarities in the 
application of mark ups above marginal costs is analysed by an attempt of quantifying the 
influence that the consideration of wear and tear costs, investment costs and the 
commercial position of the market by pricing systems can have on the value of charges for 
high speed lines. 
 
On the basis of the results obtained in chapter 4, chapter 5 deals with the analysis of the 
link existing between rail infrastructure charges and rail revenues from the ticket sales, as 
a preliminary stage before quantifying the impacts that actual prices charged to high speed 
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In chapter 6 the impact that a reduction in rail infrastructure charges can have on traffic 
volumes and on mode split is evaluated for two case scenarios, namely: a reduction of rail 
infrastructure charges equivalent to reducing mark ups either to zero or to the optimal 
mark up.  
 
The results of the previous chapters enable establishing the consequences that current 
levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented in the European framework have on the 
competitiveness of high speed passenger services running on the European railway 
network. Chapter 7 is devoted to the presentation of the conclusions and the possible 




IV. CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
The main contributions of this PhD Thesis are: 
 
• The detailed characterisation of high speed railways infrastructure charges and the 
analysis of the correlation of their value with infrastructure characteristics and their 
commercial position. 
 
• The establishment of a methodology for quantifying the impacts on traffic volumes 
and mode split of a variation in the level of rail infrastructure charges. 
 
• The quantification of the impact on European high speed traffic volumes of 
reducing mark ups either to zero, or to the optimal level of charges derived from 
the rule of the mark up proportinal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. 
 
• The quantification of the impact on European high speed mode split of reducing 
mark ups either to zero, or to the optimal level of charges. 
 
• Proving that the current level of infrastructure charges applied to high speed lines 
and services are negatively affecting the volumes and the market share. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
 
1.1. REASONS FOR INTRODUCING RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
The development of high performance road infrastructures and air transport for the 
medium and long distance routes thanks to the introduction of the jet plane, headed 
railways in Europe to a declining situation in the late 1960s. Therefore, in the 1970s, 
railway in Europe stood as the most affected means of transport by the advance of aviation 
and the private car; indeed, in Europe, the growth in market share in the period 1970-1980 
was of +2,0% for car transport, -1,9% for railways, -1,1% for bus transport and +1,05% 
for aviation (Sánchez-Borràs, 2004). 
 
The measures undertaken at the European level to revitalise railways can be classified in 
two fields: a technical field and a legislative one. 
 
With regard to the technical field, actions have focused on the construction of new railway 
infrastructures, mostly high speed lines, capable of allowing raises in commercial speeds 
and, consequently, converting railways, once again, into a competitive mode of transport. 
Annex A1 (“The European high speed network”) presents in detail the appearance of high 
speed railways and its context, and defines these new infrastructure and market segment, 
as well as their development since the 1980s to the present time. 
 
The considerable increase in commercial speed that took place as a result of the great 
investments for the construction of new high speed lines and the upgrading of other lines 
(all of them detailed in annex A1), has resulted, as it was aimed for, in the broadening of 
the railway’s potential for competition against other modes of transport (see figure 1.1). 
However, the improvement of the railway’s situation does not only depend on the 
construction side, but also on the legislative one. 
 
Regarding the legislative framework, railways in Europe are immersed in a great reform, 
aimed at improving the quality and the economic efficiency of railway services provision 
and stimulating growth on railway markets. Within the framework of this reform, defined 
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sector. Annex A2 (“The restructuring of railways in Europe”) presents in detail in what the 
above mentioned restructuration has consisted (or is consisting), reviewing the traditional 
organisation of railways in Europe, analysing the different periods of the European Union 
(EU) railway politics since the 1950s to our days, and focusing subsequently on the first 




FIGURE 1.1 PONTENTIAL COMPETITIVITY BETWEEN MODES OF TRANSPORT  




The restructuring procedure of the railway in Europe, presented in detail in annex A2, 
gave rise to the separation between the non-competitive component of the railway industry 
–the infrastructure– and the component that can be rendered as a competition regime –
railway services–. The entities responsible for assuming the typical tasks of each 
component were named infrastructure manager (IM), in the case of the infrastructure, and 
railway undertaking (RU), in the case of railway services (see figure 1.2). 
 
Given that RU’s trains must run on the infrastructure, managed by the IM, the need for 
establishing a tool regulating its use emerged. This tool was named charge for the use of 
rail infrastructure, also known as rail infrastructure charge. Before the reorganisation of 
the railway sector, rail infrastructure charges did not exist because the use of the track was 
an internal transaction within the railway company, i.e. the company in charge of the 
infrastructure maintenance had the exclusivity of using the tracks for its own trains.  
 
Railways 





Long distance airways 
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FIGURE 1.2 VERTICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN RAILWAY OPERATION AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND APPEARANCE OF THE 














The reorganisation of the railway sector to liberalise it and promote its competitiveness 
(and therefore raising its market share), has had positive effects on the efficiency of the 
European railway sector, as proven by a study carried out by Friebel et al. (2003), in 
which data for the period 1980-2003 is analysed. This data suggests that the reforms have 
had a positive effect on productivity (Calthrop, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, separation between infrastructure management and operation has 
solved, to some extent, the historical railway debt; indeed, in Western Europe many 
railway companies have reduced their losses and some of them have even had little 
benefits, even if none of them is covering its capital costs (CE, 2005).  
 
Even if the reorganisation carried out in the European railway sector seems to have borne 
good fruits, it is still unknown whether the introduction of rail infrastructure charges as a 
result of the separation between infrastructure management and operation has allowed or 
not strengthening high speed railways’ competitiveness. 
 
Previous to an analysis of the effects that rail infrastructure charges introduced in the 
European high speed network are having on the competitiveness of high performance 
railways, this chapter deals, first of all, with the definition and the strategic objectives of 
rail infrastructure charges; secondly, with the theoretical basis on the setting of charges; 
and finally, with the presentation of the legislative framework regarding rail infrastructure 
charges in the EU and an estimation of the order of magnitude that the charge should have 
according to the legal action guidelines established by the European Commission (EC). 
 
Railways’ traditional 
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1.2. DEFINITION AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF THE CHARGE FOR THE 
USE OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE     
 
The charge for the use of rail infrastructure and its strategic objectives are defined below.  
 
 
1.2.1. Definition of the charge for the use of rail infrastructure  
 
While the ticket fare corresponds to the amount of money to be paid by a user for using a 
public mode of transport, such as for instance a train, the charge for the use of rail 
infrastructure corresponds to the amount of money paid by a railway undertaking to an 
infrastructure manager for running on its tracks and using its installations. That is, the rail 
infrastructure charge regulates the use of rail infrastructure (managed by an infrastructure 
manager) by a railway undertaking.   
 
From a more strategic point of view, rail infrastructure charges can be defined as a “tool 
for modernising railways organisation and render it more efficient, that is, more able to 
face the competition of other modes of transport” (CEMT, 1998). This stems from the 
interrelation that exists between infrastructure charges and transport policies, as it will be 
seen in section 1.3.3.  
 
According to the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), a charging 
system should meet the following requirements:   
 
• No discrimination: The charge should not be discriminatory, i.e. the infrastructure 
manager should treat in the same way all applications with identical offers made 
by different railway undertakings.  
 
• Transparency: The requirements asked by the infrastructure manager should be 
known by all railway undertakings. 
 
• Attractiveness: The charge should be such that the service provided, in this case 
transport, is attractive and, within the limits of the available capacity, increases the 
use of the infrastructure up to a level considered to be efficient. 
 
• Cost recovery: The charge should enable reaching financial objectives defined by 
the infrastructure manager. This would enable for a partial cost recovery instead of 
requiring a total cost recovery. 
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• Reflexivity: The charging system should be based on empirically measurable 
calculation elements.   
 
 
1.2.2. Strategic objectives of the rail infrastructure charge  
 
The charge for the use of rail infrastructure reflects the following strategic objectives2 
(CEMT, 1998): 
 
• To reach a better use of capacities (to favour the best possible use of the railway 
network). 
 
• To direct investment options (participation in the maintenance and network 
operation cost recovery, as well as in the amortisation of investments, in particular 
investment for the renewal of installations). 
 
• To foster productivity, i.e. to increase the economical efficiency. For this, 
productive and technical efficiency (to produce services at the least possible cost) 
as well as allocative efficiency3 (resources must be oriented to the production of 
the goods and services most valued by society) must be increased. 
 
• To reduce the necessity of resorting to public funds.   
 
• To foster the rational and efficient use of the infrastructure, i.e. to stimulate the use 
and appropriate adaptation of infrastructure to traffic (to promote the use of 
railway transport and to participate in a balanced territory planning).   
 
In order to reach these objectives, the structure and the level of charges should be 
comprehensible, transparent and stable (Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 
2003). 
 
                                                 
2 The strategic objectives of the charge for the use of infrastructure have not been classified by order of 
priority. 
3 To reach allocative efficiency and recover costs requires (Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 
2003): 
- That economies of density do not exist in long-run infrastructure provision and operating costs. 
- That investment is optimal, so that at the prevailing demand, the efficient charge equals the long-run 
and short-run marginal costs. 
- That there are no significant external costs and benefits of production. 
Since rail infrastructure provision does not fulfil these conditions, access charges that are allocatively-
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On the following section the tools available for setting the charge for the use of rail 
infrastructure are presented. 
 
 
1.3. CONCEPTION OF THE CHARGE SETTING  
 
With the aim of enabling railway operators to offer their services in proper conditions, it is 
essential that the infrastructure manager carries out an appropriate maintenance of the 
infrastructure, as well as the required planning and traffic management tasks for 
guaranteeing a coherent use of the network. These activities entail several costs that must 
be faced by the infrastructure manager with the collection of enough incomes to recover 
them.   
 
In this sense, the conception of the charge setting requires, on one hand, to know the costs 
incurred and, on the other hand, selecting the costs that one wants to recover, that is, to 
choose a charging principle or philosophy, and to consider how one wants to recover 
them. 
 
The next sections present, first of all, the definition of the different types of costs and 
subsequently, the theoretical charging principles.  
 
 
1.3.1. Types of costs. Definitions  
 
Costs can be of several types: 
 
• On the one hand, costs can be classified as fixed or variable;   
• On the other hand, costs can be classified as total, average or marginal; 
• One can as well distinguish between common and avoidable costs; 
• Finally, costs can be grouped into private, external or social costs 
 
Many of these different types of costs can be combined between them. So, one can talk for 
instance of “total social cost” or of “marginal private cost”. 
 
The different types of costs presented are defined below.    
 
1.3.1.1. Fixed and variable costs  
Fixed and variable costs are defined according to their variability contingent on the 
production level. 
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Fixed costs (CF) are those costs that do not vary with the level of production, while, on the 
contrary, variable costs (CV) are those that vary with the level of production.   
 
It has to be stressed that both types of costs depend at the same time of the time period and 
the width of the considered variations in the production. So, on the very long-term, for 
instance, the only costs that can be defined as fixed are the non-recoverable costs of the 
investments carried out, while at the very short-term, most costs, except those of electric 
power and wear and tear, can be considered to be fixed. 
 
This translates into the existence of different viewpoints for the different railway 
companies, since the time periods considered by them vary from one to another; indeed, 
certain railway companies consider that all supplementary costs registered when traffic is 
not equal to zero are variable costs. With this philosophy, all maintenance and renewal 
costs, as well as signalling and train running planning, can be defined as variable costs, 
since it is superfluous to carry out all these activities if the system is not used to run trains. 
On the contrary, other railway undertakings (such as for instance Network Rail in the 
United Kingdom), define as fixed those costs with which one must count no matter the 
traffic volume, given that different types of traffic run on the network. Consequently, 
those companies only consider variable those costs that vary with the traffic when this 
exceeds a given volume. In this case, a huge number or even most part of the maintenance, 
signalling and train running planning cost elements can be considered to be fixed. 
 
The differences presented in the preceding paragraph help to explain the fact that in one 
company fixed costs can represent 90% of total costs, as it is the case of Railtrack4, while 
in other companies they can represent lower percentages (for instance, 75% of total costs 
in the case of SNCF5 (Profillidis, 2001)).  
 
1.3.1.2. Total, average and marginal costs 
Total costs (CT) constitute the whole of the costs imposed by the production of a certain 
amount of goods or services. Consequently, in the railway field, total costs represent the 
total yearly cost of infrastructure provision.  
 
Mathematically they can be defined as the sum of fixed and variable costs (or of 
investment and management costs):  
 
 VFT CCC +=   with CF = fixed costs and CV = variable costs (f. 1.1) 
 
                                                 
4 Since 2002, Network Rail, rail infrastructure manager of the United Kingdom.  
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Average costs (C ) are defined as the total cost per production unit of a good or a given 
service, i.e. the total cost divided by the level of production. Mathematically it can be 
expressed as follows: 
 




xCC VF +=    with x = volume of production (f. 1.2) 
 
The average cost is a fundamental element for the setting of prices: if prices exceed the 
average cost, the company will have benefits; if, on the contrary, they are lower than the 
average cost, the company will have losses.  
 
The marginal cost (MC or CM) corresponds to the supplementary cost imposed by the 
production of a supplementary unit of a good or service, i.e. it corresponds to the 
evolution of the total cost in case of producing one or several extra units. More precisely, 
in the railway field the marginal cost corresponds to the variation of infrastructure costs, 
when a unit of additional traffic uses the tracks (Finnish Rail Administration, 2007).  
 
Mathematically, the marginal cost can be expressed as follows: 
 









)(     (f. 1.3)  
 
and cuts the average costs curve at the minimal value of C , obtained from equaling to zero 








VF +=   (f. 1.4) 
 
In the railway field, marginal costs may encompass the following elements (CE, 1997): 
 
• Operation costs: energy, labour and certain maintenance expenses. 
 
• Costs related to the wear and tear of the infrastructure: maintenance and 
infrastructure wear and tear expenses, such as the repair of tracks. 
  
• Costs linked to congestion6 and scarcity of capacity7: cost of the delays caused to 
users and non-users due to traffic jams, for instance, queues at stations. In addition, 
                                                 
6 Congestion costs refer to the costs caused by additional delays to other services resulting from running an 
extra train. 
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the use of an infrastructure by a transport operator may hinder its use by another 
operator.  
 
• Environmental costs: air, as well as noise pollution.  
 
• Costs linked to accidents: costs in terms of material damages and losses in 
production.  
 
The marginal cost can be of two natures: 
 
• On the one hand, one can talk of the short-run marginal cost (SRMC), which is 
defined as a specific variable cost linked to the use of the existing infrastructures, 
without considering the raise in capacity (CE, 1997). Consequently, the SRMC 
assumes that some inputs of the cost function are fixed (such as, for example, 
infrastructure). 
 
• On the other hand, one can talk of the long-run marginal cost (LRMC): This cost 
differs from the short-run marginal costs because it also considers the costs derived 
from future capacity increases. Those costs are very difficult to calculate in the 
transport field.   
 
Both short-run and long-run marginal costs can vary with an increase of the number of 
runs, as seen in figure 1.3, since marginal costs incorporate congestion costs. In the short-
run, marginal costs do not consider the increase in capacity. Therefore, the increase of 
runs implies an increase of the congestion and scarcity costs, until no action is taken on 
capacity. In the long-run, these variations with the increase of the number of runs will 
depend on the period considered. In a 50-year term all costs (even investment costs) 
become variable and, therefore, long-run marginal costs tend to converge with average 
costs, since the distinction between fixed and variable costs disappears. 
 
When the use of the infrastructure is above its optimal capacity, the long-run marginal 
costs are lower than the short-run marginal costs. On the contrary, when the use of the 
infrastructure is below the optimal capacity, the long-run marginal costs are higher than 
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FIGURE 1.3 EVOLUTION OF SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN MARGINAL COSTS 
CONTINGENT ON THE NUMBER OF RUNS 




















1.3.1.3. Common and avoidable costs 
Common costs (CC) are those costs derived from the production of more than one good or 
service, i.e. they correspond to the costs due to several runs. Those costs can only be 
avoided in the case the production of all of these goods or services ceases, that is, in the 
railway field, if several types of services are withdrawn. For example, let us suppose that a 
double track is used by local passenger services, fast passenger services and freight 
services. This line could be put in operation as single track if two of the three types of 
services did not run: in that case the maintenance costs of the second track would be 
common. 
 
Common costs have to be borne by someone but if they are allocated to users, it must be 
done according to methods that do not distort the decisions concerning the level of 
services offered. 
 
On the other hand, avoidable costs (CAV) are those costs that would be avoided if a good 
or a service would no longer be produced, in particular when other goods or services that 
share common costs continue to be produced. In the railway field, it can be affirmed that 
avoidable costs for a particular type of traffic correspond to variable costs, since the cost 
SRMC: Short-run Marginal Cost 
LRMC: Long-run Marginal Cost 
LRAC: Long-run Average Cost 
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of such traffic adds to all fixed costs that would be avoided if traffic ceased. Therefore, 
certain costs related to the offer of high speed transport can be fixed as far as high speed 
trains run on the network, but they will be avoidable if the network only receives slower 
trains. 
 
The analysis of the avoidable costs is of great utility when deciding which are the 
desirable characteristics of the railway network in terms of quality and capacity. The 
infrastructure needed for particular types of service can only be guaranteed if someone (be 
it the public stakeholders, be it the users) is willing to assume the avoidable costs, and it is 
convenient to allocate these costs to the type of traffic in question as a fixed charge, which 
will only vary in the long term when it is decided to modify the quality and the 
infrastructure capacity (CEMT, 2005). 
 
 
1.3.1.4. Private, external and social costs 
Private costs (CP) or internal costs are those costs incurred by the supplier of the good or 
service in question. For example, for an infrastructure, private costs are those borne by the 
infrastructure manager, that is, infrastructure costs (construction, maintenance) and 
operation costs. 
 
With regard to private marginal8 costs, they generally comprise the costs linked to wear 
and tear (that can cause supplementary maintenance costs and the speed up of renewal of 
certain installations) and a part of the planning and trains operation costs. 
 
External costs (CEXT) are those imposed to a third party on the occasion of the supply of 
goods and services. In the case of the railway industry they correspond to environmental 
costs (noise, air pollution and global warming costs) and, possibly, certain accident costs 
and those related to congestion and scarcity of capacity.  
 
Finally, social costs (CS or SC) are defined as the sum of private costs (CP or PC) and 
external costs (CEXT or EC). Formula f. 1.5 states their mathematical expression, while 
figure 1.4 corresponds to its graphical representation: 
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1.3.2. Charging principles and philosophies  
 
1.3.2.1. Introduction. The marginal cost as reference point for charging 
The link between the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking can be defined as 
follows (Valletti et al, 1998): 
 
In order to provide one unit of final good, that is the movement of trains, railway 
undertakings need one unit of the infrastructure manager’s input: planning and 
infrastructure management. This input is produced at a unit cost c0. On the other hand, the 
infrastructure manager (IM) incurs a fixed cost F, which can be interpreted as the set up 
cost of the network, or some other costs deriving from social obligations that cause losses 
to it. In addition, the IM charges a unit access charge a to users, i.e. railway undertakings 
(see figure 1.5). 
 
Bearing in mind the fact that one of the objectives of the rail infrastructure charge consists 
in inducing railway undertakings to raise their efficiency and therefore reach levels of runs 




















SMC: Social Marginal Cost  
PMC: Private Marginal Cost 
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FIGURE 1.5 LINK BETWEEN THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGER AND A RAILWAY 















welfare (SW) is maximised. Graphically (see figure 1.6), the maximisation of the social 
welfare can be visualised as the maximisation of “dec” (which corresponds to the 
consumers’ surplus –CS–) and “ceka” (which represents the producer’s surplus –PS–) 
areas. These areas reach their maximal value when the area “efk” (known as “deadweight 
loss”) is equal to zero, situation that takes place when the marginal cost is charged. 
Consequently, the deadweight loss corresponds to the economical loss derived from 
charging above the marginal cost. Mathematically, the maximisation of the social welfare 




dSW       (f. 1.6) 
 












+           (f. 1.8) 
 
where: 
- Q corresponds to the traffic volume 
- TR are the total revenues of the producer (area “oceg”) 







c0: unit cost (marginal cost of 
production) 
F: fixed cost a: access charge 
c: other costs incurred for 
converting the intermediate good
p: charge for use 
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- TC is the total cost of producing a quantity q, without considering fixed costs  
 
The left part of the expression f. 1.8 corresponds to the area that lies under the demand 
curve D. Being: 
 
( )QPD =  (f. 1.9) 
 






 (f. 1.10) 
( ) ( )QPCSTR
dQ
d
=+   (f. 1.11) 
 
 
On the other hand, the right part of the expression f. 1.8 corresponds to the marginal cost 




dTCQP ==  (f. 1.12) 
 
This proves mathematically that social welfare is maximised when the price equals 
marginal cost. In other words, marginal cost pricing should be adopted for maximising 
social welfare9. Consequently, in economic terms it is considered that marginal cost 
pricing corresponds to the best theoretical situation and it is therefore called “first best”. 
On the contrary, charging above marginal cost is called “second best”. Figure 1.6 clearly 
shows these two theoretical solutions.  
 
It has to be highlighted that for the optimal theoretical solution of charging (first best) to 
be able to take place in practice, that is, for additional benefits in the market to be reduced 
to zero, it is required that railway undertakings seek to increase their efficiency and 
improve their level of production. This situation is only possible if there does not exist any 
source of distorsion in the market, i.e. if there exists a perfect competition and if all 
railway undertakings of the competitive sector are similar (in terms of technology and 
costs) and their products are identical. 
 
                                                 
9 The proof that marginal cost pricing is enough for optimising social welfare was formulated by Hotelling 
in his book “The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railways and utility rates” 
(Hotelling, 1938).  
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FIGURE 1.6 MARGINAL COST CHARGING (FIRST BEST) AND CHARGING ABOVE 
MARGINAL COST (SECOND BEST)  
 
Social Welfare = (Total producer’s revenues) + (Consumer’s surplus) – (Production costs) =  
 = (oceg) + (ced) – (oakg) = 
 = (acek) + (cde) = 
 = (Producer’s surplus) + (Consumers’ surplus)
(SW) 
P(price) 






















Total cost of producing the quantity g
(without considering fixed costs) 
Economic loss derived from charging 










First Best : SW = SWmaximal 




e Second Best:  SW < SWmaximal 
(P > marginal cost) 
Curves:  
- D: demand 
- MC: marginal cost curve 
- MR: marginal revenues (change in revenues produced if the infrastructure manager reduces its price enough so as 





The subsequent sections deal with marginal cost pricing (first best) and charging above 
marginal cost (second best) in depth.  
 
1.3.2.2. First best charging. Marginal cost charging 
As introduced in the preceding section, if it does not exist any source of distortions in the 
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lower the access tariff (a) is, the lower the final charges (p) will be and, consequently, the 
higher the final amount consumed by the final users will be, i.e. the higher the number of 
trains runs will be. 
 
Therefore, in a marginal cost pricing system, the charge for the use (p) should be equal to 
the marginal cost of production; thus, the access tariff (a) should be equal to the marginal 
cost of production: 
 
cap +=          (f. 1.13) 
 
with:   a = c0 = marginal cost of production  
 c = other costs incurred for transforming the intermediate good  
 
so:  
ccp += 0         (marginal cost pricing) (f. 1.14) 
 
There are two types of marginal cost pricing, depending on the type of marginal cost 
considered (short-run marginal cost, long-run marginal cost, or social marginal cost). 
The advantages and disadvantages of the short-run and long-run marginal cost pricing, 
leaving aside the inherents inconvenients to all marginal costs10, have been summarised in 
table 1.1. 
 
With regard to (short-run) marginal social cost charging11, it requires external costs to be 
reflected by means of a pigouvian tax12.  The pigouvian tax, the aim of which is to correct 
the effects of negative externalities, corresponds to the difference between the social 
marginal costs curve and the private marginal costs curve at the equilibrium point between 
the social marginal cost and the demand (see figure 1.7). 
 
From a theoretical point of view, marginal social cost charging is the best solution in 
terms of economical efficiency (CEEE/UAL-CEGEA/UCP,?). However, it can mean a 
barrier for railways if this principle is not applied in the other modes of transport. To this 
drawback it has to be added the fact that this charging principle does not reflect the 
contributive capacity of transports and, consequently, it can induce a reduction of certain 
traffics for other new traffics. 
                                                 
10 They consist in the dependence on the State contributions to the infrastructure manager so that the latter 
can face the deficit, and in the difficulty of determining marginal costs, which require detailed studies for 
evaluating the costs  related to the run of an extra train. 
11 When talking about marginal social cost, one generally refers to the short-run social marginal cost and not 
to the long-run marginal cost.  
12 Those are named after the economist Arthur Pigou (1877-1959), who established, in 1924, the optimal fee 
for internalising external costs.   
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TABLE 1.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CHARGING BASED ON SHORT-
RUN AND LONG-RUN MARGINAL COST  
 Source: Author’s elaboration from Hylén (1998), Bureau of Transport and 
Regional Economics (2003), EC (2004), CEMT (2005). 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
SRMC - Promotes the eficient use of the 
network, maximising welfare.  
- Possible problems at the planning 
stage, since charges based on this 
principle may change with time and 
space (Hylén, 1998). 
  - Given the long term required for 
extending the capacity of the 
infrastructure, short-run marginal 
cost pricing hardly gives signals to 
temporary investment. 
  - Makes it difficult to incentivise the 
infrastructure manager.  
LRMC - Incentivises the infrastructure 
manager to invest and to extend the 
network where the demand exceeds 
capacity. 
- Some railway undertakings that 
could pay the short-run marginal 
cost may be excluded from the 
market. 
 - Avoids the difficult calculations of 
congestion costs. 
- Needs calculations of investment 
expenses, often difficult to do. 
Remarks: 
- SRMC: Short-run marginal cost 




According to CEMT (2005), it is not desirable to have the product of the pigouvian taxes 
going to the infrastructure manager, since it could incite it to earn more money by 
attracting more polluting trains. Therefore, CEMT (2005) considers that the product of the 
pigouvian taxes should go directly to the State.    
 
In its most elaborated form, known as harmonised social marginal cost, it involves taking 
into account the external costs derived from all modes, and organising eventual 
compensations between the modes if one of them does not cover its social marginal cost, 
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SMC: Social Marginal Cost  
PMC: Private Marginal Cost 











1.3.2.3. Second best charging. Charging above the marginal cost  
While marginal cost charging is considered to be the optimal charging solution (“first 
best”) from a theoretical point of view, in practice this solution cannot always be reached. 
This is because the fact that the access tariff (a) is equal to marginal costs of production 
(c0) only allows recovering variable costs and, as a result of that, the infrastructure 
manager would have losses equal to the fixed costs (F). 
 
The philosophy that lies behind marginal cost charging consists in letting the State cover 
the difference between the marginal cost and the financial cost. However, if State 
financing is not enough for recovering fixed costs, it is necessary to charge above 
marginal cost, applying the second charging optimum (“second best”).  
 
Second best charging seeks, therefore, to set an efficient access charge subject to the 
infrastructure manager’s budgetary constraints. There are several ways of setting it: on the 
one hand, setting a charge above marginal cost based on costs; on the other hand, setting a 
charge above marginal costs based on the market. 
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Charging above marginal cost based on costs allows recovering the costs directly 
attributable, as well as allocating at least some of the common and fixed non-attributable 
costs. This type of charging is characterised by the fact that the level of usage of the track 
defines the level of charge and by the fact that it is not based on the determination of 
marginal costs in order to determine its level13, but on the total distribution of average 
costs.   
 
Charging above marginal cost based on the costs gives rise to two charging principles, 
depending on the State contributions:  
 
• Full cost recovery or total cost charging (FC14): Full cost recovery, also known as 
total cost charging, is based on the determination of levels of charges for the use of 
the infrastructure that allow a total cost recovery of the infrastructure manager’s 
fixed and variable costs. This charging principle is appropriate in places where 
railway transport is the predominant mode of transport and its market position is 
strong, as for instance in the Baltic States (CER, 2005b). 
 
• Full cost recovery after State subsidies (FC-): The full cost recovery after State 
subsidies principle responds to a charging conception based on the point of view of 
the infrastructure manager, which has to operate as a commercial organisation, 
because it has to recover its costs. Specifically, it determines the infrastructure 
charge beginning with the knowledge of two variables: total financial costs and 
State contributions. Therefore, if the infrastructure manager’s costs rise, the levels 
of charges rise in the same proportion. Therefore, no incentives for reducing costs 
exist.     
 
Both types of charging do not allow introducing incentives for cost reduction, given that if 
the infrastructure manager’s costs rise, the levels of charges will rise in the same 
proportion.  
 
On the other hand, charging above marginal cost based on the market (also known as 
price discrimination charging) consists in charging marginal costs with mark ups 
(marginal cost with mark ups, MC+), that is, charging marginal costs applying to them 
some mark ups aimed at reducing the need for State contribution. The mark ups applied 
can be fixed (i.e. applicable to all market segments) or variable according to the demand 
categories (see figure 1.8). 
                                                 
13 Even if the marginal cost is not used to determine the charge in the full cost recovery after subsidies 
principle, it is important for the infrastructure manager to know its value, as well as the railway 
undertakings’ elasticities, in order to recover the costs in the most efficient way.  
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FIGURE 1.8 CHARGING ABOVE MARGINAL COST PRICINPLE BASED ON THE MARKET  






















When fixing mark ups it is important to take into consideration the impact that their level 
can have on the competitiveness of railways. Therefore the charges are set at levels that 
reflect the predominant demand levels and the price elasticities, i.e. they reflect railway 
undertakings’ ability to pay.  
 
As it will be seen in section 1.4.1, the marginal cost with mark ups pricing principle is the 
one required by Directive 2001/14/CE15 and the one applied by most Western European 
countries. Its application can be done according to three levels: 
 
• First degree of price discrimination: It consists in charging a different price to 
each operator. Specifically, it consists in charging below the demand curve, which 
reflects the users’ willingness to pay.   
 
• Second degree of price discrimination: It consists in charging different prices to 
railway undertakings operating in a same (sub)market. Linear and two-part tariffs 
(application of fixed mark ups) belong to this group.  
 
                                                 
15 Directive 2001/14/EC refers to the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity, the levying of charges for 
the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification.  
x% x% 




Service 1 Service 2 
MC1 
MC2 
“Fixed” mark ups  
 (for all market segments)  
Variable mark up 
(for demand category) 
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• Third degree of price discrimination: It consists in applying different tariffs in 
different market segments (application of variable mark ups by demand category). 
This price discrimination is known as Ramsey pricing. 
 
The next paragraphs describe in detail what those three types of charging are: charging by 
total distribution of average costs (fully distributed average cost pricing), charging with a 
two-part structure and Ramsey pricing (pricing discrimination). 
 
Fully distributed average cost pricing 
This charging tool is based on the theoretical case that all railway undertakings of the 
competitive sector are similar (in terms of technology and costs) and that, consequently, 
they offer similar final services. 
 
Under these conditions, the total amount of production supplied by the infrastructure 
manager in equilibrium with the railway undertakings depends on the access tariff (QS(a): 
amount supplied). This implies that the infrastructure manager will be able to balance its 
accounts only if the charge for the use of railway infrastructure recovers the fixed costs on 
average, that is, if: 
 
( )aQ
Fca S+= 0  (f. 1.15) 
 
with:   c0 = marginal cost of production  
 F = fixed costs 
 QS(a): amount of total production supplied by the infrastructure manager   
 
Given the expressions f. 1.13 and f. 1.15, and taking into account that the quantity 
supplied by the infrastructure manager should be equal to the quantity requested by the 
operators (QD(p) = QS(a)), the implicit formula of the access tariff by total distribution of 




+= 0  (f. 1.16) 
 
Consequently, the fully distributed cost pricing distributes amongst the operators the fixed 
and common costs that cannot be directly allocated to some of them16. This distribution of 
costs can be done according to different parameters (Peter, 2003), generally linked with 
                                                 
16 Toner et al (2008) point out the difficulty of distributing common costs, which lies in the fact that they 
cannot be uniquely attributed to one output and that there is no cost-allocation method that is demonstrably 





22  PhD Thesis 
the use of the infrastructure or linked with an estimation of the cost caused. Amongst the 
methods used stand out the distribution of costs according to the number of train-km run, 
the distribution according to the market share of each operator (it can be measured in 
tonnes-km, but this would be detrimental to freight operators), the distribution according 
to gross revenues and the distribution according to the attributable cost, that is, according 
to the cost they cause. Therefore, average costs indicate the costs of tuning up the 
infrastructure by unit of traffic (CE, 1997). 
 
 




In figure 1.9 the fully distributed average cost pricing principle has been outlined. It has to 
be highlighted that this method eliminates every notion of marginality (Toner et al, 2008). 
 
Even if this approximation is quite simple, it can lead to a lack of efficiency, forcing 
certain operators to pay too high a tariff (if marginal costs are low) and other operators to 
pay too low a tariff. This can result in the exclusion of certain operators that could pay the 
marginal cost of using the infrastructure. In addition, the fully distributed average cost 
pricing can hinder the introduction of competition in the network, favouring the 








MC: Marginal cost curve 
D: Demand 
Q: Quantity produced 
C: Cost 




Pac: Average cost charging 
qac: Level of production for which the 
average cost has been calculated  
Mark up above marginal cost 
recovered by the infrastructure 
manager 
Marginal cost  
Point of efficient production 
level (first best) 
Cost recovery by the IM 
(second best) 
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Charging with no-linear or two-part structure  
While simple or linear tariffs are usually associated with systems based on marginal costs, 
the basic idea of no-linear tariffs consists in charging every train-path according to its 
marginal cost and recovering the deficit by means of a fixed tariff (independent of the 
quantity consumed) that the operator has to pay as access tariff or reservation tariff (Peter, 
2003). 
 
Generally, the fixed part of non-linear tariffs refers to fixed costs17, while the variable part 
is based on variable costs18. However, it has to be stressed that the so-called “fixed” 
element often depends on the forecast system usage. Therefore, this label can be 
misleading. 
 
According to economic theory, the basic form of a two-part tariff is the following one: 
 
qpAP ⋅+=     (f. 1.17) 
where: 
- nFA /=  is the fixed part, which corresponds to the access tariff, and can be 
expressed as the link between the deficit that the company would have if the 
marginal cost was charged (F) and the number of operators (n). 
- p is the marginal price 
- q corresponds to the quantity of product consumed  
 
Despite having attractive properties for the allocative efficiency, non-linear tariffs can be 
discriminatory in a free access situation, since they can involve an entry barrier if an 
operator can pay the marginal costs but cannot face the fixed costs imposed (this case can 
take place when p is equal to the marginal cost and A is higher than the consumer’s 
surplus of some operators). Small operators are the most vulnerable, because if no 
difference is made between the level of use and the fixed part is the same for everyone, the 
effort that small operators have to do to face this fixed part is much higher. Pietrantonio et 
al. (2004) argue that with two-part tariffs, a new operator, almost inevitably, pays either a 
higher marginal charge per train-km or a much higher fixed charge in comparison with its 





                                                 
17 Fixed costs are those that do not vary with the production level. It has to be highlighted that those costs 
considered as fixed depend at the same time on the time period and the width of the variations in production 
considered.  
18 Variable costs are those that vary according to the level of production. As with fixed costs, these costs 
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In order to avoid possible discriminations, in some cases it has been proposed to apply the 
two-part tariff in an optional way (with autoselection), so that one operator can choose 
between a linear tariff with a unit price p0 > p and a two-part tariff with an access tariff A 
and a unit price p < p0. Figure 1.10 schematises, for an operator with a demand D1 (high 
demand) and another operator with a demand D2 (low demand) in a same market, how the 
autoselection would work: on the one hand, the operator with high demand (D1) would 
prefer the two-part tariff, while the operator with low demand (D2) would choose the 
linear tariff. Indeed, the choice of paying a linear tariff p0 for each unit of product 
consumed would imply a level of consumption q0D1 and q0D2, while the choice of paying a 
two-part tariff would imply to pay an access tariff A equal to the area “p0bep1” defined in 
figure 1.10 (higher than the linear tariff that the operator with low demand would pay) 
plus a variable charge equal to p1< p0, that in the case of the operator with high demand 
would allow to raise its consumption to q1D1 as well as its surplus (increased in “bef”) and 
at the same time the producer’s surplus (that is, in the present case, the IM’s surplus) 
would increase in “efgj”. 
 
In table 1.2 the main characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of linear (or simple) 
and non-linear (or two-part) tariffs have been summarised.  
 
 
Di : Demand 
p: price 
q: quantity consumed 
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TABLE 1.2 CHARACTERISTICS, ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LINEAR AND 
TWO-PART TARIFFS  
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from CEMT (2005) and Bureau of 
Transport and Regional Economics (2003). 
 Linear tariffs Two-part tariffs 
- Directly variable with measures of use:     
· gross tonne-km 
· net tonne-km 
· passenger/km 
· train/km 
· kW and kW/h or electric traction used   
· etc. 
- One part is variable with use, and one part is 
fixed in advance in relation to expected 
capacity requirements (usually scheduled 
train-paths or train path-km) or in relation to 
an estimation of the fixed costs of the system 
that have to be covered. 
- Can eventually be weighted by:  
· speed 
· axle loadings 
· types of rolling stock 
· specific route (including the geometry 
requirements of the route) 
· time of day 
· freight commodity 
· etc. 
- The “fixed” component can be weighted by 
factors such as:  
· path quality 
· scheduled speed 
· particular line 









- Might be most appropriate for a relatively 
simple network, with few users and where 
traffic is not approaching network capacity 
(Norway, for example).   
 
- Most of the fixed component factors tend to be 
passenger service-driven (particularly by 
commuter traffic) rather than freight-related 
(most freight users can adjust their usage to 
avoid peak time use and thus do not have to 
burden capacity). 
- Easier to implement than two-part systems.   
 
- Potentially more efficient in complex, mixed-
use networks where more than marginal cost 
has to be charged.  
- Less costly to implement than two-part 
systems.  
- If used as part of a long run contract may 
actually improve incentives by reflecting the 
long run costs of the incremental capacity 






- Probably more effective in collecting 
marginal (direct) costs.  
- May be less distorting in their effects on train 
operators’ decisions that a mark up on the 
variable charge. 
- More distorting in collecting allocated shares 
of fixed costs.  
 
- Can, depending on the size of the fixed 
component of the charges, engender 
discrimination between various sizes or 
classes of users. This is particularly the case 
where the fixed component of the charge is a 
pure access charge, unrelated to planned use of 
the system, or where there are large quantity 









- May not give effective signals to encourage 
the financing of added capacity.  
- Can act as a burden on international freight 
services if the fixed component of the charge 
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 Linear tariffs Two-part tariffs 
- If used to collect fixed costs they may no 
longer give the right signals to use existing 
capacity to the full.  
 
- Inevitably make the goal of international 
competitition more difficult to achieve, since 
the existence of a two-part charge in one 
country adjoining a country with simple 
charges inherently creates a type of “seam” 
that retards international flows. 
 
 
Ramsey pricing. Third degree of price discrimination   
In reality, all operators offer different services (for example, conventional long distance 
services, high speed services, regional services, etc.), valued by users in a different way. In 
these cases, the economic theory determines that charges for recovering fixed costs should 
be different depending on the final service, i.e. a price discrimination charging should be 
introduced.    
 
FIGURE 1.11 RAMSEY PRICING 
 Source: Adapted from Toner et al (2008) 
 P (price) 
Q (quantity produced) 
D2 











P*1 second best 
P*first best 
- Set {A,B}: pricing to break-even in 
each market 





Figure 1.11 shows how costs could be recovered in the case of two different final 
services. On the one hand, one could charge according to value A (intersection between 
the demand curve of market 2 and the average cost) and B (intersection between the 
demand curve of market 1 and the average cost), breaking-even in each market (first 
degree of price discrimination). On the other hand, one could charge according to values C 
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and D, breaking-even over all. In the latter case, which corresponds to Ramsey pricing, the 
profits from market 1 are used to cover some of the costs of market 2, and the social 
surplus, in welfare terms, is bigger. Therefore, Ramsey pricing allows minimising the loss 
of efficiency associated with departure from marginal cost pricing and allows the IM to 
recover its costs, maximising social welfare under State budget constraints. All this by 
considering that railway infrastructure is a natural multi-product monopoly and assuming 
independent demands –cross-elasticities equal to zero between the different products– and 
that there are no externalities (one example would be the charging of one infrastructure 
segment, not congested, to different operators that operate in different markets –for 
example, passengers and freight–). 
 
Mathematically, the social welfare maximisation problem under State budget constraints 
can be presented as follows: 
 







  where pi is the price of the market i       (f. 1.19) 
iii xpCS ⋅=    where xi is the demand of market i (xi = fi(pi)) (f. 1.20) 
( )iii xcTC =     where ci is the cost or market i    (f. 1.21) 
 
under the condition that the net revenue (or profit) of the company must exceed some 
value Π: 
 
( ) Π≥−⋅ iiii xcxp     (f. 1.22) 
 
where Π corresponds to the quantity of benefit sought or authorised deficit. 
 
The solution to equation f. 1.18 under the constraint f. 1.22 “leads to differentiated prices, 
according to the demand (...), that distribute all attributable costs, fixed and common, 
between their services on the basis of the values that those services have for the 
consumers” (Pietrantonio et al, 2004). Specifically, it establishes that the proportionate 
deviation of price above marginal cost in each market segment should be inversely 
proportional to the respective price elasticity, so that when fixing the mark ups, the users 
most insensible to variations in the price should be those paying higher prices, since this 




























MC =  is the marginal cost 
- λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the budgetary constraint Π. It indicates how much 
would the social benefit increase if Π (amount of benefit sought or authorised 
deficit, i.e. difference between benefit and cost) would be reduced by one unit, that 
is, it corresponds to the marginal cost of oportunity of using public subsidies that 
could be spent elsewhere. λ is equal to zero if prices equal marginal costs and 
tends to the infinity if benefits are maximised. To give an example, a value of 
λ=0,3 implies that benefits should be 1,3 times higher than costs. 
- ε corresponds to the price elasticity of market i demand (its value is negative), 
defined as the change in demand caused by a 1% change in price.  
 
Generally it is possible to identify different market segments (different values of elasticity) 
according to:  
 
• The broad category of train: passengers train (intercity, suburban, regional) and 
freight train (container, bulk, general merchandise). In the case of transport 
infrastructures, passengers demand is less elastic than freight demand. Therefore, 
Ramsey pricing implies that prices in passenger transport should be higher than 
those of freight transport (CE, 1997). 
 
• The location: the demand of an infrastructure that links two cities with a big 
economic weight is less elastic than the one registered in an infrastructure that 
links secondary cities.  
 
• The time of the day/week/year: For example, the elasticity of a passenger train is 
lower at peak hours than at off-peak hours, because generally the passengers that 
use the train at peak periods do it for obliged mobility reasons. This explains why 
higher charges can be set at peak periods for passenger trains runs. 
 
On the basis of expression f. 1.23, Crozet (2007) proposes calculating the level of optimal 
mark up above marginal cost according to the expression:  
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a     (f. 1.24) 
 
where: 
- a is the level of infrastructure charge with an optimal mark up above marginal cost   
- Ci is the marginal infrastructure cost 
- Cs is the marginal train service cost 







is a parameter reflecting the cost opportunity of public funds λ 
- ε is the price elasticity of traffic expressed in absolute value  
 
α/ε being the key ratio for determining the optimal value of the mark up above marginal 
cost.  
 
The application of Ramsey pricing is allowed by Directive  2001/14/EC, as presented in 
section 1.4. Compared to fully distributed average cost pricing, Ramsey pricing allows 
establishing prices in an economically efficient way, combining cost and demand factors 
in an optimal way (Pietrantonio et al, 2004). As a result of that, lower prices can be 
obtained for operators in general.  
 
The main inconvenients for its application are the fact that its implementation requires a 
thorough knowledge of the market (operator’s costs and demand elasticies of final users, 
information of the services offered) that is not always easy to obtain, since this 
information is strategic for the operators (and they are unwilling to make it public). 
Therefore it is especially difficult to apply in a vertically separated structure (OECD, 
1999). 
 
1.3.2.4. Remarks on the different pricing principles  
In table 1.3 the main characteristics of the four pricing principles applied in the railway 
sector are presented. Even if these pricing principles differ on their philosophical basis and 
their application, some of them have to face common difficulties, in particular the 
calculation of marginal and social costs and the evaluation of the impact of the difference 
between charges and marginal cost on the users. 
  
These difficulties have led to the appearance of detractors of the adoption of marginal cost 
pricing. Specifically, Rothengatter (2003) criticises the adoption of the marginal cost 
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including investment decisions and technological choice; it also ignores financial and 
institutional aspects, and the existence of price distorsion in other parts of the economy; in 
addition, the implementation of social marginal cost tariffs can bring significant 
administrative costs, which are not always compensated by the benefits it generates. 
According to Nash (2003), “considerations such as budget constraints, equity, institutional 
issues, simplicity and price distortions elsewhere in the economy lead to a need to depart 
from pure marginal social cost pricing but do not change the position that the 
measurement of marginal social cost is the correct starting point in the development of any 
efficient pricing policy”. 
 
 
TABLE 1.3 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRICING PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN THE 
RAILWAY SECTOR  
Method Acronym Philosophy Characteristics 
(Social) marginal cost 
pricing  
(S)MC The State covers the 
difference between the 
marginal cost and the 
financial cost.   
- Consists in allocating to the users the 
variable costs related with a particular 
use.  Recomended by the European 
Union.  
- The one that, in principle, maximises the 
degree of efficiency of the use of the 
infrastructures.  
- The one that charges more the State 
budget.   
Marginal cost pricing 
with mark ups above 
the marginal cost  
MC+ Tries to reduce (or 
eliminate) State 
intervention and the 
difference between 
marginal cost and 
financial cost.  
- If correctly applied, could optimise the 
equilibrium between the search for 
efficiency and the budgetary constraints, 
perfectly allowing to reach the 
objectives assigned to the method FC-.  
Full cost recovery 
pricing after State 
subsidies  
FC- Charges fixed at levels 
that allow recovering the 
difference between State 
intervention and the 
financial cost.  
- Protects the IM’s financial balance, but 
incites it to correct the malfunction of its 
infrastruture services offer to a lesser 
extent.  
- Can give rise to inefficiencies in the use 
of infrastructures.   
- All the costs that are not directly funded 
by the State must be distributed amongst 
infrastructure users in an efficient and 
equitative way. 
Full cost recovery 
pricing  
FC Charges fixed at levels 
that allow recovering the 
financial cost.  
- Applied in several Eastern European 
countries: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia. 
 
 
The most appropriate pricing principle in each railway network will depend on each 
country’s specific circumstances (not all pricing principles allow reaching all the strategic 
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objectives of the charge for the use of the infrastructure presented in section 1.2.2 at the 
same time – see table 1.4). For example, as introduced in section 1.3.3.3, the full cost 
recovery principle is convenient for freight railway transport in the Baltic States, while in 
other countries, where railways are at a disadvantage with regard to road transport, it is not 
convenient if one aims at promoting railways usage. 
 
 
TABLE 1.4 ACHIEVABLE OBJECTIVES BY THE DIFFERENT PRICING METHODOLOGIES  
Objectives 









of the need 








MC :      
SRMC    x x x x 
LRMC       x 
SMC   x x x x 
MC+:       
Ramsey   x      
Two-part x     x 
Average costs 
(FC, FC-)  x  x   x 
Remarks: 
 : Achievable objectives 
x  : Non-achievable objectives 
Blank: No data available  
 
 
According to Arduin et al. (2002), charge setting should be determined by the global 
railway project economic profitability. Consequently, for: 
 
• A global positive and high economic profitability, the full infrastructure cost 
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TABLE 1.5 RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE ACCESS PRICING REGIMES BY RAIL USER 
TYPE  
 Source: CEMT (2005). 
Type of service Pure SMC MC+ FC- 
FC contract 
with sponsor (if 
any)*  
Suburban    High requirement 
for scheduled slots, 
relatively low speed. 
Limited response to 
price signals, high 
public support.  
High speed rail 
franchise 
 
  Use of two-part 
tariff for operations 
on conventional 
lines   







city passenger and 
HSR:  
    
With competition 
in the railway 
market  
 










for the market (i)) 
  High capacity 
schedule 
requirements. 
Suitable for two-part 
contracts 
 
Freight Low schedule and track quality 
requirements. High response to price 
signals. Use either SMC or MC+ simple 
tariff with minimum mark ups. Mark ups (if 
any) for freight in domestic, import-export 




* Full cost recovery contract with the financial public authority.  
(i) Competition for the market: it is the one that takes place between the different transport markets.   
 
• A global low economic profitability (case in which railway operation is enough to 
pay investments, the operation and railway undertaking’s maintenance), the 
marginal cost pricing principle can be applied under the condition that the global 
level of the charge does not affect RU’s profitability. 
 
• A global low economic profitability (case in which railway operation is not enough 
for paying investments, operation and RU’s maintenance), the marginal cost 
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pricing principle can be applied in all cases but a State or community subsidy will 
be needed not only for infrastructure investments but also for RU’s investments. 
 
On the other hand, theoretic studies carried out on occasion of the introduction of the 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure in Europe propose, as presented in Baritaud et 
al. (2000), either a social marginal cost pricing (UIC/CER, 1998) or a Ramsey pricing, 
which allows covering the fixed costs not covered by State subsidies (NERA et al, 1998), 
or even the integration of external effects corrections.  
 
CEMT (2005) has also expressed its opinion on the subject (see table 1.5). Its standpoint 
is that railway infrastructure access pricing regimes should be determined according to the 
rail users type. As it can be seen in table 1.5, high performance railway services should be 
charged (at least in a close future) on the basis of marginal cost plus mark ups, considering 
that European legislation established that in 2010 passengers’ railway market should be 
opened to competition. 
 
 
1.4. CHARGE FOR THE USE OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EU 
 
A charge for the use of rail infrastructure started to be introduced in a generalised way in 
the European Union countries as a result of the First Railway Package implementation. 
  
The legislative framework that regulates and defines the charge for the use of railway 
infrastructure in the European Union countries is presented below, as well as an estimation 
of the order of magnitude of the infrastructure charge based on the principles established 
by the European directives.  
 
1.4.1. Legislative framework 
 
The railway pricing structure at the European level is mainly defined by Directive 
2001/14/EC19 relative to, amongst other aspects, the levying of charges for the use of 
railway infrastructure, which widely complements the first definitions of the charging 
system for the use of railway infrastructure published in Directives 91/440/CEE20 and 
95/19/CE21 of the first reforms stage.  
                                                 
19 Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure 
and safety certification. 
20 Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community's railways, 
amended by Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001. 
21 Council Directive 95/19/EC of 19 June 1995 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the 
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1.4.1.1. Directive 91/440/EEC  
Directive 91/440/EEC initiated the charge definition legislative framework at European 
level, with a series of considerations on the pricing of railway infrastructures (see table 
1.6) and several action measures (see table 1.7) grouped into section III (“Separation 
between infrastructure management and transport operations”). 
 
 
TABLE 1.6 DIRECTIVE 91/440/EEC CONSIDERATIONS OR OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD 
TO THE RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURES PRICING   
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Directive 91/440/EEC (CE, 1991). 
Nº Consideration Objective 
Recital 
clause 6A 
“(...) Member States shall (...) lay down rules providing 
for the payment by railway undertakings and their 
groupings for the use of railway infrastructure (...)”.  
Setting of rules for the 
payment of user fees 
Recital 
clause 6B 
“(...) in the absence of common rules on allocation of 
infrastructure costs, Member States shall (...) consult the 




“(...) such payments must comply with the principle of 





TABLE 1.7 ACTION MEASURES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTIVE 91/440/EEC  
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Directive 91/440/EEC (CE, 1991). 
Nº Consideration Requirement 
Article 8.1 “The manager of the infrastructure shall charge a 
fee for the use of the railway infrastructure for 
which he is responsible, payable by railway 
undertakings and international groupings using that 
infrastructure (...)”. 
Establishment of a fee 
for the use of railway 
infrastructure 
Article 8.2  “(...) After consulting the manager, Member States 
shall lay down the rules for determining this fee 
(...)”. 
Determination of the 
charge at a national 
level  
Article 8.3 “The user fee (...) shall be calculated in such a way 
as to avoid any discrimination between railway 




Article 8.4 “The user fee (...) may in particular take into 
account the mileage, the composition of the train 
and any specific requirements in terms of such 
factors as speed, axle load and the degree or period 
of utilisation of the infrastructure”. 
Possible parameters to 
be used when 
calculating the charge  
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The action measures defined by Directive 91/440/EEC established the obligation of 
introducing a charge for the use of railway infrastructure at national level (for the EU 
member states). The directive established that the user fee should be “calculated in such a 
way as to avoid any discrimination between railway undertakings” and stipulated that,   
although it is not compulsory, user fees should be calculated on the basis of parameters 
such as mileage, speed, axle load, time period, etc. Each Memeber State would be 
responsible for the selection of the parameters to be used to calculate the user fee.  
 
1.4.1.2. Directive 95/19/EC 
In 1995, Directive 95/19/EC stressed that the nature of the charge must be non-
discriminatory. To this consideration, it added the need for adopting common rules 
concerning the charging of infrastructure fees, which should be, at the same time, non-
discriminatory in a same market, as well as the need for adopting a transparent procedure 
for charge setting (see table 1.8).   
 
 
TABLE 1.8 DIRECTIVE 95/19/EC CONSIDERATIONS OR OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO 
THE RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURES PRICING  
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Directive 95/19/EC (CE, 1995). 
Nº Consideration Objective 
Recital 
clause 4A 
“(...) it is appropriate to establish a system for (...) the 
charging of infrastructure fees which is uniform 
throughout the Community”.  
Uniform system 
throughout the EU  
Recital 
clause 4B 
“(...) it is appropriate to establish a system for (...) the 
charging of infrastructure fees which is non-





“The accounts of the infrastructure manager should be in 
balance so that infrastructure expenditure can be 
covered”. 
Recovery of 
expenditures by the IM 
Recital 
clause 11 
“It is necessary to define non-discriminatory rules as 
regards the charging of infrastructure fees in the same 
market”. 
Non-discriminatory 
fees in a same market  
Recital 
clause 12A 






“(...) common rules should be adopted concerning the 
procedures for (...) the charging of infrastructure fees”. 
Common rules for the 
charging of 
infrastructure fees  
 
 
On the basis of these considerations, the directive lays down, in its section III (“Charging 
of infrastructure fees”), action measures that oblige infrastructure managers to balance 
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discriminatory fees fixed by Member States according to the nature of the service, the time 
of the service, the market situation and the type and degree of wear and tear of the 
infrastructure (see table 1.9). 
 
 
TABLE 1.9 ACTION MEASURES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTIVE 95/19/EC 
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Directive 95/19/EC (CE, 1995). 
Nº Consideration Requirement 
Article 6.1 “The accounts of an infrastructure manager shall, 
under normal business conditions over a reasonable 
time period, at least balance income from 
infrastructure fees plus State contributions on the 
one hand and infrastructure expenditure on the 
other”. 
Balance of IM’s 
accounts  
Article 7A “There shall be no discrimination in the charging for 
services of an equivalent nature in the same 
market”. 
Non-discriminatory 
fees for different RU  
Article 7B “After consulting the infrastructure manager, 
Member States shall lay down the rules for 
determining the infrastructure fees. These rules shall 
provide the infrastructure manager with the facility 
to market the available infrastructure capacity 
efficiently”. 
Responsible for the 
rules for determining 
the infrastructure fees  
Article 8.1 “The fees charged by the infrastructure manager 
shall be fixed according to the nature of the service, 
the time of the service, the market situation and the 
type and degree of wear and tear of the 
infrastructure”. 
Fees calculation  
Article 9.1 “The fees shall be paid to the infrastructure 
manager(s)”. 
Fees beneficiary  
Article 9.2 “Member States may require the infrastructure 
manager to provide all the information on the fees 
necessary to satisfy them so that they are charged on 





1.4.1.3. Directive 2001/14/EC 
Even if directives 91/440/EEC and 95/19/EC established the first principles for the 
infrastructure fees to follow, Directive 2001/14/EC is the one that widely defines the 
objectives that charges for the use of the infrastructure should fulfill in Member States. All 
of them have been summarised in table 1.10.   
 
Directive 2001/14/EC lays down that charges should be set according to uniform pricing 
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principles and non-discriminatory criteria (see table 1.10), and should be published in a 
“network statement” 22. With regard to the structure of the charge, the directive proposes a 
structure in three main parts (see figure 1.12):  
 
• Charges for minimum access package and track access to services facilities. 
• Charges for supply of services at track access facilities. 
• Charges for “additional and ancillary” services. 
 
 
TABLE 1.10 DIRECTIVE 2001/14/EC CONSIDERATIONS OR OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD 
TO THE RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURES PRICING 
 Source: Adapted from CENIT et al (2007b) according to the provisions of 
Directive 2001/14/EC (CE, 2001d). 




“To ensure transparency and non-discriminatory access to 
rail infrastructure for all railway undertakings all the 
necessary information required to use access rights are to 




“The revitalisation of European railways (…) requires fair 
intermodal competition between rail and road, 
particularly by taking appropriate account of the different 
external effects (…)”. 
Fairness (intermodal)  
Recital 
clause 11 
“Charging schemes should permit equal and non-
discriminatory access for all undertakings and attempt as 
far as possible to meet the needs of all users and traffic 





“Within the framework set out by Member States 
charging and capacity-allocation schemes should 
encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise the 





“It is desirable for railway undertakings and the 
infrastructure manager to be provided with incentives to 
minimise disruption and improve performance of the 
network”. 
Incentive for reliability 
Recital 
clause 16 
“Charging (…) schemes should allow for fair competition 





“It is important to have regard to the business 




                                                 
22 Directive 2001/14/EC defines the “network statement” as the statement which sets out in detail the general 
rules, deadlines, procedures and criteria concerning the charging and capacity allocation schemes. It shall 
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Nº Consideration Objective 
Recital 
clause 23 
“Different users and types of users will frequently have a 
different impact on infrastructure capacity and the needs 






“It is important to minimise the distortions of competition 
which may arise, either between railway infrastructures or 
between transport modes, from significant differences in 





“It is desirable to define those components of the 
infrastructure service which are essential to enable an 
operador to provide a service and which should be 
provided in return for minimum access charges”. 




“Investment in railway infrastructure is desirable and 
infrastructure charging schemes should provide incentives 
for infrastructure managers to make appropriate 





“Any carging scheme will send economic signals to users. 
It is important that those signals to railway undertakings 






“To enable the establishment of appropriate and fair 
levels of infrastructure charges, infrastructure managers 
need to record and establish the valuation of their assets 
and develop a clear understanding of cost factors in the 




“It is desirable to ensure that account is taken of external 




“A railway infrastructure is a natural monopoly. It is 
therefore necessary to provide infrastructure managers 
with incentives to reduce costs and manage their 
infrastructure efficiently”. 
Incentive to cost 
efficienty 
Specific objectives: Cost categories(i) and cost centres(ii) 
Recital 
clause 36 
“To enable the establishment of appropriate and fair 
levels of infrastructure charges, infrastructure managers 
need to record and establish the valuation of their assets 
and develop a clear understanding of cost factors in the 
operation of the infrastructure”.  
Cost relatedness 
Specific objectives: Cost of use of assets (wear and tear) 
Recital 
clause 21 
“(…) charging schemes may need to take account of the 
fact that different components of the rail infrastructure 
network may have been designed with different principal 
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Nº Consideration Objective 
Recital 
clause 38 
“It is important to ensure that charges for international 
traffic are such as to permit rail to meet the needs of the 
market; consequently infrastructure charging should be 
set at the cost that is directly incurred as a result of 
operating the train service”.  
Cost relatedness 
Specific objectives: Mark ups 
Recital 
clause 39 
“(…) it is desirable for any infrastructure charging 
scheme to enable traffic to use the rail network which can 
at least pay for the additional cost which it imposes”.  
Fairness (intramodal) 
Specific objectives: Reservation charges 
Recital 
clause 44 
“The allocation of capacity is associated with a cost to the 
infrastructure manager, payment for which should be 
required”.  
Cost relatedness 
Specific objectives: Performance regimes 
Recital 
clause 43 
“It is desirable for railway undertakings and the 
infrastructure manager to be provided with incentives to 
minimise disruption of the network”.  
Incentive to 
operational efficiency 
Specific objectives: Congestion and scarcity related charges 
Recital 
clause 25 
“The charging schemes must take acount of the effects of 
increasing saturation of infrastructure capacity and 
ultimately the scarcity of capacity”.  
Consideration of 
saturation and scarcity 
Specific objectives: Environmental charges/subsidies 
Recital 
clause 37 
“It is desirable to ensure that account is taken of external 




“It is important to ensure that charges for international 
trafic are such as to permit rail to meet the needs of the 
market; consequently infrastructure charging should be 
set at the cost that is directly incurred as a result of 
operating the train service”.  
Cost relatedness  




“Discounts which are allowed to railway undertakings 
must relate to actual administrative cost savings 






“(…) discounts may also be used to promote the efficient 





(i) Examples of cost categories (or cost elements) in the railway framework are train planning and 
operations, electricity, congestion and scarcity, maintenance and renewals, other services, external costs.  
(ii) The cost centres are the parts of the companies to which certain costs are attributed. In the railway 
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FIGURE 1.12 CHARGING STRUCTURE ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF DIRECTIVE 
2001/14/EC   









































The charge for the minimum access package is made up of a basic charge, external costs, 
a scarcity charge and a series of mark ups.  
 
The specific requirements related to the basic charge are described in Article 7 of the 
directive. Amongst them the marginal cost focus that charges must have is highlighted 
(see table 1.11).  
 
With regard to external costs, the directive allows taking into consideration the 
environmental effects caused by railway service operation. The directive allows pricing 
the environmental costs if a comparable pricing for all transport modes competing with 













A. Charges for minimum access 
 package and track access to 
 services facilities 
B. Charges for supply of services at 
track access facilities 
C. Charges for ‘additional’ and  
 ancillary services 
The cost that is directly incurred as a result of  
operating the train service.  
Cost varies with traffic volume and should be 
differentiated according to factors that determine 
the size of the cost drivers. 
Applies only if charged for competing transport 
mode 
During periods/at locations of ‘congestion’  
(insufficient paths), risk of disruption, opportunity 
cost 
Efficient, transparent, non-discriminating and  
differentiated according to market segments 
“willingness to pay” 
 
No specific charging principles based on 
competitive situation of railway 
If the infrastructure manager is the only supplier, 
charge cost only, based on level of use 
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TABLE 1.11 ACTION MEASURES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTIVE 2001/14/EC 
 Source: Adapted from CENIT et al (2007b) according to the provisions of 
Directive 2001/14/EC (CE, 2001d). 
Nº Consideration Requirement 
General requirements related to the charging practice 
Article 4.4 “Except where specific arrangements are made 
under Article 8.2, infrastructure managers shall 
ensure that the charging scheme in use is based on 
the same principles over the whole of their 
network”. 
Uniformity of charging 
principles 
Article 4.5 “Infrastructure managers shall ensure that the 
application of the charging scheme results in 
equivalent and non-discriminatory charges for 
different railway undertakings that perform services 
of equivalent nature in a similar part of the market 
(…)”. 
Non discriminatory 
charges for different 
RU 
Article 8.3 “To prevent discrimination, it shall be ensured that 
any given infrastructure manager’s average and 
marginal charges for equivalent uses of his 
infrastructure are comparable and that comparable 
services in the same market segment are subject to 
the same charges. The infrastructure manager shall 
show in the network statement that the charging 
system meets these requirements insofar as this can 
be done without disclosing confidentail business 
information”. 
Equivalent charges for 
equivalent uses of the 
infrastructure and 
comparable services 
Specific requirements: Cost of use of assets  
Article 7.3 “(...) the charges for the minimum access package 
and track access to service facilities shall be set at 
the cost that is directly incurred as a result of 
operating the train service”.  
Marginal cost approach 
Article 7.6B “(...) the relative magnitudes of the infrastructure 
charges shall be related to the costs attributable to 
the services”. 
Relation between 
charges and costs 
attributable to services 
Specific requirements: Mark ups 
Article 8.1A “(...) The charging system shall respect the 
productivity increases achieved by railway 
undertakings (...)”. 
Respect to RU 
productivity increases 
Article 8.1B “(...) the level of charges must not exclude the use 
of infrastructure by market segments which can pay 
at least the cost that is directly incurred as a result of 
operating the railway services, plus a rate of return 
which the market can bear”. 
No exclusion of market 
segments able to pay 
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Nº Consideration Requirement 
Article 8.2 “For specific investment projects (...) the 
infrastructure manager may set or continue to set 
higher charges on the basis of the long-term costs of 
such projects if they increase efficiency and/or cost-
effectiveness and could not otherwise be or have 
been undertaken (...)”. 
Conditions to levy 
mark ups for specific 
investment projects 
Specific requirements: Reservation charges 
Article 12 “Infrastructure managers may levy an appropriate 
charge for capacity that is requested but not used. 
This charge shall provide incentives for efficient use 
of capacity (...)”. 
Incentives for efficient 
use of capacity 
Specific requirements: Performance regimes 
Article 11.1A “Infrastructure charging systems shall through a 
performance scheme (...)”. 
Implementation of a 
performance scheme 
Article 11.1B “Infrastructure charging schemes shall (...) 
encourage railway undertakings and the 
infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and 




performance of the 
network 
Article 11.2 “The basic principles of the performance scheme 
shall apply throughout the network”.  
Uniformity of the 
performance scheme 
Specific requirements: Congestion and scarcity related charges 
Article 7.6B “(...) the relative magnitudes of the infrastructure 
charges shall be related to the costs attributable to 
the services”.  
Relation between 
charges and costs 
attributable to 
infrastructure services 
Specific requirements: Environmental charges/subsidies 
Article 7.5A “The infrastructure charge may be modified to take 
account of the cost of the environmental effects 
caused by the operation of the train. Such a 
modification shall be differentiated according to the 
magnitude of the effect caused (...). 
Differentiation 
according to magnitude 
Article 7.5B “(...) charging environmental costs which results in 
an increase in the overall revenue accruing to the 
infrastructure manager shall however be allowed 
only if such charging is applied at a comparable 




Article 7.6B “(...) the relative magnitudes of the infrastructure 
charges shall be related to the costs attributable to 
the services”.  
Relation between 
charges and costs 
attributable to 
infrastructure services 
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Nº Consideration Requirement 
Specific requirements: Discounts 
Article 9.2A “With the exception of paragraph 3 (Article 9.3), 
discounts shall be limited to the actual saving of the 
administrative cost to the infrastructure manager 
(...)”. 
Limited to saving on 
administrative costs 
Article 9.2B “(...) In determining the level of discount, no 
account may be taken of cost savings already 
internalised in the charge levied”. 
Already internalised 
cost savings cannot be 
incorporated 
Article 9.3A “Infrastructure managers may introduce schemes 
available to all users of the infrastructure (...)”. 
Availability to all users 
Article 9.3B “Infrastructure managers may introduce schemes 
(...) granting time limited discounts (…)”. 
Limitation in time  
Article 9.3C “Infrastructure managers may introduce schemes 
(...) to encourage the development of new rail 
services, or discounts encouraging the use of 
considerably underutilised lines”. 
Encouragement of new 
rail services 
Article 9.5 “Similar discount schemes shall apply for similar 
services”. 




In addition, the directive allows infrastructure managers to include “a charge which 
reflects the scarcity of capacity of the identifiable segment of the infrastructure during 
periods of congestion” (Article 7.4). The requirements to be accomplished by these 
scarcity charges are summarised in table 1.11. 
 
The nature of the mark ups, which can be applied by infrastructure mangers to fully 
recover their costs and for specific investments projects, is defined in Article 8 of the 
directive (see table 1.11).  
 
In addition to these components, Directive 2001/14/EC allows infrastructure managers to 
“levy an appropriate charge for capacity that is requested but not used” (Article 12). It also 
allows the application of time limited discounts to encourage the development of new rail 
services or the use of considerably underutilised lines (see table 1.11).   
 
In short, the basic charge, set according to the marginal cost principle23, can be modified: 
 
• Upwards, in order to take into account congestion, to favour investments and 
                                                 
23 The marginal cost principle implies in this case that “the charges for the minimum access package and 
track access to service facilities shall be set at the cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating the 
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improve performance, and to include environmental costs (although only when 
they are also taken into account in transport modes competing with railways). 
 
• Downwards, in order to encourage new railway services or the use of considerably 
underutilised lines.   
 
In addition, if the State wishes so and if the market can bear it, charges may even cover 
full costs.  
 
 
1.4.2. Estimation of the charge for the use of infrastructure based on short-run social 
marginal costs and of the optimal mark up for high speed lines 
 
At the European level, the European Commission as well as several countries favour 
introducing and/or reinforcing cost-based infrastructure charges principle and practice. In 
this line, and as it has been shown in section 1.3.2, short-run social marginal costs are 
considered to be the most appropriate as departure point for the price fixing process (Ricci 
et al, 2006). Consequently, a correct estimation of marginal costs (or cost elements) 
derived from the railway system is essential to be able to set the charges for the use of 
infrastructure at levels that allow incentivising both infrastructure provision and trains 
operation. Nevertheless, in the railway sector no consensus for defining each of the 
railway marginal cost components exists. 
 
On the following pages the state of the art on railway infrastructure social marginal cost 
measurement in the European framework is briefly presented. Based on this, two 
estimations of the order of magnitude of railway charge for high speed railways will be 
made: one based on social marginal cost charging (first best) and one based on Ramsey 
pricing, applying optimal mark ups. 
 
1.4.2.1. Estimation and magnitude of social marginal costs for setting charges 
based on marginal cost: State of the art 
In this section the state of the art on the estimation and magnitude of social marginal costs 
it is presented, mainly based on Sánchez-Borràs et al (2008c). These costs include 
infrastructure marginal costs, environmental costs, accident costs, and congestion and 
scarcity costs (IMPRINT-NET 2006). 
 
Infrastructure marginal costs 
The analysis of the interaction between operations and infrastructure for pricing aims is 
very recent, since the analysis of railway costs before the reorganisation of the railway 
sector was focused on the vertically integrated railway model. 
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It is currenlty generally accepted that the only infrastructure manager’s costs that vary in 
the short term with the running of trains are maintenance costs24 (Sánchez-Borràs et al, 
2008c) or that, at least, all costs other than wear and tear ones are very low. Therefore, 
infrastructure marginal costs would correspond to these wear and tear costs (or to 
maintenance and renewals marginal costs). 
 
In the last years several studies have been carried out trying to estimate the most 
appropriate level of infrastructure charges in certain countries. Despite of that, there is yet 
no consensus for defining the railway infrastructure cost components. This can be 
explained by the fact that, in order to estimate infrastructure costs, it is necessary to 
understand how the infrastructure use generates costs, i.e. it is necessary to know which 
are the cost-drivers. This is a complicated task, since in many cases the link between use 
and cost is multidimensional, in the sense that several costs associated with a particular 
usage type may exist. This is mainly due to the different definitions of a track standard and 
to the regime applied by each infrastructure manager, that are at the same time related to 
the infrastructure investment levels and to the type of runs allowed on it (freight and high 
speed trains runs, etc.). This translates into the existence of multiple relationships between 
infrastructure maintenance cost and its use.    
 
Lately several authors and studies have dealt with the subject (Thomas, 2002; 
Rothengatter, 2003; Peter, 2003; Nash, 2005; Link et al, 2005; Finnish Rail 
Administration, 2007; Andersson, 2007; GRACE, 200625), but much research can still be 
done in this field. The state of the art on the infrastructure wear and tear marginal costs 
estimation carried out by Sánchez-Borràs et al. (2008c) is presented below. 
 
The infrastructure wear and tear marginal costs estimation can be divided into two groups: 
top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches. 
 
Top-down approaches use data on infrastructure maintenance and/or renewals costs and 
estimate the proportion of those costs that vary with traffic. In Europe two methodologies 
for carrying out such approaches have been implemented: 
 
• Econometric method, which estimates an infrastructure total costs function from 
transversal or temporal data series, from which it is possible to obtain the marginal 
                                                 
24 Other cost elements of the IM are, for instance, train planning and signalling.   
25 The GRACE Project (Generalisation of Research on Accounts and Cost Estimation, 2005-2008), directed 
by DG TREN within the Sixth Framework Programme of Research and Technological Development, 
includes studies for measuring wear and tear, congestion, accidents and environmental impacts marginal 
costs, mainly focused on road and rail transport (more information on the project is available at: www.grace-
eu.org). The project CATRIN, currently under development, should contribute with new results on wear and 
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cost considering the total cost first derivative with regard to the number of gross 
tonnes per kilometre. Consequently, this method considers that total expenditure 
can be explained by different variables, amongst which we can find the transport 
activity product. The main current disadvantage of the econometric method is that 
for estimations to be reliable it is necessary to have a data sample with enough data 
and quality. 
 
• Cost allocation method, which allocates parts of the total cost to cost activities 
(registered in the available accounting information) and afterwards uses 
engineering opinions to determine cost variability depending on traffic. The main 
disadvantages of this method are the fact that it gives a measure of variable 
average costs that can differ from true marginal costs and that results strongly 
depend on the experts’ opinion. This method is considered to be a pragmatic 
alternative to the estimation of a cost function with econometric methods.  
 
On the other hand, bottom-up approaches are based on engineering models for 
determining the probable wear and tear caused by running an extra service. Specifically, 
the total expense is disaggregated in subcategories and for each one a specific analysis is 
carried out in order to determine the variable part of the expense in each category. That is, 
the engineering method allocates total variable costs to the different trains that run on the 
infrastructure, by means of relations between costs and level of use. Theoretically, this 
method should give a precise measure of the wear and tear marginal cost because, as 
opposed to top-down approaches, it is based on maintenance and renewal needs rather 
than on historical activity, which can be distorted, for instance, by budgetary constraints. 
In spite of that, real-world engineering models may depend on weak suppositions and not 
cover all wear and tear costs aspects. Therefore in railway transport the application of 
bottom-up approaches is often only used to allocate variable costs determined with top-
down models to different vehicle types (Booz Allen Hamilton et al, 2005). 
 
According to Imprint-Net (2006), econometric and engineering methods for measuring 
infrastructure marginal costs can complement each other. Indeed, econometric methods 
can provide evidence on total and marginal costs elasticities, while engineering methods 
can provide evidence on marginal cost differentiation according to relevant parameters.  
 
Given the difficulties in establishing a relation between infrastructure use and cost, as well 
as the existence of divergences in the cost estimation and its definition26, infrastructure 
                                                 
26 Maintenance and renewal costs can have different definitions in various countries (Quinet, 2008). It is for 
this reason that it may be misleading to compare the costs of each of these two categories from one country 
to another if the definitions are not the same. Quinet (2008) defines both costs for the French railway case. 
On the one hand, inspection and detection, correction maintenance (which aims at curing the damages that 
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costs differ unavoidably from one administration to another. At a European level, 
differences between marginal costs levels vary with a relatively high factor. Nevertheless, 
econometric studies carried out to this date (see table 1.12) give, as a general rule, wear 
and tear marginal cost estimations lower than 1€/1000 gross tonne-kilometre. The results 
found by Crozet (2007) for the French network are to be highlighted as exceptions to this 
tendency: they are significantly higher than the unit (approximately 4,65 €/1000 gross 
tonne-kilometre for high speed runs, considering a TGV-Duplex train, which weights 430 
gross tonnes). These results would therefore be more in line with the results of cost 
allocation found for the British case.  
 
 
TABLE 1.12 RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MARGINAL RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
COSTS 
 Source: Sánchez-Borràs et al (2008c) with data from EC (2006), Wheat (2007), 
Lindberg (2006), Wheat et al (2008) 




costs) (2)   
Average MC 
(€/1000 gross 
tonne-km) (3)   
Maintenance only 
Andersson (2006a) Econometric Sweden 0,204* 0,204 (100%) 0,35 
Wheat and Smith (2008) 
(model IV) 
Econometric Great Britain 0,239* 0,108 (45%) 1,25 
Wheat and Smith (2008) 
(model VI) 
Econometric Great Britain 0,378 0,17 (45%) 1,78 
Marti and 
Neuenschwander (2006) 
Model Type 1 




Econometric Switzerland 0,285 Not reported 0,38 
Johansson and Nilsson 
(2002) 
Econometric Sweden 0,1691* Not reported 0,143 
Johansson and Nilsson 
(2002) 
Econometric Finland 0,167* Not reported 0,27 
Tervonen and Idstrom 
(2004) 
Econometric Finland 0.,133-0,175 0,073-0,096 (55%) 0,22 
Munduch et al (2002) Econometric Austria 0,27 Not reported 0,55 
Gaudry and Quinet (2003) Econometric France 0,37* Not reported Not reported 
Booz Allen and Hamilton 
(2005) 
Cost allocation Great Britain 0.,28 for track 
maintenance 
0,14 (50%) 1,77 
Maintenance and renewals 
Andersson (2006a) Econometric Sweden 0,302* (100%) 0,79 
                                                                                                                                                   
the inspection has shown to be both important and local) and prevention maintenance (which aims regularly 
at correcting small defaults and divergences on a regular and systematic basis) are considered to be 
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costs) (2)   
Average MC 
(€/1000 gross 
tonne-km) (3)   






Econometric Switzerland 0,265 Not reported 0,97 
Tervonen and Idstrom 
(2004) 
Econometric Finland 0,267-0,291 0,150-0,160 (55%) Not reported 
Booz Allen and Hamilton 
(2005) 
Cost allocation Great Britain 0,19 Not reported 4,99 
Renewals only 
Andersson (2006b) Duration Sweden Not reported - 0,32 passenger 
0,14 freight 
Booz Allen and Hamilton 
(2005) 
Cost allocation Great Britain 0,19 (renewals as a 
whole); 0,45 for 
track renewals 
Not reported 3,45 
Operations only 
Andersson (2006a) Econometric Sweden 0,324 - 0,61 per train-km 
 
Remarks:  
- For class 390 pendolino, ORR recommends charges of around 14p per vehicle mile. This amounts to roughly 1 euro per train-
km or 2 euros per 1000 gross tonne-km. 
- The studies highlighted are the latest econometric studies for maintenance and maintenance and renewal costs for each 
country. 
 (1) The usage elasticity corresponds to the elasticity of cost with respect to usage. 
 (2) The scaled elasticity is constructed by multiplying the average usage elasticity by the proportion of total maintenance (or 
maintenance and renewal) cost considered in the study. The scaled elasticity, defined by Link et al (2007), gives a more 
comparable figure between studies because, provided the elements of cost excluded from each analysis do not vary with usage, the 
scaled elasticities give the elasticity of total maintenance cost with respect to usage. 
 (3) 2005/06 prices 
(*) average elasticity 
(**) Average marginal cost estimated from Gaudry and Quinet (2003) 
 
 
Environmental marginal costs 
The most significant environmental costs associated with rail are noise, greenhouse gas 
emissions and air pollutant emissions. Those costs vary considerably with vehicle 
technology and site (or route) characteristics.   
 
The calculation methods developed to this day for their estimation can be classified, 
according to their approach, as damage cost approach and avoidance cost approach, the 
former being the one most used.  
 
The Impact Pathway Approach (IPA), a method developed within the ExternE project 
series following the damage cost approach, is currently considered to be the most reliable 
tool for estimating environmental impacts (Bickel et al, 2001). 
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The Impact Pathway Approach, which uses the bottom-up calculation principle for the 
estimation of environmental costs caused by air pollutant emissions and noise, is 
structured in four stages (see figure 1.13). The first stage is devoted to modelling of 
transport activity emissions, using data on parameters such as average speed, traffic 
situation, load, etc., and using emission factors according to the vehicle type (road vehicle, 
diesel trains, vessels, airplanes). The second stage is dedicated to the dispersion 
modelling, focusing on pollutants concentration and settling. The third stage links changes 
in air pollutant concentrations to changes in human health, materials corrosion, etc., 
applying dose-response (or concentration-response) functions. Finally, it carries out the 
economic valuation of the injuries quantified with the individual preferences valuation 
using market prices when possible or revealed preference approaches or contingent 
valuation surveys when not. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.13 STRUCTURE OF THE IMPACT PATHWAY APPROACH FOR THE ESTIMATION 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARGINAL COSTS  




The IPA has some uncertainties and gaps. According to Bickel et al (2001), the most 
important ones are those linked to the impact valuation, more than to the emissions 
quantification. According to CE Delft (2008), the main problem of the IPA is the lack of 
information on the dose-response function for measuring the damage caused.    
 SOURCE 
(specification of site and technology) 
⇒ emission 
(e.g., kg/yr of particulates) 
DISPERSION 
(e.g. atmospheric dispersion model) 
⇒ increase in concentration at 
receptor sites 
(e.g., µg/m3 of particulares in all affected 
regions)
DOSE-RESPONSE FUNCTION 
(or concentration-response function) 
⇒ impact 
(e.g., cases of asthma due to ambient 
concentration of particulates) 
MONETARY VALUATION 
⇒ cost 
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The external cost estimates from rail transport vary somewhat (Sánchez-Borràs et al, 
2008c) as this depends on a number of factors including average occupancy rates, type of 
traction, maximum and average speeds, stop spacing and the unit value of externalities.  
 
The studies carried until now show, in any case, environmental externalities for rail 
transport to be low: Sansom et al (1998) suggest a figure of 0,6 €/train-km for British 
intercity trains, whereas Bickel et al (2005) give figures for different countries covering air 
pollution, noise and global warming ranging from 0,61 to 1,33 €/train-km.  
 
Accident marginal costs 
Transport accidents have negative effects both on the victim of the accident and on society 
as a whole. However, only those accident costs (be them material –medical and hospital 
costs, administrative costs, net lost production and congestion caused, property damage– 
or non material –opportunity cost for the society bearing permanently disabled citizens or 
loss of human lifes and the suffering cost and victims’ and their relatives’ pain cost–) 
caused by the running of additional trains and that are not directly born (or born through 
insurance) by the train operator that suffers the accident are considered as marginal 
external accident costs. 
 
Some of the external accident costs are easily quantifiable (direct costs), such as for 
instance medical and property damage costs, while others are more difficult to quantify 
(indirect costs). Within the latter group, we can find the increase in accident risk for extra 
trains running on the network and for road users in level crossings, as well as any cost 
element (such as for instance medical expenses, social and family pain, grief and suffering 
for injuries and death, etc.) born by third parties without an appropriate compensation. 
 
Among the existing methodologies for quantifying indirect accident marginal costs, the 
most commonly used methods are survey-based Contingent Valuation Methods (CVM) 
that allow determining the users’ willingness to pay (WTP) in order to reduce death and 
injury risks. However, there is very little evidence on these values for rail and therefore it 
is generally assumed that “given the low accident risk, and the fact that railway companies 
are responsible for their own insurance” (i.e. costs are mainly directly borne or through 
insurance by railway operators), “it seems unlikely that the external accident costs are very 
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Congestion and scarcity marginal costs  
Congestion marginal costs seek to reflect the economic costs of the consequences of 
changes in traffic levels on congestion on the network27 (Gibson et al, 2002), while 
scarcity costs are those costs that arise where the operation of a train service prevents 
another one from operating, or requires it to take an inferior path (Abrantes et al, 2008). 
Therefore, congestion and scarcity costs are only relevant when lines are operated at levels 
close to capacity. 
 
Congestion marginal costs will be external only if the train that suffers the delay belongs 
to another operator. CE Delft (2008) presents external congestion marginal costs 
estimations. The values given are those proposed by UNITE D728 and have been estimated 
to be around 0,20 €/train-km at peak periods for the British and Swiss cases29. 
 
With regard to scarcity marginal costs estimation, Abrantes et al (2008) highlight the 
difficulty in developing a general methodology for their estimation. This is due to the fact 
that a network might be used to run many possible combinations of services, which makes 
it difficult to uniquely determine its capacity and therefore the opportunity cost of a given 
service. 
 
The GRACE project (GRACE, 2006) did some research in scarcity costs, but the total 
level of scarcity values were treated as confidential information and therefore remain 
unpublished. 
 
1.4.2.2. Estimation of the charges for the use of the infrastructure based on 
short-run social marginal costs for high speed lines 
As seen in section 1.4.2.1, short-run social marginal costs include maintenance and 
renewals marginal costs, and environmental, accident and congestion and scarcity external 
marginal costs30.  
 
The estimation of the charge for the use of infrastructure based on short-run social 
marginal costs for high speed lines implemented to date in European countries requires to 
take into consideration not only the cost estimations presented in the preceding section but 
                                                 
27 It is assumed that a railway line is congested when, given high rail infrastructure usage levels, an 
additional train on the track gives rise to additional delays to other trains, reducing the system capacity to 
recover the delays. 
28 “UNIfication of accounts and marginal costs for Transport Efficiency” is a project within the Fifth 
European Union Framework Programme (1998-2002).    
29 However, it has to be highlighted that the value for the Swiss case should be mostly internal, since the 
opening to competition in the Swiss network had not yet taken place when the estimation was made.  
30 The quantification of environmental, accident, and congestion and scarcity internal marginal costs is not 
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also the aspects presented in this one. 
 
With regard to environmental costs, their internalisation is still a pending issue in the 
transport sector, and even more so in the passenger transport sector. To date, only the 
Finish, Latvian and Polish railway pricing systems internalise them, according to data 
published by CEMT (2005)31. In fact, Directive 2001/14/EC states that external 
environmental costs will only be charged by infrastructure pricing systems if they are also 
charged in the transport modes that compete with railways. Therefore environmental costs 
will not be taken into account in the estimation of the charge. 
 
Marginal accident costs will as well be rejected for the purpose of this analysis, because 
according to what has been presented in the preceding section, they can be considered 
negligible in the railway transport. 
 
Concerning marginal congestion and scarcity costs, Abrantes et al. (2008) affirm that 
“where congestion or scarcity costs are imposed on the same firm that causes the costs, 
they are already internalised. Thus they are only really important in pricing when there is a 
lot of competition between different firms (or between parts of the same firm that act 
independently, such as passenger and freight sectors of a traditional railway company)”. It 
is for these reasons that for new high speed lines, congestion and scarcity costs could be 
considered negligible in most cases. On the one hand, high speed lines are mainly used 
solely by passenger services (except in Germany, where some high speed lines are used 
both by passenger and freight services). On the other hand, competition between different 
firms does not yet exist32 and, consequently, there is only one operator per route and the 
possible congestion and scarcity costs are already internalised by the operator causing 
them. Furthermore, while in very few high speed lines, such as the Paris-Lyon line, track 
occupancy at peak hours could be considered especially high and could, perhaps, come 
close to track capacity, in most cases new high speed lines capacity is much higher than 
the registered traffic33. Where there is no shortage of capacity, i.e. where it is not expected 
to be a problem within the planning period, Nash et al (2004) affirm that the most efficient 
approach to charge a section is to apply a nil charge. As a result of all these arguments, 
marginal congestion and scarcity costs will not be considered for the quantification of the 
                                                 
31 In Germany, noise external costs are only partially internalised by the charges for the use of the 
infrastructure.  
32 Directive 2001/14/EC stipulates that the opening of the railway market for passenger services will take 
place in 2010. 
33 Studies such as “Etude de modélisation du trafic regional sur lignes à grande vitesse – Corridor sud”, 
directed by UIC and carried out by CENIT (CENIT, 2008), and which analyses how to increase new high 
speed lines usage introducing a new product on new high speed lines, called regional high speed, are an 
excellent proof of the capacity that new European high speed lines have to bear much more runs than the 
ones currently registered.   
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order of magnitude of the charge based on social marginal costs. 
 
TABLE 1.13 ESTIMATION OF THE CHARGE BASED ON MARGINAL COSTS (IN €/TRAIN-
KM) FOR PASSENGER TRAINS RUNNING ON CONVENTIONAL AND HIGH 
SPEED LINES   
Marginal cost High speed lines Conventional lines 
Infrastructure(1) 2,1 €/train-km(2)  France:  ≈ 2 €/train-km for main intercity 
lines with high traffic (2) 
 United Kingdom: 2,5 €/train-km(3) 
 Sweden – Switzerland: 0,4-0,5 €/train-
km(4)  
Environmental Great variability Great variability 
Accident Negligible Negligible 
Congestion 0 ≤ 0,20 €/train-km 
Scarcity Already internalised ? 
Estimated TOTAL MC    
MC ≈ 2 €/train-km 0,4-2,5 €/train-km 
(intercity lines: ≈ 2 €/train-km) 
SMC ≈ 4 €/train-km ? 
ESTIMATED 
CHARGE(5) 
≈ 2 €/train-km ≥ 0,4-2,5 €/train-km 
(intercity lines: ≈ ≥ 2 €/tren-km) 
Remarks: 
(1) It includes maintenance and renewals. 
(2) Calculated from Crozet (2007), with the average marginal costs estimated by Gaudry et al (2003). 
(3) Data for the United Kingdom: taken from Booz Allen and Hamilton (2005), considering that a 
passenger train weights 500 gross tonnes.   
(4) Calculated from Andersson (2006a) and Marti et al (2006) data, considering that a passenger train 
weights 500 gross tonnes.   
(5) Taking into consideration the remarks presented in section 1.4.2.2. 
 
Finally, with regard to marginal maintenance and renewals costs, several authors have 
estimated them using different approaches, and have obtained significantly different 
values in some cases (see table 1.12). The differences in the estimations could stem from 
differences in the methodology used (model/function used), differences in the 
infrastructure (in terms of design and quality) and differences in the sample of data. In the 
CATRIN34 project framework, a benchmarking of the different methodologies used by 
different countries and authors for determining maintenance and renewal marginal costs is 
being carried out. The results should clarify the origin of the differences in the estimations 
and provide more precise data on wear and tear marginal costs. Given that the estimations 
                                                 
34 CATRIN is a research project to support the European transport policy, specifically to assist in the 
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deduced from Crozet (2007) with data from Gaudry et al (2003) are the only ones 
published hitherto that distinguish by line or service type (the other estimations refer to the 
whole network, without distinguishing by type of infrastructure), the results published by 
this author will be the ones considered in this study. Therefore, the value considered for 
maintenance and renewal marginal costs will be of 2 €/train-km approximately for high 
speed runs. 
 
Table 1.13 summarises the short-run social marginal costs value and the estimated 
magnitude of the charge based on social marginal costs for the current charging scenario 
(no internalisation of environmental marginal costs), for passenger trains running on high 
speed and conventional lines in Europe, according to the considerations presented before. 
According to these results, it would not seem appropriate to have a first best pricing with 
charges for the use of the infrastructure above 2 €/train-km for high speed trains (4 
€/train-km if environmental external marginal costs were internalised). For intercity trains 
running on conventional lines with high traffic, the data published by Crozet (2007) gives 
values equivalent to the ones found for high speed runs.  
 
1.4.2.3. Estimation of the optimal mark up above social marginal cost for high 
speed lines  
Using formula f. 1.24 proposed by Crozet (2007), in this section the level of optimal mark 
up above marginal cost is estimated. 
 
For the French case, the cost opportunity of public funds λ is, according to official data, 
0,3. Therefore, α = 0,23 (Crozet, 2007)35. Given this value and the demand elasticity value 
for different links, for the French high speed railway network the optimal mark up above 
marginal cost would range, according to Crozet (2007), between 2 and 3,2 times the 
marginal cost, for elasticities of -1,50 (Paris-Nice link) and -0,70 (Paris-Lyon link), 
respectively. 
 
Supposing that the infrastructure usage marginal cost for high speed lines is about 2 
€/train-km (see section 1.4.2.2), the charges for the use of the infrastructure applied to 
high performance runs (high speed lines or main intercity lines with high traffic) should 
not be higher than 6,4 €/train-km for elasticities ε ≥ 0,70 (in absolute value) and a cost 
opportunity of public funds λ ≤ 0,3: 
 
Charge for the use of the infrastructure ≤ 6,4 €/train-km (f. 1.25) 
(if   MC ≈ 2 €/train-km,  ε ≥ 0,7   and   λ ≤ 0,3)  
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CHAPTER 2 
POSSIBLE INFLUENCES OF RAILWAY CHARGES 
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH SPEED 
RAILWAYS IN EUROPE.  
FORMULATION OF THE PhD THESIS OBJECTIVE 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION OF THE CHARGE FOR THE USE OF THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: STATE OF THE ART  
 
Even if Directive 2001/14/EC affirms that “Directive 91/440/EEC (…) and Directive 
95/19/EC (…) have not prevented a considerable variation in the structure and level of 
railway infrastructure charges”, the directive of 2001 does not curtail the Member States 
liberty of action for setting the charge for the use of the railway infrastructure. As a result 
of that and considering the fact that each State is responsible for the incorporation of the 
rules of the Directive in their laws, the transposition to a national level of Directive 
2001/14/EC has given rise to very different charging realities in the European Union 
geographical framework. 
 
The actors responsible for setting the charge for the use of the railway infrastructure in the 
diferent EU countries are presented next, as well as the cost recovery rates and the pricing 
principles currently applied in the European railway framework. The process by which 
costs have been allocated to charges is analysed as well. Finally, the PhD thesis objective 
is formulated.  
 
 
2.1.1. Determination of the charge for the use of the infrastructure in the EU  
 
With regard to the determination and application of charges, Directive 2001/14/EC 
specifies that “Member States shall (...) establish specific charging rules or delegate such 
powers to the infrastructure manager (... that will determine) the charge for the use of 
infrastructure” if it is independent of any railway undertaking.  
 
As a result of the implementation of Directive 2001/14/EC, in each EU Member State the 
responsibility of fixing the charge for the use of infrastructure goes to different 
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regulatory organisation, while in other countries it is an infrastructure authority or 
infrastructure companies that set them (see table 2.1). 
 
 
TABLE 2.1 ENTITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHARGE FOR THE USE OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE DETERMINATION  
Charge determination method 
Country  
(Entity responsible for the charge determination) 
 Without regulation for charge-
setting 
 Ireland  
 Charges set by law by the 
Government  
 Belgium 
 Czech Republic (Ministry of Finance) 
 Denmark (National Railway Authority, dependent 
on the Ministry of Transport and Energy)  
 Slovak Republic (Ministry of Finance) 
 Spain (Ministry of Works) 
 Estonia (Railway Inspectorate) 
 Finland (Ministry of Transport) 
 Netherlands (Ministry of Transport, Civil Works 
and Water Management)  
 Hungary (VPE, company in charge of the capacity 
allocation)   
 Italy (CIPE, Interdepartmental Committee for 
Economic Programming) 
 Luxembourg (determined by Accès Réseau and 
approved by the Ministry of Transport)   
 Norway (Ministry of Transport) 
 Portugal (Decree-Law 270/2003 of the Ministry of 
Public Works, Transport and Housing) 
 United Kingdom (Office of Rail Regulation, ORR) 
 Sweden (Ministry of Transport and 
Communications) 
 Switzerland (FOT, Federal Office of Transport) 
 Charges set by an 
infrastructure authority and 
decided by the Government  
 Austria (ÖBB Infrastruktur Betrieb AG)  
 Slovenia (AŽP, railway transport public agency)  
 France (Proposed by RFF and set in Decrees by the 
Ministry of Transport)  
 Greece (set by EDISY and approved by the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications)  
 Latvia (LDZ, state-owned railway company)  
 Lithuania (LG, Lithuanian Railways) 
 Poland (PLP PKL, according to the rules set by 
UTK, the Railway Transport Department) 
 Charges set by (private) 
infrastructure companies and 
approved by the corresponding 
ministry   
 Germany (DB Netz AG) 
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In most EU Member States charges for the use of infrastructure are set by a state regulator, 
i.e. it is the government who sets them. 
 
The characteristics of the pricing systems implemented in the EU by the different entities 




2.1.2. Cost recovery rates 
 
Pricing principles are related to financing, as a result of the fact that infrastructures are 
considered public goods. The reason why they are considered public goods is that 
infrastructure maintenance, modernisation and development are part of the global 
transport politics (Bergougnoux, 2000). 
 
The cost recovery rate concept comes from this interrelation between financing and 
charging, understood as the total infrastructure manager’s cost36 percentage that is really 
recovered by access charges. The remaining cost percentage, i.e. the expenses not covered 
by charging is covered by the State with public subsidies. In other words, to reach a 
financial stability, infrastructure managers have to set access charges so as to recover an 
amount equivalent to the difference between total costs and public subsidies of one year. 
 
The level of charges cost recovery, i.e. the upper limit for cost recovery, is a national 
politics decision, related to the State long-term commitment to the sector (Baritaud et al, 
1998; CEMT, 2005b). Therefore, for a given level of costs, the access charge level reflects 
the amount of State subsidies.      
 
In figure 2.1 the cost recovery rates of the European rail charges for the year 2004 are 
presented, published by CEMT (2005b)37. Central and Eastern European countries cost 
recovery rates have been represented in light shading, while the ones for Western 
European countries have been represented in dark shading.  
 
Figure 2.1 and the shading distinction allows to easily perceive the important differences 
existing between cost recovery rates in the different European countries, especially 
between Eastern and Western Europe. Even if some of the differences could be explained 
by the fact that costs definitions may (and usually do) vary from one infrastructure 
                                                 
36 Total costs include (CER, 2005b): maintenance, operation expenses, renewals, interests and depreciation.  
37 The cost recovery rates published by CEMT (2005b) refer to the cost recovery rates of the entire network 
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manager to another (Calvo, 200738), according to the Economic Commission for Europe 
(2005) this data shows that infrastructure managers’ cost recovery rates are low in rich 
countries and high in less wealthier countries; i.e. Central and Eastern European 
governments give only a minimal financial support to infrastructure managers (CE, 2005). 
The Economic Commission for Europe argues that this can be explained by the fact that 
rich countries can afford funding their railways, while infrastructure managers in less 




FIGURE 2.1 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COSTS COVERED BY INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGES IN 2004  






















With regard to the first remark (lower cost recovery rates in rich countries), figure 2.1 
shows that most Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have cost recovery rates 
above 80% (the Czech Republic, with a 60% cost recovery rate and Slovenia, with a 13% 
                                                 
38 In pricing systems based on the marginal cost, differences in the consideration of the different costs could 
be due to the current little agreement on what cost elements should be considered short-run marginal social 
cost and how they should be measured (Nash, 2005). 






































































- Cost recovery = revenues from charges as a proportion of total expenditure on the network on operations, maintenance, 
renewals, interest depreciation.  
- Light shading indicates Central and Eastern European countries.  
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cost recovery rate are the only exceptions). On the contrary, all Western European 
countries have cost recovery rates below 30%, with the exceptions of the United Kingdom 
(50%), Germany (60%) and France (63%)39. These figures reflect a clear East-West divide 
between the proportion of infrastructure costs covered by access fees in the CEE countries 
and the rest of the European Union.  
 
It is of interest to highlight that these cost recovery rates can vary with time. This is 
because financing is not stable, since it depends on how yearly State budget is structured. 
Table 2.2 summarises the evolution of the charges cost recovery rates for different 
Western European countries in 2001 and 2002. The increase of the cost recovery rate in 
the Netherlands is due to the obligation coming from DG TREN (General Directorate for 
Transport of the European Commission), responsible for competition, of changing the nil 
charging politics to a marginal cost pricing politics. For the rest of the countries, the 
tendencies are very diverse. This hints at the probability of the existence of very different 
guidelines for the application of mark ups above marginal costs between European 
countries.  
 
The pricing systems applied in the different European countries are presented below, with 
the aim of better understanding the cost recovery rates values presented in this section. 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE CHARGES COST RECOVERY RATES FOR DIFFERENT 
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Profillidis (2001) and CEMT 
(2005).  
Charges cost recovery rate 
Country 
Year 2001 Year 2002 
 Switzerland 70% 30% 
 Italy 40% 16% 
 France 30% 63% 
 Sweden 5% 5% 
 Belgium 20% 20% 





                                                 
39 According to IRJ (2008), of the first 15 EU members, only France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
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2.1.3. Pricing principles applied 
 
Table 2.3 groups the European countries according to the pricing principle applied in the 
railway sector (full cost recovery, full cost recovery after State subsidies, marginal cost, 
and marginal cost with mark ups)40.  
 
 
TABLE 2.3 CHARGING PHILOSOPHIES OR PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN DIFFERENT 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from CEMT (2005) and EC (2007).  
FC 
(Full cost recovery) 
FC- 





(Marginal cost with 
mark ups) 
 Slovenia  Germany  Greece  Austria 
 Hungary  Belgium  Netherlands  Bulgaria 
 Latvia  Estonia   Portugal  Denmark 
 Poland  Italy1   Spain 
 Romania    Finland 
    France 
    United Kingdom 
    Czech Republic 
    Sweden 
    Switzerland 
Remarks:  
1 Only traffic management 
- Data not available for Lithuania, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic. 
- Passenger trains are not charged in Norway.  
 
 
The information presented in table 2.3 allows identifying the following tendencies:  
 
• Full cost recovery practice (FC) is only applied in CEE countries, specifically in 
Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Romania.  
 
• Full cost recovery after subsidies (FC-) is mainly used in Western Europe: three 
Western European countries have adopted this charging principle, namely Italy, 
Belgium and Germany, the railway networks of which have high speed lines in 
                                                 
40 Even if the pricing principles presented in table 2.3 are representative of each country, in some particular 
links pricing principles can differ from the representative one. 
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operation. In Central and Eastern Europe, only Estonia charges according to this 
pricing philosophy. 
 
• Marginal cost charging (MC) is exclusively applied in Western Europe although it 
is not widespread there. 
 
• Marginal cost with mark ups (MC+) is the most widespread charging principle in 
Europe, being the main pricing philosophy in Western European networks. France, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, all with high speed lines in 
operation, apply it. However, in Central and European networks only one IM has 
adopted this charging principle.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.2 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COSTS COVERED BY INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGES IN 2004, DISTINGUISHING BY PRICING PRINCIPLE  



















These tendencies show that Eastern countries tend to apply a full cost recovery principle, 
while Western countries favour systems based on marginal costs (with or without mark 
ups), along the lines of the proposal found in Directive 2001/14/EC. As expected by the 
intrinsic definition of full cost recovery, the application of a full cost recovery pricing is 
strongly linked with high cost recovery rates (see figure 2.2). However, it is important to 
highlight that there are great differences in the cost recovery rates between countries with 
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a “marginal costs with mark ups” pricing. Specifically, cost recovery rates range from 5% 
in Sweden to 63% in France, according to CEMT (2005) data. This shows the great 
flexibility of this pricing philosophy, which allows recovering an important part of the 
costs (in some cases, its value approaches the percentage of costs covered by full cost 
recovery after subsidies pricing systems). 
 
 
TABLE 2.4 PRICING STRUCTURES APPLIED BY THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING 
PRINCIPLES IN THE EU   
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from CEMT (2005).  
Linear tariff Two-part tariff 
 Germany  Netherlands  France 
 Austria  Latvia  Hungary 
 Belgium  Poland  Italy 
 Denmark  Portugal  Lithuania 
 Slovak Republic  Czech Republic  United Kingdom 
 Slovenia  Sweden  Spain 
 Estonia  Switzerland  
 Finland   
Remarks:  
- Data not available for Greece and Luxembourg.  
- Passenger trains are not charged in Norway.  
 
 
With regard to the pricing structures implemented in the EU countries, most European 
countries have implemented linear tariffs (see table 2.4). However, countries with high 
speed lines in operation where pricing systems are based on marginal costs have a two-
part tariff structure41.  
 
 
2.1.4. Cost allocation in the charges for the use of infrastructure  
 
The recovery of costs derived from the use of railway infrastructure is characterised by the 
variables defined in each country for allocating costs and calculating the charge for the use 
of infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
41 As presented in section 4.2.4, although Italy affirms to apply a full cost after subsidies pricing principle, it 
would seem that the charges calculation is based on marginal costs. Sweden and Denmark, where high speed 
lines are big civil works (bridges and tunnels), do not have a two-part tariff structure. 
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In table 2.5 the cost categories supposedly covered by the infrastructure charges 
implemented in different European countries are presented42. Amongst them we find 
investment expenses, and financial, maintenance, renewal, traffic management, accident, 
air pollution, noise and congestion/scarcity costs.    
 
Charges for the use of infrastructure cover, in some cases, part of the new high speed 
lines, upgraded lines and big civil works (such as bridges of great magnitude43) investment 
costs. Nowadays, among countries with high speed lines, France, Spain, Germany and 
Denmark (the latter with high speed lines that run along two big bridges, the Great Belt –
Storebælt– and the Öresund) cover part of the investment costs of their high performance 
lines. The European countries that do not partially or fully cover the high performance 
infrastructure investment costs (either because they do not have such infrastructure or 
because they have decided not to cover part of the expenses by means of infrastructure 
charges) present lower cost recovery rates than those of the countries that do cover them 
(cost recovery rates lower than 20% for Western European countries and lower than 80% 
for CEE countries). Therefore the consideration of investment costs by pricing systems 
plays an important role in the cost recovery rate.  
 
With regard to the recovery of maintenance costs, all countries cover wholly or partially 
this cost category by means of infrastructure charges, except for the Italian pricing system. 
In the other countries with high speed lines in operation, maintenance costs are either 
totally covered by pricing systems (for instance, in Germany and the United Kingdom) or 
partially covered (Denmark, France and Sweden). In Spain it is not clear whether 
maintenance costs are wholly or only partially recovered. 
 
Although the maintenance cost category is the most widespread in the European railway 
pricing systems (together with the traffic management cost category) this is not the case of 
renewal costs, even if they are also linked to track wear and tear. Amongst the countries 
that do recover al least part of maintenance costs by means of infrastructure charges, those 
applying a first best pricing (the Netherlands and Portugal) do not cover renewals costs. 
 
With regard to the costs linked to traffic management, all pricing systems except for the 
Finish one seem to cover them. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Belgium and the rest of EU-25 countries with railways not included in table 2.5 have not been analysed 
due to lack of data. Norway has not been included in the table because the Norwegian pricing system does 
not include charges for passenger services.  
43 Conventional railway lines investment costs are considered sunk costs (i.e. costs that were incurred in the 
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TABLE 2.5 COSTS COVERED BY RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN EUROPE 










































YES    X               
Y/N X  X   X X   X  X   X    
 
NO  X   X   X X  X  X X  X   
YES    X        X       
Y/N        X       X    
 
NO              X     
YES X   X   X   X  X      X 
Y/N  X X  X X     X  X X X X   
 
NO         X          
YES    X    X  X        X 
Y/N X    X X X     X  X     
 
NO  X       X  X  X   X   
YES    X   X   X  X      X 
Y/N  X X   X   X  X  X X X X   
 
NO     X              
YES                   
Y/N     X     X  X       
 
NO  X  X  X X X   X  X X X   X 
YES                   
Y/N     X     X  X       
 
NO    X  X X X   X  X X X   X 
YES                   
Y/N     X  X   X  X       
 
NO  X  X  X  X   X  X X X   X 
YES  X    X       X      
Y/N     X     X  X       
 
NO    X    X       X    
Remarks: 
- In bold, countries with new high speed lines in operation 
- YES: Cost covered by rail infrastructure charges 
- Y/N: Cost partly covered by rail infrastructure charges 
- NO: Cost not covered by rail infrastructure charges 
- Blank: no information available 
- Type of cost: 
Investment expenditures Accident costs 
Finance costs (loan costs) Air pollution costs 
Maintenance Noise costs 
Renewal Scarcity/congestion costs 
 Traffic management  
- Data for Spain has been obtained from the legal documents defining the infrastructure charging system. 
Since it is not clear whether the costs indicated are wholly or only partially covered by infrastructure 
charges, they have all been classified as being partially covered. 
- In Denmark, charges cover the short-run marginal cost (SRMC) and part of investment expenditures. In 
order to elaborate this table, SRMC has been interpreted as Denmark recovering part of traffic management 
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Finally, table 2.5 shows that the recovery of external costs by infrastructure charges is not 
a common practice amongst the European pricing systems, as seen in section 1.4.2.2. Only 
Finland, Latvia and Poland seem to consider those costs. On the other hand, congestion 
and scarcity costs seem to be internalised by means of infrastructure charges in France, 
Portugal and the Czech Republic, while Germany partially internalises noise costs with its 
infrastructure charges. 
 
Even if the cost categories supposedly covered by pricing systems are the ones presented 
in the preceding paragraphs, cost categories are generally regrouped when calculating 
charges, according to the following cost categories (CEMT, 2005):   
 
• Train planning and operations   
• Electricity 
• Congestion and scarcity 
• Maintenance and renewals 
• External costs 
• Mark ups44 and other services 
 
The existing link between cost categories covered by pricing systems and cost categories 
used to calculate infrastructure charges in Europe have been summarised in table 2.6.    
 
The analysis of the network statements valid in 2006 in the European railway networks 
show cost categories other than the ones presented up to this point, which correspond to 
those used when determining the amount of charges to be paid for the use of the railway 
infrastructure. The differences between the cost categories covered by pricing systems in 
Europe and the ones actually used to charge the use of railway infrastructure reflect, to 
some extent, the difficulties for quantifying the costs derived from the use of the 
infrastructure and allocating them to the runs that take place in the network. 
 
The categories detected in the network statements, even if they are in some way linked to 
the cost categories used for the calculation of charges, show some differences with regard 
to the latter, as table 2.6 shows. Specifically, when calculating charges the cost categories 
“train planning and operations” and “maintenance and renewals” are included within the 
category “trains movement” in most cases. The Spanish case is an example at hand: in 
Spain the running charge (or the charge for trains’ movement) covers, according to the 
Ministerial Order of 2005 where the amount of railway charges is defined (MFOM, 2005), 
the variable maintenance, operation and management costs. On the other hand, the cost 
categories “Access charge” and “Capacity reservation” detected in the network statement, 
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could be included in the category “Mark ups and other services”, as will be justified in the 
following paragraphs.            
 
In this sense, it is of special interest to analyse the evolution undergone in the amount of 
the charges attributed to, on the one hand, the cost category “trains movement” (where 
theoretically short-run marginal costs should be included) and, on the other hand, the cost 
category “capacity reservation”, in countries with high speed lines in operation. This 
analysis unveils the possible cost categories to which mark ups above marginal cost have 
been allocated.  
 
 
TABLE 2.6 COST CATEGORIES OF THE PRICING STRUCTURES IMPLEMENTED IN 
EUROPE  
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from CEMT (2005) and the network 
statements valid in 2006 in the European countries with pricing systems.  
Cost categories covered by 
the European pricing 
systems 
 (according to CEMT, 2005) 
Cost categories generally 
used for the calculation of 
charges in the EU 
 (according to CEMT, 2005) 
Cost categories detected in 
the pricing systems 
currently used in the EU in 
2006 
 (based on the network 
statements) 
 Traffic management  Train planning and 
operations 
 Trains movement 
 Maintenance costs 
 Renewal costs 
 Maintenance and  
renewals  
 Maintenance 
  Electricity  Energy/electricity 
 Accident costs 
 Air pollution costs 
 Noise costs 
 External costs  Security 
 Congestion/scarcity  
costs 
 Congestion and scarcity  Congestion 
 Investment expenditures 
 Financing costs 
 Mark ups and other 
services 
 Access 
 Capacity reservation 
 Information 
Remarks:  
- The cost category “Capacity reservation” has been considered to be included within the calculation 
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FIGURE 2.3 EVOLUTION OF THE CHARGES IN THE FRENCH RAILWAY NETWORK 
FROM 1997 TO 2004   






























Figure 2.3 presents the evolution of charges in the French railway network from 1997 to 
2004. This figure not only shows the considerable increase experienced by charges in the 
1997-2004 period (the money levied from charges more than doubled in the 1997-200445 
period) but also gives information on the cost category/ies to which those increases have 
                                                 
45 This increase can be explained by the French railway infrastructure manager’s (RFF, Réseau Ferré de 
France) objective, which was to reach the “small equilibrium”, that is, to bring global charges (excluding the 
complementary charge for the transport of electricity) and main operation expenses (the remuneration of the 
French national railway operator, SNCF, for the network management that carries out on behalf of RFF) to 
the same level from the year 2008 (Richard et al, 2005).    










DA (Droit d’accès): Access right 
DR (Droit de réservation): Reservation right 
DRS (Droit de réservation du sillon): Train-path reservation right 
DRAG (Droit de réservation d’arrêt en gare): Reservation right for stopping at a station 
DR + DC (Droit de réservation + Droit de circulation): Reservation right + Running right 
DC (Droit de circulation): Running right 
RCE (Redevance complémentaire d’électricité): Complementary charge for the availability of power traction
RCTE (Redevance complémentaire de transport d’électricité): Complementary charge for the transport of 
electricity  
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been allocated. Specifically, it can be seen that in 2004 the amount of the cost categories 
“access” and “capacity reservation” was strongly risen compared to the preceding years 
(2000 to 2003, in which the capacity reservation cost category was already treated as a 
separate cost category). This fact seems to show that it is in these cost categories where 
mark ups are allocated.    
 
On the other hand, the cost category “trains’ movement” (running right) was almost 
trebled in the pricing system introduced in 2002 compared to the one in force in the two 
preceding years. This could indicate an increase of the running charge derived from an 
increase in the number of runs, and/or from a deeper knowledge of marginal costs that 
could have been shown to be higher than the amount previously charged, and/or from the 
introduction of mark ups based on wear and tear and, consequently, attributed to this cost 
category. Therefore, it would seem that this cost category is not exempt from mark ups 
(nor perhaps the other cost categories).     
 
Once the cost categories covered and used by pricing systems in force in the European 
railway sector are known, it is interesting to shed light on the cost allocation process to 
charges, i.e. which variables the different pricing systems have defined to allocate costs to 
charges for the use of infrastructure.  
 
As for the link between charges and the costs attributable to infrastructure services, as well 
as with regard to the variables to be used for calculating the charge, section 1.4.1 showed 
that the European legislative framework in force stipulates that “the relative magnitudes of 
the infrastructure charges shall be related to the costs attributable to the services” (Article 
7 of Directive 2001/14/EC) and that “the user fee (…) may in particular take into account 
the mileage, the composition of the train and any specific requirements in terms of such 
factors as speed, axle load and the degree or period of utilisation of the infrastructure” 
(Article 8 of Directive 91/440/EEC). 
 
In practice, the determination of the variables for charging the different costs to 
infrastructure users is determined by the nature of the cost categories presented in the 
preceding section. In spite of that, the existence of divergences with regard to the 
consideration of a cost as fixed or variable and the difficulty, in some cases, of having 
access to enough data for determining the costs explains that different variables can be 
used for charging a same cost element in different administrations.    
 
For instance, according to CEMT (2005), the (marginal) cost element derived from train 
planning and operations is usually charged by planned train-path or by train-km, or even 
by the number of saturated nodes that have to be crossed. On the other hand, electricity, a 
typical cost element in electric power trains, can be calculated with variables that 
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distinguish between electric power and diesel trains, or variables that allow estimating the 
catenary wear and tear. With regard to the congestion and scarcity cost category, charges 
can vary with time and place according to the capacity usage intensity and the capacity 
needed for the train, which depends on the relationship between its speed and that of the 
other trains. The cost element maintenance and renewals, which depends on the 
characteristics of the rolling stock (axle load, non-suspended weight, etc.), the train 
maximal speed and the track, can be charged with gross tonnes-km or with vehicle or 
train-km. Finally, with regard to the external cost elements, they can be charged, amongst 
other variables, according to gross tonnes-km, vehicle-km or train-km, depending on the 




TABLE 2.7 MAIN VARIABLES OF THE CHARGES FOR THE USE OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE  




Km of the 
train-path 
Other 
Germany       
Austria        
Belgium       
Bulgaria       Charges per train-path 
Denmark      Charges per train for bottlenecks 
and bridges 
Estonia        
Finland       
France        
Hungary        
Italy      Also charge per node 
Latvia       
Netherlands       
Poland        
Portugal       
Czech Rep.        
Romania       
U. Kingdom      Per vehicle km by type of vehicle
Slovenia       
Sweden      Öresund bridge surcharge 
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As a summary of the preceding considerations, in its publication “Railway reform and 
charges for the use of infrastructure” (CEMT, 2005)46, CEMT presents the most common 
variables in the charges for the use of rail infrastructures, as presented in table 2.7. 
 
The author of this PhD thesis has carried out a more in-depth analysis on the variables 
used by the different infrastructure managers in Europe (Teixeira, Sánchez Borràs et al, 
2007; Sánchez Borràs et al, 2007), on the basis of the network statements valid in 2006 in 
the countries within the EU-25 geographical framework, except for Cyprus and Malta 
(which currently have no railways), plus Switzerland and Norway. The analysis presented 
in the following paragraphs, not only brings to light all the variables used by European rail 
pricing systems, but also allows shedding light to the variables used by the different 
pricing systems to determine the amount allocated to each cost category, included the one 
for mark ups. 
 
Although the liberty enjoyed by the different countries when choosing the parameters used 
already pointed to the existence of a wide range of possible variables used, the results 
found show a striking heterogeneity. Table 2.8 contains the variables used by the 
infrastructure managers of the European geographical framework when charging the cost 
categories previously presented. In total 46 different variables have been identified (see 
the third column of said table), which can be grouped into 6 typologies of variables:  
 
• The type of infrastructure used (constituted by 7 variables): This first category 
groups the charging variables that allow defining and characterising the network, 
the track or the stations, as well as those that refer to the network specificities, such 
as the existence of railway bridges. 
 
• The type of allocation requested (it groups 12 variables): This second category 
contains those charging variables related to train-paths, traffic expected, time 
period, length of the reservation and transport characteristics. 
 
• The type of service (constituted by 4 variables): The category related to the type of 
service includes variables that refer to the involved stakeholders or to the type of 
service itself, both considering geography (international traffic, national traffic, 
etc.) and the characteristics of the service (passengers or freight). 
 
• The type of rolling stock used (it groups 7 variables): This category groups the 
variables that allow characterising the trains and the wear and tear caused by them. 
                                                 
46 Also published in French under the title: “Réforme ferroviaire & tarification de l’usage des 
infrastructures”. 
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• The service offered (constituted by 11 variables): The category linked with the 
service offered groups variables related to the runs, that is, the route, the stops at 
stations, etc. 
 
• The type of traction (it groups 5 variables): Finally, the type of traction category 
groups the variables that refer to the type of traction and energy consumption. 
 
 
TABLE 2.8 VARIABLES USED BY THE EUROPEAN RAIL PRICING SYSTEMS  
 Source: Sánchez Borràs (2007b).  
Categories of variables 
considered  Variables considered 
 Network  Category/type of line/network 
 Admissible load on rail 
 Speed of the section 
 Specificities   Specific links 
















 Stations  Station category 
 Distinction departing trains, arrival, … 
 Train-path  Type of train-path requested 
 Train-path 
 Train-path / km 
 Traffic  Transport contract (number of trips requested) 
 Level of traffic (number of train-km/year) 
 Time period  Annual period 
 Time period 
 Nocturnal period 


















 Transport  Special transport conditions 
 Level of running priority 
 According to the number of people and per trip 











 Field of service  Geographical zone/charging zone 
 Type of traffic (Distinction passengers/freight) 
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Categories of variables 


















wear and tear 
produced 
 Type of train 
 Type of traction unit 
 Train speed 
 Use of titling technology 
 Train’s weight 
 Number of pantographs of the train 
 Number of bodies/boxes of the train 
 Route  Kilometres covered (total length) 
 Trains-km 
 Seats-km 
 Tonne-km or Gross tonne-km 
 Number of trains/movement of trains 
 Stops at stations  Stop/Station/Arrival or departure at a station 
 Minutes (at a station/node) 
















 Performance regime/delay/minutes 
 Saturation, temporary and local bottlenecks 
 Traffic density 










n  Consumption 
(measuring units 
used) 
 KWh consumed 
 Electric train-km 
 Diesel litres consumed 
 Day/night 
Remarks: Data obtained from the network statements (valid for the year 2006) of the infrastructure 
managers with railway networks within the geographical framework defined by EU-25 countries, with 
the exception of Cyprus and Malta, plus Switzerland and Norway.  
 
 
It is to be noted that the variables used in the pricing systems are of diverse natures. Some 
reflect quantitative aspects (variables corresponding to measure units), while other reflect 
aspects with a rather qualitative character. In the latter case, we find variables such as the 
type of traffic (distinction between passengers and freight traffic), the time period and the 
train type, amongst others. 
 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 reflect which and how many of these six categories of variables out of 
the 46 variables identified at the European level are applied in each country. A low 
number of variables is used in each country compared to the total 46 defined at the 
European level: indeed, out of the 46 variables identified in the railway pricing 
framework, most countries only use between 6 and 13 variables that can be grouped into 
4-5 categories out of the total 6 defined.  
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FIGURE 2.4 NUMBER OF VARIABLES USED BY THE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN PRICING 
SYSTEMS ACCORDING TO THE TYPES OF VARIABLES DEFINED 
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Type of allocation requested
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Even if the number of variables used in each country compared to the ones defined at the 
European level is low, all six categories of variables defined have a considerable weight, 
since:  
 
• All countries have variables within the category relative to the type of service.  
 
• 95% of the countries use variables that belong to the category relative to the 
service offered (runs) in order to determine the amount of charge to be paid.  
 
• 85% of the countries charge different amounts according to the type of 
infrastructure used.   
 
• 60% of the countries have variables to characterise the type of allocation 
requested.  
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FIGURE 2.5 VARIABLES USED BY EUROPEAN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGERS  
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Distinction departing trains, 
arrival, ...
Type of train-path requested
Train-path
Train-path/km
Transport contract (number of 
trips requested)







Level of running priority
According to the number of 
people and per trip
Railway undertaking (RU)/Type of 
RU
Geographical zone/charging zone





According to mobility/type of 
traction unit
Train speed
Use of titling technology
Train's weight
Number of pantographs of the 
train
Number of bodies/boxes of the 
train
Kilometres covered (total length)
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Seats-km
Tonne-km or Gross tonne -km
Number of trains/movement of 
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• 45% of the countries consider the type of rolling stock for charging purposes.  
 
But rather than the difference between the number of variables used or the weight of each 
category of variable, the most important aspect of the analysis lies in the study of the 
variables used for quantifying each of the cost categories defined by the pricing systems 
implemented in Europe. Figure 2.647 shows this information. It allows the following 
statements with regard to the two cost categories detected in the pricing structures 
implemented in Europe that would be included in the cost category “mark ups and other 
services”: 
  
• The cost category “capacity reservation” is only defined in the charging systems 
of those countries with high speed lines in operation plus Luxembourg (see figure 
2.7): For its quantification, the different countries use four typologies of variables: 
type of infrastructure used, type of allocation requested, type of service and service 
offered (runs). The variables included within these typologies allow differentiating 
the time period, type of train, performances and type of category. This allows 
affirming that a Ramsey pricing may be applied when determining the mark ups 
for high speed lines.  
 
• The cost category “access” is only defined in the charging systems of those 
countries with high speed lines in operation plus the Netherlands and the Slovak 
Republic (see figure 2.7): The variables used in the countries with high speed lines 
in operation are comprised within the same typologies as those detected for the 
cost category “capacity reservation”. Nevertheless, the variables included in these 
typologies do not only allow implementing mark ups according to demand 
elasticity (variable mark ups), but also introducing fixed mark ups. 
 
These statements do not imply that mark ups are only applied in countries with high speed 
lines in operation: as it has been previously pointed out, all cost categories can be subject 
to mark ups above marginal costs. However, they show that it is very likely that high 
performance lines (or runs) are charged higher mark ups than the rest of lines, since 
networks with high speed lines in operation are subject to an additional cost category to 
which mark ups aimed at increasing the cost recovery by infrastructure charges are mainly 
and uniquely allocated.   
 
 
                                                 
47 In some countries, such as for instance Germany, the structure of the pricing system implemented does not 
allow distinguishing between cost categories, probably as a result of the pricing principle implemented (full 
cost recovery after State subsidies). In these cases, all variables have been allocated to the “trains 
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FIGURE 2.6 VARIABLES USED FOR DEFINING THE CHARGE TO BE ASSIGNED TO 
EACH COST CATEGORY DEFINED IN THE EUROPEAN IM’S NETWORK 
STATEMENTS 













































Cost category Variables for allocating the cost to the infrastructure charge DE AT BE DK ES EE FI FR GR HU IE IT LV LT LU NO NL PL PT UK SK SI SE CH CZ
Category/type of line/network
Admissible load on rail
Specific links
Special infrastructure (bridges, tunnels…)
Station category
Distinction departing trains, arrival, …
Traffic Level of traffic (number of train-km/year)
Time period Time period
Length of the reservation Year
Transport Level of running priority
Stakeholders Railway undertaking (RU)/Type of RU
Field of service Type of traffic (Distinction passengers/freight)
Km covered (Total length)
Trains-km
Tonne-km or Gross tonne-km
Number of trains/movement of trains
Stops at stations Stop/Station/Arrival or departure at a station
Type of traction Type of traction Electric/diesel traction
Category/type of line/network
Speed of the section
Specificities Specific links
Type of train-path requested
Train-path
Time period Time period
Stakeholders Railway undertaking (RU)/Type of RU
Field of service Type of traffic (Distinction passengers/freight)
Km covered (Total length)
Trains-km
Number of trains/movement of trains
Stops at stations Stop/Station/Arrival or departure at a station
Category/type of line/network
Admissible load on rail
Speed of the section
Specific links
Special infrastructure (bridges, tunnels…)
Station category
Distinction departing trains, arrival, …
Type of train-path requested
Train-path/km
Time period Time period
Special transport conditions
Level of running priority
Geographical zone/charging zone
Type of traffic (Distinction passengers/freight)
Domestic/ international/ regional/high-speed…
Type of train
According to mobility/type of traction unit
Train speed
Use of titling technology
Train's weight
Number of pantographs of the train
Number of bodies/boxes of the train
 Km covered (Total length)
Trains-km
Seats-km
Tonne-km or Gross tonne-km
Number of trains/movement of trains
Stop/Station/Arrival or departure at a station




Type of traction Electric/diesel traction
Consumption KWh consumed










Number of bodies/boxes of the train
Route Km covered (Total length)
Stops at stations Stop/Station/Arrival or departure at a station





Type of infr. used Network Category/Type of line/network
Service offered (runs) Route Tonne-km or Gross tonne-km
Type of service Field of service Type of traffic (Distinction passengers/freight)
Service offered (runs) Route Tonne-km or Gross tonne-km
Traffic Transport contract (number of trips requested)
Transport According to the number of people and per trip
Type of service Field of service Type of traffic (Distinction passengers/freight)
Service offered (runs) Route Km covered (Total length)
Route Km covered (Total length)
Performance regime/delay/ minutes
Saturation, temporary and local bottlenecks
Categories of variables for allocating the cost to 
the infrastructure charge








Type of rolling stock 
used
Train characteristics / wear and 
tear produced
CONGESTION Service offered (runs)
Performance indicator
SECURITY





Type of infrastructure 
used










Type of rolling stock 
used


















Type of infrastructure 
used
Network










Type of allocation 
requested
Type of service
Remarks: Greek, Irish and Lithuanian rail charging systems not available in 2006; Estonian and Hungarian charging systems could not be interpreted since they were only published in the official language of the respective country 
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FIGURE 2.7 VARIABLES USED TO DEFINE THE CHARGE TO BE ASSIGNED TO COST 
CATEGORIES “ACCESS” AND “CAPACITY RESERVATION” DETECTED IN 
THE EUROPEAN IM’S NETWORK STATEMENTS  
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from the network statements valid in 
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2.2. THOUGHTS ON THE CHARGE FOR THE USE OF RAILWAY 
INFRASTRUCTURE INTRODUCED IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
COUNTRIES  
 
In 1998, ECMT (1998) considered that the introduction of charges for the use of railway 
infrastructure should be seen as a powerful tool for strengthening railways for facing 
competition from other modes of transport. This might be explained by the fact that 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure are not only aimed at covering costs, but they 
exert as well a strong influence in the way infrastructure is used, especially when railway 
undertakings are competitive (Thompson et al, 2006). A good such example is Thalys48, 
which had to reduce its number of trains due to an increase in rail infrastructure charges, 
with the aim of raising the load factor and, consequently, the revenues per train in order to 
render Thalys services profitable again.    
 
The preceding example backs Nash et al (2005) stating that a very important aspect of 
transport pricing is the final price to consumer, since this price is the one that determines 
railways competitiveness compared to other transport modes. Therefore, especially for 
journey times comprised between 3 and 4 hours, demand sensibility to ticket fares hints 
that a raise in the charge for the use of rail infrastructure or simply too high a charge can 
have a non-negligible effect on high speed railways – airways modal split. The level of 
charges is, as a result of that, crucial to establish a competitive high performance railway 
network. 
 
According to the Developing European Railways Committee (DERC, 2005), rail 
infrastructure charges constitute an important part of a railway operator’s cost. Currently, 
it is known that high performance rail passenger services in Europe have to bear higher 
charges for the use of infrastructure than the other rail services, although no study has 
quantified the differences yet. As a first approximation, new high speed lines high 
construction costs and the fact that users are able and willing to financially contribute to 
the recovery of part of this cost, explain why charges are higher for high performance 
passenger services than for the rest of passenger services. Despite of that, in 2005 Nash et 
al (2005) indicated that for some years, there have been worries about the great variety in 
the level of charges having negative effects on the traffic volume in certain countries. In 
fact, in 2003, Moulinier (2003), member of the French Ministry of Equipment, already 
asked whether the structure of the charge for the use of railway infrastructure could 
handicap the future use of railway transport. It seems plausible that the great heterogeneity 
of charges, presented in the preceding section, are a sign that infrastructure managers are 
                                                 
48 Thalys International is a Belgian limited liability cooperative. It is a joint service offered by the Belgian 
(SNCB), French (SNCF), Dutch (NS) and German (DB) railways that provides commercial passenger rail 
transport services on their behalf between the following cities: Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Cologne. 
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far from the optimal charge value.      
 
Given this situation, railway operators’ complaints on the level of charges are frequent 
(CER, 2005b). This fact, together with the preceding remarks, show the need for carrying 
out a quantitative study on the charges to be paid by railway operators that run high 
performance services on the European railway network in order to know in detail how the 
level of charge for the use of infrastructure may be affecting (or may affect) the present 
and future use of the European high speed railway network. 
 
The interest of analysing the impact that charges for the use of infrastructure have on 
railway operators and users (that is, ultimately, on traffic volumes and mode split) of the 
lines composing the European high speed network is especially relevant in the current 
context, in which the reorganisation of the railway sector (which contributes to the 
establishment of a European market) will lead to an enlargement of the operating 
perimeter, especially suitable for high speed links between big cities (Bergougnoux, 
2000), and in which the European Union is making big efforts into building a high 
performance European railway network aimed at fostering railways and favouring a modal 
re-equilibrium, main objective of the White Book published by the European Commission, 
entitled “European transport policy for 2010: time to decide”. What would be the point of 
devoting a great economical effort building a high performance railway network at 
European level if the charge for the use of the infrastructure penalised high performance 
railway transport with regard to possible competitor modes? 
 
 
2.3. INTENDED RESEARCH. FORMULATION OF THE PHD OBJECTIVE  
 
On the basis of what has been presented in section 2.2, the objective of the research is to 
determine the impact that the levels of charges set by rail infrastructure pricing systems in 
Europe exert on the high speed railways market position. In other words, the intended 
research aims at answering the following question:    
 
“Which consequences do current levels of rail infrastructure charges 
implemented in the European framework have on the competitiveness of the 
high performance passenger services that run on the European railway 
network?”  
 
That is, the global objective of this PhD Thesis consists in analysing whether the current 
charging system for the use of railway infrastructure contributes or not to the development 
of high speed railways in Europe. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
3.1. APPROACH AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
Answering the question raised by the proposed research (“Which consequences do current 
levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented in the European framework have on the 
competitiveness of high performance passenger services that run on the European railway 
network?”) requires to establish the possible correlation existing between a change in the 
rail infrastructure charge value and a change in the market share.   
 
The changes in the level of rail infrastructure charges correspond, basically, to a: 
 
• Change in the level of rail infrastructure charges up to making it equal to the 
marginal cost: What would happen if high speed lines were charged at the 
marginal cost without mark ups? 
 
• Change in the level of rail infrastructure charges up to making it equal to the 
optimal charge (calculated in chapter 1): Are the mark ups applied by pricing 
systems to high speed lines too high? Do they damage the development of high 
performance services or, on the contrary, do they benefit their development? 
 
The determination of the abovementioned changes requires a good knowledge of the 
pricing systems implemented in the European railway framework, both of their structure 
and level. It requires as well a detailed characterisation of the pricing specificities for (new 
or upgraded) high speed lines. In this line, it is essential to carry out a detailed analysis 
about how mark ups above marginal cost have been established (if they actually exist). 
 
With regard to the establishment of a correlation between the rail infrastructure charge and 
the mode split, market share models such as Logit allow establishing a link between ticket 
fares and market share. However, the existing correlation between the level of rail 
infrastructure charge and ticket fares, which would allow relating the rail infrastructure 
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Sub-objective 1 – To detect the application of mark ups above marginal cost in the charging systems for 
European railway networks with high speed lines in operation: Analysis of the charging systems, stressing 
the charging principles applied, the application of mark ups and the unit rates established for high speed 
services.     
Sub-objective 2 – To come to a conclusion on the criteria for applying mark ups in the pricing systems 
implemented in the European railway network: Development of an econometric analysis aimed at 
establishing correlations between rail infrastructure charges and the type of infrastructure, as well as market 
characteristics. 
Sub-objective 3 – To establish a link between the level of rail infrastructure charges and the revenues from 
ticket sales: Previous stage to the establishment of the probable link existing between a change in the level 
of the rail infrastructure charge and the traffic level. 
Sub-objective 4 – To quantify the impact that the level of charges (or mark ups above marginal cost) 
implemented in the European railway network can be exerting on the traffic level in high speed and high 
performance lines: To establish a link between a change in the level of rail infrastructure charges (or the 
level of mark ups above marginal cost) and a change in the rail traffic volume. 
Sub-objective 5 – To quantify the impact that the level of charges (or mark ups above marginal cost) 
implemented in the European railway network can be exerting on the high speed railways-airways mode 
split: To establish a link between a change in the level of rail infrastructure charges (or the level of mark ups 





- Modes in competition 























∆F = f(∆IC) ?
Ability to pay 
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On the basis of the preceding remarks, the global objective of the proposed research has 
been divided into 5 sub-objectives. All of them are characterised overleaf (in 
chronological order) and schematised in figure 3.1: 
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(1) Sub-objective 1: To detect the application of mark ups above marginal cost in the 
charging systems applied in European railway networks with high speed lines in 
operation: Analysis of the charging systems, stressing the charging principles 
applied, the application of mark ups and the unit rates established for high speed 
services.  
.     
(2) Sub-objective 2: To come to a conclusion on the criteria for applying mark ups in 
the pricing systems implemented in the European railway network: Development 
of an econometric analysis aimed at establishing correlations between rail 
infrastructure charges and the type of infrastructure, as well as market 
characteristics. 
 
(3) Sub-objective 3: To establish a link between the level of rail infrastructure charges 
and the revenues from ticket sales, as a previous stage to the establishment of a 
probable link connecting a change in the level of the rail infrastructure charge with 
the traffic level. 
 
(4) Sub-objective 4: To quantify the impact that the level of charges (or mark ups 
above marginal cost) implemented in the European railway network may be 
exerting on the traffic level in high speed and high performance lines: To establish 
a link between a change in the level of rail infrastructure charges (or the level of 
mark ups above marginal cost) and a change in the rail traffic volume. 
 
(5) Sub-objective 5: To quantify the impact that the level of charges (or mark ups 
above marginal cost) implemented in the European railway network may be 
exerting on the high speed railways-airways mode split: To establish a link 
between a change in the level of rail infrastructure charges (or the level of mark 
ups above marginal cost) and a change in the rail market share. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with these five sub-objectives.  
 
Chapter 4, “Analysis of the structure and value of rail charges for the use of rail 
infrastructure in the European high speed network”, is devoted to the achievement of sub-
objectives 1 and 2. In this chapter the charging systems implemented in the European 
countries with high speed lines in operation are analysed in detail. Special emphasis is put 
on the pricing principles applied, the characterisation of the application of mark ups above 
marginal cost and unit tariffs for high speed services running on new lines (NL), upgraded 
lines (UL) and conventional lines (CL). An econometric analysis aimed at establishing a 
correlation between rail infrastructure charges implemented in the European high 
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performance railway network and the type of infrastructure (NL, UL, CL), as well as 
market characteristics (commercial speed, travel time), is also developed in chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 5, “Analysis of the link between rail charges for the use of infrastructure and rail 
revenues from the ticket sales”, deals with sub-objective 3. 
 
Finally, chapter 6, “Analysis of the impacts that current prices charged to high speed trains 
are likely to have on high speed railways competitiveness”, focuses on sub-objectives 4 
and 5. 
 
The tasks needed to achieve the sub-objectives require defining a methodology and a 
series of assumptions in order to: 
 
• Define the geographical framework to be analysed, including the modelling of the 
network to be analysed and the description of the competition framework in this 
network.  
 
• Calculate the rail infrastructure charges and the railways’ revenues in the set of 
links that constitute the network being studied.  
 
• Calculate the charges and revenues of the rival mode of transport in the set of links 
that define the network being studied49.  
 
• Define a theoretical link between the level of rail infrastructure charge and the rail 
traffic volume. 
 
• Define a theoretical link between the level of rail infrastructure charge and the 
ticket fare rates for travelling by rail. 
 
• Define a market share model that sets up the link between the rail ticket fare rate 
and the rail market share. 
 
Next section presents the methodology and the basic assumptions (relative to the 
abovementioned points) taken for this piece of research. 
 
                                                 
49 The interest in calculating these parameters for the rival mode lies in being able to thoroughly study the 
link existing between the amount of rail infrastructure charges and the railways undertakings’ revenues from 
ticket sales for high speed services compared to the one registered for conventional services and to 
thouroughly study the possible consequences for the competitiveness of high performance services with 
regard to its main competitor mode of transport. 
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3.2. MODELLING OF THE ANALYSED NETWORK AND DEFINITION OF THE 
COMPETITION FRAMEWORK  
 
3.2.1. Definition of the geographical framework to be analysed 
 
The geographical framework defined for carrying out the proposed research is the one 
comprised by the EU-25 countries (except for Cyprus and Malta, since they do not 
currently have a railway network), as well as Norway and Switzerland. Within the area 
considered, the infrastructure management is undertaken by the rail infrastructure 
managers listed in figure 3.2. 
 
 
3.2.2. Modelling of the network to be analysed 
 
As detailed in annex A1, the current proposal of European high speed railways network 
combines completely new high speed lines with upgraded lines for raising speeds up to the 
200-250 km/h benchmark, as well as with existing lines that play a linking and spreading 
role. 
 
As a result of the fact that the future high speed railway network will be constituted by 
three different types of infrastructure (new lines, upgraded lines and conventional lines), 
all new high speed lines in operation, upgraded lines and conventional lines (that in a 
closer or further future will be, or not, substituted by new infrastructures or upgraded 
infrastructures) were taken into consideration for the modelling of the high performance 
railway network. 
 
The consideration of this heterogeneity in the nature of the infrastructure, not only fits in 
the nature of the future high performance railway network, but it also allows a more 
complete characterisation of the mark ups above marginal cost implemented by pricing 
systems. The range of their variability contingent on commercial speeds and the travel 
time will indeed be higher. 
 
The high performance railway network has been modelled with 100 Origin-Destination 
links (ODs from now on): 25 national main links (one per country) and 75 (national and 
international) European links, representative of the European high performance railway 
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FIGURE 3.2 GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK AND RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGERS 
IN THE TERRITORY CONSIDERED 
 
Country  Infrastructure manager 
DE Deutsche Bahn Netz AG (DB Netz) 
AT ÖBB Infrastruktur Betrieb 
BE Infrabel 
DK Banedanmark 
SK Železnice SR 
SI Javna agencija za železniški promet Republike Slovenije (AŽP)  
ES Administrador de Infraestructura Ferroviaria (ADIF) 
EE Raudteeinspektsioon 
FI Ratahallintokeskus Banforvaltningscentralen 
FR Réseau Ferré de France (RFF) 
EL OSE S.A. 
NL ProRail B.V. 
HO MÁV Rt 
IE Iarnród Éireann 
Country Infrastructure manager 
IT Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA (RFI) 
LV Latvijas Dzelzcelsh (LDZ) 
LT Lietuvos Gelezinkelai (LG) 
LU Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Luxembourgeois (CFL) 
NO Jernbaneverket (JBV) 
PL PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. 
PT REFER EP 
UK Network Rail 
CZ Správa Železnični Dopravní Cesty (SŽDC) 
SE Banverket 
CH Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB) 
 BLS 
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TABLE 3.1 SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE EUROPEAN LINKS (NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL) TO MODEL THE EUROPEAN HIGH PERFORMANCE 
RAILWAYS NETWORK  
Selection criteria for the 100 European links 
 - Origin/destination link through which high speed trains currently run or 
- Origin/destination link with a high speed line under construction or 
- Origin/destination link with a high performance line in operation  
 - Link identified in the high speed network map defined by the International Union of 
Railways (UIC)50 for the 2020 horizon (see appendix A1, figure A1.10) and/or 
- Potential high speed link in the CEEC51 described in the study “The opportunity for 
high speed railways in the CEEC” (CENIT, 2004, for UIC) 
 For the 75 (national and international) European links, representative of the European 
high performance railway network, links distributed in the following distance 
segments, taking into consideration that high speed railways competitiveness is 
stronger for links allowing travel times shorter than 3 hours:   
 [0 ; 250 km] 
 [250 km ; 600 km] 
 [600 km ; 1.000 km] 
 [1.000 km ; 1.500 km] 
 [> 1.500 km] 
 Geographical and national equilibrium criteria in order that the selected links can be 
considered to be representative of the European railway network 
 
 
As a result of these criteria, the 100 links selected as representative of the European high 
performance railways network are the ones schematised in figure 3.3 and defined in 
tables 3.2 and 3.3 according to the characteristics that they had in 2006. It has to be 
highlighted that out of the 100 links, 49 are national links, while 51 are international links 
(see table 3.4). In addition, 27 links cross one border, 16 links cross two borders and 8 
links cross three or more borders. 
 
 
TABLE 3.2 LINKS SELECTED AS NATIONAL MAIN LINKS OF THE EUROPEAN HIGH 
PERFORMANCE RAILWAY NETWORK (1 PER COUNTRY)  
Country  Link Distance Vcommercial (km/h)
1. Germany Frankfurt – Köln  180 154 
2. Austria Wien – Salzburg  317 123 
3. Belgium Bruxelles – Liège  103 121 
                                                 
50 Founded in 1922, the International Union of Railways (UIC– Union Internationale des Chemins de fer) is 
the worldwide international organisation of the railway sector  (www.uic-asso.fr).  
51 CEEC: Central and Eastern European Countries. 
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Country  Link Distance Vcommercial (km/h) 
4. Denmark København – Esbjerg  319 112 
5. Slovak Republic Bratislava – Zilina  196 81 
6. Slovenia Ljubljana – Maribor  156 87 
7. Spain Madrid – Sevilla  471 202 
8. Estonia Tallin – Narva  210 70 
9. Finland Helsinki – Turku  200 112 
10. France Paris – Lyon  433 234 
11. Greece Athinai – Thessaloniki  502 118 
12. Netherlands Amsterdam – Breda  132 76 
13. Hungary Budapest – Debrecen  221 87 
14. Ireland Belfast – Dublin  183 95 
15. Italy Roma – Firenze  261 167 
16. Latvia Riga – Recekne  224 69 
17. Lithuania  Vilnius – Klaipeda  376 80 




19. Norway Oslo – Trondheim  553 84 
20. Poland Warszawa – Katowice  319 128 
21. Portugal Lisboa – Porto  337 116 
22. United Kingdom London –Newcastle  432 162 
23. Czech Republic Praha – Brno  256 107 
24. Sweden Göteborg – Stockholm 457 159 






TABLE 3.3 LINKS SELECTED AS (NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL) EUROPEAN 
LINKS, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN HIGH PERFORMANCE 
RAILWAY NETWORK  
Link  Distance segment Commercial speed (km/h) 
26. København – Malmö  [0-250] 82 
27. Madrid – Toledo  [0-250] 150 
28. Bratislava – Wien  [0-250] 58 
29. Lille – Bruxelles  [0-250] 203 
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Link  Distance segment Commercial speed (km/h) 
30. Warszawa – Lódz  [0-250] 60 
31. Manchester - Birmingham [0-250] 82 
32. Praha – Ostrawa  [250-600] 83 
33. Ljubljana – Trieste  [0-250] 53 
34. Milano – Genova  [0-250] 102 
35. Lyon – Genève  [0-250] 98 
36. Strasbourg – Stuttgart  [0-250] 91 
37. Paris – Tours  [0-250] 186 
38. Paris – Lille  [0-250] 217 
39. Roma – Napoli  [0-250] 160 
40. Amsterdam – Bruxelles  [0-250] 89 
41. Hannover – Berlin  [250-600] 161 
42. Wien – Nürnberg  [250-600] 126 
43.Warszawa – Poznan  [250-600] 112 
44. Madrid – Zaragoza  [250-600] 205 
45. Firenze – Milano  [250-600] 115 
46. Lyon – Marseille  [250-600] 229 
47. Warszawa – Gdansk  [250-600] 75 
48. Hannover – Frankfurt  [250-600] 160 
49. Bruxelles – Köln  [0-250] 99 
50. Paris – Rennes  [250-600] 160 
51. London – Bruxelles  [250-600] 175 
52. Warszawa – Wrocław  [250-600] 56 
53. Praha – Berlin  [250-600] 79 
54. Bratislava – Košice  [250-600] 70 
55. Praha – Wien  [250-600] 92 
56. Amsterdam – Berlin  [600-1000] 99 
57. Paris – Strasbourg  [250-600] 197 
58. Paris – Amsterdam  [250-600] 132 
59. Paris – Genève  [250-600] 162 
60. Warszawa – Berlin  [250-600] 100 
61. Paris – Bordeaux  [250-600] 183 
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Link  Distance segment Commercial speed (km/h) 
62. Praha – München  [250-600] 90 
63. Stockholm – Oslo  [250-600] 96 
64. Madrid – Barcelona  [600-1000] 149 
65. London –Edinburgh  [250-600] 123 
66. Lisboa – Madrid  [600-1000] 70 
67. Barcelona – Bordeaux  [600-1000] 72 
68. Barcelona – Lyon  [600-1000] 106 
69. Oslo – København  [600-1000] 85 
70. Warszawa – Wien  [600-1000] 96 
71. Paris – Marseille  [600-1000] 249 
72. Paris – Hannover  [600-1000] 113 
73 København – Köln  [600-1000] 89 
74. Strasbourg – Nürnberg  [600-1000] 67 
75. Milano – Köln  [600-1000] 94 
76. London – Strasbourg  [600-1000] 101 
77. München – Roma  [600-1000] 86 
78. Hamburg – Stockolm  [600-1000] 97 
79. Amsterdam – Warszawa  [1000-1500] 85 
80. London – Bordeaux  [1000-1500] 146 
81. Genève – Wien  [1000-1500] 90 
82. Barcelona – Sevilla  [1000-1500] 158 
83. Barcelona – Paris [1000-1500] 97 
84. Hamburg – Wien  [1000-1500] 124 
85. Lisboa – Barcelona  [1000-1500] 80 
86. Marseille – Amsterdam  [1000-1500] 157 
87. Praha – Paris  [1000-1500] 87 
88. Paris – Wien  [1000-1500] 86 
89. Luxembourg – Warszawa  [1000-1500] 103 
90. Paris – Roma  [1000-1500] 101 
91. Glasgow – Rennes  [1000-1500] 119 
92. Paris – Warszawa  [> 1500] 107 
93. Zürich – Warszawa  [> 1500] 69 
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Link  Distance segment Commercial speed (km/h) 
94. Madrid – Zürich  [> 1500] 96 
95. München – Stockolm  [> 1500] 105 
96. Madrid – Bruxelles  [> 1500] 111 
97. London – Warszawa  [> 1500] 83 
98. Barcelona – Wien  [> 1500] 84 
99. Lisboa – Genève  [> 1500] 70 





FIGURE 3.3 LINKS SELECTED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN HIGH 
PERFORMANCE RAILWAY NETWORK  
 
LEGEND
National main links (1 per country) 
(National and international) European links 
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TABLE 3.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SELECTED LINKS  
Distance segment National links International links  
[0-250] 18 8 
[250-600] 28 9 
[600-1000] 2 13 
[1000-1500] 1 12 
[> 1500] 0 9 




3.2.3. Description of the competition framework 
 
Within the geographical framework defined in the preceding section, high performance 
railways compete with airways and/or the road. However, in this piece of research, the 
analysis of the competitiveness of high performance passenger services that run on the 





3.3. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CALCULATION OF 
THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES APPLIED TO THE EUROPEAN 
HIGH SPEED NETWORK               
 
In this section the sources of information and the tools available for the calculation of rail 
infrastructure charges in European railway networks are analysed. A methodological 
proposal for the calculation of rail infrastructure charges is presented. 
  
  
3.3.1. Sources of information and tools available for the calculation of rail 
infrastructure charges in European railway networks  
 
There are different sources of information and public tools to calculate rail infrastructure 
charges in the European networks. The most relevant ones are: 
 
• Network statements and other public documents on railway infrastructure pricing 
(decrees, laws, …).  
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• EICIS, a tool for the calculation of rail infrastructure charges. 
 
The next sections are devoted to characterising them. 
 
3.3.1.1. The Network Statements 
As presented in chapter 1, a Network Statement is, by definition of Directive 2001/14/EC, 
“the statement that sets out in detail the general rules, deadlines, procedures and criteria 
concerning the charging and capacity allocation schemes” and that contains “such other 
information as is required to enable application for infrastructure capacity” as well. 
 
According to the aforementioned Directive, the Network Statement should provide the 
information summarised in table 3.5.  
 
With the aim of designing a common guideline for the elaboration of Network Statements, 
including a common format and structure, UIC’s infrastructure managers established a 
working group in 2002. This working group gave rise to a formal agreement amongst all 
EU infrastructure managers on the Network Statement’s format. Current Network 
Statements have been elaborated according to the agreed format. The information they 
contain is generally structured into seven chapters, namely:    
 
• Chapter 1. General information: amongst the most important information of this 
chapter, one can find the legal framework of the Network Statement, as well as its 
validity. 
 
• Chapter 2. Conditions of access: this chapter describes which traffic and under 
which conditions (security conditions, request of capacity, commercial) may have 
access to the network, as well as the technical requirements that the rolling stock 
and the railway staff should fulfill. 
 
• Chapter 3. Description of the network/infrastructure: this section cotains, amongst 
other information, details on the network performances (gauge, load per axle, 
linear load, tonnage rating, characteristic gradients, maximal speed, etc.), the safety 
systems, traffic control and communications, traffic restrictions and availability of 
the infrastructure.   
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TABLE 3.5 CONTENTS OF THE NETWORK STATEMENT ACCORDING TO DIRECTIVE 
2001/14/EC  
Source: Own from CE (2001d) 
Contents 
 A section setting out: 
 The nature of the infrastructure which is available to railway undertakings  
 The conditions of access to the infrastructure 
 A section on charging principles and tariffs: 
 Appropriate details of the charging scheme 
 Sufficient information on charges that apply to the services listed in annex II (1) which 
are provided by only one supplier. 
 Detail of the methodology, rules and, where applicable, scales used for the application of 
Article 7(4) and (5) (2)  and Articles 8(3) and 9(4)  . 
 Information on changes in charges already decided upon or foreseen. 
 A section on the principles and criteria for capacity allocation:  
 Setting out of the general capacity characteristics of the infrastructure which is available 
to railway undertakings.  
 Setting out of any restrictions relating to the use of the infrastructure, including likely 
capacity requirements for maintenance.    
 Specification of the procedures and deadlines which relate to the capacity allocation 
process.  
 Specific criteria which are employed during the capacity allocation process.  
Remarks: 
(1) Annex II of Directive 2001/14/EC refers to the services to be supplied to the railway undertakings. 
Those services are:     
-  Services comprised within the minimum access package: handling of requests for infrastructure 
capacity; the right to utilise capacity which is granted; use of running track points and junctions; 
train control including signalling, regulation, dispatching and the communication and provision of 
information on train movement; all other information required to implement or operate the service 
for which capacity has been granted. 
-  Track Access to services facilities and supply of services: use of electrical supply equipment for 
traction current, where available; refuelling facilities; passenger stations, their buildings and other 
facilities; freight terminals; marshalling yards; train formation facilities; storage sidings; 
maintenance and other technical facilities. 
-  Additional services: they may comprise traction current; pre-heating of passenger trains; supply of 
fuel, shunting, and all other services provided at the access services facilities mentioned above; 
tailor-made contracts for control of transport of dangerous goods and assistance in running 
abnormal trains. 
-  Ancillary services: they may comprise access to telecommunication network; provision of 
supplementary information; technical inspection of rolling stock. 
(2) Relative to the inclusion of a charge which reflects the scarcity of capacity (section 4 of Article 7) and 
the cost of the environmental effects caused by the operation of the train (section 5 of Article 7).         
(3)  Relative to the exceptions to charging principles.  
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• Chapter 5. Services: this chapter is devoted to presenting the services comprised 
within the minimum access package, as well as the additional, supplementary and 
ancillary services. 
 
• Chapter 6. Charges: This chapter comprises a section devoted to the legal 
framework and presents the charging system, as well as the unit tariffs for the 
provision of services and the payment procedure.   
 
• Chapter 7. Annexes: the annexes complement the information presented in the 
previous chapters of the network statement. Maps or lists with the segmentation of 
the infrastructure in charging terms are some of the contents of these annexes.    
 
With the information contained in the chapter devoted to the charges and, in some cases, 
complemented with additional information presented in the annexes, it is possible to do a 
detailed calculation of rail infrastructure charges to be paid by a passenger train running 
on the tracks.  
 
3.3.1.2. Other documents on the charging of European rail infrastructure  
In addition to the network statements, in some countries other documents complementing 
the information on the charging system provided by the network statements exist. This is 
the case, for instance, of Italy, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom.  
 
In Italy, the charges and the method of calculation to be applied are published in different 
decrees. In the Czech Republic the charges are published by the Czech Ministry of 
Finances in a prices bulletin not included in the network statement. Finally, with regard to 
the British case, the information on the charging of the rail infrastructure is spread over 
several documents (more than five) published by the railway regulator ORR (Office of 
Rail Regulation).  
  
The consultation of these documents is of special interest, since their contents complement 
the ones of the respective network statements.   
 
3.3.1.3. The European Infrastructure Charging Information System: EICIS 
EICIS stands for “European Infrastructure Charging Information System”. The main goal 
of this system, managed by RailNetEurope52, is to enable easy access to the information 
on rail infrastructure charges for the European railway network. Specifically, EICIS is a 
                                                 
52 RailNetEurope (RNE) is an association set up by a majority of European rail Infrastructure Managers. Its 
main goal is to enable fast, easy access to European rail, as well as to increase the quality and efficiency of 
international rail traffic. Scherp (2002) defines RailNetEurope as a commercial cooperation system whose 
aim is to facilitate the provision of international services to railway operators.    
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tool prepared for carrying out the calculation of rail infrastructure charges for train-paths, 
stations fees and shunting fees.  
 
In February 2008, EICIS included 17 European railway networks53 (EICIS, 2008). These 
networks correspond to the ones managed by the Austrian, Belgian, Swiss, Czech, 
German, Danish, Spanish, Hungarian, Italian, Luxembourgian, Norwegian, Polish, 
Swedish, Finish, Slovak and Slovenian IMs.     
 
EICIS has established four steps in the calculation of charges to be paid for running on the 
networks above: 
 
• The first step requires specifying the train category, which distinguishes between 
freight trains, passenger trains and others (mail trains, military trains, etc.).  
 
• The second step is devoted to the definition of the train-path. It requires 
characterising the origin and the destination of the route (country, infrastructure 
manager and origin and destination stations). There is also the possibility of 
specifying one or several intermediate points of the route and choosing between 
the calculation for the shortest or the cheapest route.  
 
• The third step is devoted to the definition of the train characteristics. EICIS 
requires twelve inputs in order to define them: Type of train (high speed train, fast 
passenger train, slow passenger train, suburban train, lightweight train), type of 
traction (diesel, electric, steam), number of locomotives, number of  cars, length of 
all locomotives (in metres), length of all cars (in metres), total number of seats, 
weight of all locomotives (in tones), weight of all cars/motor units (in tones), 
maximum axle load (in tones), path type (express path, short distance regular 
interval path, long distance regular interval path, economy passenger path,       
disposition path), supplement (no supplement or titling for passenger trains; axle 
load higher than 22 tones, out of gauge for freight trains and transport of dangerous 
goods). Besides that, four inputs are reserved in order to define the following 
special parameters: requested average speed, number of all diesel locomotives, 
number of all electric locomotives and number of all steam locomotives.  
 
• Finally, the fourth step focuses on the stations. In this stage, the duration of the 
stop (expressed in minutes) is characterised. 
                                                 
53 The list provided by the programme comprises 22 countries. However, only 17 out of these 22 countries 
contain the data needed for the calculation of rail infrastructure charges. The other five countries correspond 
to Croatia, Portugal, France, Rumania and the United Kingdom.  
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Even if EICIS is a powerful calculation tool for international train-paths, it has several 
weak points that hinder the rail charges calculations accuracy. Amongst them we find:  
 
• Firstly, several countries have not introduced in the programme their 
information on infrastructure charges. As a result of that, it is not possible to 
calculate the charges for runs taking place within or crossing those countries 
(France, Croatia, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom). The lack of data for 
France notably penalises the use of this tool for the analysis proposed, because of 
the great importance of the French high speed network and its strategic central 
setting affecting international services derived from the large number of countries 
bordering France: Spain, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
• Secondly, the programme’s database is still under completion, especially in the 
passenger transport framework. To give an example, in the Spanish network the 
calculation of the charge for the use of stations is still incomplete. This leads to the 
programme giving a charge equal to 0 euros, although the Spanish network 
statement actually defines a positive charge for the use of stations. According to 
the contacts made with EICIS’ responsible, the quality of the data and the 
reliability of the results of the charges calculations strongly depend on the data 
manager appointed by each infrastructure manager and on the data that it 
introduces in EICIS.       
 
• Even if the four steps to calculate charges defined by EICIS allow introducing a 
large number of variables, in most cases these do not coincide with the ones 
defined in the network statements. This results into EICIS giving only a rough 
calculation. To give an example, EICIS does not allow calculating charges for 
different time periods, as required by the Spanish, French, Italian and Belgian 
charging systems. On the contrary, some information requested by EICIS is not 
required by some European rail charging systems for the calculation of rail 
charges. 
 
3.3.2. Proposal of a methodology to calculate rail infrastructure charges  
 
Taking into account the considerations presented in the preceding sections, a methodology 
to calculate rail infrastructure charges has been proposed. It is based on: 
 
• The selection of the documents to be used for calculating rail charges for passenger 
services.  
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• The elaboration of a charging database, based on the contents of the documents 
selected, in order to ease the charges analysis and calculation processes.   
 
• The definition of the rail infrastructure charges calculation procedure 
 
Next sections give details on these three points.  
 
3.3.2.1. Documents used  
The network statements for 2006 and the supplementary documents presented in table 3.6 
were the ones chosen as sources of information for the calculation of rail infrastructure 
charges. This choice was done taking into consideration the remarks made in the 
preceding sections on the information contained in the public documents on rail 
infrastructure charges (the network statements) and the characteristics of the rail 
infrastructure charges calculation tools available up to date. 
 
 
TABLE 3.6 DOCUMENTS USED TO BUILD THE DATABASE ON RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGING     
Country   Documents used Validity period 
 Germany  Network Statement 
 Products Train Paths. Modular Train Path Price System, 
02/2005  
 Stationspreisliste 2006 
 Bahnhofskategorisierung der DB Stations+Service AG 
11.12.05 – 10.12.06 
 Austria  Network Statement 2006 
 Track Access Product Catalogue 2005 
11.12.05 – 10.12.06 
 Belgium  Document de Référence du Réseau 2006 11.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 Denmark  Network Statement 2006 11.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 Slovak Rep.  Network Statement (Ref. No. 1430/O410) 01.01.06 – 31.12.06 
 Slovenia  The Network Statement of the Republic of Slovenia 2007 10.12.06 – 08.12.07 
 Spain  Declaración sobre la Red 2006 11.12. 05 – 09.12.06 
 Estonia(1)  Network Statement 2006-2007 28.05.06 – 26.05.07 
 Finland  Network Statement 2006 11.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 France  Document de Référence du Réseau Ferré National. Horaire 
de service 2006 
11.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 Greece(2) – – 
 Netherlands  Network Statement 2006 10.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 Hungary(1)  Network Statement 2006 Up to 01.01.06 
 Ireland(2) – – 
 Italy  Network Statement  
 Decree of 21 March 2000, 22 March 2000, 11 April 2003, 
15 July 2003 and 24 March 2005 
12.12.04 – 12.09.06 
 Latvia  Network Statement 2006 29.05.05 – 28.05.06 
 Lithuania(1) – – 
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Country   Documents used Validity period 
 Luxemburg  Document de Référence du Réseau 2006 11.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 Norway  Network Statement 2006 2006 
 Poland  Cennik na rok 2006 
 "Cennika na rok 2006. Stawki jednostkowe opłat za usługi 
podstawowe udost_pniania linii kolejowych PKP Polskie 
Linie Kolejowe S.A." 
10.12.05 – 09.12.06 
 Portugal  Network Statement 2005. 1st Addenda 2005  
 U. Kingdom  Schedule 7 : Track Charges 
 Access Charges Review 2003 : Regulator’s approval of 
network rail’s proposed financing arrangements 
 Railways Act 1993: Access charges review 2003 
 Track usage price list 
 List of Capacity Charges Rates  
 Schedule of CC terms 
01.04.05 – 31.03.06 
 Czech Rep.  Network Statement (Ref. no. 6461/04- OŘ, and updates up 
to No. 3/2005) 
 Price Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech 
Republic 1/2005   
From 01.07.05 
 Sweden   Network Statement T05.2 08.01.06 – 19.06.06 
 Switzerland  Network Statement. Infrastructure 
 Catalogue de prestations Infrastructure 2006 
11.12.05 – 09.12.06 
SEGMENTS WITH SPECIAL CHARGING 
 Channel T.  Eurotunnel’s Network Statement 
 Network Rail/Eurostar contract 
14.12.03 – 11.12.04 
 Öresund  Document de Référence du Réseau 2006  
 Network Statement Part 1(2)  (20060108–20060619 
(T05.2))  
2005 (Danish part) 
08.01.06 – 09.12.06 
(Swedish part) 
 Storebælt  Network Statement 2006 (Banedanmark) 2005 
Remarks:  
(1) The Estonian and Hungarian network statements of 2006 are only published in the official language of the 
respective country. Hence, their interpretation was not possible. For these countries and for Lithuania
(country for which a network statement for the year analysed does not exist) the data used for the
calculation of rail charges were obtained from CEMT (2005).   
 (2) Rail charging systems not available in 2006. 
- The fares published in the documents presented in this table do not include VAT (value-added tax), which 




3.3.2.2. Development of a database  
In order to facilitate the analysis of the rail charging systems and the calculations of rail 
infrastructure charges, a database was developed. This database gathers the charging 
information presented in the network statements and in the annexed documents that 
complement the charging information of the network statements presented in table 3.6. 
The interest of developing this database lies in several aspects: 
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FIGURE 3.4 EXAMPLE OF CARD CONTAINING THE INFORMATION OF THE PRICING 
LIST. SPANISH CASE   

























• Synthesising and systematising the data on rail charging systems for the different 
European countries: The network statements have a common structure. However, 
they differ considerably with regard to the charging system adopted. This fact 
hinders the analysis and the comparison of the charging systems, as well as the 
systematisation of the calculations for the geographical framework analysed and, 
especially, the calculations of charges for international links. Hence, the interest of 
synthesising and systematising the data on charging systems for the European 
countries analysed, in order to present them in a clear, concise and comparable 
way. 
 
• Speeding up the calculations of the rail infrastructure charges: Grouping the 
elements needed for the charges calculation in a single card per country 
considerably eases up the calculation, by allowing disregarding burdensome 
documents and directly focusing on the important information for the calculation. 
 
• Standardising the language in which the data is presented: Even if the great 
majority of rail infrastructure managers currently publish their network statements 
Components or factors of the charging formula 
and their units 
Unit rates of the components or factors 
contingent on different factors defining the 
network, the traffic, etc.  
Charging formula 
LEGEND
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in English, there are cases in which some information is only available in the 
official language of the country, sometimes because it is presented as an annex to 
the network statement. This is for instance the case of certain Italian decrees that 
complement the information of the network statement, of the Polish and Hungarian 
network statements, and of some Austrian and German documents. A preliminary 
task of translation facilitates the subsequent calculation task. 
 
In annex A3 the basic information of the database necessary for analysing the charging 
systems and calculating the rail infrastructure charges is presented under a card format 
(see figure 3.3). This information corresponds to the rail charges unit tariffs applied in 
each European country, differentiating, as far as possible, between minimum access 
package, ancillary services, supplementary services, etc. and specifying the unit prices for 
each category or variable considered (type of line, train, station, traffic, time period, etc.).  
 
3.3.2.3. Assumptions in the calculation of rail infrastructure charges for high 
performance services  
To calculate European rail infrastructure charges in some cases is required, as seen in 
figure 2.5 (in which the variables used by the European infrastructure managers are 
presented), to know the characteristics of the train running on the infrastructure, the time 
period in which runs take place and the stations in which the train stops. The assumptions 
made on their definition when calculating rail infrastructure charges in this piece of 
research are presented below. When analysing the results of the calculations it will be very 
important to bear them in mind. 
 
Assumptions regarding the time period and the stops at stations  
The assumptions made regarding the time period in which runs take place and the station 
in which the train stops have been summarised in table 3.7. 
 
Given the complexity of the calculations of the rail charges in certain countries, and with 
the aim to simplify them, it was decided that only terminal stops would be considered. 
That is, calculations do not take into consideration the intermediate stops that a train 
makes in its current runs. This assumption means that the charges calculated will be, in 
those cases where the charging systems charge stops at stations, slightly lower than real 
charges. With regard to the Belgian case, especially for the TGV Bruxelles-Midi 
Terminal, this assumption can imply quite an important reduction of the charge value. 
This remark will be taken into consideration when analysing the results of the calculations.     
 
The need to define the time period in which a given train runs comes from the fact that 
certain infrastructure managers charge differently runs at peak hours than at normal and 
off-peak hours. In the geographical framework of this research, only four infrastructure 
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managers have introduced a charging system that distinguishes between time period: Adif 
in Spain, RFF in France, RFI in Italy and Infrabel in Belgium. 
 
 
TABLE 3.7 ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE CALCULATION OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
Assumptions regarding….. Assumptions made 
 Rail charges calculation  
 For national links of reference 
(25 ODs) 
→ Average between:  
- A train departing at 8 a.m. from the Origin 
point (O) towards the Destination point (D)  
- A train departing at 8 a.m. from the D to O 
- A train departing at 6 p.m. from the O to D 
- A train departing at 6 p.m. from the D to O  
 For (national and international) 
European representative links 
(75 ODs)  
→ Rail charge to be paid by a train departing at 8 a.m. 
from the Origin point (O) towards the Destination 
point (D)  
 Stops at stations → Only terminals have been considered  
(intermediate stops not considered)  
 Rates of exchange → With the aim of being able to compare all the 
costs, the rates of exchange valid in January 16, 
2006(1) have been used 
(it is reminded that the rail charges analysed are the ones valid 
for 2006 in the different European national railway networks)  
Remarks: 
(1) The rates of exchange valid on the 16th of January 2006 are presented in annex A4. 
 
 
In a first stage, the assumptions were defined for the 25 national main links of the 
European high performance railway network (defined in table 3.2). With the aim of 
analysing the influence of time differentiation in the amount of charges, for a given link 
both running directions were considered (O-D and D-O). At the same time, given their 
relatively short length and their relatively short travel times from the Origin point to the 
Destination point, it was supposed that both outward and return journeys would take place 
on the same day, the former taking place at 8 a.m. and the latter at 6 p.m. These timetables 
seem reasonable for business trips at a national level. 
 
The calculations made by the author for the Spanish, French, Italian and Belgian national 
links allow stating that the difference between the infrastructure charge to be paid for a run 
linking O and D at 8 a.m. and the infrastructure charge resulting from the average of the 
four options presented in the preceding paragraph is practically negligible. This is due to 
the fact that according to the timetable assumptions made, in both running directions 
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departures take place at peak periods and arrivals take place at normal or off-peak periods. 
Consequently, for the rest of the links analysed in this piece of research, it was considered 
appropriate and sensible to reduce (and therefore simplify) the calculation of the 
infrastructure charge to a single running direction (from O to D) and the outward journey. 
This simplification has a negligible impact on the resulting charge for the type of runs 
analysed in this piece of research. 
 
It has to be mentioned that in some of the 100 selected links there are no railway services 
with departures at 8 a.m. However, in order to be able to compare infrastructure charges 
under the same conditions in the links where charging systems consider the timetable 
period, in such cases “fictitious” runs departing at 8 a.m. o’clock were considered. Despite 
this consideration, it is important to highlight that current trains’ real routes linking O with 
D have been considered for the definition of the route covered by the trains running 
through the selected ODs. The information on this subject has been obtained from the 
European Rail Timetable (Cook, 2005).  
 
Assumptions on the vehicle characteristics 
A wide variety of trains (high speed or high performance trains) run on the European high 
performance railway network, from the French and “European” TGV (Thalys and 
Eurostar) to the German ICE, the Spanish AVE and the Italian ETR, amongst others. 
 
 
TABLE 3.8 MOST PERFORMANT HIGH SPEED TRAINS IN OPERATION ON THE 
RAILWAY LINES IN THE EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED NETWORK (excluding 
regional high speed trains)  
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from RENFE (2008), Talgo (2007), 
Siemens (2006), Alstom (2006) and other sources  
Model/Name Company Capacity (seats) 
Vmax 
(km/h) 
Country and Year 
of 1st service 
TGV Duplex Alstom 350 to 520  300 a 320 France, 2006 
ICE 3 Siemens 458   Germany, 2004 
(series 2) 
AVE S 102  
(Talgo 350, “El Pato”) 
Talgo – Bombardier ? 330 Spain, 2001 
AVE S 103 Siemens 404  330 Spain, 2003  
ETR 485 Fiat Ferroviaria ? 320 Italy, 1990s 
 
 
In table 3.8 the data on capacity (number of seats) and maximal speed allowed by the 
most modern high speed trains that currently run on the national (and international) 
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railway networks of the countries in which high speed infrastructure is more developed (in 
terms of total length built) has been summarised.   
 
Taking into account that the analysis framework considered comprises the future high 
speed network, that the departure of the runs analysed takes place at the peak period and 
that currently the length of the French high speed network is the most important one 
within the European high speed network, it was decided to choose the TGV Duplex as the 
reference vehicle (see figure 3.5). Table 3.9 summarises the characteristics of this train 
needed for the calculations to be carried out in this piece of research. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.5 TRAIN CONSIDERED FOR THE CALCULATIONS: TGV DUPLEX  




TABLE 3.9 ASSUMPTIONS RELATIVE TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RAILWAY 
VEHICLE   
Characteristics of the railway vehicle  
Capacity Weight Model selected Other characteristics
500 seats 430 tonnes 
(390 + 500 x 0,08)* 
TGV Duplex Single composition 
Remarks: 
* In the expression (390 + 500 x 0,08): 
- 390 corresponds to the total weight of the empty train (expressed in tonnes); 
- 500 corresponds to the number of seats;  
- 0,08 corresponds to the average weight (expressed in tonnes) of a traveller.  
 
 
3.3.2.4. Steps of the calculation procedure  
On the line of the previous systematisation and harmonisation of the data relative to the 
European rail infrastructure charging, a common calculation procedure has been defined 
for all the European charging systems. It consists of four steps, presented by chronological 
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order: 
 
• First step: Link identification. In a first stage, it is necessary to identify the 
charging systems that apply to the calculation of the rail infrastructure charge for a 
given link. The more countries a given link crosses, that is, the more networks with 
a different owner it crosses, the higher the number of charging systems to be 
considered in the calculation procedure will be. This stems from the fact that, as it 
has been previously presented, each infrastructure manager applies a different 
charging system. 
 
• Second step: Definition of the link. With the aid of the network statements, each 
link will have to be divided in segments, which will be characterised according to 
the type of line and/or other characteristics (such as the type of traffic, the weight 
of the train, the type of traction, the time period, the running speed, etc.), 
depending on the charging system applied to each segment. 
 
• Third step: Calculation of each cost category. According to the structure of each 
network statement, rail infrastructure charges will be calculated by homogeneous 
groups (access charges, capacity reservation charges, charges for the use of 
stations, energy/electricity charges, etc.). 
 
• Fourth step: Calculation of the total charges. The fourth and last step of the 
calculation procedure consists in adding the cost of each cost category in order to 
obtain the total charge to be paid by a high performance European railway service. 
 
It is to be highlighted that the step devoted to the definition of the link is especially 
complicated in international links, since most network statements do not define the border 
segments in detail. In addition, defining a link implies, in certain cases, dividing the link 




3.4. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CALCULATION OF 
RAILWAYS’ REVENUES 
 
The calculation of railway’s revenues requires knowing how much a passenger has to pay 
for its travel ticket, besides knowing the capacity and average load factor of the vehicle: 
 
Railways’ revenues= (Capacitytrain) x (Load factorrailways) x (Ticket pricerailways)   (f. 3.1)  
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3.4.1. Determination of the average ticket fare for railways 
 
The definition of the average ticket fare in a given railway link is essential for calculating 
Railway Undertakings’ (RU) revenues. 
 
Even if it is generally assumed that the average of the first and second class fares 
approaches the full fare of the second class, in reality, real revenues are lower than those 
calculated on the basis of the second class fare. This is a direct consequence of the 
existence of a wide range of discounts on full fares by means of seasonal tickets, special 
offers, etc. Therefore, it is not appropriate to calculate revenues on the basis of the full fare 
of the second class tariff. 
 
Taking into account the preceding remarks, it was assumed that the average ticket fare for 
railways would be calculated as the ticket fare equivalent to 75% of the second class fare 
(obtained considering the return ticket), in order to take into account the considerable 
reductions offered by RUs to their customers: 
 
Ticket pricerailways = (2nd class fare) x 0,75   (f. 3.2)  
 
where the value of the second class fare corresponds to the price of a one-way ticket for 
travelling from O to D with a train departing at 8 a.m. (or around this period of the day). F 
3.2 was validated by several stakeholders from different national RUs operating in Europe. 
 
 
3.4.2. Determination of the load factor for railways 
 
To determine the load factor for railways, real data concerning the load factors for 
Belgian, British, French and Spanish high speed trains has been consulted. 
 
In Belgium, the average numbers of passengers per train for the trains running on the high 
speed network in 2003 were the ones presented in table 3.10. High speed trains’ load 
factors in Belgium have been calculated assuming two different cases: services operated 
with no train set pairing and services operated in a two-train set pairing. If all Thalys 
services were operated in single train set pairing, their load factor would be 59,8% (see 
table 3.10). On the other hand, if Eurostar services were operated with the capacity of the 
Thalys trains and 50% of those services were operated in a two-train set pairing, the load 
factor of Eurostar services in Belgium would be 60,1%. 
 
Concerning the traffic of Eurostar high speed trains crossing the Channel Tunnel, it 
reached 7,28 million passengers in 2004 and 7,45 million in 2005 (Eurotunnel, 2006). 
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With such traffics and the 750 seats configuration of Eurostar trains, the load factors 
amounted 53,2% in 2004 and 54,4% in 2005 (see table 3.11). These values, slightly above              
50%, are rather low. This is the result of the undeformation of Eurostar train sets. If these 
services were operated with the capacity of a standard TGV Duplex (500 seats), one third 
of them in a two-train set pairing configuration, the load factor would reach 61,2%.  
 
 
TABLE 3.10 LOAD FACTORS OF BELGIAN HIGH SPEED TRAINS IN THE YEAR 2003 
Source: Sánchez Borràs from SNCB (2004) and Thalys (2008)  
Train 
Passengers/train 
(average year 2003) 
Seats/train Load factor 
Eurostar 263,9 750 35,2% 
Thalys 225,6 377(1) 59,8% 
Thalys 225,6 501(2) 45,0% 
Remarks: 
(1) Assuming that there is no train set pairing  
(2) Assuming a two-train set pairing 
 
 
TABLE 3.11 LOAD FACTORS OF EUROSTAR HIGH SPEED TRAINS CROSSING THE 
CHANNEL TUNNEL IN 2004 AND 2005 




Seats/train Load factor 
Eurostar 399 (year 2004) 750 53,2% 
Eurostar 408 (year 2005) 750 54,4% 
 
 
In France, the average load factor in high speed trains (Eurostar and Thalys trains 
excluded) leaving from Paris was 67,6% in 2004. For the whole of TGV traffic (that is, 
including traffic that did not begin in Paris), the load factor was approximately 60% 
(SNCF, 200654). 
 
In Spain, the average load factor for the high speed market was 60,7% in 2004 (Renfe, 
2005). This figure takes into account the load factors of the high speed links Madrid-
Seville and Madrid-Barcelona, the latter being only partially in operation in 2004. 
Considering only the first Spanish high speed line (Madrid-Seville), the load factor 
reaches 66,1% (Renfe, 2004). 
                                                 
54 These values were obtained from a direct contact with SNCF. 
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The average value of the load factor for the aforementioned sources is approximately 60%. 
Given the fact that, according to the assumptions on infrastructure charges calculations, 
the analysis will be made on hypothetical trains departing at 8 a.m. (peak hour) and that 
the values obtained from the abovementioned sources are average values for all time 
periods, the author decided to take a load factor for railways of 65%. This value, which 
is intended to reflect the load factor of high speed trains in peak hours, remains 
nevertheless conservative. Figure 3.6 shows  the  sensitivity  analysis  for a  variation  of 
(-5%, +5%) of the considered load factor (65%) on the value of the charges/revenues ratio, 
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3.5. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CALCULATION OF 
CHARGES AND REVENUES FOR RAILWAYS’ MAIN COMPETITOR: 
AIRWAYS 
 
3.5.1. Methodology and assumptions for the calculation of airways’ charges 
 
If the calculation of rail infrastructure charges is a very complicated procedure, as it has 
been seen in section 3.3, the calculation of air charges is not a simpler task. This stems 
from the fact that, contrary to what happens in the railways’ organisational structure, in the 
air sector not always does a single national organisation exist in charge of the establishing 
of the prices for all national airports.  
 
Indeed, while for example in Spain a single national airport manager (AENA, Aeropuertos 
Españoles y Navegación Aérea) is in charge of the definition of air charges, in other 
countries such as for instance France, no such an organisation exists. In those countries 
each airport establishes its own charges for the use of the infrastructure. 
 
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to gather the information on the precise charging 
regime applied in each European airport. Furthermore, the language of the charging 
documents can represent an added difficulty when trying to obtain the data on the subject 
at hand.  
 
In order to overcome the aforementioned difficulties some assumptions on air charges 
calculation were made. Those are presented in the following sections. 
 
3.5.1.1. Assumptions related to the calculation of air charges 
It was assumed that air charges can be calculated as follows: 
 




Navigation charge = Route charge + Air Traffic Terminal Service Charge (f. 3.4)  
 
The route charge corresponds to the charge set aside for “remunerating the costs incurred 
by Eurocontrol55 Member States for providing en-route services to the users of their 
airspace” (Eurocontrol, 2008). This charge takes into account the distance flown and, less 
                                                 
55 Eurocontrol is an agency whose mission is to harmonise and integrate air navigation services in Europe, 
aiming at the creation of a uniform air traffic management (ATM) system for civil and military users, in 
order to achieve the save, secure, orderly, expeditious and economic flow of traffic throughout Europe, 
while minimising adverse environmental impact (Eurocontrol, 2008).  
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than proportionately, the aircraft weight. The route charge per flight equals the sum of the 










   (f. 3.5)  
 
where ri is the individual charge, which is equal to the product of a distance factor (di), a 
weight factor (p) and a unit rate (ti): 
 
iii tpdr ××=  (f. 3.6)  
 
In (f. 3.6): 
 
• The distance factor di is equal to the one hundredth of the great circle distance, 
expressed in kilometres, between the aerodrome of departure within (or the point 
of entry into) the airspace of the FIRs of State (i) and the aerodrome of first 
destination within (or the point of exit from) that airspace.  
 
• The weight factor p corresponds to the square root of the quotient obtained by 
dividing by fifty the number of metric tons in the maximum certificated take-off 
weight (MTOW) of the aircraft as follows: 
 
50
MTOWp =  (f. 3.7)  
 
• The unit rate ti is established for each State and is applicable as from 1 January of 
each year. Nevertheless, it is adjusted every month in order to reduce the effect of 
exchange rate fluctuations on the system. The rates used for the calculations in this 
study were the adjusted unit rates applicable to January 2006 flights (see annex 
A5). 
 
The air traffic terminal service charge (ATTSC) covers the cost of air traffic terminal 
services. Its value is equal to the product of a unit rate (u) and the number of service units 
(N): 
 
NuATTSC ×=  (f. 3.8)  
 
The values for the unit rate and the number of service units are published by each 
infrastructure manager. Given the aforementioned difficulties of gathering the information 
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of the precise charging regime applied in each European airport, the values published by 
AENA (2005) where adopted for the calculations in all of the European airports 
considered in this dissertation. This implies that the number of service units is equal to the 
maximum take-off weight recorded in the flight manual of the aircraft expressed in metric 
tonnes raised to the power 0,90: 
 
9,0MTOWN =  (f. 3.9)  
 
With regard to the unit rate, the value considered was the one given by AENA (2005) for 
first category airports ( 41,4=u ). 
 
 
FIGURE 3.7 EXAMPLE OF TAXES PAID BY EACH USER/CUSTOMER  








Finally, the passenger charge corresponds to the charge relating to travellers. Its value 
can be obtained from the flight tickets. As it can be seen in figure 3.7, each passenger 
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must pay a tax. The value of the passenger charge for a given flight covering an OD link, 
will equal: 
Passenger charge = 
2
tax




• The value of the tax corresponds to the tax paid by each passenger buying a return 
flight ticket.  
 
• The aircraft capacity equals 150 seats (see table 3.12 for the assumptions related to 
the characteristics of the reference aircraft chosen for this study). 
 
• The load factor is the one specified in section 3.5.2.2. 
 
When comparing the situation of railways with the one of airways with regard to charges, 
it will be very important to bear in mind those hypotheses and assumptions. These 
assumptions result in a simplified and approximate value for the air charges. 
 
 
3.5.1.2. Assumptions related to the aircraft characteristics 
The aircraft selected for this study is the Airbus 320 (see table 3.12 and figure 3.8), 
because of its widespread use in Europe. According to Airbus (2008), in January 2008 a 
total of 1.291 A230 aircrafts were in operation throughout Europe. Among the carriers 
offering services with an A320 in Europe there are legacy carriers such as, for instance, 
Air France, Alitalia, British Airways, Iberia and Lufthansa. There are low cost carriers as 
well. Clickair, Easyjet, Germanwings and Vueling are just some examples of low cost 
carriers using the A320 for their national and international flights in Europe. 
 
 
TABLE 3.12 HYPOTHESES RELATED TO THE AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS  
Source: Sánchez-Borràs from Airbus (2008) 
Aircraft characteristics 
Capacity Weight Model selected 
150 seats(1) MTOW(2) = 73,5 A320 
Remarks: 
(1) Number of seats in a typical two-class cabin layout (see figure 3.8). 
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FIGURE 3.8 AIRCRAFT CONSIDERED FOR THE CALCULATIONS. AIRBUS 320  




3.5.2. Methodology and assumptions for the calculation of airways’ revenues 
 
Just like in railways, the calculation of airways’ revenues requires knowing how much a 
passenger has to pay for its travel ticket, as well as knowing the capacity and average load 
factor of the aircraft: 
 
Airways’ revenues= (Capacityaircraft) x (Load factorairways) x (Ticket priceairways)  (f. 3.11)  
 
 
3.5.2.1. Determination of the average ticket fare for airways 
The assumptions made when calculating the airways average ticket fare were aimed at the 
obtaining of a value close to the real carriers’ revenues, like it was aimed when 
determining the average ticket fare in railways.  
 
The assumptions made are summarised in table 3.13. As done with railways’ fares, the 
prices used correspond to ticket fares for trips departing around 8 a.m. from the origin 
point. However, air travel sees a widespread use of yield management56, which translates 
into fuzzy ticket prices, variable even within a given route, carrier and time.  
 
To gauge the extent of this variability, the evolution of ticket prices for a Wednesday 
flight from the origin point to the destination point were monitored during a week prior to 
flight time. Wednesday was the day chosen for this target flight, since its mid-work-week 
situation guarantees a high number of business trips. It was observed that buying the flight 
ticket with one week in advance can imply, in some cases, fares of approximately 60% the 
Y tariff. In any case, it depends on the politics of each carrier.  
 
Since the journeys analysed start at 8 a.m. and, consequently, may correspond to business 
                                                 
56 Yield management is a management system consisting in applying different tariffs according to the 
demand type, taking into consideration its characteristics and behaviour, with the aim of maximising tariffs 
when the demand exceeds the offer, or maximising occupation when the offer exceeds the demand.   
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travels, it seemed reasonable to buy the ticket one week in advance. Therefore, despite the 
gauged variability, and further fluctuation caused by sharp differences between one-way 
and return tickets, in the end the price used for the current research was the cheapest return 
ticket available a week prior to the actual flight.  
 
TABLA 3.13 ASSUMPTIONS ON AIRWAYS’ REVENUES CALCULATION 
Concept Assumptions  
Tariff Tourist tariff (selling prices available) 
Type of ticket Return ticket: outward journey at 8 a.m. 
- for the national links of reference, comeback at 6 p.m., on the same day 
- for the rest of the links, next-day comeback 
Price demand Purchase of the ticket one week in advance (purchase one Wednesday to 
travel next Wednesday) 
Search of prices City O to city D and comeback  
 
 
Therefore, in order to obtain the equivalent real revenues for airways, the price considered 
for air ticket fares was the one of the cheapest return ticket offered by a carrier offering a 
flight at (or near) 8 a.m. from the origin point to the destination point considered, divided 
by two. It implies that in some links, Legacy Carriers are taken into account, whilst in 
others it is Low Cost Carriers that are considered, depending on the air travel offer 
available in each link. No distinction was made between these two types of airlines, since 
according to SDG (2006), and as recently proved by Casas (2008), “the boundaries 
between low cost and classic airlines are breaking down” given the fact that on most 
routes, “there is little fundamental difference between the services offered by the different 
types of airline”. 
 
3.5.2.2. Determination of the load factor for airways 
The load factor for airways has been determined on the basis of real data provided by the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) for the period July 2005 – May 2006 (see table 
3.14). 
 
Taking into account that the assumption of the load factor must apply to both national and 
international links, the load factor for domestic European flights and geographical Europe 
has been considered. The calculated average value (67,3%) has been rounded to 70%, 
which is the load factor considered for this study. Figure 3.9 presents the results of the 
sensitivity analysis for a variation of (-5%, +5%) of the considered load factor (70%) on 
the value of the charges/revenues ratio, for the national links of reference presented in 
table 3.2. 
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TABLE 3.14 LOAD FACTOR FOR EUROPEAN AIRLINE TRAFFIC IN EUROPE 
Source: Author’s elaboration from AEA (2005a-e; 2006a-f) 
Load factor(1) for: 
Month/year TOTAL Europe 
(Domestic + Geographical Europe) 
Domestic Geographical Europe(2) 
July 2005 73,9% 70,8% 75,0% 
August 2005 72,3% 68,9% 73,4% 
September 2005 72,5% 68,4% 74,0% 
October 2005 69,4% 67,3% 70,2% 
November 2005 63,4% 64,3% 63,0% 
December 2005 62,5% 64,6% 61,7% 
January 2006 58,8% 59,5% 58,5% 
February 2006 60,8% 62,0% 60,3% 
March 2006 64,6% 64,5% 64,6% 
April 2006 71,8% 69,8% 72,4% 
May 2006 70,1% 69,6% 70,3% 
Average value 67,3% ≅ 70% 66,3% 67,6% 
Remarks: 
(1) AEA defines the load factor (PLP) as the percentage of seats on offer, filled by revenue passengers.  
(2) AEA defines Geographical Europe as the territory including all cross border/international routes 
originating and terminating within Europe (including Turkey and Russia up to 55ºE), Azores, Canary 
Islands, Madeira and Cyprus. 
 
 








































































































































(70%): Load factor assumed for the airplane
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3.6. ASSUMPTIONS TO ANALYSE THE IMPACT OF A REDUCTION/ 
INCREASE IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES ON HIGH SPEED 
TRAFFIC VOLUMES 
 
The analysis of the impact that an increase in rail infrastructure charges can have on rail 
traffic volumes requires to establish a link between, on the one hand, infrastructure 
charges and, on the other hand, traffic demand.  
 
As presented in f. 3.1, revenues from ticket sales are calculated as the fare times the 
capacity of the vehicle times the load factor. Therefore, they can also be expressed as: 
 
  Rev QF ×=  (f. 3.12) 
 
where: 
- F corresponds to the ticket fare 
- Q is the traffic expressed in passengers per train 
 
Hence, the derivative of the revenues with respect to fare can be expressed as: 
 












Re  (f. 3.13) 
 



















Re  (f. 3.14) 
 
On the other hand, ticket fares are linked to traffic volumes by means of the price 
elasticity of demand, which provides evidence on ability to pay without distortion of 
traffic levels and is defined to be “the percentage change in demand caused by a 1% 
change in price” (Glaister, 1981): 
 




















ε  (f. 3.15) 
 
where: 
- ε is the price elasticity of demand 
- Q is the traffic expressed in passengers 
- F is the ticket fare (i.e. the price) 
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∆ ε  (f. 3.16) 
 
Hence, substituting f. 3.16 in f. 3.14, the relative change in revenues can be expressed as: 
 










v  (f. 3.17) 
 
If we assume that the profitability must remain unchanged, then the change in revenues 
must equal the change in infrastructure charges, that is to say: 
 
   ICv ∆=∆Re   (Assumption: profitability unchanged) (f. 3.18) 
 
Thus, f. 3.17 can be expressed as: 
 




IC  (f. 3.19) 
 
From f. 3.19 it is possible to work out the change in fare resulting from any change in 
infrastructure charge: 
 







1  (f. 3.20) 
 
Combining f. 3.20 and f. 3.16, we can also work out the change in traffic resulting from 














ε  (f. 6.21) 
 









ε  (f. 3.22) 
 
If we denote a the ratio between rail infrastructure charges (IC) and the revenues earned 
by RUs from ticket sales (Rev) for a given link:  










 (f. 3.23) 
 
and we substitute the revenues in f. 3.21 for the expression presented in f. 3.23, the 
relative change in traffic can be expressed as a product of the relative change in 














 (f. 3.24) 
 
In the present study, the assumptions on the calculation of revenues allow obtaining the 
average revenues and not the revenues according to the time of the day. Therefore, in 
infrastructure charging systems that do not distinguish between time periods, a is 
considered to be constant for each link analysed. In France, Spain, Italy and Belgium, 
where the current rail infrastructure charging systems distinguish between time periods, 
the calculated value of a is a bit higher than the average value, as a result of the 
assumptions made on rail charges calculation (see section 3.3.2.3). 
 
F. 3.24 will be the tool used to analyse the impact that a reduction/increase in rail 
infrastructure charges can have on high speed traffic volumes. The values of a will be 




3.7. ASSUMPTIONS TO ANALYSE THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE HIGH 
SPEED MARKET SHARE RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION/INCREASE 
IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
 
The assumptions to analyse the possible effects on the high speed market share resulting 
from a reduction/increase in rail infrastructure charges relate, on the one hand, to the link 
existing between a change in infrastructure charges and ticket fares and, on the other hand, 
to the link existing between a change in rail fares and the level of modal share. 
 
 
3.7.1. Establishment of a link between infrastructure charges and rail ticket fares 
 
F. 3.20 presented in the preceding section gives the change in fare resulting from any 
change in infrastructure charge, expressed as a product of the absolute change in 
infrastructure charges, the revenues earned by a railway operator from the ticket sales and 
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the elasticity. Combining f. 3.20 with f. 3.23, the change in fare resulting from any change 
in infrastructure charge can be expressed as: 
 









1  (f. 3.25) 
 
 
3.7.2. Calibration of a market share model for European high speed links 
 
As stated in section 3.2.3, the competition framework considered includes, exclusively, 
two modes of transport, namely high speed railways and airways. Therefore, the market 
share model to be calibrated should respond to a binary choice model.  
 
SDG (2006) recently published a report on “Air and rail competition and 
complementarity” prepared for the European Commission DG TREN, in which a market 
share model for European high speed links is developed. In it, passengers’ choices 
between air57 and rail transport are predicted by means of a logit model calibrated using 
data from European routes linked by high speed lines, with the ultimate objective of 
testing scenarios for the development of short haul transport over the next 10 years. The 
results of the market share model calibrated in this study are only presented graphically, 
which complicates its use for the purpose of the present research. However, the 
abovementioned report presents valuable data when trying to calibrate a market share 
model. Consequently, this data is the one used in the next sections when calibrating a 
market share model for European high speed links.  
 
3.7.2.1. Description of the model   
The model calibrated to quantify the change in rail-air market share resulting from a 
reduction (or increase) of rail infrastructure charges is a logit model.  
 
The logit model is a discrete choice model based on the aleatory utility theory, the four 
main postulates of which are presented below (Domenich et al 1975): 
 
• Individuals pertaining to a given homogenous population, Q, act in a rational way 
and have perfect information, i.e. they always choose the option that maximises 
their net personal utility subject to legal, social, physical and/or budgetary 
restrictions. 
 
                                                 
57 The logit model at hand does not separately identify low cost and classic airlines because, as seen in 
section 3.5.2, there is little fundamental difference between the services offered by different types of airline. 
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• There is a series of available alternatives A and a series of X passengers’ and 
alternatives attributes vectors. An individual q is assigned a series of attributes 
x∈X and, generally, it will choose amongst the options available A(q)∈A. In 
principle, it is assumed that the restrictions to which the individual q is subjected 
have already been taken into consideration and, therefore, they do not affect the 
choice amongst the different alternatives. 
 
• Each option Aj(q)∈A has an associated net utility for an individual q. This utility 
(U’jq) is represented by a measurable (Ujq) part, which is a function of the average 
attributes x, and an aleatory (ξjq) part, which reflects the particular tastes of each 
individual as well as any error in the measurement or observation by the 
researcher. 
 
• The individual q chooses the alternative that gives him the maximal utility, i.e. the 
individual chooses Aj if and only if U’qj ≥ U’ij, ∀A∈A(q).  
 
Therefore, choices are made on the basis of the perceived utility (instead of the measured 
utility), which is aleatory and unknown and can be expressed as follows: 
 
U’i(θi,A)= Ui(θi,A) + ξi(θi,A)         with      i=1, ..., m   (f. 3.26) 
 
where: 
- i refers to the mode of transport 
- θ is the parameters vector for mode i 
- A is the vector of the traveller’s characteristics  
 
For the logit model, it is assumed that the aleatory factor ξi has a Gumbel distribution. 















=    (f. 3.27) 
 
where: 
- HSijU  is the measurable utility of high speed railways  
- AirijU  is the measurable utility of airways  
 
Consequently, the logit model allows representing systematic taste variation, that is, taste 
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variation that relates to observed characteristics (e.g. schedule related factors, fares).  
 
In addition, the logit probability presents the property of having an S-shaped relation to 
representative utility. This implies, on the one hand, that if the model projects a rail share 
of 20% for a relative utility of +n, it will project a rail share of 80% for a relative utility of 
–n; and on the other hand, that the point at which the increase in representative utility has 
the greatest effect on the probability of it being chosen is when the probability is close to 
0,5, meaning a 50-50 chance of the alternative being chosen. 
 
3.7.2.2. Definition of the utility function 
By definition, the measurable utility function allows calculating the true cost of travel 






ij VU ⋅= α  (f. 3.28) 
 
where α is a scale factor applied to the measured utility Vij.  
 
In its simplest expression, the measured utility Vij corresponds to a weighted average of 
schedule related factors (converted into a monetary cost using value of time assumptions) 
and fares, which are the factors accounting for most of the variation in demand between 
routes. However, an accurate estimation of the utility value requires taking into account 
other aspects that also play a role in the prediction of the market share. Those are access 
costs and quality factor scores. Therefore, the utility function for a link ij and a mode of 
transport k can be expressed as follows: 
 
ScoresGJCV kij +⋅= λ    (f. 3.29) 
or  
( ) ( )[ ] ScorestAccessfareAvGJTV kij +⋅⋅+⋅+= λγγ 21 cos__  (f. 3.30) 
 
where: 
- GJT is the generalised journey time, which corresponds to the monetarisation of 
the schedule related factors. 
- AV_fare is the average fare of the travel ticket. 
- Access_cost corresponds to the cost of journeys to/from the terminals. 
- GJC is the generalised journey cost, which corresponds to the weighted sum of the 
generalised journey time, the average fare and the access cost. 
- Scores corresponds to the quality factor scores. 
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- γ1 and γ2 are coefficients weighting the value of the average fare and the access 
cost. 
- λ is a coefficient weighting the generalised journey time, average fares and access 
costs with regard to the weight of the quality factor scores. 
 
With regard to the schedule related factors, they include, according to SDG (2006), 
journey time, check-in time, time required to leave a rail station or airport, and frequency. 
The conversion of these schedule related factors into a monetary cost using value of time 































 (f. 3.31) 
 
where: 
- IVt corresponds to the “in-vehicle time”, that is, the journey time.  
- Freq_tr_day is the frequency expressed as the number of trains (or flights) per day.  
- MFP is the minimum frequency penalty, expressed in minutes. It takes into 
account that low service frequency makes a mode relatively unattractive even if the 
journey time is faster, and vice versa, by translating differences in frequency into 
differences in journey time. 
- ChInt corresponds to the check-in time plus the terminal exit time (i.e. plus a time 
allowance to exit the airport). 
- At is the access time, defined as the average time required to access the terminals. 
- θ1, θ2, θ3 and θ4 are factors weighting the different times of each stage of a travel. 
- VoT is the value of time and corresponds to the monetary value attributed to an 
hour. 
 
Concerning the quality factor scores, they refer to factors such as reliability, accessibility 
and service quality. Their quantification is sometimes complicated either because 
sometimes there is no data available on the subject, or because the structure of this data 
varies between routes/operators. 
 
3.7.2.3. Case studies data used to characterise the utility function  
The model will be calibrated on the basis of seven different links where high speed 
railways compete with airways and for which SDG (2006) provides data on the 
components defining the utility of high speed railways and airways, as well as for which 
data on their mode split was available.  
 
Tables 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 present the characterisation, according to SDG (2006), of the 
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average fare and access cost (table 3.15), the schedule related factors (table 3.16), and the 
quality factor scores (table 3.17). This data was obtained in the case studies. 
 
The average fares presented in table 3.15 correspond to average one-way ticket prices for 
each mode on each route. The values were estimated on the basis of a large sample of 
fares collected from the operators, which was subsequently weighted by the share of 
frequencies provided by each operator. With regard to the access cost (cost of journeys 
to/from the terminals) and access time, their values result from an estimation based on 
material collected for the case studies58.  
 
 
TABLE 3.15 AVERAGE FARE AND AVERAGE ACCESS COST 
Source: Own from SDG (2006) data 
Average fare (€) Access cost (€) 
Route Rail Air Rail Air 
Frankfurt - Köln 42 72 5 10 
London - Edinburgh 66 88 10 20 
London - Paris 90 96 10 35 
Madrid - Barcelona 55 97 5 10 
Madrid - Sevilla 58 100 5 10 
Milano - Roma 46 104 10 10 
Paris - Marseille 63 108 10 15 
 
 
The minimum frequency penalties presented in table 3.16 are not directly proportional to 
the time gap between services. SDG (2006) has defined them by using an inverse power 
rule59. This means that the impact on market share of an improvement from a frequency of 
one train every 60 minutes to one every 30 is greater than the impact of an improvement 
from once every 120 minutes to once every 90. As a result of that, an increase in 
frequency of a service from every 2 hours to every 1 hour has the same impact on market 
share as an improvement in journey time of 20-25 minutes. The minimal value accepted 
for a frequency penalty is 15 minutes, since where frequency is very high, it is usually 
divided between several operators and it can be assumed that passengers’ perceptions of 
frequency are based primarily on the one offered by the operator with which they have a 
ticket60. 
                                                 
58 As a default, SDG (2006) proposes to use a rail access time of 30 minutes and an airport access time of 45 
minutes, with higher or lower values on particular routes reflecting individual characteristics.    
59 This is in line with formulae used for frequency penalties in other transport models. 
60 In the railway field, this only applies to countries where there is competition in the market. 
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TABLE 3.16 SCHEDULE RELATED FACTORS AND ACCESS TIME 













R A R A R A R A R A 
VOT(*) 
(€/hour)
Frankfurt - Köln 70 45 32 4 20 108 0 45 30 45 33 
London - Edinburgh  270 85 19 79 29 15 0 45 40 45 33 
London - Paris 160 75 15 54 35 15 30 75 30 75 24,16 
Madrid - Barcelona  290 70 7 64 59 15 5 30 30 30 33 
Madrid - Sevilla  150 70 22 7 26 59 5 45 30 45 33 
Milano - Roma 270 75 20 36 28 18 0 45 30 30 33 
Paris - Marseille  190 80 24 26 25 23 0 50 30 45 33 
Remarks: R stands for railways and A for airways. 
(*) On the London-Paris route, car does not represent a realistic alternative due to the time and cost involved 
in crossing the Channel, and therefore SDG (2006) assumes that 67% of passengers are travelling for 
leisure purposes. In the other cases, SDG (2006) assumes that 50% of passengers are travelling on business. 
The values used by this source are 59 €/hour for business passengers and 7 €/hour for leisure passengers, 
reflecting typical values used in other appraisals. 
 
 
With regard to the quality factor scores, SDG (2006) defines four different quality factors: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )qualityServiceTicketingicinglinksAirportliabilityScores _&Pr_Re +++=  (f. 3.32) 
 
where: 
- Reliability reflects the proportion of trains/flights that actually run and arrive at 
their destination on time. 
 
- Airport links reflects the existence of a direct link to other air services, and its 
degree of integration, for passengers that wish to make connections. 
 
- Pricing and ticketing (or price variability) reflects the likelihood of passengers 
purchasing a ticket at a price that is lower than the average. This score is relevant 
in those cases where yield management systems are applied. 
 
- Service quality reflects whether there is a premium class service and its quality 
(e.g. catering facilities available, quality of standard class premium and terminal 
facilities). 
 
The values used in this study for these quality factor scores are presented in table 3.17.  
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The mode split currently registered in the high speed links used as case studies is the one 
presented in table 3.18. 
 
 
TABLE 3.17 QUALITY FACTOR SCORES (10 IS BEST) 
Source: SDG (2006)  




quality Scores Route 
R A R A R A R A R A 
Frankfurt - Köln 9 8 6 10 7 9 6 5 28 32 
London - Edinburgh  2 5 0 10 5 10 7 5 14 30 
London - Paris 8 2 0 10 6 9 9 4 23 25 
Madrid - Barcelona  8 6 0 10 0 6 8 5 16 27 
Madrid - Sevilla  10 6 0 10 0 5 9 5 19 26 
Milano - Roma 9 6 0 10 7 7 7 4 23 27 
Paris - Marseille  6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Remarks: R stands for railways and A for airways. 
 
 
TABLE 3.18 MODAL SPLIT REGISTERED IN THE LINKS ANALYSED 
Source: Own from SDG (2006) data 
Route Rail market share 
Frankfurt - Köln 97% 
London - Edinburgh 18% 
London - Paris 69% 
Madrid - Barcelona 12% 
Madrid - Sevilla 86% 
Milano - Roma 38% 
Paris - Marseille 67% 
 
  
3.7.2.4. Calibration of the market share model  
The calibration of the market share model consists in calibrating the scale factor α, as well 
as defining the value of time and the coefficients affecting the key inputs of the utility 
function, which are:  
 
• γ1, γ2: coefficients weighting the average fare and access cost, respectively 
• θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4: coefficients weighting the times of each stage of a journey 
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• λ: scale factor for the generalised journey cost 
 
In table 3.19 the weights applied by the author to the coefficients affecting the key inputs 
of the utility function are presented. As it can be seen, the weight attributed to the check-in 
time and to the access time is higher than the one attributed to the journey time. This is 
because it is generally assumed that the traveller’s perception of time differs according to 
the travelling stage. On the other hand, the value attributed to the frequency power (θ2) is 
the one that seems to best fit the utility function. With regard to the average fare and the 
average cost, a factor equal to 1 was defined. Finally, since the generalised journey cost 
reflects the disutility of the travel (the utility drops with the cost61), the scale factor for the 
generalised journey cost (λ) was given a negative value (consequently, the scale factor α 
will be positive). The quality factor scores, which quantify positive aspects of the journey 
(e.g. reliability, accessibility, etc.), will reduce the disutility implied by the generalised 
journey cost.     
 
 
TABLE 3.19 CALIBRATION OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION  
γ1 γ2 θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 λ 
1 1 1 7,5 1,5 1,25 -1 
 
 
With regard to the value of time, there is no common value of time used for use in 
European appraisals. For the present study, the value defined by SDG (2006) is the one 
that will be used. This corresponds to a VoT of 59 €/hour for business passengers and 7 
€/hour for leisure passengers. Assuming that on high speed links there is a high proportion 
of business travelers, SDG (2006) assumes that on most of high speed routes 50% of 
passengers are travelling on business62, while on high speed routes crossing the Channel 
Tunnel it is assumed that 67% of passengers are travelling for leisure purposes63. These 
assumptions give an average VoT of 33 €/hour (and 24,16 €/hour for links crossing the 
Channel Tunnel). This value is consistent with the ones given by other authors. For 
instance, Hammadou et al (2002) propose an average VoT of 37 €/hour for French air 
traffic, while Boiteux (2001) proposes a VoT of 32,3 €/hour for first class railways for 
                                                 
61 Logit models assume that travel always has a negative utility, mostly in terms of time and cost, i.e. 
passengers would rather not make the journey, but the positive benefit from doing so (for example, attending 
a business meeting) offsets the disutility of the journey (SDG, 2006). 
62 According to SDG (2006), this is relatively high compared to other air and rail routes but reflects the fact 
that many of these routes are quite short and therefore many leisure passengers, particularly those travelling 
with families or in groups, would travel by car. The same source adds that where figures for the proportion 
of passengers travelling on business are available, they are consistent with this assumption.  
63 This exception is justified by the fact that car does not represent a realistic alternative due to the time and 
cost involved in crossing the Channel Tunnel (SDG, 2006).  
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distances greater than 400 kilometers.  
 
With these values of time and the coefficients affecting the key inputs of the utility 
function, and the current market shares, the scale factor α can be easily calibrated by 














− α11ln  (f. 3.3364) 
 













 is the dependent variable (y) 
• ( )HSijAirij VV −  is the explanatory variable (x) 
• α is the scale factor to be calibrated 
 
 
FIGURE 3.10 MARKET SHARE MODEL: MARKET SHARE OF AIR/RAIL SERVICES 
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The results of the calibration are presented in figure 3.10. It reflects that with the 
aforementioned assumptions made the model calibrates well. 
 
3.7.2.5. Validation of the market share model for European high speed links 
The validation of the model was done with data available for five of the 100 links 
presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4 and for which the mode split was known, namely Madrid-
Seville, Paris-Strasbourg, Paris-Lyons, Paris-Marseilles and Paris-Bordeaux. The data 
used is presented in tables 3.20, 3.21, 3.22 and 3.23. 
 
In this case, the average fares for rail and air transport were calculated as specified in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5. With regard to access costs, they depend on the origin station/airport. 
Therefore, the values adopted for the links with its origin in Paris are the same as the ones 
proposed in table 3.15 for the journey starting in Paris. The equivalent assumption applies 
to the Madrid-Seville link.  
 
 
TABLE 3.20 AVERAGE FARE AND AVERAGE ACCESS COST. LINKS FOR MODEL 
VALIDATION 
Average fare (€) Access cost (€) 
Route Rail Air Rail Air 
Paris - Lyon 44,03 123,34 10 15 
Madrid - Sevilla 52,35 165,9 5 10 
Paris - Strasbourg 34,65 138,42 10 15 
Paris - Bordeaux 47,78 186,66 10 15 
Paris - Marseille 56,4 193,44 10 15 
 
 













R A R A R A R A R A 
Paris - Lyon 115 65 33 27 20 24 0 50 30 45 
Madrid - Sevilla 140 60 22 13 26 38 5 45 30 45 
Paris - Strasbourg 284 60 17 19 38 29 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Bordeaux 191 70 19 43 29 17 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Marseille 183 65 24 45 25 18 0 50 30 45 
Remarks: R stands for railways and A for airways. 
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The journey time (in-vehicle time) was obtained from the tickets “bought”, and the 
frequency calculated from Cook (2005) for railways and the airports’ websites for 
airways. With regard to the minimum frequency penalty, its quantification was based on 
the assumptions presented in section 3.7.2.3. Concerning the check-in and the access 
times, it was assumed that the values for the French and the Spanish links given in table 
3.16 are valid in other French and Spanish national links. The same assumption was made 
when defining the quality factor scores of the French links used for the model validation 
(see table 3.22). 
 
Finally, the (real) rail market share for the links used for the model validation is the one 
presented in table 3.23. 
 
 
TABLE 3.22 QUALITY FACTOR SCORES (10 IS BEST). LINKS FOR MODEL VALIDATION 




quality Scores Route 
R A R A R A R A R A 
Paris - Lyon 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Madrid - Sevilla 10 6 0 10 0 5 9 5 19 26 
Paris - Strasbourg 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Bordeaux 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Marseille 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Remarks: R stands for railways and A for airways. 
 
 
TABLE 3.23 MODAL SPLIT REGISTERED IN THE HIGH SPEED LINKS ANALYSED. LINKS 
FOR MODEL VALIDATION 
Source: Own from López-Pita et al (2007) and Sánchez-Borràs et al (2008a) 
data 
Route Rail market share 
Paris - Lyon 92% 
Madrid - Sevilla 92% 
Paris - Strasbourg 60% 
Paris - Bordeaux 68% 
Paris - Marseille 69% 
 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the results of the model validation obtained from the data presented in 
tables 3.20 to 3.23. It can be seen that the model is only properly validated after applying 
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a factor of 1,8 to air ticket fares for those French links served by services running on new 
high speed lines and offering journey times of around 3 hours (see figure 3.11b). If, on the 
contrary, the assumptions on the calculation of air ticket fares presented in section 3.5.2 
are applied to these links, the results do not come close to the actual average fare; indeed, 
the value obtained for the Paris-Marseilles link with the assumptions presented in section 
3.5.2 is for instance almost twice as high as the average value given by SDG (2006) for 
the same link. This could be explained by the fact that in such links, the application of  
yield management may lead to especially high air ticket fares at the morning peak65 
compared to the fares for other time periods.      
 
 
























Paris – Strasbourg   
Paris – Marseille
Paris – Bordeaux












-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200
Vij_Rail- Vij_Air
Paris – Strasbourg    
Paris – Marseille
Paris – Bordeaux     




Paris - Lyon 92% 90,7% 
Madrid - Sevilla 92% (1) 92,6% 
Paris - Strasbourg 60% 66,1% 
Paris - Bordeaux 68% 69,4% 
Paris - Marseille 69% 69,9% 
(1) Value obtained from López-Pita et al (2007). It 
differs from the one published by SDG (2006). 
a)  Results of the model validation with the data 
presented in tables 3.20 to 3.23 
b) Results of the model validation applying an 
adjustment to air fares (factor of 1,8) for 
French links served by services running on new 
high speed lines and offering journey times of 
around 3 hours,  in order to bring air fares nearer 




Paris - Lyon 92% 90,7% 
Madrid - Sevilla 92% (1) 92,6% 
Paris - Strasbourg 60% 66,1% 
Paris - Bordeaux 68% 93,1% 
Paris - Marseille 69% 93,3% 
(1) Value obtained from López-Pita et al (2007). It 




Therefore, the validated model, which is the one that will be used in chapter 6 to quantify 
the change in market share resulting from a reduction (or increase) in rail infrastructure 
charges, takes the following expression: 
                                                 
65 As seen in sections 3.3 and 3.5, the fare tickets calculated for this study are the ones applicable to journeys 
starting at 8 a.m. 
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 ScorestAccessfareAv +−− cos..  (f. 3.35) 
 
being VoT equal to 33 €/hour, except for the links crossing the Channel Tunnel, for which 




3.8. OUTPUTS FROM THE CALCULATIONS OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGES AND REVENUES 
 
The outputs from the calculations of infrastructure charges and revenues for the links 
composing the network modelled in section 3.2.2 are presented in annex A6. Annex A7 
summarises the segmentation and the assumptions needed in order to calculate the rail 




                                                 
66 The segmentation is presented only for a selection of links because of the large amount of pages that 
would be needed to summarise it for all the links analysed. Nevertheless, the segmentation and assumtions 
needed in order to calculate the rail infrastructure charges for the rest of the links are available on request. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE AND VALUE OF 
RAIL CHARGES FOR THE USE OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN HIGH 





As stated in chapter 3, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the rail infrastructure pricing 
systems implemented in the European railway networks, with the aim of analysing and 
quantifying the mark ups above marginal cost that are being charged to high speed 
services running on the European high speed lines, as well as coming to some conclusions 
on the criteria for applying mark ups in the pricing systems implemented on the European 




4.2. CHARACTERISATION OF THE PRICING SYSTEMS IN COUNTRIES 
WITH HIGH SPEED LINES IN OPERATION 
 
In chapter 2 a brief introduction has been presented on the current situation of European 
charges for the use of rail infrastructure. This section thoroughly analyses the specificities 
of the rail infrastructure charging systems of the countries with high speed lines in 
operation, paying special attention to the charging specificities in high speed lines and the 
application of mark ups.  
 
Annex A1 (figure A1.7 and table A1.2) shows that new high speed lines have been built 
in France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden.  
 
The new high speed lines built Denmark and Sweden present the specificity of being 
bridges. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom passenger transport is mostly carried 
out by franchised passenger train operators. Because of these peculiarities, the charging 
systems of these three countries will be treated separately in annex A8. In section 4.2, the 
characterisation of the pricing systems focuses on France, Spain, Germany, Italy and 
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Belgium, which all of them have more than 100 km of new high speed lines within their 
territory (see annex A1, table A1.2).      
 
 
4.2.1. French rail infrastructure charging system   
 
The current French infrastructure manager and owner of the French railway network, 
Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), was created in 1997 by Law Nr 97-135 as a state-owned 
company. Since then, RFF bills SNCF (the national French operator) as a railway 
undertaking. From 1997 to 2001, RFF billed SNCF lump sums as charges but since 2002, 
a dedicated charging information system is applied (Remond, 2004). 
 
The current legal framework for rail infrastructure charges is defined in decrees 
(“arrêtés”), approved by the Ministry of Transport on proposal of RFF. They contain the 
structure and the amount of charges for the use of rail infrastructure. Its content is 
published in the annual Network Statements, the preparation and publication of which is 
under RFF’s responsibility. 
 
Infrastructure charges for the use of the French railway network are based on short-run 
marginal costs68. Hence, charges cover the marginal costs of using the existing 
infrastructure, including scarcity/congestion costs but excluding external accident, air 
pollution and noise costs, which are neither covered by charges nor any other means. 
Infrastructure charges also partly cover traffic management, maintenance, renewals and 
investment costs, by means of mark ups to the marginal cost. This stems from the contents 
of law 91-135, which does not allow RFF to accept any development project if no balance 
between new cost and new charges is made, either by government or local authorities 
subsidies or by means of mark ups on infrastructure charges. 
 
With this MC+ charging system, in 2004 RFF covered 63% of its total infrastructure costs 
(including loans and grants), as well as 90% of its infrastructure maintenance costs 
(CEMT, 2005); the remaining percentage being paid by the central government, except for 
renewals and investment costs, which are sometimes covered by regional governments. 
The total infrastructure expenditure recovery is currently expected to be higher than the 
one registered in 2004: according to Remond (2004), RFF was allowed to increase its 
2004 and 2005 prices in order to reach the “small balance” between charges incomes and 
maintenance-operation costs as from 2008. The charges calculated for 2006 in two high 
speed links, Paris-Lyons and Paris-Marseilles, show that, indeed, infrastructure charges 
                                                 
68 However, according to the French Network Statement, infrastructure charges would be determined 
according to financial considerations. This would mean that a detailed calculation of infrastructure marginal 
costs would not be carried out. 
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did increase in the 2004-2006 period: running from Paris to Lyons cost 11,09 €/train-km 
in 2004 (Remond, 2004) versus 14,6 €/train-km in 2006 (Sánchez-Borràs from data from 
RFF’s Network Statement 2006); for the same period, in the Paris-Marseilles link charges 
amounted 8,55 €/train-km in 2004 and 10,3 €/train-km in 2006 (same sources as for Paris-
Lyons). 
 
In annex A3 the structure and the tariffs of the French pricing system have been 
summarised, according to the data published in RFF’s Network Statement for 2006. Its 
structure follows the one outlined in Directive 2001/14/EC (see figure 1.11). With regard 
to the minimum access package, charges are divided into two different groups according 
to the characteristics they reflect: 
 
• Charges reflecting infrastructure characteristics (access charge and reservation 
charge, both for train-paths and stations) 
 
• Charges reflecting traffic characteristics (running charge)  
 
The access charge is a fixed charge, whilst the other ones are variable. Therefore, the 
charging system corresponds to a two-part tariff structure. 
 
In France, the marginal costs for using the infrastructure are approximately reflected in the 
running charge and the charge for electric traction facilities69. The running charge70 is 
supposed to reflect the cost of running different types of trains on the network (national 
and regional passenger trains and freight trains). However, according to Gaudry and 
Quinet’s (2003) findings, regional passenger trains should pay higher running charges 
than national passenger trains and freight trains, since the relative marginal costs of the 
former have been found to be higher than the latter (see section 1.4.2.1). This could be 
interpreted as charges meant to consider wear and tear costs actually being rather set to 
reflect the operator’s ability to pay distinguishing by category of passenger and freight 
train. Perhaps it also allows for the fact that higher infrastructure quality is often linked 
                                                 
69 The charge for electric traction facilities only covers the cost of the substations and the overhead contact 
lines, i.e. it does not cover all the costs of maintenance of the transmission and distribution network 
belonging to RFF (CENIT et al, 2007a). Its value depends on the type of train, being national high speed 
trains the ones having to pay higher amounts for this concept (0,442 €/train-electric km, compared to 4,33 
€/train-electric km for regional passenger trains Île de France, 0,317 €/train-electric km for national 
passenger trains other than high speed trains, 0,36 €/train-electric km for freight trains and 0,219 €/train-
electric km for other regional passenger trains). The power transmission (charge for additional services) is 
charged separately and adjusted periodically taking into consideration the evolution of electricity public 
charging.    
70 The running charge is expressed in unit price per train-kilometre and currently it does not distinguish per 
type of infrastructure, even if the structure of the network statement makes think that it will do so in the 
future. Therefore, the structure of the network statement makes think that in the future, running charges will 
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with high average maintenance costs due to more restrictive maintenance intervention 
thresholds, even if the marginal cost is low (this aspect will be further developed in 
section 4.4). 
 
The mark ups implemented in the French charging system have been introduced in the 
fixed component (access charge) and the reservation charge (both for train paths and for 
stopping at a station), which are clearly subject to substantial mark ups, differentiated by 
broad category of passenger train, location and time of day. 
 
The fixed component (access charge) is given in €/train-km and reflects the different 
quality levels of the sections composing the railway network as well as the amount of 
traffic borne (high, medium and low) and, in some cases, the maximum speed allowed on 
those. These quality levels are defined by classifying the sections composing the network 
into four different categories: suburban lines, main intercity lines, high speed lines and 
other lines.  
 
With regard to high speed lines, they are classified into five different subcategories71, 
namely: 
 
• N1: High speed lines with high traffic (TGV Sud Est, TGV Atlantique –from Paris 
to Courtalain– and TGV Nord Europe –from Paris to Lille–). 
 
• N2: High speed lines with medium traffic (TGV Rhône Alpes, TGV Nord –from 
Lille to Belgian border, TGV Jonction Atlantique, TGV Atlantique –from 
Courtalain to Le Mans and St Pierre bifurcation– and TGV Nord Europe from Lille 
to Hazebruck–). 
 
• N2*: Mediterranean high speed line with medium traffic (TGV Méditerranée –
from Valence to Roquemoure–). 
 
• N3: High speed lines with low traffic (TGV Atlantique –from St Pierre bifurcation 
to Monts, TGV Jonction and TGV Nord-Europe –from Hazebruck to Calais). 
 
 
                                                 
71 According to Remond (2004), the length in kilometres for each subcategory is as follows: 287 km for 
subcategory A (suburban lines with high traffic); 985 km for subcategory B (suburban lines with medium 
traffic); 7.209 for subcategories C (main intercity lines with high traffic) and C* (main intercity lines with 
high traffic and maximal speeds of 220 km/h); 5.840 for subcategories D (main intercity lines with medium 
traffic) and D* (main intercity lines with medium traffic and maximal speeds of 220 km/h); 12.738 km for 
subcategory E; 718 for subcategory N1; 457 for subcategories N2 and N2*; and 321 km for subcategories 
N3 and N3*. 
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• N3*: Mediterranean high speed line with low traffic (TGV Méditerranée –from 
Roquemoure to Marseilles–). 
 
The access charge is the same for all high speed lines subcategories (0,946 €/km) and its 
value is about 60 times higher than the one charged to other types of lines, for which a 
charge of 0,015 €/train-km (for suburban lines –A, B– and main intercity lines with high 
traffic –C, C*–) or 0,000 €/train-km (for main intercity lines with medium traffic or other 
lines) is due.  
 
Reservation charges are divided into a train-path reservation charge and a reservation 
charge for stopping at a station. Both types differentiate tariffs according to the 
infrastructure categorisation presented above, as well as to the time of day, considering 
three different options (off-peak, normal and peak hour), which ensure that the operators 
that value more the traffic in peak hours pay more for reserving the capacity. 
 
Concerning the train-path reservation charge, it is expressed in terms of euros per train-
kilometre reserved. For high speed lines, three different tariffs are defined: a more 
expensive one for subcategory N1, a cheaper one for subcategories N2 and N2* and an 
even cheaper one for subcategories N3 and N3*. With regard to the tariffs applied to the 
other line categories, in peak and off-peak hours train-path reservation charges for high 
speed lines are more expensive than for the rest of lines, with the exception of suburban 
lines with high traffic (subcategory A), which are more expensive at peak hours. The same 
applies to normal hours, with the particularity that in this case the charge for high speed 
lines with high traffic (subcategory N1) is the highest. According to Remond (2004), these 
differences are linked to the scarcity of capacity, according to the level of traffic registered 
on each line. CENIT et al (2007a) add that it could be considered that congestion is 
charged by reservation charges according to two different parameters: the time period and 
the situation of the line with regard to a big city (in view of the spatial distribution of the 
different subcategories). Therefore, the reservation charge can be considered as a proxy 
for scarcity costs related to the use of the infrastructure. In addition, the same source 
considers that mark ups related to high potential demand markets could be behind the 
definition of different subcategories for same infrastructure characteristics (e.g. high speed 
lines), which result in higher prices in sections close to main cities like Paris and Lyons.  
 
With regard to the reservation charge for stopping at a station, it is expressed in euros per 
stop reserved. This charge only has to be paid in runs taking place at normal and peak 
hours. In both cases, tariffs for high speed lines and suburban lines with high traffic 
(subcategories N1 and A) are equivalent (7,200 €/train and 24,350 €/train for normal and 
peak hours, respectively). For the rest of lines, the reservation fee amounts 5,500 €/train 
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hours (with the only exception of category E, for which the charge is lower: 10,000 
€/train). Like train-path reservation charges, reservation charges for stopping at a station 
reflect the scarcity of capacity of the infrastructure.  
 
Reservation charges, which in 2005 amounted to more than 60% of total infrastructure 
fees, appear to be where most mark ups are applied. IMPRINTE-NET (2006) highlighted 
that mark ups above marginal cost for high speed lines with high traffic (N1) amount to 
many times marginal cost (see table 4.1). Calculations done by the author for the year 
2006 for runs at peak periods, give charges of 14,6 and 10,3 €/train-km for the Paris-
Lyons and the Paris-Marseilles links, respectively, values considerably higher than the 
optimal mark up defined in chapter 1 (section 1.4.2.3). According to Crozet (2006), the 
strong demand with low elasticity allows applying such high mark ups, which result from 
the application of a Ramsey-Boiteux pricing scheme. And according to RFF’s recent 
suggestions to French transport policy makers, charges could be further modulated so that 
unprofitable routes or services are funded through a levy on high speed rail undertakings 
turnover (Sauvant, 2008). 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES AND MARGINAL COSTS OF THE FRENCH 
RAILWAY NETWORK IN 2005 















N1 53,4 72,3 91 163 110 655 
N2 12,5 26,1 24 51 27 61 
N3 3,4 12,4 8 20 8 12 
N2* 5,6 10,3 11 21 12 27 









Tot. 78,3 130,6 141 271 166 767 
A 44,4 190 53 243 137 509 
B 59,8 231 71 303 172 264 
C 230,5 887 275 1.162 497 418 
C* 17,9 51 21 72 35 45 
D 78,2 499 219 718 281 123 
D* 2,6 8 7 15 8 7 





Tot. 474,6 2.392 754 3.145 1.260 1.427 
Total 552,9 2.522 895 3.416 1.426 2.194 
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FIGURE 4.1 LEVEL OF CHARGES FOR THE FRENCH RAILWAY NETWORK IN 2006   











PEAK HOUR NORMAL HOUR OFF-PEAK HOUR
Line category: 
N1 (HSL with high traffic) 
C & C* (main intercity line with high traffic) 
N2 & N2* (HSL with medium traffic)
D & D* (main intercity line with medium traffic) 
Remarks: 



















A (suburban line with high traffic) 
14.32 €/train-km 


















TABLE 4.2 WEIGHT OF THE FIXED AND VARIABLE CHARGES FOR FRENCH 
NATIONAL HIGH SPEED LINKS 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs from data from RFF’s Network Statement 2006 
(RFF, 2004) 
Fixed charge Variable charge 
Link  
In € % fixed/total In € % variable/total
Paris – Strasbourg 6,8 €  0,4 % 1.528,7 99,6 % 
Paris – Bordeaux 207,9 € 6,1 % 3.209,6 93,9 % 
Lyon – Marseille  321,2 12,1 % 2.325,4 87,9 % 
Paris – Rennes  174,4 6,3 % 2.586,3 93,7 % 
Paris – Marseille  695,0 9,0 % 6.991,5 91,0 % 
Paris – Tours  202,7 7,7 % 2.414,7 92,3 % 
Paris – Lyon  390,7 6,2 % 5.912,3 93,8 % 
Paris – Lille  198,5 5,8 % 3.207,4 94,2 % 
Remark: The low fixed charge in the Paris-Strasbourg link compared to the other links is due to the fact 
that in 2006 this link was a conventional line from beginning to end. 
 
 
It must be noted that the ability to pay principle has been applied in France in a quite 
detailed way, since, for a given link, such as for instance Paris-Lyons, the segmentation of 
the infrastructure in different categories permits differentiation of charges according to 
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as being constituted by category A (suburban line with high traffic), N1 (high speed line 
with high traffic), N3 (high speed line with low traffic), C (main intercity line with high 
traffic) and finally A again at its arrival in Lyons. 
 
Figure 4.1 summarises the unit level of charges for the French railway network, resulting 
from the charging system described. On the other hand, table 4.2 shows that this structure 
of charges entails a two part tariff structure where the variable component of the charge 
has a very important weight (around 90% of the total charges) whereas fixed charges take 
a secondary role. 
 
 
4.2.2. Spanish rail infrastructure charging system   
 
The current Spanish infrastructure manager, Administrador de Infraestructuras 
Ferroviarias (Adif), was established in 2005 as the result of the integration of GIF (the 
former rail infrastructure manager, in charge of the construction and the operation of new 
high speed lines) with Renfe and the segregation of the Operation Services, which 
currently constitute Renfe-Operadora, the national Spanish rail operator.  
 
The legal framework for rail infrastructure charges is defined by the Railway Sector 
Spanish Law 39/2003 of 17 November (Ley del Sector Ferroviario, LSF). In its Titles II 
and III, the LSF establishes that the settlement of charges or private prices for the 
provision of additional, supplementary and ancillary services corresponds to Adif. In 
addition, in its Titles V and VI, and articles 74 and 75, the LSF establishes a tariff for 
using railway lines to be applied for the allocation of the network capacity and the use of 
stations and other railway facilities. The amounts of these tariffs are currently set through 
two Ministerial Orders. On the one hand, ORDEN FOM/897/2005 regulates the 
preparation, contents and publishing of the Network Statement, whereas ORDEN 
FOM/898/2005 defines the level of infrastructure charges. 
 
In accordance with Law 39/2003, the basic charging structure reflects the costs incurred 
by the infrastructure manager by introducing different parameters (time period, level of 
traffic, type of line and service, distance covered, type of contract, and type of 
homologation). Hence, infrastructure charges for the use of the Spanish railway network 
are based on marginal costs. 
 
In annex A3 the structure and tariffs of the Spanish pricing system have been summarised, 
according to the data published in Adif’s 2006 Network Statement. Tariffs are divided into 
tariffs for the minimum access package and tariffs for track access to services facilities 
and supply of services. In addition, there is a safety fee for passenger transport and a fee 
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for approval of railway staff training centres and rolling stock maintenance depots. 
 
Tariffs for the minimum access package comprise an access tariff, a reserve capacity 
tariff, an operating tariff and a traffic tariff. The tariffs for track access to services 
facilities and supply of services include five different components: a tariff for stations use, 
a tariff for stabling and use of platforms at stations, a tariff for passing track gauge 
changers, a tariff for use of sidings and a tariff for provision of services requiring 
permission for use of public railway property. As in the French case, the access tariff is a 
fixed charge, whilst the other ones are variable. Therefore, the charging system 
corresponds to a two-part tariff structure. 
 
In Spain, in line with the French charging system, the marginal costs for using the 
infrastructure are approximately reflected by the running charge (operating tariff, 
established according to the train-kilometres actually used and regulating the actual use of 
reserved capacity), which is set according to the variable maintenance, operation and rail 
infrastructure management costs. However, this charge is again differentiated, since 
services running on high speed lines see a tariff varying according to the type of line and 
the service offered (top speed higher or lower than 260 kilometres per hour), which can be 
interpreted as a mark up according to the ability to pay of the market for faster trains, as 
well as according to construction costs. 
 
With regard to the other additive charges, the access tariff regulates the general right to 
use the network and, according to Calvo et al (2006), takes into account the costs related 
to administrative management procedures associated to the infrastructure manager’s 
relations with railway operators. These costs include the costs of staff and equipment for 
their general administration, the publication of the network statement, the elaboration of 
operating plans, the allocation of capacity and the running of trains supervision. The 
tariff’s amounts are established in accordance with the estimated yearly level of traffic for 
a given operator. In total, five different levels of traffic are defined: level N1 for operators 
with a volume of traffic lower than 1 million train-km per year, level N2.A for operators 
with a volume of traffic of 1 to 5 million train-km per year, level N2.B for traffic volumes 
comprised between 5 and 10 million train-km per year, level N3.A for volumes of 10 to 15 
million train-km per year and level N3.B for higher volumes of traffic. Tariffs differ 
considerably  from one level to another (from 60.000 €/year to 1.400.000 €/year for levels 
N1 and N3.B, respectively), due to the non linearity of this scheme.  
 
On the other hand, the capacity reservation tariff (imposed for the availability of the 
requested route and set according to the fixed maintenance, operation and rail 
infrastructure management costs) and the traffic tariff (set according to the financial 
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for guaranteeing the reasonable development of railway infrastructure) are also highly 
differentiated.  
 
Concerning the capacity reservation tariff, the unit values are established according to the 
train-km reserved, taking into account three different parameters, namely: 
 
• The type of line, which reflects the consideration of construction costs: 
Infrastructure is categorised as type A for new high speed lines, type B for 
upgraded lines and type C for conventional lines. In 2006, line type A included 
Madrid-Barcelona (type A.1) and Madrid-Seville (type A.2), even if the Network 
Statement stated that Madrid-Barcelona would be considered line type A.2 until its 
construction was completely finished. Line type B included the Mediterranean 
Corridor, defined as the section between Valencia and Tarragona, and line type C 
included the rest of Adif’s lines. In all cases, tariffs decrease from A.1 to C through 
A.2 and B.   
 
• The type of service to be provided and the type of train (top speeds above or below 
260 km/h), which reflect the ability to pay of faster services, since they usually 
enjoy a better commercial position: Reservation capacity tariffs vary with the type 
of service to be provided, either passenger transport, freight transport or test 
services72. The type of passenger service is further divided into two different 
categories, according to the top speed73 of the service: type of passenger service 
V1 for services with top speed equal to or above 260 km/h and type of passenger 
service V2 for services with top speed below 260 km/h. The tariffs for passenger 
transport are more expensive than the ones for freight transport.  
 
• The period of day affected by the reservation: Reservation capacity tariffs also 
differentiate tariffs amounts according to the period of day, considering three 
different options (off-peak, normal or peak periods). Reservation capacity tariffs 
are considerably higher for peak periods than for off-peak periods (with the 
exception of test services, which pay the same tariff regardless of the period of the 
day affected by the reservation). This differentiation in time periods could be 
interpreted as reservation capacity tariffs considering a congestion component or 
the ability to pay of the market. Furthermore, it should be added that the stopping 
time at the previous station is the one considered for the purposes of the tariff 
application according to the period of the day; therefore, the reservation capacity 
                                                 
72 Test services correspond to train operations carried out to adapt and measure new or existing vehicles, 
which need service entry or operating licences, as well to calibrate any of their components (Adif, 2005). 
73 Top speed is understood to be the maximum effective speed in the corresponding service (Adif, 2005). 
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tariff could incentivise operators towards specific stop patterns (CENIT et al, 
2007a) or incentivise them to plan train departures at off-peak hours. 
 
The consideration of the market’s ability to pay being gauged by the capacity reservation 
tariff is considerable as confirmed by the fact that services reaching 260 km/h on high 
speed lines during peak periods will have to pay amounts almost five times higher than if 
the run took place at off-peak periods. 
 
With regard to the traffic tariff, set according to the financial related costs, the fixed assets 
amortisation costs and, when appropriate, the necessary costs for guaranteeing the 
reasonable development of railway infrastructure, it is clearly a mark up for high speed 
services and a higher one for those running at peak hours, since it only applies to high 
speed lines (passenger services74 with top speeds above 260 km/h) and it varies with the 
time period. Furthermore, it reflects the service commercial value, by taking into account 
the transport capacity offered (seats-km).  
 
With regard to track access to services facilities and supply of services, special mention 
must be made to the tariff for station use. Its value is fixed per passenger and varies 
depending on the class of the station where the trains stop and on the distance travelled. 
With regard to stations, three different station classes are distinguished. The more 
expensive one (class 1) includes 6 stations, all of which are connected to the Spanish high 
speed lines (Madrid-Puerta de Atocha, Barcelona-Sants, Córdoba, Lleida, Sevilla-Santa 
Justa and Zaragoza-Delicias) and are used by almost all high speed services connecting 
Madrid with Seville and Barcelona. Concerning the distance travelled, four different 
tariffs are established according to the length of the route (route of more than 250 km, 
route comprised between 126 and 250 km, 80 km and 125 km or shorter than 80 km). It 
has to be noted that high speed services are characterised by a higher load factor than other 
medium and long distance services, higher travel distances and stops at first category 
stations. Therefore, tariffs for station use seem to be set to reflect the rather favourable 
commercial position of high speed services and their ability to pay higher charges. 
 
Passenger transport security fees seem to follow a similar pattern to the tariff for station 
use. Indeed, the fee is also fixed per passenger and varies depending on the distance 
travelled, although in this case only three categories are defined: route services covering 
less than 150 km, between 150 and 300 km or more than 300 km, with all international 
services explicitly included in the last category. Therefore, international services seem to 
be penalised. 
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The structure of charges presented in the preceding paragraphs gives rise to a two part 
tariff structure where the variable component of the charge amounts to approximately 
99,9% of the total charge for all high speed links analysed75 (Madrid-Toledo, Madrid-
Saragossa, Madrid-Seville, Madrid-Barcelona and Barcelona-Seville). Figure 4.2 
summarises the unit level of charges for the Spanish railway network, resulting from the 
charging system described.  
  
 
FIGURE 4.2 LEVEL OF CHARGES FOR THE SPANISH RAILWAY NETWORK IN 2006 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs et al (2009). 
 















NORMAL HOUR Rail charge (€)
Speed 
OFF-PEAK 
Line category: C1 (conventional line) B1 (upgraded line) 
A2 (high speed line Madrid-Sevilla) A1 (high speed line Madrid-Barcelona) 
Remarks: 
-  Values obtained considering a level of traffic above 15 million train-km/year (and the real number of train-km for the national Spanish 
operator, Renfe, to be 180 million train-km/year approximately) and a length of line of 400 km. 
























4.2.3. German rail infrastructure charging system   
 
The current German infrastructure manager, DB Netz AG, is a subsidiary of DB AG 
Holding, created in 1994 as a public limited company, succeeding the previous German 
railway companies, Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn. In the same year, 
DB AG opened its infrastructure to new entrants and introduced the first German 
infrastructure charging system in order to regulate the use, by railway operators, of the 
infrastructure managed by DB Netz AG.  
 
                                                 
75 In order to allocate the fixed charge to each of the links considered, the value given by Adif was divided 
by the total train-km run in 2004 in the corridor analysed and multiplied by the length of the link for which 
the infrastructure charge was to be calculated. 
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The legal framework for rail infrastructure charging is defined in Art. 14 of Germany’s 
General Railway Act (AEG), which states that “infrastructure managers have to calculate 
their infrastructure charges (....) in such a way that their costs (plus a return on investment 
which can be borne by the market) can be covered”.  
 
The costs to be covered by DB Netz AG and therefore to be borne by the railway 
undertakings through infrastructure charges are the costs of network operation, 
maintenance, administration, and the remainder of the costs connected to infrastructure 
investment after State contributions (Ludwig, 2006), which partly covers investment 
expenditures and renewal costs. CEMT (2005) states that noise costs are also partly 
covered by infrastructure charges.  
 
Therefore, the German infrastructure pricing system aims to full cost recovery (taking into 
account State grants and interest-free loans) for the minimum access package. According 
to CEMT (2005), 60% of infrastructure expenditure (including loans and grants) is 
covered by rail infrastructure charges. According to Railimplement, there is strong 
evidence of high speed trains not covering their true (incremental) infrastructure costs 
when operating on dedicated lines with maximum speeds above 250 km/h. 
 
The current German infrastructure charging system differentiates between pricing systems 
for train paths, facilities (stations and terminals) and additional services.  
 
The current pricing system for train paths, introduced in 2001, is known as Train Path 
Pricing System 2001 (TPS 2001). This system has been set so that it “takes into account 
both the infrastructure costs generated by customer requirements and the financial 
situation of the respective user groups” (DB Netz AG, 2007) and in a way that all 
customers pay the same price for the use of identical services (train path products), 
ensuring a non-discriminatory acces to rail infrastructure. According to DB Netz AG 
network statement, with the purchase of a path all standard services are covered.  
 
In annex A3 the structure and the tariffs of the TPS have been summarised according to 
the data published in DB Netz AG’s 2006 Network Statement. It can be seen that the 
single-stage Train Path Pricing System contains three modular pricing determinants: 
 
• Line category and utilisation  
• Train path products 
• Supplements and deductions 
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takes into account the line category as well as the train path products), a performance-
based component (where the utilisation factor is considered) and other charge components 
(which comprise supplements and deductions). Infrastructure charges for the minimum 
access services are calculated as the product of these three components.   
 
With regard to the usage-based component, it is made up of a base price and a train path 
product. The base price is determined by the quality of the route and expressed per train 
path-kilometre. Specifically, the network has been divided into sections and each one has 
been assigned one class of route availability. In total 12 different classes of route 
availability have been defined (Fplus, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 and F6 for long distance lines; Z1 
and Z2 for feeder lines; and S1, S2 and S3 for urban rapid transit lines), taking into 
consideration objective line features, i.e. a “specific, expense-item infrastructure fitments 
as well as the significance in traffic terms that each section has for users as part of the 
overall network” (DB Netz AG, 2007). As a result of this, the price differentiation is 
market-driven. 
 
Out of these 12 classes of route availability, two are mainly intended for high speed 
traffic, namely: 
 
• Category Fplus lines (High speed lines), which are those of above-average 
importance in traffic terms and which can be worked at speeds above 280 km/h for 
the most part. 
 
• Category F1 lines (High speed lines), which combines all lines that can be worked 
at speeds between 200 km/h and 280 km/h. 
 
The base price attributed to categories Fplus and F1 (new lines, i.e. high speed lines) is 
much higher than the one for the other classes of route availability (8,30 and 3,79 €/train 
path-km versus 1,46 to 2,51 €/train path-km for the other classes). 
 
The train path products, which complete the usage-based component, enable the train path 
system to adjust to differing market needs (DB Netz AG, 2007), correspondingly ensuring 
a market focus. These multipliers of the base price are divided into five pathing products 
for passenger traffic (express path, long distance regular interval path, local regular 
interval path, economy path, light running passenger service path) and four pathing 
products for freight traffic (express path, standard path, out-of-gauge path, light running 
freight path).  
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The level of the product factor is determined by the costs caused by customer’s 
requirements and quality and the willingness to pay, i.e. the impact of charge levels on the 
competitiveness of RUs. Figure 4.3 shows that express paths and long distance regular 
interval paths are the ones where the willingness to pay and quality demands in terms of 
time and routing are the highest. It needs to be highlighted that high speed services are 
specifically prone to use these two categories of passenger traffic paths.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.3 DETERMINATION OF THE LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT FACTOR   




Concerning the performance-based component, referred to as a utilisation factor, it is 
meant to raise the efficiency of the route network; that is to say, it acts as an incentive to 
raise capacity performance. According to the German network statement, it only applies to 
very busy lines for which there are alternative routes, enabling better capacity 
management and a redirection of traffic flows towards routes with low traffic volumes. 
Therefore, congestion is considered in the charging system by means of a mark up. 
 
This utilisation factor charges a supplement of 20% for routes with extremely high 
utilisation, which often coincide with new lines (high speed lines –HSL–) or upgraded 
lines (see figure 4.4).  
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the regular path price. No in-depth comment will be made of those components, since 
none of them is especially relevant in high speed services76.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.4 GERMAN RAIL ROUTES WITH EXTREMELY HIGH UTILISATION (left) AND 
HIGH SPEED LINES (right) 











With regard to the charging of facilities (stations and terminals), stops at stations are 
charged according to their geographical location (federal Länder) and to six different 
categories (long distance transport nodes –1–; stations belonging to the long distance 
system –2–; local transport nodes with, eventually, long distance stations –3–; very busy 
local transport stations –4– (local transport nodes); stations of the local transport system –
5–; and local transport stations –6–), category 1 being the most expensive one and 
                                                 
76 On the one hand, the load component only applies to freight traffic and reflects the additional expenditure 
that heavy trains cause through increased wear and capacity consumption; on the other hand, the regional 
factor only affects local passenger trains. 
Remarks:  




- In red, HSL allowing speeds of 300 km/h 
- In yellow, HSL allowing speeds equal to or 
above 250 km/h  
- In blue, upgraded lines allowing speeds equal 
to or above 200 km/h 
- In grey, conventional lines, sometimes 
upgraded to run with speeds up to 160 km/h 
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category 6 the cheapest one in each federal Land (see table 4.3). Those prices are 
modified with a factor taking into consideration the length of the train (factor 1 for trains 
shorter than 180 m and factor 2 for trains longer than 180 m).  Since high speed trains use 
mainly station categories 1 and 2 (sometimes category 3 too), it could be considered that 
stations are charged according to the ability to pay of the market. Furthermore, the system 
incentivises to run frequent short trains, rather than sporadic long trains. 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 CHARGING OF FACILITIES (STATIONS AND TERMINALS) FOR THE YEAR 
2006  
Source: Sánchez-Borràs from DB Netz AG’s Network Statement for the year 
2006 
Station category (prices in €) 
Federal Länder 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baden-Württemberg 14,82 11,74 6,87 1,47 2,31 2,03 
Bayern 14,51 12,22 8,54 1,44 2,32 2,01 
Berlin 13,96 6,59 8,38 1,01 3,10  
Brandenburg  25,65 19,94 2,74 6,95 3,44 
Bremen 29,73  17,17 2,55 5,86 2,72 
Hamburg 14,71 10,28 5,70 2,58 3,16  
Hessen 18,71 15,81 4,65 1,85 2,37 2,32 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  27,98 18,80 1,28 9,03 2,72 
Niedersachsen 26,31 16,61 6,53 1,96 2,75 2,61 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 16,82 14,31 5,81 1,89 2,83 2,79 
Rheinland-Pfalz 21,68 18,81 9,56 1,31 1,73 1,47 
Saarland  26,17 6,86 1,09 1,46 1,25 
Sachsen 40,01 28,39 18,58 2,05 3,71 2,36 
Sachsen-Anhalt  34,64 10,15 1,91 2,83 2,23 
Schleswig-Holstein  31,02 8,10 1,76 4,06 2,56 




From the paragraphs above it can be concluded that the German charging system applies 
mark ups to high speed lines and differentiate by category of passenger trains and location. 
However, those mark ups do not strictly follow the Ramsey-Boiteux principle. Figure 4.5 
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FIGURE 4.5 LEVEL OF CHARGES FOR THE GERMAN RAILWAY NETWORK IN 2006 














- The consideration of busy sections requires to multiply the given values by a coefficient 1.20 (20% increase). 
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4.2.4. Italian rail infrastructure charging system   
 
The current Italian infrastructure manager, Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA (RFI), was 
created in 2001 as a result of the restructuring of the Gruppo Ferrovie dello Stato (a 100% 
State owned holding) defined by Decree 168/T of 31st October 2000. Since then, 
infrastructure charges are charged to railway operators, Trenitalia, the State-owned-
operator, being the main one.  
 
The determination of the Italian  charging  system  is defined  by the Legislative  Decree 
N. 188 of 8th July 2003 (DLgs 188/03), which transposed Directive 2001/14/EC (as well 
as the other two Directives of the First Railway Package) into national law. According to 
DLgs 188/03, the acceptance of an infrastructure management proposal must be subject to 
an examination by the Ministries’ Board for Economical Planning (Comitato 
Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica, CIPE), a pan governmental 
institution that decides on the appropriateness of implementing it through an 
infrastructure/transport ministry legislative decree. Currently, the legal framework for rail 
infrastructure charges is set by the Ministry Decrees DM 43/T of 21st March 2000 and 
Decree DM 44/T of 22nd March 2000. The first one defines the charging principles and 
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presents the formula for calculating the charge for the Minimum Access Package77. The 
second one establishes a temporary discount, aimed at partially compensating the higher 
costs incurred in connection with the technological underdevelopment of the railway 
network. 
 
Infrastructure charges for the use of the Italian railway network cover the full cost after 
State grants. Specifically, out of all infrastructure management costs, infrastructure 
charges paid by railway operators to RFI cover part of the running cost (all traffic 
management costs –a share of direct and indirect overheads relating to traffic movements, 
the costs of electricity for electric traction, as well as scarcity/congestion costs– and part 
of IM’s salary costs), while maintenance costs are covered by the State, by means of a 
public service contract (Contratto di Programma) renewed every five years. The State 
also covers the full costs of renewals and investment and the part of salary costs not 
covered by infrastructure charges. Accidents, pollution and noise costs are neither covered 
by infrastructure charges nor the State. 
 
According to CEMT (2005) “the basic approach taken to charging in Italy is described by 
RFI as being based on short-run marginal cost”. Nevertheless, figures cited on the same 
source regarding the recovery of total costs from access charges for the year 2004 (cost 
recovery rate of 16%, which represents approximately a third of routine maintenance 
costs) showed that the Italian charging approach fails to recover important elements of 
marginal cost, namely maintenance and renewals. 
 
Infrastructure charges can be divided into charges for the minimum access package, for 
mandatory services, for complementary services and for ancillary services. For the 
services not included in the access charge, the amount to be paid by RUs are determined 
according to the resources used and other costs supported by RFI for the supply of those 
services. 
 
Infrastructure charges for the minimum access package consist on an access charge to 
which some discounts can be applied according to Decree DM 44/T of 22nd March 2000. 
Since these discounts only apply to lines with technological underdevelopment, which is 
not the case of high speed lines, they will not be treated in detail in this report. 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the lines with a top speed above 200 km/h 
are partly subsidised through this discount, even if DM 44/T means it to compensate the 
                                                 
77 Its values are updated in subsequent decrees: Decree of 11 April 2003 (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica 
Italiana, Serie Generale, N. 114 of 19 May, 2003), Decree of 15 July 2003 (Gazzetta Ufficiale della 
Repubblica Italiana, Serie Generale, M. 174 of 29 July, 2003) and Decree of 24 March 2005 (Gazzetta 
Ufficialeº, N. 91 of 20 April, 2005). The most recent update is found in Ministry Decree of 18 August 2006, 
the values of which apply to the year 2007. Therefore, the values published in it will not be analysed in this 
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technological backwardness of the network (CENIT et al, 2007a). 
 
In terms of charging for the minimum access package, the Italian network has been 
categorised in: 
 
• Trunk lines: 78 sections  
• Main nodes: 8 nodes 
• Complementary lines: secondary lines (191 sections), low traffic lines (42 
sections) and shuttle lines (15 sections) 
 
This categorisation is meant to reflect the quality of each part of the Italian railway 
network (number of tracks, speed and technological equipment). 
 
The structure and the tariffs of the Italian access charge (on the basis of the data published 
in RFI’s 2006 Network Statement) is presented in annex A3. In Italy, the charge for the 
use of the infrastructure is composed of: 
 
• A charge per section/node (Rsection/node): a fixed charge which corresponds to the 
access cost for each section or node.  
 
• A charge per kilometre/minute (Rkm/minutes): a variable charge which is intended to 
reflect the cost of the use of the infrastructure contingent on the distance run in 
each section and the minutes spent within a node.  
 
• A charge for power consumption (Rpower consumption): a variable charge which 
corresponds to the cost of using traction electric power. 
 
The fixed charge of the Italian two-part tariff charging structure varies according to the 
characteristics of the route used (trunk lines and complementary lines), taking into account 
the quality of the railway infrastructure depending on the maximum speed and the 
technical layout of the line. Specifically, four different values have been established for 
trunk lines:  
 
• One for double track lines with maximum speeds up to 250 km/h (64,56 
€/section78): The only line that belongs to this category is the Direttissima line 
(high speed rail link between Florence and Rome), the first Italian high speed line.  
                                                 
78 The values presented in the text for the Italian network correspond to the ones defined by the Decree of 21 
March 2000. Their update for 2005 requires to increase the stated value by 1,4% and again 1,7% to take into 
account the inflation rate published in the Decrees of 15 July 2003 and 24 March 2005 (Gazzetta Ufficiale 
della Repubblica Italiana, 2000, 2003, 2005). 
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• One for double track lines with maximum speeds up to 200 km/h (56,81 €/section): 
In this category we find five different sections, namely the Rome-Naples high 
speed line and four sections that are projected to be new or upgraded lines in a near 
future: Bologna-Milan, Bologna-Florence, Salermo-Paola and Paola-Reggio 
Calabria Centrale.   
 
• One for double track lines with maximum speeds lower than 200 km/h (54,23 
€/section).  
 
• Another one for single track lines (49,06 €/section). 
 
The fixed charge is paid for each node and trunk line, but only once for all secondary lines 
(RFI, 2004b). Four different values are applied to trunk lines. According to Nash (2004), 
this charge, which includes also a train-path reservation charge, may deter some operators 
from entering the market at all, since it has to be paid by all operators. 
 
The variable part of the Italian access charges (Rkm/minutes and Rpower consumption) also varies 
according to the characteristics of the route used (trunk lines, complementary lines and 
nodes).  
 
With regard to Rkm/minutes, the calculation of the different parts of the network follows 
different patterns: 
 
• For trunk lines, the charge is calculated as the sum of three parameters: the first 
one (Pspeed) takes into account the inefficient use of capacity (congestion), by 
determining the deviation between the commercial speed of the train in relation to 
the average speed defined for the section; the second one (Pdensity) takes into 
consideration the traffic demand, distinguishing between time periods; finally, the 
third one (Pusage) takes into account the wear and tear (of both track and electrical 
wire) caused by the rolling stock, considering its running speed and weight. All 
three parameters vary according to the number of kilometres run on each section.   
 
• For complementary lines, the price only takes into account the number of 
kilometres run. Therefore, neither congestion nor traffic demand are considered. 
 
• For nodes, the price varies with the number of minutes spent in a node and with the 
time period (peak hour –from 6 to 9 a.m. –, semi-peak hour –9 a.m. to 10 p.m. and 
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expensive ones and night periods the cheapest. Therefore, this charges could be 




TABLE 4.4 WEIGHT OF THE FIXED AND VARIABLE CHARGES FOR ITALIAN NATIONAL 
HIGH SPEED LINKS 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs from RFI’s Network Statement 2006 (RFI, 2004) 
Fixed charge Variable charge 
Link  
In € % fixed/total In € % variable/total
Firenze – Milano  223,7 €  19,9 % 898,4 € 80,1 % 
Roma – Firenze  173,1 € 17,5 % 816,1 € 82,5 % 
Roma – Napoli  165,1 € 15,7 % 886,0 € 84,3 % 





FIGURE 4.6 LEVEL OF CHARGES FOR THE ITALIAN RAILWAY NETWORK in 2006 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs et al (2009). 
  €/train-km 
Pspeed = 1.0 
Remarks: 
- Calculations made considering a length of line of 400 km (in order to distribute the access charge per train-km) 
- Calculations valid for a train of 430 tonnes (TGV Duplex) with 2 pantographs, running on a line with a reference speed of 120 km/h (speed allowed 
on the Direttissima line between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m.) 
- The value considered for the access charge is the one for the Dirrettissima line for speeds above 200 km/h and the one for double track lines with 
maximum speeds of 200 km/h for speeds below 200km/h. 
- Charges for Stations not included. 
Pspeed = 1.3 Pspeed = 3.0 Pspeed = 5.0 
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The facts above show that the variable charge per kilometre/minute (Rkm/minutes) reflects the 
marginal wear and tear and congestion costs and, by means of the consideration of the 
traffic demand according to three different time periods, includes a mark up according to 
Ramsey pricing on the ability to pay as well.  
 
With regard to Rpower consumption, it is charged according to the number of kilometres run. 
 
The structure presented in the preceding paragraphs outlines a two-part tariff structure 
where the variable component of the access charge has a weight of around 82-84% for 
trains running on high speed lines (see table 4.4), and to the level of charges summarised 
in figure 4.6. It needs to be highlighted that, in the Italian scheme, the mark ups applied 
are not always higher for high speed lines than for conventional lines. 
 
 
4.2.5. Belgian rail infrastructure charging system   
 
In 2005, the Belgian State railway administration SNCB was restructured into a holding 
company (SNCB-Holding) with two subsidiaries: Infrabel, the current infrastructure 
manager, and SNCB, the current State-owned railway operator. 
 
The conditions of use of Infrabel’s infrastructure by railway operators (principles and 
procedures for charging the use of railway infrastructure) are defined by decree law in the 
“Arrêté royal créant le Service de Régulation du Transport ferroviaire et fixant sa 
composition ainsi que le statut applicable à ses membres”, which transposes some 
provisions of Directive 2001/14/EC. 
 
According to CEMT (2005), the Belgian charging system is FC- with a linear tariff per 
train-km and has a cost recovery rate of total infrastructure expenditure (including loans 
and grants) of 20%.  
 
The structure of the Belgian charging system for 2006 is composed of a train path-line 
charge for having access to and using the lines, a train path-facility charge for having 
access to and using tracks with platforms and certain arrival and departure tracks, a 
shunting charge and administrative costs for the handling of capacity applications (see 
annex A3). 
 
The train path-line charge for having access to and using the lines (infrastructure charges 
for the minimum access services) is calculated as the product of a base price P (revised 
and established every year on 1st January according to a weighting of the “sanity price 
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• Environmental incidence coefficient (Ce): this coefficient is supposed to reflect the 
environmental impact of rail transport. Nevertheless, this value does not currently 
affect the amount of infrastructure charges, since it equals 1. According to the 
network statement, this will remain so until other modes of transport are also 
charged for the environmental impact they inflict.  
 
• Category of running priority (Pt): Six running priority categories are defined 
according to the quality of the service offered by the IM and specifically according 
to the level of priority assigned to a train with regard to other trains in case there 
are some traffic disturbances. Categories 1 and 2, which correspond to those 
assigned to high speed trains and classic international passenger trains, are the ones 
to which a higher running importance is assigned, and those for which the 
coefficient value is the highest (increase of 50%). This coefficient might reflect the 
commercial position of the different services. 
 
• Category of admissible weight on track (C): Infrastructure is divided into five 
categories depending on the admissible weight on track: 0-400 tonnes, 401-800 
tonnes, 801-1200 tonnes, 1201-1600 tonnes and 1601-2000 tones. This could be 
interpreted as a way of considering wear and tear costs. However, since this system 
implies that the weight of the train is charged according to a non-linear scheme, it 
could be rather reflecting the costs of planned maintenance and renewals. It should 
be noted that a high speed train such a TGV Duplex weights 430 tonnes and, 
therefore, would be classified in category 2, which implies an increase of the base 
price of 55%. 
 
• Category of line (C1(i) –operational importance of the section– and C2(i)              
–technical equipment of the section–): On the one hand, coefficient C1(i) divides 
infrastructure into five different categories according to the operational importance 
of the sections. The criteria used for this categorisation is not specified in the 
network statement. On the other hand, coefficient C2(i) divides infrastructure 
according to the maximum speeds allowed by the technical equipment of the 
section. Category 1 applies to reference speeds above 220 km/h. The other 
categories group speeds into the following intervals: 160-220 km/h (including the 
Nord-Midi junction), 140-160 km/h, 120-140 km/h, less than 120 km/h, industrial 
lines and lines with restricted operation. Values for speeds above 220 km/h are 
considerably higher than the ones applied to lower speeds. According to 
Railimplement, both coefficients C1(i) and C2(i) can be seen as a proxy for 
congestion costs. 
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• Time period (category H(i)): Three time periods are defined for the Belgian 
network (important or peak hour, medium or semi-peak hour and normal hour). As 
figure 4.7 shows, its definition varies not only with the time of the day, but also 
with the line and running direction. This differentiation by time period, line and 
direction of running could be reflecting the ability to pay of certain services. 
 
• Deviation coefficient with regard to the standard train-path contingent on the 
difference between the train-path running time on the line section and the standard 
running time (T(i)): This coefficient reflects the punctuality of the services. The 
non punctuality of passenger trains is penalised to a greater extent for passenger 
services than for freight services. For instance, passenger trains are penalised for 
deviations from 5,01% with regard to the standard train path, while penalties for 
freight trains apply only if deviations in time journey exceed 100%. Therefore, 




FIGURE 4.7 TIME PERIOD DEFINITION SECTIONS OF THE BELGIAN NETWORK 
PERTAINING TO THE LILLE-BRUSSELS-AMSTERDAM CORRIDOR 
Source: Adapted from Sánchez-Borràs et al. (2008a) 
Off-peak hourNormal hourPeak hour

















From the information above it can be concluded that these coefficients cover the key 
drivers relating to marginal costs (weight of the train, wear and tear on the network, etc) as 
well as other parameters (e.g. environmental coefficient and coefficients that relate to the 
congestion) that compose the social marginal costs of running a train. Furthermore, the 
coefficients include a differentiation by broad category of passenger train (coefficient Pt) 
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FIGURE 4.8 LEVEL OF CHARGES FOR THE BELGIAN RAILWAY NETWORK in 2006 












C2 (cat.4) C2 (cat.3) 
Remarks: 
- Values applicable to high speed trains and classic international passenger trains (weight comprised between 401-800 tonnes) considering a 
punctual service running at peak hours. 
- The values for normal and off-peak hours can be obtained dividing the values presented by 4/3 and 4, respectively. 
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The train path-facility charge for having access to and using tracks with platforms and 
certain arrival and departure tracks is made of the sum of two components: a base price 
increased by coefficients reflecting the nature of the use of a station (Cu) and the 
operational importance of the station and its equipment (C(i)), and the same base price 
increased by coefficients reflecting the operational importance of the station and its 
equipment (C(i)) and the time spent in the station. Therefore, this charge may be 
considering both the ability to pay for certain services and congestion. 
 
Base prices differ by type of service (passenger, freight), the one for freight trains being 
1,25 times higher than the one for passenger trains. 
 
Concerning the nature of the use of stops, the Network Statement defines four different 
types of stops: origin, destination, intermediate commercial stop and stop of service. This 
categorisation may incentivise the operation of direct trains rather than trains with 
intermediate commercial stops. Nevertheless, it does not incentivise, according to CENIT 
et al (2007a), to optimise RU’s operation at origin and destination stations, since the 
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coefficient for origin and destination stations is not contingent on the time spent in those 
by the train. 
 
As per the operational importance of the station and its equipment, it depends on the 
category of the station, as well as on the type of traffic (passenger trains, freight trains). 
The classification of stations established in the Network Statement reflects the importance 
of each station, high speed terminals (Terminal TGV Bruxelles-Midi TGV train-path) 
being the stations that increase the base price the most. The type of traffic considerably 
influences the value of the train path-facility charge for passenger services. Indeed, 
passenger services using the TGV Terminal Brussels-Midi TGV train-path will be 
increased by a C(i) coefficient equal to 20,0.  
 
The weight of train path-facility charges compared to the total charge to be paid by a high 
speed train can be significant. For instance, a railway operator offering a high speed 
service from Brussels to Cologne will have to pay a charge for using the station in 
Brussels almost as expensive as the charge to be paid for running on the 147 km of track 
that separate Brussels from the Belgian-German border in Hergenrath. In the case of the 
Lille-Brussels link, out of the total 1.157,7 € to be paid for running a high speed train on 




4.3. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN 
PRICING SYSTEMS FOR HIGH SPEED SERVICES IN TERMS OF THE 
APPLICATION OF MARK UPS ABOVE MARGINAL COST 
 
The results presented in the preceding section show that rail infrastructure charging 
systems implemented in European countries with high speed lines in operation correspond 
to a second-best charging strategy. On the one hand, France and Spain apply mark ups to 
social marginal cost (MC+). On the other hand, Germany, Italy and Belgium follow a 
pricing policy consisting of collecting the full financial cost minus subsidies (FC-). 
However, it has to be stressed that although Italy nominally uses FC-, the basic approach 
taken to charging is described as being based on short-run marginal cost (CEMT, 2005).  
 
For those charging systems based on marginal cost, the rail access charging consists of 
additive charging components (see table 4.5), with a fixed and a variable component (two-
part tariff); France and Spain both have reservation charges as well. The weight of the 
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With regard to the charging systems based on the collection of the full financial cost 
minus subsidies (FC-), the rail access charging consists of a base price multiplied by 
different coefficients (see table 4.7). The charging structure is therefore a linear tariff. 
 
 
TABLE 4.5 UNIT VALUES CHARGED TO HIGH SPEED SERVICES FOR USING THE 
EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED LINES (2006 VALUES). CASE OF ADDITIVE 
CHARGING SYSTEMS 
Type of charge (values given in €/train-km) 









FR 0,946 0,0896 – 5,366 
1,894 –10,739 
3,565 –12,870 
0,944 0,442  
ES Lump sum 0,65 – 0,75 
1,00 – 2,20 
2,00 – 3,40 
0,70 – 2,00  Traffic tariff: 
0,65 – 1,25 
€/100 seats-
km 
IT 56,81 – 64,56 
€/section 






- When three rank values are given, the first one corresponds to off-peak hours, the second one to normal 
hours and the third one to peak hours. 




TABLE 4.6 WEIGHT OF VARIABLE AND FIXED CHARGES FOR HIGH SPEED SERVICES 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs from data from the corresponding 2006 Network 
Statements, and according to the assumptions presented in chapter 3 
Weight of: 
Country  Tariff structure 
Fixed charges Variables charges 
FR Two-part tariff 12 – 8 % (for 100% NL) 88 – 92% (for 100% NL) 
ES(1) Two-part tariff 0,1 % (for 100% NL) 99,9 % (for 100% NL) 
IT Two-part tariff 20-16 % (for NL or UL) 80 – 84 % (for NL or UL) 
Remarks: 
NL: New line 
UL: Upgraded line 
(1) In order to allocate the fixed charge (published by Adif as a lump sum) to each of the links considered, 
the value given by the IM was divided by the total train-km run each year in the analysed corridor and 
multiplied by the length of the link for which the infrastructure charge was to be calculated. 
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TABLE 4.7 UNIT VALUES CHARGED TO HIGH SPEED SERVICES FOR USING THE 
EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED LINES (2006 VALUES). CASE OF MULTIPLICATIVE 
CHARGING SYSTEMS 
Country Base price Multipliers  
DE 2,50 – 8,30 
(€/train-km) 
- Utilisation factor on busy sections:    1,20 
- Product factor:      1,65 – 1,80 
BE 0,285073 
(€/train-km) 
- Environmental incidence coefficient (Ce):   1 
- Category of running priority (Pt):    1,50 
- Category of admissible weight on track (C):   1,55 
- Operational importance of the section (C1(i)):  2 
- Technical equipment of the section (C2(i)):   3,5 
- Time period (H(i)):      4 
- Deviation coefficient (T(i)):     1 – 1,45 




TABLE 4.8 CHARACTERISATION OF PRICE DIFFERENTIATION APPLIED IN THOSE 
COUNTRIES WHERE THE CHARGING SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON 
MARGINAL COST 
Differentiation by: 
Country Broad category of 
passenger train Location Time of day/week/year 
France Considered indirectly by 
the definition of the 




- High speed  
- Regional 
Considered indirectly by 
the definition of 
subcategories for each 
category of section, which 
are defined taking into 
account the amount of 
traffic borne (high, medium 
and low) and, in some 
cases, also the maximum 
speed allowed on it. 
Time of day: 
- Peak: 6:30-9:00; 
17:00-20:00 
- Normal: 4:31-6-29; 
9:01-16:59; 20:01-
0:30 
- Off-peak: 00:31-4:30 
Spain - Passenger trains with top 
speeds above 260 km/h 
- Passenger trains with top 
speeds below 260 km/h 
Considered indirectly by 
the lines’ categorisation 
(new lines –A–, upgraded 
lines –B–, conventional 
lines –C–). 
Time of day: 
- Peak: 7:00-9:29; 
18:00-20:29 
- Normal: 9:30-17-59; 
20:30-23:59 
- Off-peak: 0:00-6-59 
Italy No differentiation Considered indirectly by 
the route category (trunk, 
complementary, nodes) 
when defining the traffic 
density. 
Time of day: 
- Peak: 6:00-9:00 
- Normal: 9:00-22:00 
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The results presented in the preceding section also show that there seems to be a 
widespread tendency towards applying higher charges to HSL, i.e. of applying higher 
mark ups over marginal costs to HSL. These higher charges in those countries charging 
mark ups to social marginal cost result from the broadly application of Ramsey-Boiteux 
pricing, differentiating by broad category of passenger train, location and time of day, 
each country using however its own criteria (see table 4.8).  
 
 
FIGURE 4.9 UNIT VALUES CHARGED TO HIGH SPEED SERVICES RUNNING AT 250 
KM/H ON THE BEST HIGH SPEED LINE QUALITY OF EACH COUNTRY WITH 
HIGH SPEED LINES. 




























Peak hour Normal hour Off-peak hour 
Remarks: 
- Values for a train running at 250 km/h on the best high speed line quality in each country 
(stops at stations not considered).  
-  Same assumptions as for figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8. 
* According to Nash et al (2006), the probable components of the marginal social cost of rail 
infrastructure use are usually identified as marginal wear and tear cost, marginal congestion 











Area where marginal costs for high speed railways seem to be comprised (all 
marginal social costs considered*), according to evidence on marginal cost 
estimation available up to now.  
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The unit values charged to high speed services running at 250 km/h on the best high speed 
line quality of each country with high speed lines are summarised in figure 4.9. This 
figure shows that mark ups for high speed runs are well above marginal social costs 
(estimations of marginal social costs for each country do not exist, but considering the 
upper limit values of the existing evidence on marginal social cost estimation in Europe 
presented in section 1.4.2, those costs would not exceed 4 €/train-km), as well as above 
the optimal mark up for high speed lines calculated in section 1.4.2. Furthermore, it shows 
that the level of mark ups for high speed lines differ from one country to another. This 
could be due to differences in the level of subsidies in each country (the level of subsidies 
really allocated to HSL is unknown), as well as to different applications of price 
discrimination. 
 
Figure 4.10 presents the level of infrastructure charges in different high speed links of the 
five countries with new high speed lines. It shows that price discrimination results in 
different levels of charges for high speed links within a single country and that in all cases, 
the values for representative national high performance links obtained considering the 
assumption presented in chapter 3, are way above the average charges for passenger 
railway services published by CEMT (2005), which are higher than (or equal to) 2 €/train-
km79. 
 
Neither how the mark ups are implemented in practice nor how they have been calculated 
are clearly explained in the public information available. However, the characterisation of 
the pricing systems for countries with HSL in operation presented in the preceding section 
contributes to shed light on the concepts to which the mark ups seem to be applied in the 
different countries. Those are mark ups based on wear and tear costs, mark ups to recover 
part of the investment costs or mark ups set at a level that the market can bear, taking into 
consideration the commercial position of HSR (see table 4.9). Therefore, infrastructure 
charges for HSL seem to be a mix of recovery of the capital cost with a mark up on what 
the market can bear.  
 
The implementation of these mark ups above marginal cost, although based on the ability 
to pay in all countries, is done very differently from one country to another (table 4.9).  
However, some common features can be identified:  
 
• On the one hand, major mark ups above marginal costs are applied to high speed 
lines: important mark ups on the marginal cost are applied to high speed lines 
with the aim of assisting with cost-recovery. 
                                                 
79 This statement is true even if average access charges correspond to 2004 values, whilst the values for the 
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FIGURE 4.10 COMPARISON BETWEEN RAILWAY CHARGES IN REPRESENTATIVE HIGH 
SPEED FRENCH, GERMAN, ITALIAN, SPANISH AND BELGIAN RAILWAY 
LINKS (FOR 2005-2006) AND THE AVERAGE ACCESS CHARGE (FOR 2004) 
PUBLISHED BY CEMT (2005) FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTRIES.  












































































Average access charge  
(year 2004) 
French charges for HS links 
German charges for HS links
Spanish charges for HS links 
Italian charges for HS links 
Belgian charges for HS links 
LEGEND: 
Remark: France, Italy and Spain apply a two-part tariff structure. The French and the Italian Network 
Statements present their fixed charges (access right) as unit prices to be applied to each single running. In 
contrast to RFF and RFI, Adif publishes fixed charges for the access to infrastructure as a lump sum. In 
order to allocate the fixed charge to each one of the links considered, the value given by the Spanish IM 
was divided by the traffic (expressed in train-km) registered by Renfe for the year 2005 and the value 
obtained used as unit value of the access tariff.  
FR DE 





(it includes all types of passenger services) 
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TABLE 4.9 CONCEPTS TO WHICH MARK UPS SEEM TO BE APPLIED 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs et al (2009). 
Concepts to which mark ups seem to be applied 
Country  
Wear and tear Investment costs Commercial position 
France - Charge for access to 
electric traction 
equipment 
- Access & reservation 
charges (R.ch.: 61% of 
total infrastructure fees 
in 2005) 
- Congestion charges according 
to time period and 
geographical situation 





- Operating tariff: mark 
up for construction costs 
- Traffic tariff: only for 
HSL 
- Capacity reservation (time 
period, top speed) 
- Operating tariff: ability to pay 
for faster trains 
- Traffic tariff (HSL): seat-km 
offered, peak hours 
Germany - Usage based 
component (speed 
differentiation) 
 - Usage-based component: 
market driven (route 
availability, train-path/km) 
- Product factor: WTP 
- Utilisation factor: mark up for 
congestion 
Italy - Rkm/min: cost of the 
use of infrastructure 
- Pwear&tear 
NO - Pspeed: congestion 
- Pdensity: traffic demand, time 
periods 
- Nodes (time, period): mark up 
for congestion 
Belgium - C (Admissible 
weight on track) 
 - Category of running priority 
(Pt) 
- Category of line: congestion 
costs 
- H (time period): ability to pay 
- Train path facility charge: 
ability to pay, congestion 
Remarks: The separation between mark ups applied to investment costs and commercial position is not 




• On the other hand, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is broadly applied in those countries 
charging mark ups to social marginal cost, differentiating by broad category of 
passenger train, location and time of day, although with different criteria in each 
country: Infrastructure charges for high speed lines seem to be a mix of recovery 
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• Finally, mark ups applied to high speed lines seem to be higher than the optimal 
values presented in section 1.4.2.3, except for the Italian case, the only one not 
aiming at recovering investment costs: Calculations published by Sánchez-Borràs 
et al (2008b) for the year 2006 and for a train supposed to leave at 8 a.m. from 
the origin point and heading for the destination point (for those pricing systems 
considering the timetable period for the calculation of infrastructure charges) and 
without taking into consideration intermediate stops in order to ease the 
calculations, result in infrastructure charges above 10 €/train-km for the main 
national links of the countries analysed with the exception of the Italian link 
(Paris-Lyons: 14,6 €/train-km; Madrid-Seville: 10,2 €/train-km; Frankfurt-





4.4. POSSIBLE SIMILARITIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MARK UPS ABOVE 
MARGINAL COST FOR HIGH SPEED SERVICES 
 
Previous works gave average values for infrastructure charges in different European 
countries ranging from less than 0,5 €/train-km to up to 4 €/train-km in the case of 
passenger services (CEMT, 2005). However, others (Crozet, 2004b) said that values for 
particular time periods or specific lines (such as high speed lines) might give rise to much 
higher levels. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have shown that the charging systems applied on the 
networks with new high speed lines in operation involve important mark ups above the 
marginal cost of wear and tear, giving rise to much higher charging values as foreseen by 
Crozet (2004b). The present section intends to analyse whether some similarities in the 
application of mark ups above marginal cost for HSL can be detected in quantitative 
terms. 
 
In the preceding section it has been shown that mark ups seem to be based on wear and 
tear costs and to reflect investment costs and the commercial position. Therefore, in the 
next sections, the influence that the consideration of wear and tear costs, investment costs 
and the commercial position of the market by pricing systems can have on the value of 
charges for high speed lines will be analysed. 
 
With regard to the reflection of investment costs and the commercial position by charging 
systems, construction costs are bound up with the type of railway infrastructure 
(conventional, upgraded, new –the latter corresponding to high speed lines–), whilst the 
position of the market is to a great extent determined by the commercial speed and the 
travel time. Figure 4.11 (which presents the infrastructure charges values for the national 
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links selected in chapter 3, for which the charging philosophy and the cost recovery rate80 
is known81) enables making the following points: 
 
 
FIGURE 4.11 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES SORTED BY INCREASING ORDER OF 
COST RECOVERY RATE, DISTINGUISHING BY CHARGING PHILOSOPHY, 
COUNTRY CATEGORY (EASTERN/WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY) AND 
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Cost recov. rate: 






NL UL CLNL + UL
 
                                                 
80 The cost recovery rates correspond to those published by CEMT (2005). Values correspond to the cost 
recovery of the whole railway network (and not the specific link analysed) valid in 2004-2005. 
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• For links within a given country, higher construction costs (better infrastructure 
characteristics) lead to higher infrastructure charges (in countries where 
infrastructure charges are supposed to cover part of the investment costs): It is 
well known that new lines (or high speed lines) are considerably more expensive 
than conventional lines, because of the higher technical requirements necessary 
for reaching high speeds. Since State budgets are limited, it is to be expected that 
charges try to recover at least part of the investment costs of these high speed 
lines. 
 
• The great differences in the level of charges for new high speed lines in the 
French links seem to be tied to the market’s ability to pay (commercial speed and 
travel time). 
 
Hence, the search for similarities in the application of mark ups reflecting investment costs 
and the commercial position focuses on the analysis of the existence of correlations 
between the level of infrastructure charges and three parameters: the type of railway 
infrastructure, the commercial speed and the travel time. 
 
 
4.4.1. Influence that the consideration of wear and tear cost by pricing systems may 
have on the value of charges for high speed lines. Mark ups based on wear and 
tear costs 
 
In table 1.12, the results of empirical studies on marginal rail infrastructure costs have 
been presented. The only results distinguishing marginal costs by type of line (or service) 
refer to the French network. For this network, the results published by Crozet (2007) from 
data from Gaudry and Quinet (2003) show that marginal costs amount to 2,1-2,4 €/train-
km for high speed services, 2,9-3,1 €/train-km for suburban services (IdF82 services), and 
2,0-3,6 €/train-km for intercity services (TER services). Gaudry and Quinet (2003) present 
these differences in marginal costs among services in terms of relative marginal costs, as 
summarised in table 4.10.  
 
According to Quinet, the reasons that could justify why marginal costs of wear and tear for 
passenger trains are higher than those for freight trains and why those for high speed trains 




                                                 
82 IdF stands for Île-de-France. 
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TABLE 4.10 RELATIVE MARGINAL COSTS AMONG EACH SERVICE AND AMONG TONS 
OF THESE SERVICES IN FRANCE 
Source: Gaudry and Quinet (2003) 
Type of service 
Equivalence among types of 
services 
Equivalence among tonnes of 
types of services 
High speed services 1,00 1,00 
TER services 2,22 5,58 
IdF services 1,42 1,94 




• A shortage of funds for maintenance may induce to favouring the most circulated 
tracks (in terms of prevention and renewals) and result in an increase of the 
marginal cost of the other ones, which are more subject to curative maintenance. 
 
• Although the damages of the trains have an influence on maintenance costs, those 
costs also depend on the quality level objective: As affirmed by Ubalde (2004), 
maintenance activities do not only depend on the level of wear and tear but also, 
among other aspects, on the requirements in terms of line performance. Indeed, 
segments with a large proportion of freight trains do not require a high level of 
quality while segments with a large proportion of passenger trains require a high 
quality level. Table 4.11 presents the corrective intervention thresholds used in 
Spain by the former Renfe for identifying specific buckling of rail and track 
gauge defects, which are shown to be higher in new lines (high speed lines), since 
the higher the speed allowed in a segment of a line, the more restrictive the 
corrective intervention threshold. These more restrictive corrective intervention 
thresholds are intended to ensure the accomplishment of the higher requirements 
in terms of line performance. 
 
• Maintenance costs are influenced by the definition of track possessions: Short 
track possession with a large number of trains (this would be the case of tracks 
with regional trains) induces more expensive maintenance costs (except when the 
maintenance is performed during nocturnal periods, which is the case of high 
speed trains and some suburban tracks in France).  
 
Therefore, the fact that high speed lines are built to a high standard and because they are 
maintained at night, would justify why the marginal wear and tear cost is lower for those 
lines compared to conventional lines even though they have to be maintained to higher 
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TABLE 4.11 CORRECTIVE INTERVENTION THRESHOLDS WHEN IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC 
WARPING OF TRACK AND TRACK GAUGE DEFECTS   
Source : López-Pita et al (2002) from Renfe 
Warping of track in:  Speeds 
(km/h) 3m base 
(mm) 
5 m base 
(mm) 






v ≤ 80 ±5 ±2,8 ±2,3 +15 -5 
80 < v ≤ 120 ±4 ±2,3 ±1,8 +10 -5 
120 < v ≤ 160 ±3 ±1,7 ±1,4 +10 -4 
160 < v ≤ 200 ±2,5 ±1,4 ±1,2 +8 -3 
200 < v ≤ 240 ±2,2 ±1,1 ±0,9 +8 -3 
240 < v ≤ 280 ±2,0 ±0,9 ±0,7 +7 -2 
280 < v ≤ 320 ±1,8 ±0,7 ±0,5 +7 -2 




According to these results, the level of rail infrastructure charges that are supposed to 
reflect the marginal wear and tear cost should be lower for high speed lines than for 
conventional lines if the charges were really set to solely cover the marginal wear and tear 
cost. However, this is not the case. As table 4.12 shows, in the rail pricing systems of 
those networks with high speed lines in operation, charges meant to reflect the marginal 
wear and tear cost are generally highest for high speed lines. These results could be 




TABLE 4.12 CHARGES SUPPOSED TO REFLECT THE MARGINAL WEAR AND TEAR 
COST AND THEIR VALUE 
Source: Own from the corresponding network statements 
Country  
Charge supposed to reflect the MC of 
wear and tear 
Value (comparison HSL with 
conventional lines) 
France Charge for access to electric traction 
equipment (€/electric train-km) 
HS national trains > other trains 
Spain Capacity reservation tariff  
(€/train-km reserved) 
New HSL > rest of lines 
Germany Usage-based component Long distance lines Fplus and F1 > 
rest of lines 
Italy Rkm/min (cost of the use of infrastr.) 
Pwear&tear 
Higher for higher speeds, higher 
weight and more pantographs 
Belgium C (admissible weight on track) Higher for higher weight 
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The reason that could justify the application of mark ups based on marginal costs of wear 
and tear is the fact that lower marginal costs of wear and tear for high speed lines are the 
result of dedicating more funds for maintenance to high speed lines (than to other types of 
lines) in order to keep the high quality level objective. Hence, the mark ups based on 
marginal costs of wear and tear would be aimed at recovering part of the higher 
maintenance expenses for high speed lines that allow those lower levels of marginal costs 
of wear and tear.  
 
 
4.4.2. Influence that the consideration of investment costs by pricing systems may 
have on the value of charges for high speed lines. Mark ups reflecting 
investment costs 
 
Railway projects have always involved great investment costs. Nevertheless, the 
construction of new lines (high speed lines) and upgraded lines (high performance lines) 
has raised them to a greater level. This is a direct consequence of the more precise and 
restrictive track geometry (for instance in terms of curve radius and cant), as well as the 
special safety facilities (see annex A1), required to allow maximum speeds in commercial 
runs up to 250 km/h and 300-350 km/h. 
 
While conventional lines’ capital costs are mainly sunk, some States have decided to cover 
part of new lines investment costs through infrastructure charges. The recovery rate of 
these costs varies from country to country, as does the construction cost from one high 
speed line to another (see table 4.13). Engineering aspects such as the use of ballast track 
or slab track, the presence of viaducts, tunnels or other civil works are in the origin of 
these differences in cost. 
 
TABLE 4.13 ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF NEW LINES AND 
UPGRADED LINES (2004 costs) 
Source: Own from CENIT (2004) and other sources  
Type of line Line Construction cost (106  €/km) 
DE: Köln – Frankfurt (slab track) 26,0 
ES: Madrid – Lleida  10,0 
FR: Valence – Marseille  17,7
(1)
 
BE: Bruxelles – French border 15,7 
New line 
UK: London – Folkestone (first section) 37,0 
Upgraded line  Very variable 
Remarks: 
(1)
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Therefore, the recovery of these costs through infrastructure charges can be expected to 
bring about differences in the amount of infrastructure charges for European high speed or 
high performance links. The next paragraphs are devoted to analyse the influence that the 
consideration of investment costs by pricing systems can have on the value of charges for 
high speed and upgraded lines. 
 
In order to analyse if a correlation can be established between the charge to be paid by a 
RU offering a high performance passenger service (on the European high speed network) 
and the type of infrastructure, national links have been considered as a first step. The 
reason for excluding international links in this first stage of the analysis is to avoid some 
“interferences” in the results, which could come from the application of different charging 
systems within a given link.  
 
Those national links have been defined in detail and classified according to the 
characteristics of their infrastructure into four groups: 
 
• 100% (in length) conventional lines, that is, lines where the infrastructure can be 
labelled as conventional over the whole length.  
 
• 100% upgraded lines, i.e. lines where the infrastructure has been upgraded over 
the whole length. 
 
• 100% new lines, that is, lines where the infrastructure has been recently built 
from scratch over their whole length in order to allow high speed runs. 
 
• Lines where the type of infrastructure is not homogeneous, i.e. different 
combinations of infrastructure constitute the line (combination of new line and 
upgraded line; new line and conventional line; upgraded line and conventional 
line; new line, upgraded line and conventional line). 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the value of the charge for those national links, grouped into Eastern 
and Western countries links and sorted by increasing order83. If we do not consider links 
affected by pricing systems that do not cover investment costs, different general 
tendencies can be observed:  
 
 
                                                 
83 The values for Estonia, Hungary and Latvia were obtained from CEMT (2005), since the corresponding 
network statements were not available for the year 2006 or were only published in the official language of 
the corresponding country. Therefore, the values presented for these countries correspond to average 
infrastructure charges for passenger trains. 
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FIGURE 4.12 RAILWAY CHARGES FOR EUROPEAN NATIONAL PASSENGER SERVICES, 
DISTINGUISHING BY TYPE OF INFRASTRUCTURE (NEW LINES, UPGRADED 




























• In conventional lines the amount of the infrastructure charge tends to have lower 
values: The amount of the infrastructure charge to be paid by RUs running on 
conventional lines ranges from 1,8 to 6,7 €/train-km for Western links and from 
1,1 to 3,7 €/train-km for Eastern links. The highest value (6,7 €/train-km) is 
approximately half the value of the most expensive link analysed, which 
corresponds to a new line.  
 
• In new lines the amount of the infrastructure charge tends to have higher values: 
The amount of the infrastructure charges to be paid by RU running on new lines 
ranges from 7,6 to 15,2 €/train-km.  
 
• The amount of infrastructure charges for the use of upgraded lines presents a 
great variability: For this type of lines, infrastructure charges range from 0,6 to 
14,4 €/train-km. The analysis of the length and the commercial speed of the links 
belonging to this category does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the 
aforementioned variability (see table 4.14). In this case, the analysis of the pricing 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eastern countries Western countries 
100% conventional line 
100% upgraded line 
100% new line 
Link with different types of infrastructure 
Investment costs not covered 
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As an example, in the British links, the pricing principle (MC+) and the high cost 
recovery rate (50%), which is considerably higher than those of the rest of Western 
Europe according to ECMT (2005), may explain the high value of charges 
compared to the ones registered by the Finish and the Swedish pricing systems, 
which cover 12% and 5%, respectively, of the total infrastructure costs.    
 
• The existence of a segment of line with new or upgraded infrastructure 
considerably increases the amount of the charge to be paid by a train running on 
such a link: The amount of the infrastructure charge to be paid by RU running on 
lines where the type of infrastructure is not homogeneous ranges from 3,6 to 10,5 
€/train-km. These values are in some cases as high as the values in new lines. 
These differences could be due to the percentage in length of new or upgraded 
lines in the link. Two other country-specific reasons could explain these results: on 
the one hand, in Belgium, high values are as a result of high charges for the use of 
stations (they represent 70% of total infrastructure charges for the Brussels – Liège 
link); on the other hand, in Germany and France the reason could be the high cost 
recovery rates.   
 
• Eastern countries seem to follow the same pattern as Western countries with 
regard to the correlation between the amount of charges and the type of 
infrastructure: Nevertheless, attention has to be drawn to the fact that even if 
Poland affirms to partly cover investment costs through infrastructure charges, 
their cost recovery for passenger services is not reflected in the amount of charges. 
Therefore, although Eastern countries are said to have high cost recovery rates, it 
may be that they are reached through higher contributions by freight services, 
either by means of cross-subsidies or through the application of different pricing 
systems according to the traffic (for instance, in some cases passenger services are 




TABLE 4.14 CHARACTERISTICS OF 100% UPGRADED LINES 





Helsinki-Turku 0,6 200 103 
Lisboa-Porto 1,4 337 112 
Roma-Napoli 4,5 232 123 
London-Edinburgh 8,7 553 122 
London-Newcastle 9,4 432 146 
Manchester-Birmingham 14,4 123 79 
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In order to see to what extent these tendencies are observed in the whole of high speed 
network, that is in both national and international links, in figure 4.13 rail infrastructure 
charges for approximately 100 links that constitute the high performance European 
railway network have been sorted by increasing order (top-down) and at the same time, in 
figure 4.14 they have also been broken down by type of infrastructure (expressed in 
percentage of the total length of the link). 
 
These figures confirm that infrastructure charges for links with new lines or upgraded 
lines are among the most expensive ones. Indeed, as it was to be expected from the 
analysis of the different European pricing systems, there is a correlation between rail 
infrastructure charges and the type of infrastructure, according to which the percentage in 
length of new line in a link seems to be directly proportional to the amount of charge to be 
paid by a passenger train running through a link of the European high speed network, i.e. 
the longer the length of the link with new line, the higher the amount of infrastructure 
charge.  
 
Therefore it can be concluded that the consideration of investment costs by pricing 
systems can have an important influence on the value of charges for high speed lines. 
Indeed, they can result in infrastructure charges ranging from less than 1 €/train-km to 
more than 48 €/train-km. Nevertheless, these differences could also be explained by the 
commercial position of the different links, as may be inferred by the wide range of values 
among new lines within a given country, particularly visible in French high speed lines. 
This aspect will be dealt with in section 4.4.3. 
 
The results presented in this section are of great interest, since the studies published until 
now (for instance the one published by the European Conference of Ministers of Transport 
published in 2005 –ECMT, 2005–) had neither related charges to infrastructure 
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FIGURE 4.13 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES FOR PASSENGER RAILWAY SERVICES 
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FIGURE 4.14 RAILWAY CHARGES FOR EUROPEAN HIGH PERFORMANCE PASSENGER 
SERVICES, SORTED BY INCREASING ORDER OF THE CHARGE AND 
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4.4.3. Influence that the consideration of the market’s commercial position by pricing 
systems may have on the value of charges for high speed lines. Mark ups 
reflecting commercial position 
 
The commercial position of a transport mode in a particular link depends on several 
factors, such as the total travel time, the frequency and the commercial speed. The first 
factor is closely related to the total length of the link and the line performances, which will 
be determinant in the definition of the maximum running speed allowed on it and, 
therefore, the commercial speed. 
 
High speed services are characterised by reduced travel times compared to conventional 
passenger railway services, thanks to the higher maximum and commercial speeds 
achieved on new lines. These reduced travel times are especially valued by passengers. 
Indeed, according to a study carried out in 1993 on the demand requirements depending 
on the trip purpose, rapidity scores 12 out of 12 for business trips (12 being the highest 
score) and 9 out of 12 for private trips (López-Pita, 1998). Therefore, users are prepared to 
pay more for faster trains, i.e. passengers’ ability to pay is extremely bound up with 
commercial speeds. 
 
Railway operators have taken advantage of this fact increasing their ticket fares and thus 
earning more revenues from the links where the market willingness to pay is higher. 
Infrastructure managers seem to have applied the same strategy through their charging 
systems. As table 4.9 shows, in countries with high speed lines in operation, charges seem 
to be set taking into consideration the commercial position of high speed railways. 
 
This section analyses the influence that the consideration of the commercial position of the 
market by pricing systems can have on the value of charges for high speed lines. For this 
analysis, the commercial speed has been used as an indicator of the line’s performance 
and, therefore, of the commercial position. 
 
In figure 4.15, for the set of 100 links selected in chapter 3, the value of the rail 
infrastructure charges has been presented as dependent variable and the commercial speed 
as explanatory variable. If the links surrounded by a circle are not taken into consideration, 
one can distinguish a correlation between rail infrastructure charges and commercial 
speed, which seems to confirm the existence of a correlation between high charges and 
infrastructure allowing high commercial speeds. 
 
The links surrounded by a circle correspond to five links crossing the Channel Tunnel 
(namely, London-Brussels, London-Bordeaux, London-Strasbourg, Glasgow-Rennes and 
London-Warsaw) and the links Manchester-Birmingham and the one crossing 
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Luxembourg from the Belgian border to the French border (via Kleinbettingen, 
Luxembourg and Bettembourg).  
 
With regard to the Channel Tunnel, which links Folkestone in Kent to Coquelles in Pas-
de-Calais, it is important to mention that it corresponds to the longest undersea tunnel in 
the world, with a 38 km long section under the sea, bored at an average 40 m below the 
sea bed. Its construction costs amount 14.680,12 M€ (293,60 M€/km84), including 
financing by shareholder funds and bank loans (Eurotunnel, 2006). Since it works with 
private financing, infrastructure charges for crossing the Channel Tunnel have been 
conceived to guarantee cost recovery. This explains the higher infrastructure values 
compared to the ones in the rest of the links. Given the specificity of the charging system 
of the Channel Tunnel, the links crossing this big civil work will not be taken into account 
in this part of the analysis. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.15 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES (IN €/TRAIN-KM) CONTINGENT ON  





















                                                 
84 Construction costs for new lines range approximately between 10 M€/km (e.g. Madrid-Lleida link, build 
with ballasted track) and 40 MEUR/km (e.g. Nuremberg-Ingolstadt link, built with slab track), according to 

































Links crossing the Channel Tunnel: (1) London-Bruxelles, (2) London-Strasbourg, (3) London-
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Concerning the link crossing Luxembourg from the Belgian border to the French border 
(via Kleinbettingen, Luxembourg and Bettembourg), there is no direct train linking the 
origin and the destination points. Therefore, the total travel time increases significantly 
and results in a very low commercial speed (23 km/h). Since such a low value for 
commercial speeds is not representative of the ensemble of links, this link will be 
eliminated from the analysis of the correlation between rail infrastructure charges and the 
commercial speed. 
 
Finally, the Manchester-Birmingham link will also be eliminated from this analysis, since 
its values are similar to the ones observed for the links crossing the Channel Tunnel. This 
is the result of the high fixed charge resulting from the British charging system. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.16 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS USING THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES AS 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEED AS 























In figure 4.16 the results of the econometric analysis carried out without taking into 
consideration the links mentioned in the preceding paragraphs are presented. In this 



























Dependent variable: y = rail infrastructure charges (in €/train-km)
αβ += xy
Explanatory variable: x = commercial speed (in km/h)  
Regression coefficient: β = 0,0625  
95% confidential interval for β: [CI] = [0,051;0,074] 
Remark: Links crossing the Channel Tunnel, the Manchester-Birmingham link and the link crossing Luxembourg from 
the Belgian border to the French border via Kleinbettingen, Luxembourg and Bettembourg, not considered. 
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econometric analysis, infrastructure charges are the dependent variable and the 
commercial speed is the explanatory variable. According to the simple linear regression 
carried out, the regression coefficient for the variable rail infrastructure charge is 0,0625 
(95% confidential interval [CI]:0,051;0,074). The model was validated with the analysis 
of the residuals. 
 
The results of the econometric analysis are as expected: there is a strong correlation 
between high infrastructure charges and infrastructure with high performance (expressed 
in terms of commercial speed). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.17 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES (IN €/TRAIN-KM) CONTINGENT ON  
COMMERCIAL SPEED (IN KM/H), DISTINGUISING BETWEEN LINKS WITH 
ONLY ONE TYPE OF INFRASTRUCTURE (NEW LINES, UPGRADED LINES 








































København-Malmö: link crossing the Øresund link   
 
 
In order to graphically reflect how these commercial speeds are linked to the type of 
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(represented by a different coloured polygon in the graphic): (1) 100% conventional links 
(orange squares), (2) 100% upgraded links (green triangles), (3) 100% new links (yellow 
rhombus) and (4) non-homogeneous links, e.g. partly upgraded, partly new (blue circles).  
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from figure 4.17. On the one hand, for conventional 
lines, which are the ones offering the lowest commercial speeds currently available in the 
passenger railway market (48-121 km/h), it is not possible to establish a correlation 
between infrastructure charges and commercial speed. This result seems to confirm that 
current rail European pricing systems do not consider the commercial position of the 
market in their conventional network. In other words, current charging systems do not 
apply any mark up on the ability to pay of RUs offering conventional passenger services. 
 
On the other hand, figure 4.17 clearly shows that, contrary to conventional lines,   
infrastructure charges for new lines are very sensitive to an increase of commercial speed. 
This would be in line with charging systems considering the commercial position of the 
market (see table 4.9). 
 
In the French case, as it could be expected from figures 4.10 and 4.11 and from the 
characterisation of the pricing system presented in section 4.2, the commercial position 
exerts a strong influence on the value of charges for high speed and high performance 
services. As stated by Crozet (2004b), in France the charging structure takes sharply into 
account the abilities to contribute as well as the service quality, with a highly and more 
and more differentiated charges in time and space. Indeed, for links belonging to a single 
corridor, as for instance Paris-Lyons, Paris-Marseilles or Lyons-Marseilles, differences in 
charges exist due to the time differentiation applied by the French rail infrastructure 
pricing system (see figure 4.18). The great differences in charges in the Lyons urban area 
between the links passing through it and the links departing from it are not only due to 
time differentiation of charges, but also to the amount due for the use of the station, 
considered only (according to the assumptions made in chapter 3 but also according to 
RFF’s Network Statement) in the journeys starting in Lyons. 
 
The consideration of the commercial position in the different countries with high speed 






                                                 
85 The results presented correspond to infrastructure charges for services departing at 8 a.m. from the origin 
point (calculation hypotheses presented in chapter 3). 
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FIGURE 4.18 INFLUENCE OF TIME DIFFERENTIATION ON THE LEVEL OF CHARGES IN 





















































Start of normal period for trains having 
departed from Lyon at 8h00 
Start of normal period for trains 




The French charges for high speed services seem to be very sensitive to the travel time 
(see figure 4.19). Indeed, an increase of the travel time from one hour to two hours can 
imply differences in charges as high as approximately 7 €/train-km. It is also remarkable 
that an additional mark up on the ability to pay seems to be in place for the services 
linking Paris with the two other main French cities: Lyons and Marseilles. 
 
In Spain, where the commercial position of the market is also considered by the pricing 
system through several tariffs (reservation capacity tariff, operating tariff, traffic tariff, 
tariff for the station use and transport security fees), the influence of the travel time on the 
value of charges for high speed lines is lower than in France (see figure 4.19). Indeed, an 
increase of the travel time from one hour to two hours can imply differences in charges of 
about 2 €/train-km, difference considerably lower than the 7 €/train-km registered in 
France.  
 
In Germany, the influence of the travel time on the value of charges for high speed 
services seems to be very close to the one observed in France (there are too few 
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(2005), “in Germany charges vary a little bit with the ability to pay, in order to stimulate 
RUs to use capacities in a rational manner”.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.19 CORRELATION BETWEEN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES AND THE 
TRAVEL TIME FOR HIGH SPEED SERVICES IN EUROPE (year 2006)  
 












































































































Travelling ti e ( in)
Travelling ti e ( in)
 -9.6509Ln(x) + 52.032
R2 = 0.676
y = -0.010  
R2 = 0.4227
FRANCE ITALY
SPAIN GERMANY ITALY 
GERMANY 
Remarks: The links analysed are those composing the current European high speed network (new lines 
and upgraded lines, in some cases combined with some sections built as conventional lines) as well as a 
few conventional lines which in a near future will be new high speed lines. This explains the higher 
number of observations in France and Spain, which are the European countries with more kilometres of 
HSL in service.  
 
 
In Italy, the consideration of the commercial position by pricing systems seems to have a 
smaller influence on the value of charges for high speed services than in the countries 
presented (as for Germany, there are too few observations available for a proper statistical 
estimation). 
 
Travel time (min) Travel time (min) 
Travel time (min) Travel time (min) 
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For the Belgian pricing system, the influence of the commercial position on the value of 
charges for high speed lines could not be analysed, since only one link was defined for this 
country. 
 
The results presented in this section confirm that the consideration of the commercial 
position of the market by pricing systems can have an important influence on the value of 
charges for high speed lines. Charges for high speed lines seem to be strongly bound up 
with the total travel time; indeed, a reduction of a journey from 2 hours to 1 hour implies 
for instance mark ups of up to 7 €/train-km in France and 2 €/train-km in Spain. 
 
If the potential of high speed trains is further developed in the years to come86, travel 
times will be shortened. This could result, in some cases, in a higher ability to pay. 
Furthermore, the expected internalisation of external costs in all transport modes could 
further increase the commercial position of high speed railways. With those assumptions 
and if the current correlation between infrastructure charges and commercial speeds is 
maintained in the years to come, an increase in the value of infrastructure charges for new 




4.5. COMMENTS ON THE VALUE OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
FOR THE USE OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN HIGH 
SPEED NETWORK  
 
While, as a rule, urban or rural transit services lose money and have to be subsidised, 
intercity trains and especially HSR are able to generate cash surpluses. In this chapter it 
has been analysed how the pricing systems implemented in the European countries with 
HSL have taken into consideration the ability and willingness of intercity and HSL 
operators to make a financial contribution towards part of the cost, materialised in the 
level of charges (or mark ups) for the use of infrastructure. 
 
The results obtained prove that even if current European charging systems for HSL differ 
considerably, there is a similarity between them in terms of the implementation of mark 
ups. On the one hand, the unit values charged to high speed services appear to be well 
above marginal costs and even over the optimal mark up for high speed lines calculated in 
chapter 1. On the other hand, mark ups seem to be introduced by means of three different 
common concepts, namely mark ups based on wear and tear costs, mark ups to recover 
                                                 
86 This possibility is feasible, since trial runs on the LGV Est linking Paris to Strasbourg in France have 
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part of the investment costs and mark ups set at a level that the market can bear, taking 
into consideration the commercial position of HSR.  
 
The data available does not allow to know how much of the mark ups relate to what costs. 
However, the results suggest that where pricing systems are meant to partly cover 
investment costs, the higher the share of high performance infrastructure in a given link, 
the higher the level of charges per kilometre. In addition, this chapter has proven that mark 
ups that take the commercial position into account are only applied to new and upgraded 
infrastructure. 
 
With respect to international traffic, mark ups are typically just de sum of the mark ups 
applied to that category of traffic in each country through which it passes. Thus the mark 
up for the whole journey is not considered, or worse still, if it is considered then each IM 
may try to earn a surplus from such traffic regardless of what the other IMs are doing. In 
annex A9, the consequences of the application of the current charging philosophies and 
mark ups in international links are analysed in detail. This annex shows that the current 
charging systems involve some barriers to international services, derived from the fact that 
the combination of linear tariffs and two-part tariffs result in an economic border, whilst 
the different charging philosophies and cost recovery rates along an international link 
provokes imbalances between governments in terms of financing of an international link. 
Therefore, where charges exceed short-run marginal social cost, charges for international 
traffic really need to be negotiated between the IMs concerned and set at a corridor level 
in the light of the competitive position of rail in the corridor as a whole (Sánchez-Borràs et 
al, 2008c). 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF THE LINK BETWEEN RAIL 
CHARGES FOR THE USE OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND RAIL REVENUES FROM TICKET SALES  
 
 
5.1. INTEREST OF ANALYSING THE LINK EXISTING BETWEEN RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES AND REVENUES FROM TICKET SALES 
 
The results presented in chapter 4 have confirmed that European pricing systems apply 
important mark ups above marginal costs to high speed services running on new and 
upgraded lines (high speed and high performance lines). At the same time, the amount of 
charges resulting from those mark ups on investment costs and according to the 
commercial position has been quantified. The present chapter is devoted to analyse the 
link between rail charges for the use of infrastructure and RU’s rail revenues from the 
ticket sales87, as a previous stage to calculating (in chapter 6) how the important mark ups 
charged above marginal costs to HS operators could be affecting the traffic level88. 
 
The link between rail infrastructure charges and rail revenues from ticket sales has been 
calculated for the high speed network links defined in chapter 3. Furthermore, the values 
obtained (see annex A6) have been analysed in terms of their correlation with the type of 
infrastructure (bound up with investment costs and consequently with mark ups intended 
to recover investment costs) and the commercial position in the market. This analysis aims 
at characterising the influence that the application of mark ups intended to recover 
investment costs and to reflect the commercial position of a link may have on the charges-
to-revenues ratio. Finally, the charges-to-revenues ratios and the margins over 
infrastructure charges89 for railways have been compared to those for airways offering 
services on the same links. These results constitute a first approach to the characterisation 
                                                 
87 As presented in chapter 3, revenues are calculated as the fare F times the capacity C of the vehicle and 
times the load factor L (Q = C · L being the traffic volume per train –number of passengers per train–). 
88 According to the assumptions made in chapter 3, a variation in the level of infrastructure charges causes a 












      (f. 3.24). 
89 Defined in this piece of research as the difference between the revenues earned from the ticket sales and 
the amount of charges for the use of the infrastructure. In reality, railways operators’ margin depends on the 
difference between their total revenues and the total costs they have to face (for instance, the payment of 
infrastructure charges and other operating costs such as energy, rolling stock, staff, ticket sales, marketing, 
overheads). For a high speed service, RU’s main revenues come from ticket sales since the limited public 
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of the influence that the level of charges implemented in the European high speed network 




5.2. ANALISIS OF THE LINK BETWEEN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
AND REVENUES FROM TICKET SALES 
 
5.2.1. Weight of the infrastructure charges value for high speed links with regard to 
 the revenues from ticket sales 
 
In figure 5.1 the revenues from the ticket sales (expressed in euros per train-kilometre) for 
the links constituting the European high speed network have been sorted by increasing 
order. At the same time, the part of those revenues “used” for paying infrastructure 
charges has been shadowed. According to these results, the charges-to-revenues ratio of 
railway operators varies considerably from one link to another and does not follow any 
correlation with the value of rail infrastructure charges. 
 
More specifically, the weight of the infrastructure charges compared to the revenues 
ranges from 1,0 % to 52,9 %90 for the links that constitute the high speed network91 (see 
figure 5.2), 16,5 % being the average value, that is, for the links analysed, revenues are on 
average six times higher than infrastructure charges.  
 
The distribution of these values among the different links points to the fact that the 
application of mark ups to recover part of the investment costs and reflecting the 
commercial   position   of   the  market   can  considerably   influence   the   value   of   the 
infrastructure charges to revenues (from ticket sales) ratio. Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 are 






                                                 
90 Without taking into consideration the Oslo – Trondheim link, for which no infrastructure charges are 
applied to passenger services and excluding the national Estonian and Latvian links (Tallin – Narva and 
Riga– Recekne, respectively), where the high results of the charges/revenues ratio is due to extremely low 
ticket fare rates. 
91 Some links are not included in figure 5.1 because of the lack of data on infrastructure charges and/or 
revenues from the ticket sales: Belfast – Dublin, Athens – Thessaloniki, Copenhagen – Malmö, Bratislava– 
Vienna, Prague – Vienna, and Warsaw – Vienna.  
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FIGURE 5.1 PART OF REVENUES FROM TICKET SALES SET ASIDE TO PAY FOR  
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES ON THE EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED NETWORK 
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FIGURE 5.2 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES FOR EUROPEAN HIGH-PERFORMANCE 
PASSENGER SERVICES AND THEIR VALUE COMPARED TO RAILWAYS 
REVENUES FROM TICKET SALES 
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Rail infrastructure charges (in €/train-km) 
% Rail infrastructure charges (in €) / Revenues (in €) 
Rail infrastructure charges (in €/train-km) for links for 
which the length of new line is higher than 40% of the 
total length of the link  
Value of the % Rail infrastructure charges (in €) / Revenues
(in €) for the links for which the length of new line is higher 
than 40% of the total length of the link  
Interval of values of the % Rail infrastructure charges 
(in €) / Revenues (in €) for the links for which the 
length of new line is higher than 40% of the total 
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5.2.2. Influence of the consideration of investment costs by pricing systems on the 
 charges/revenues ratio 
 
In chapter 4 we saw that the consideration of investment costs by pricing systems 
(application of mark ups reflecting investment costs) can have an important influence on 
the value of charges for high speed lines. In this section, whether this influence affects or 
not the infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratio of railway operators offering high speed 
services is analysed. 
 
In figure 5.3 the links analysed have been sorted by increasing order of the value of the 
“infrastructure charges/revenues from ticket sales” ratio. This figure clearly shows that 
there are links where revenues are just 2,5 times greater than the cost of infrastructure 
charges, while for others they exceed 20 times the value of charges, on average being 6 
times higher than infrastructure charges. In order to analyse whether these large 
differences are to any extent related to the recovery of investment costs by infrastructure 
charges, figure 5.4 was produced. In it, links are split between types of infrastructure (new 
lines, upgraded lines and conventional lines) and ordered by their charges/revenues ratio 
value. The results obtained allow affirming that: 
 
• The links where revenues are approximately 4 to 2,5 times higher than 
infrastructure charges are generally links with new lines in the total length (or 
almost in the whole length) of the link. In those links where there are different 
types of infrastructure, more than 40% of the total length of the link is built as new 
line. As a consequence, links where the charges/revenues ratio is higher than 25% 
are mainly French, Spanish and British national or international links, where 
infrastructure charges partly recover investment costs. Exceptions to this tendency 
are three national Eastern links, namely Budapest – Debrecen (Hungary), Warsaw– 
Wrocław (Poland) and Vilnius – Klaipeda (Lithuania), built with conventional 
line, where the high charges/revenues ratio may be explained by the full cost 
recovery philosophy applied in those countries, but mostly by the low ticket fares.  
 
• The links where revenues are approximately 7 to 4 times higher than infrastructure 
charges are generally links with upgraded lines or a mixture of new or upgraded 
lines with other types of lines, as well as Eastern links with conventional lines. In 
the cases where the pricing systems do not recover investment costs, the high 
weight of infrastructure charges with regard to revenues could be due to the 
application of mark ups according to the commercial position of the market (such 
could be the case of Italian links) or to low revenues (as would be the case of 
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FIGURE 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES/REVENUES RATIO FOR THE LINKS 
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FIGURE 5.4 PERCENTAGE IN LENGTH OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF LINES FOR THE 
LINKS ANALYSED, ORDERED BY INCREASING RANGE OF CHARGES/ 
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Remark: The Bruxelles-Liège link is composed by new line and upgraded line. However, since the percentages are not known, it has been 




according to the commercial position of the market on the charges/revenues ratio 
will be analysed in the next section (section 5.2.3). 
 
• The links where revenues are approximately 20 to 7 times higher than 
infrastructure charges are generally links with conventional line in almost the 
whole length of the link. Exceptions to this tendency are, on the one hand, some 
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the other hand, the high speed line Rome-Florence, for which railway charges do 
not cover investment costs at all; and finally, links with new and upgraded lines, 
mainly situated in Germany (where infrastructure charges are mainly fixed 
according to the usage of the line rather than according to the type of 
infrastructure) and in the Netherlands (where investment costs are not covered by 
infrastructure charges). 
 
• The links where revenues are at least 20 times higher than infrastructure charges 
are links which are mainly on Scandinavian countries, as well as links shorter than 
100 km. For such links, the type of line does not seem to play a role. In part, this is 
due to the fact that most Scandinavian countries do not set charges so as to partly 
recover infrastructure costs. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.5 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE RAIL CHARGES/REVENUES RATIO AND 
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y = βx 
 
Dependent variable: y = charges/revenues 
Explanatory variable: x = rail infrastructure charges (€/train-km) 
Regression coefficient: β = 0,0235 
95% confidential interval for β: [CI]: = [0,021;0,026] 
Remark: Conventional lines, as well as the London-Brussels link, are excluded from the analysis. On the one hand, 
because pricing systems do not apply mark ups for the recovery of investment costs in conventional lines. On the 
other hand, because the value for the London-Brussels link is not representative for the general tendency. 
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According to what has been presented, it can be affirmed that for the representative 
European links, RU’s revenues from ticket sales are always at least 2,5 times higher than 
the infrastructure charges that they have to pay to IM for the use of infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, it is in links with new lines (the ones that respond to the technical definition 
of high speed lines) where the amount of charges is closer to RU’s revenues earned from 
ticket sales. Figure 5.5, where the value of infrastructure charges has been related to the 
charges-to-revenues ratio for all the links analysed except for the ones with conventional 
line all over their length (for which pricing systems do not consider investment costs), 
confirms this tendency. Thus, higher charges tend to imply higher charges/revenues ratios.  
 
 
5.2.3. Influence of the consideration of the commercial position of the market on the 
 charges/revenues ratio 
 
According to the results presented in section 5.2.2, the consideration of investment costs 
by pricing systems affects the infrastructure charges/revenues ratio but in some cases 
values seem to be more correlated with mark ups on the commercial position of the 
market. Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs focus on the influence that the consideration 
of the commercial position of the market may have on the value of the infrastructure 
charges-to-revenues ratio.  
 
In chapter 4 it was proved that infrastructure charges for high speed services (running on 
new lines) are strongly correlated to the commercial speed, besides being very sensitive to 
the travel time. In this section, the influence that both the commercial speed and the travel 
time can have on the value of the charges/revenue ratio will be considered.  
 
In figure 5.6 the value of the rail infrastructure charges/revenues ratio has been presented 
as dependent variable and the commercial speed as explanatory variable. If we do not take 
into account the values for the Riga – Recekne and the Tallin – Narva links92, it looks as if 
the value of the charges-to-revenues ratio tends to increase with faster commercial speeds, 
following the same tendency observed between rail infrastructure charges and the 
commercial speed. 
 
Since the results of chapter 4 show that the type of infrastructure plays an important role in 
the correlation existing between infrastructure charges and the commercial speed93, in 
                                                 
92 As outlined in section 5.2.1, the values for those links are extremely high due to the very low value of 
revenues from ticket sales.  
93 For conventional lines it was not possible to establish a correlation between infrastructure charges and the 
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figure 5.7 the results have been presented distinguishing by type of line. It can be seen 
that while no correlation can be established between the value of rail charges/revenues 
ratio and the commercial speed for conventional lines, the correlation between these two 
parameters is very strong for links constituted by new infrastructure (new lines). So 
strong, that in links where the type of infrastructure is mixed, the correlation can still be 
inferred, even if the new infrastructure is only found in a segment of the link.   
 
 





































However, the type of infrastructure does not allow establishing a clear correlation between 
the charges/revenues ratio and the travel time (see figure 5.8). Therefore, in figure 5.9 the 
analysis has been presented at national level, for those countries where different high 
speed or high performance links constitute the network modelled in chapter 3. The aim of 
this was to analyse whether some tendency could be found in the policies of railways 
operators regarding the definition of ticket sales according to the value of infrastructure 
charge or the other way round.  
 
On the left hand side of figure 5.9, the correlation between the charges/revenues ratio and 
the travel time has been presented, while on the right hand side the results obtained in 
chapter 4 are summarised. Figure 5.9 shows that: 
 
• The value of the charges/revenues ratio is especially high for French and Spanish 
high speed links. Indeed, only in these two countries is the value above 25%, with 
the ratio reaching values up to approximately 40%-45%. 
Riga – Recekne 
Tallin – Narva   
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FIGURE 5.7 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE CHARGES/REVENUES RATIO AND THE 
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Remark: For this analysis, the values for the links crossing the Channel Tunnel are in line with the general tendency. 
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FIGURE 5.8 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE CHARGES/REVENUES RATIO AND THE 
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• In France, where charges for high speed services seem to be very sensitive to the 
travel time (see chapter 4), the charges/revenues ratio is strongly correlated to the 
travel time. However, the Paris – Lyons and Paris – Marseilles links, the most 
important French high speed links, seem to follow a different pattern; indeed, 
according to the travel time required to run the distance separating these cities, the 
charges/revenues ratio would be expected to amount approximately 20%-25%, but 
in those links the ratio is comprised between 40% and 45%. 
Manchester - Birmingham 
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FIGURE 5.9 CORRELATION BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES/REVENUES AND 
THE TRAVEL TIME PER COUNTRY   
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• In Spain, where the influence of the travel time on the value of charges for high 
speed lines is noticeable but lower than in France (see chapter 4), the 
charges/revenues ratio is strongly correlated to the travel time. In contrast to what 
happens in France, in Spain the value of the ratio analysed increases with an 
increase of the travel time. This can only be explained by a RU’s fare policy 
consisting of applying lower ticket fares to longer (in terms of time) journeys. It 
has to be noted that the Madrid – Toledo high speed link (90 km), which is 
operated as high speed regional service, does not follow the tendency observed for 
long distance links. 
 
• In Germany, where the value of the charges/revenues ratio ranges from 10,3% to 
16,3% for the high speed links analysed, the charges/revenues ratio seems to 
decrease with an increase of the travel time, as it happens in France. Nevertheless, 
in Germany the values of the charges/revenues ratio seem to be approximately 
15% lower than the ones registered in France for a given travel time (comprised 
between one and two hours). It has to be mentioned that in terms of infrastructure 
charges, the values in Germany tend to be about 4 €/train-km lower than in France 
for a given travel time (comprised between one and two hours).  
 
• In Italy, where the value of the charges/revenues ratio ranges from 13,8% to 20,7% 
for the high speed links analysed, the charges/revenues ratio does not seem to be 
correlated to the travel time.  
 
According to the remarks presented in the preceding paragraphs, the charges-to-revenues 
ratio for railway operators offering high speed services are higher the shorter the travel 
time is. Exceptions to this tendency are found in Spain, where the value remains almost 
invariable for travel times up to three hours and only then it increases, and in Italy, where 




5.3. ANALYSIS OF THE CHARGES-TO-REVENUES RATIO FOR HIGH SPEED 
RAILWAYS COMPARED TO THE ONE FOR AIRWAYS 
 
5.3.1. Comparison of the charges-to-revenues ratio for railways and airways 
 
In this section, the charges-to-revenues ratio for railways is compared to the one for 
airways, with the aim of determining whether railway operators offering high performance 
railway services have to dedicate a bigger part of their revenues (in percentage) to pay 
infrastructure charges than airways carriers covering a same Origin-Destination (OD) link. 
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The results obtained are presented in figure 5.10 and were calculated assuming load 
factors of 65% for railways and 70% for airways, a TGV Duplex in a 500 seats 
configuration and an A320 airplane with a maximum takeoff weight of 73,5 tones and in a 
150 seats configuration (see chapter 3 for more details on the calculation assumptions). 
 
According to the results presented in figure 5.10, three different behavioural tendencies 
may be distinguished: 
 
• Value of infrastructure charges-to-revenues from ticket sales ratio predominantly 
higher for airways than for railways: This tendency seems to apply to links for 
which the infrastructure charges/revenues ratio is lower than 15% (railway 
revenues at least 7 times higher than rail infrastructure charges). As presented in 
section 5.2, these links are generally links with conventional line in almost the 
whole length of the link as well as Scandinavian links. Exceptions are mainly 
found in international links departing from Prague and crossing Germany, and 
links with their origin in Spain. 
 
• Value of infrastructure charges-to-revenues from ticket sales ratio indifferently 
higher or lower for airways than for railways (transition zone): This ambiguous 
tendency is observed in links where the railways infrastructure charges/revenues 
ratio is comprised between 15% and 20% (revenues 5 to 7 times higher than 
infrastructure charges). 
 
• Value of infrastructure charges-to-revenues from ticket sales ratio predominantly 
higher for railways than for airways: This tendency seems to apply to links where 
the infrastructure charges/revenues ratio is higher than 20% (railway revenues up 
to 5 times higher than rail infrastructure charges). As presented in section 5.2, links 
belonging to this group are generally those with new lines in the total length of the 
link (or at least in more than 40% of the total length of the link). It has to be 
remarked that the Madrid-Barcelona link is an exception of this tendency. 
 
The existence of these three tendencies points to the fact that the consideration of 
investment costs and the commercial position of the market by railway pricing systems 
may influence the results of the comparison of the infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratio 
for railways and airways. Therefore, sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 focus on the analysis of the 
existence of a correlation between a higher charges-to-revenues ratio for railways than for 
airways and the consideration of investment costs and the commercial position of the 
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FIGURE 5.10 WEIGHT OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES AND AIRWAYS CHARGES 
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5.3.2. Analysis of the influence that the consideration of investment costs by railway 
pricing systems may have on the competitiveness of high speed railways 
compared to airways  
 
Figure 5.10 showed that there are numerous links where the charges/revenues ratio is 
higher for airways than for railways. Nevertheless, the opposite situation is also observed 
in other links. In figure 5.11 links have been sorted out by increasing order of the 
charges/revenues ratio and split into type of line (new line, upgraded line and conventional 
line). In addition, the difference between the charges-to-revenues ratio of a railway 
operator offering a high speed service and the charges-to-revenues ratio of an airline 
carrier connecting the same cities as the railway operator has been presented. 
 
According to the results presented in figure 5.11, links served by high speed lines or high 
quality services where the percentage of new lines is above 30% of the total length of the 
link, have higher infrastructure charges/revenues ratios for railways than for airways (the 
Hanover-Frankfurt, the Rome-Florence and the Madrid-Barcelona links are exceptions to 
this rule because of their specificities94). This result (higher infrastructure 
charges/revenues ratios for railways than for airways for links supplied by high speed lines 
or high quality services) was to be expected: on the one hand, because of the strong 
differences existing between the infrastructure requirements for high speed lines (or high 
quality services) and conventional services; on the other hand, because it is logical that 
higher infrastructure costs give rise to higher infrastructure charges if the charging systems 
are defined to partly cover investment costs. Furthermore, it is to be noted that in the case 
of airways, the differences across infrastructure requirements for different types of 
services are much lower than for railways.  
 
However, the analysis would not be complete without determining how much the 
comparison of the charges-to-revenues ratio between railways and airways really amounts 
to from an economic point of view. The chart in the middle of figure 5.11 shows that even 
if in links with more that 30% of their length in new line railway operators have to 
dedicate a higher percentage of their revenues to pay charges for the use of infrastructure 
than airways operators, in some cases this does not imply that the margins over 
infrastructure charges are lower in absolute terms than the ones of airways operators. 
Indeed, it can be observed that: 
 
                                                 
94 On the one hand, the Italian infrastructure charging system does not cover investment costs. On the other 
hand, the charges defined by ADIF for the new Madrid-Barcelona high speed line are applicable only from 
February 2008 on, when the works of the new line between the two cities were finished and the link could be 
considered as a new line in its whole length. Regarding the German exception, different aspects other than 
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FIGURE 5.11 COMPARISON OF THE CHARGES/REVENUES RATIO AND PROFIT FOR THE 
RAIL AND THE AIR MODES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN HIGH 
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• In the links crossing the Channel Tunnel, the margin over infrastructure charge in 
absolute terms is higher for railway operators than for airways operators. Since 
charges for the links crossing the Channel Tunnel are the most expensive in the 
railway European framework (from approximately 19 €/train-km to about 48 
€/train-km95 compared to the 0 €/train-km to 15 €/train-km registered in the other 
links constituting the European high speed network), those results show that the 
ticket fare rates for the railway services crossing the Channel Tunnel are 
considerably higher. Indeed, their amounts range from about 54 €/train-km to 
approximately 143 €/train-km. In the other other links however, only those in the 
United Kingdom (London-Newcastle and Manchester-Birmingham links) and 
Sweden (Göteborg-Stockholm link) saw revenues beyond 60 €/train-km.  
 
• In national Spanish links, the margin over infrastructure charge in absolute terms is 
higher for railway operators than for airways carriers in those services running on 
links which are not fully built as new lines (for instance, Barcelona-Sevilla and 
Madrid-Barcelona96). 
 
• The Madrid-Zurich and Paris-Warsaw links register higher margins over 
infrastructure charges for railways operators than for airways carriers offering 
flights on those links. 
 
With regard to the links where the charges-to-revenues ratio between railways and airways 
is lower than one (see figure 5.11), the railways operators’ margin over infrastructure 
charge is in general terms higher than the one of airline carriers offering the same service. 
The main exceptions are found in Portuguese national and international links, as well as in 
the Prague-Berlin link. 
 
Despite all the aforementioned exceptions, it can be affirmed as a general rule, that: 
 
• Higher infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratios for railways than for airways 
(values above 1 in figure 5.11) imply higher margins over infrastructure charges 
for airways carriers than for railway operators running services on such links.   
 
                                                 
95 Rail infrastructure charges amount 13,3 €/train-km in the London-Warszaw link. This lower value is due 
to the long length of the link (1.743 km).  
96 The calculations were made for 2006, when the Madrid-Barcelona new line had not yet been open to 
commercial operation (February 2008 saw the complete opening of the new line Madrid-Barcelona to 
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• Lower infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratios for railways than for airways 
(values below 1 in figure 5.11) imply higher margins over infrastructure charges 
for railways operators than for airways carriers offering services on such links. 
 
According to these facts, it can be affirmed that the consideration of investment costs by 
railways infrastructure charging systems results in lower margins over infrastructure 
charges for RUs offering high speed services than for airways carriers.  As a result of that, 
compared to railway operators offering conventional services on conventional railway 
lines, railway undertakings offering high speed services on high speed lines lose their 
advantage with regard to airways in terms of margins over infrastructure charges. 
 
 
5.3.3. Analysis of the influence that the consideration of the commercial position of 
the market by railway pricing systems may have on the competitiveness of 
high speed railways with regard to airways  
 
The influence that the consideration of the commercial position of the market by railway 
pricing systems may have on the competitiveness of high speed railways compared to 
airways has been analysed on the basis of the value of the charges-to-revenues ratio 
between railways and airways.  
 
According to the results obtained (presented in figure 5.12), when railways reach 
commercial speeds that can directly compete with the ones of the air mode (commercial 
speeds above 165 km/h), the percentage of incomes from ticket sales dedicated to pay 
infrastructure charges is higher for railways than for airways. That means that the charges-
to-revenues ratio is more unfavourable to the rail than to the air mode97.  
 
Despite this situation, no further correlation could be established between the charges-to-
revenues ratio between railways and airways and the commercial speed. Indeed, for speeds 
lower than 165 km/h, the value of the commercial speed seems not to have a direct effect 
on the value of the ratio analysed. However, it is to be noted that links where commercial 
speeds are above 165 km/h correspond to new lines (yellow rhombus) or a combination of 
new and upgraded lines, with the length of new lines above 40% of the total length of the 
link. Given that chapter 4 and the preceding sections of chapter 5 have ascertained that rail 
infrastructure charges are strongly correlated with the commercial speed and that there is a 
strong correlation between the rail infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratio and the 
commercial speed in links with new lines, it may be affirmed that the consideration of the 
                                                 
97 In section 5.3.2 it has been verified that higher infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratios for railways than 
airways imply, in general terms, lower margins over infrastructure charges for railway operators than for 
airways carriers.  
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commercial position of the market by railway pricing systems negatively affects the 
competitiveness of high speed railways in front of airways.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.12 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE WEIGHT OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGES AND AIRWAYS CHARGES COMPARED TO THE REVENUES 
















































































5.4. COMMENTS ON THE LINK BETWEEN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGES AND REVENUES FROM TICKET SALES 
 
The results presented in this chapter have shown that the application to high speed lines 
(and services) of mark ups reflecting investment costs and the commercial position result 
in higher charges-to-revenues ratios compared to the ones registered for conventional 
lines. This may be affecting the competitiveness of RUs offering high speed services, 
since their margins over infrastructure charges have been found to be lower for RUs 
offering high speed services than those of airways carriers, whilst the situation is the 
reverse in links where conventional railway services are offered.  
 
Attention has to be drawn to the fact that the prices used in this research are based on the 
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train (see chapter 3). This assumption leads to a surcharge of the revenues compared to 
reality and, consequently, the influence of the mark ups above marginal costs implemented 
in the rail charging systems on the European high speed network could even be higher 
than stated. 
 
The fact that unit values for infrastructure charges are well above marginal costs and 
higher than the optimal mark up calculated in chapter 1 (as seen in chapter 4), added to the 
aforementioned results, shows that many IMs’ charges may be far from the optimum 
infrastructure charge value. This discrepancy is also visible from the railway operators’ 
point of view. Indeed, when a RU seeks a certain profitability for high performance 
services, in particular when it is a question of facing a competition characterised by 
reduced prices, a pricing design representing an important percentage of the total cost 
could result in a limitation to the development of offers on the new high speed lines. This 
was for instance the case of Thalys, which had to reduce its number of trains due to an 
increase in the infrastructure charge. The reduction of trains was aimed at raising the load 
factor and, therefore, the revenues per train in order to render Thalys profitable. On the 
other hand, the national French operator, SNCF, in 2008 was planning to increase its ticket 
fares by 2% in all its high speed trains in order to face the increase in rail infrastructure 
charges to be paid to the French infrastructure manager, RFF (Vía Libre, 2008). The 
question is how it will influence the market share of high speed railways compared to that 
of airways.  
 
Even if increased access charges aimed at recovering capital costs are compliant with 
Directive 2001/14/EC, according to Smith (2006), the spirit should be such that the traffic 
can afford to use the infrastructure. The next chapter is devoted to quantifying the 
competitive impact of the actual levels of HSR charges. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS THAT CURRENT 
PRICES CHARGED TO HS TRAINS ARE LIKELY 
TO HAVE ON HSR COMPETITIVENESS 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION ON THE IMPACT THAT THE VALUE OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES MAY HAVE ON THE RAILWAYS 
COMPETITIVE POSITION 
 
Railways competitiveness compared to other modes of transport is, in some terms, 
determined by the commercial speed (closely related to line performances: new line, 
upgraded line, conventional line), the total travel time (related to the total length of the 
link and line performances) and the ticket fares. However, the introduction of 
infrastructure charging systems in the new European railways scenario meant introducing 
a new element in this field. As it was introduced in chapter 2 the demand sensitivity to 
ticket fare rates points to the fact that an increase in the charge for the use of infrastructure 
or too high an infrastructure charge level can have an important effect on the HS railways 
market share compared to airways, especially for travel times of 3-4 hours. 
 
In chapter 5, some correlations were established between the rail infrastructure charges-to-
revenues ratio and the travel time in two countries, namely France and Spain, both 
applying important mark ups on charges for high speed trains running on high speed lines. 
In these countries it is possible to establish how the infrastructure charges-to-revenues 
ratio is related to the market share98 (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the econometric analysis carried out for France using the charges-to-
revenues ratio as the dependent variable and the market share as explanatory variable, 
without taking into account the two main French high speed links (Paris-Lyons and Paris-
Marseilles), which do not follow the general French tendency. According to the results 
obtained, in France the charges-to-revenues ratio would increase with the market share 
according to a positive polynomial function. These results seem to show that mark ups 
may have been imposed taking careful consideration of the market position of RUs in the 
market segment in question, i.e. there seems to be a clear market-based pricing.   
                                                 
98 The results of this correlation are valid for 2006 and in journeys starting at 8 a.m. (see chapter 3 for more 
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FIGURE 6.1 LINK BETWEEN THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES/ REVENUES 
RATIO AND THE MARKET SHARE FOR FRENCH HIGH SPEED LINKS IN 2006 
 




















































- Paris-Lyons and Paris-Marseilles (circled with a dotted 
red circle) do not follow the general tendency. 
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FIGURE 6.2 LINK BETWEEN THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES/REVENUES RATIO 
AND THE MARKET SHARE FOR SPANISH HIGH SPEED LINKS IN 2006 
 




















































- The market share – travel time curve is only valid for 
journeys shorter than six hours. 
- The curve infrastructure charges/revenues – market share 
does not take into consideration the Barcelona – Seville 
link (because this journey is longer than six hours.  
- The Madrid-Toledo link (with a charges-to-revenues 
ratio equal to 52,9%) does not follow the general 
tendency. This could be explained by the fact that this 
link is operated as a regional service and not as a long 
distance service and therefore, the ticket fare policy 
differs from the one applied to long distance high speed 
links. 
Travel time ( in) Travel time (min) 
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Figure 6.2 presents the results of the same analysis for the Spanish case. The results show 
that contrary to what has been observed in France, in Spain the infrastructure charges-to-
revenues ratio does not increase with an increase of the railways’ market share. According 
to these results, the ratio for high speed links hardly varies with market share and if it 
does, it tends to decrease with an increase of railways market share with regard to the one 
of airways. Therefore, there is no real evidence of market-based pricing. 
 
Those results lead to suspect that the mark ups have not always been “imposed after 
careful consideration of the most efficient way of doing so and their consequences for the 
market position of railway undertakings in the market segment in question”, as IMPRINT-
NET (2008) recommended it should be done. 
 
In order to try to understand how the level of infrastructure charges can affect the 
competitiveness of high speed services with regard to airways, the analysis has been 
divided into two main parts: 
 
• Firstly, the impact that current prices charged in the main European countries 
operating high speed trains are likely to have on traffic levels is analysed.  
 
• Secondly, the impact that current prices charged in the main European countries 




6.2. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT THAT A REDUCTION IN RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES CAN HAVE ON TRAFFIC VOLUMES 
 
The impact that a reduction in rail infrastructure charges is likely to have on traffic 
volumes has been assessed on the basis of f. 3.25 presented in chapter 3. From f. 3.25, it is 
possible to affirm that the impact derived from a reduction in infrastructure charges will be 





 is as well as.  
 
Concerning the value of a, the results presented in chapter 5 have shown that it is in links 
with new lines that a sees higher values, while the lowest ones are registered in 
conventional lines. At the same time, the analysis of the results shows that above 
commercial speeds of 150 km/h, a increases proportionally and considerably with an 
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the current charging and pricing levels are expected to bring about higher changes in 
traffic volumes than in conventional lines. 
 
With regard to the value of the price elasticity of demand, a similar value applies to a 
given market segment99. For the present analysis it has been assumed that high speed runs 
on the European high speed network constitute a single market segment and therefore, the 
value of the price elasticity of demand for those can be considered to be the same for such 
runs100. 
 
Evidence on fare elasticity for high speed railways can be found in Wardman (1998). 
According to this author, the fare elasticities for Eurostar do not vary greatly across the 
different fare increases and amount on average approximately -0,50 for business and -0,70 
for leisure. It could be expected that the improvement of yield management in the railway 
field during the last ten years may have reduced the elasticity published by Wardman 
(1998). However, according to Crozet (2007) price elasticity for high speed trains is 
supposed to range from -0,70 (Lyons-Paris line) to -1,50 (Paris-Nice line).  
 
Since the present study focuses on high speed runs departing at 8 a.m. from the origin 
point (see chapter 3 for more details about the calculation assumptions), and in order not 
to overestimate the impact on traffic volumes of a variation in rail infrastructure charges, 
the value of fare elasticity used for the calculations was the one for business trips 
published by Wardman (1998), that is, -0,50. Therefore, the relative change in traffic 
volumes for the high performance services departing at 8 a.m. from the origin point and 
running on the European high speed network can be expressed as: 
 














50,0  (f. 6.1) 
 
 
The analysis of the impact that actual prices charged in the main European countries 
operating high speed trains are likely to have on traffic levels has been carried out using f. 
6.1 and assuming: 
 
• Firstly, a reduction of rail infrastructure charges to the level of marginal cost of 
maintenance and renewals, i.e. a reduction of mark ups to zero. 
                                                 
99 According to IMPRINT-NET (2008), market segments relate to identifiable sets of traffic with similar 
price elasticity of demand.  
100 Since the analysis of the change in traffic resulting from any change in infrastructure charge will be 
focused on those countries where new high speed lines are in operation (France, Spain, Germany, Italy and 
Belgium), this assumption is applicable. 
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• Secondly, a reduction of current levels of rail infrastructure charges to the optimal 
level of mark up (as according to section 1.4.2). 
 
 
6.2.1. Impact on traffic volumes resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure 
charges to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals 
 
As presented in chapter 1, Directive 2001/14/EC states that “the charges for the minimum 
access package and track access to service facilities shall be set at the cost that is directly 
incurred as a result of operating the train service” (article 7.3), i.e. following the marginal 
cost principle, even if allowances for applying some mark ups are made.   
 
The characterisation and analysis of the European rail infrastructure charging systems for 
HSL presented in chapter 4 has proven that the levels of charges implemented for new and 
upgraded lines are currently set far above the marginal maintenance and renewal costs, 
which according to the estimations available amount approximately 2 €/train-km (see 
section 1.4.2). Therefore, it would be interesting to quantify the impact that a reduction of 
rail infrastructure charges to the level of marginal cost would have on traffic volumes 
registered on the European high speed lines.  
 
Table 6.1 and figure 6.3 summarise the impact on traffic volumes resulting from a 
reduction of rail infrastructure charges to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and 
renewals (2 €/train-km). According to the results obtained, it can be affirmed that: 
 
• In France, if infrastructure charges were reduced to the marginal cost of 
maintenance and renewals (reductions of about 70%-85%, with the exception of 
the Paris-Strasbourg link, still a conventional line in the year of the analysis), 
traffic volumes would increase between 19%-38% in links with new lines. 
Increases above 30% would be expected to take place in the Paris-Lyons, Paris-
Marseilles and Paris-Lille links, which correspond to those already carrying higher 
volumes of passengers, probably due to the economical importance of the cities 
they link (especially, Paris and Marseilles) and to their strategic situation in terms 
of European communication junctions (especially, Lille). 
 
• In Spain, a reduction of the level of infrastructure charges to the marginal cost of 
maintenance and renewals would increase traffic volumes from 21% to 28% for 
medium and long distance high speed links (with the highest increase in the 
Barcelona-Seville link, which could be considered as the sum of two different high 
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TABLE 6.1 IMPACT ON TRAFFIC VOLUMES RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES TO THE LEVEL OF MARGINAL COST OF 
MAINTENANCE AND RENEWALS (2 €/train-km)  
Current situation With reduction (calculated) 







Paris-Tours 12,1 42,3 28,6% -10,1 -83,44% 23,84% 
Paris-Lille 15,2 39,4 38,5% -13,2 -86,82% 33,42% 
Lyon-Marseille 7,6 30,2 25,2% -5,6 -73,71% 18,57% 
Paris-Rennes 7,7 34,0 22,6% -5,7 -73,94% 16,68% 
Paris-Lyon 14,6 33,0 44,1% -12,6 -86,26% 38,00% 
Paris-Strasbourg 3,1 22,4 13,6% -1,1 -34,60% 4,72% 
Paris-Bordeaux 6,1 27,6 22,0% -4,1 -67,08% 14,76% 
FR 
Paris-Marseille 10,3 24,6 41,9% -8,3 -80,59% 33,79% 
Madrid-Toledo 11,9 22,5 52,9% -9,9 -83,20% 44,04% 
Madrid-Zaragoza 9,3 33,5 27,8% -7,3 -78,49% 21,78% 
Madrid-Sevilla 10,2 36,1 28,2% -8,2 -80,37% 22,67% 
Madrid-Barcelona 7,2 24,0 29,9% -5,2 -72,19% 21,60% 
ES 
Barcelona-Sevilla 7,1 18,2 39,2% -5,1 -71,94% 28,20% 
Frankfurt-Köln 12,1 74,5 16,3% -10,1 -83,52% 13,61% 
Hannover-Berlin 5,1 49,6 10,3% -3,1 -60,94% 6,29% 
DE 
Hannover-Frankfurt 5,7 51,7 11,0% -3,7 -64,70% 7,09% 
Milano-Genova 4,7 26,0 18,2% -2,7 -57,62% 10,48% 
Roma-Napoli 4,5 21,9 20,7% -2,5 -55,86% 11,56% 
Roma-Firenze 3,8 27,5 13,8% -1,8 -47,23% 6,51% 
IT 
Firenze-Milano 3,6 22,3 15,9% -1,6 -43,68% 6,95% 
BE Bruxelles-Liège 10,5 29,4 35,8% -8,5 -81,00% 29,03% 
Remarks:  
- ∆IC corresponds to the decrease in infrastructure charges necessary to reach the marginal cost of 
maintenance and renewal (i.e. ∆IC = IC – MCmaintenance&renewals), accepted to be 2 €/train-km for high 
speed lines (see table 1.13). 
- The calculations of infrastructure charges are those for high speed runs taking place in 2006, departing 
at 8 a.m. from the origin point and heading for the destination point (for those pricing systems 
considering the timetable period for the calculation of infrastructure charges) and without taking into 
account intermediate stops in order to ease the calculations. 
- Revenues are calculated as the product of the vehicle capacity, the load factor and the ticket fare. For 
the train revenues calculation it was assumed a ticket fare equivalent to the 2nd class fare reduced of 
25% in order to take into account the considerable season tickets, offers, etc. available, and therefore, 
to obtain a value for revenues which is close to real RUs’ revenues. The vehicle capacity considered 
was 500 seats (TGV Duplex) and the load factor, 65%. 
- Since infrastructure charges calculations correspond to high speed runs departing at 8 a.m. from the 
origin point and in order not to overestimate the impact on traffic volumes of a variation in rail 
infrastructure charges, the value of fare elasticity used for the calculations was the one for business 
trips published by Wardman (1998), that is -0.50 and not -0.7, which is the value given by Crozet 
(2007) for high speed trains on the Lyons-Paris line. 
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• In Germany, the increase in traffic resulting from a reduction of the level of 
charges to the marginal cost of maintenance and renewals would amount to 14% in 
links with new lines over their total length (case of Frankfurt-Cologne link) and 
approximately 7% in links with a mixture of new and upgraded lines (e.g. 
Hanover-Berlin and Hanover-Frankfurt). 
 
• In Italy, if infrastructure charges were reduced to the marginal cost of maintenance 
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increases in traffic would not correspond to new high speed lines. The Italian 
charging system does not aim at recovering investment costs, thus high speed lines 
are neither the ones bearing higher infrastructure charges nor higher infrastructure 
charges-to-revenues ratios (see chapters 4 and 5). 
 
• In Belgium, increases in traffic resulting from a reduction of infrastructure charges 
to the marginal cost of maintenance and renewals would be in line with the 
increases observed in France. Specifically, they would be expected to amount 
around 30%. 
 
The preceding conclusions allow affirming that the increases in traffic volumes deduced 
from f. 6.1 are very significant (even if according to the assumption made, they are 
supposed to correspond to the minimum change expected). Indeed, transporting up to 
approximately 40% more passengers in a link such as Paris-Lyons, where approximately 
100 trains run daily (including both directions), would in all likelihood be prone to lead to 
capacity problems. Consequently, in such cases, it may be appropriate to maintain the 
level of infrastructure charges above the marginal costs of maintenance and renewals, so 
as to ensure that the current capacity of the existing lines is sufficient to bear the increases 
in traffic resulting from a reduction of infrastructure charges. Indeed, a state of shortage of 
capacity could be reached as a consequence of the increase in traffic volumes derived from 
such an important reduction in the level of infrastructure charges. Consequently, the 
marginal costs would increase and the reduction in infrastructure charges needed for 
lowering them until the level of marginal costs would be lower. But in many cases the 
suggested increase in traffic could be accommodated on the existing infrastructure. 
 
 
6.2.2. Impact on traffic volumes resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure 
charges to the optimal level of mark ups 
 
Assuming that there is generally considered to be a shadow price attached to public funds 
of around 1,3 (official value in France according to Crozet, 2007), this generally justifies a 
mark up, depending on the price elasticity of demand for the service in question. Given 
that infrastructure charges are only a part of the total cost of providing a high speed rail 
service, substantial mark ups may be justified, as has been demonstrated in chapter 1. 
However, according to the analysis carried out in chapter 4, in many cases it appears that 
mark ups even exceed these levels.  
 
In this section calculations are made of the impact of reducing mark ups to the optimal 
level, which is assumed to be around three times the marginal cost for the main national 
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European high speed links. These are made considering a price elasticity of traffic equal to 
-0,70 (see section 1.4.2.3).  
 
The impact on traffic volumes in the main national European high speed links resulting 
from such a reduction according to the preceding assumptions would be the one presented 




TABLE 6.2 IMPACT ON TRAFFIC VOLUMES RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES TO THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF MARK UP 
(APPROXIMATELY THREE TIMES THE MARGINAL COST OF 2 €/TRAIN-KM)  
Current situation With reduction (calculated) 







FR Paris-Lyon 14,6 33,0 44,1% -8.6 -58,78% 60,42%
ES Madrid-Sevilla 10,2 36,1 28,2% -4.2 -41,11% 27,05%
DE Frankfurt-Köln 12,1 74,5 16,3% -6.1 -50,55% 19,22%
IT Roma-Firenze 3,8 27,5 13,8% +2.2 58,32% -18,76%
BE Bruxelles-Liège 10,5 29,4 35,8% -4.5 -43,00% 35,96%
Remarks:  
- ∆IC corresponds to the reduction in infrastructure charges necessary to reach the optimal mark up, 
accepted to be about 3 times the marginal cost. 
- See remarks in table 6.1 for calculations of infrastructure charges and revenues.  
- Price elasticity of demand: -0,70 (Crozet, 2007), in order to be consistent with the price elasticity used for 




Apart from the Italian case, where the charging system does not cover maintenance and 
renewal costs, infrastructure charges would be reduced by about 40-50% and even up to 
approximately 60% in the case of the Paris-Lyons link, resulting in traffic volumes 
increases of 20% to 30% in the Frankfurt-Cologne and Madrid-Seville links, respectively, 
of about 36% in the Brussels-Liège link and more than 60% in the Paris-Lyons link. As 
noted above the author has serious doubts about the Paris-Lyons link being able to cope 
with 60% traffic increase (derived from a reduction of the current level of infrastrucutre 
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6.2.3. Comments on the impact that a reduction in rail infrastructure charges 
equivalent to reducing mark ups either to zero or to the optimal Ramsey mark 
up may have on traffic volumes  
 
According to the quantification of the impacts resulting from a reduction in rail 
infrastructure charges equivalent either to reducing mark ups to zero or to equalling 
infrastructure charges to the optimal Ramsey mark up values, the following statements can 
be made: 
 
• It would seem that charging high speed lines with only the marginal cost is not the 
optimal solution: Firstly, because the increases in traffic forecasted as a result of 
such a reduction could result in insufficient infrastructure capacity and the ensuing 
raise in marginal congestion and scarcity costs would result in the estimates of 
marginal costs used for the calculations not being appropriate anymore; secondly, 
it would mean neglecting the high ability to pay that railway operators offering 
high speed services on high speed lines seem to have, thus losing an important 
source of revenues for recovering part of the total infrastructure costs; finally, it 
would also mean neglecting the opportunity cost of public funds, that is, the 
existence of budget constraints. 
 
• If mark ups to marginal cost were fixed at the optimal level of mark up calculated 
for the main national European high speed links, traffic volumes would increase 
approximately by 20-30%, or even 60% in the Paris-Lyons link. 
 
Hence, the results show that an important percentage of passengers would be deterred 
from using high speed railways (at least during peak periods) as a result of the influence 
that the current levels of mark ups exert on the ticket fares, which correspond to the final 
price to consumers (users).  
 
These impacts can be translated into yearly losses in passengers travelling at peak periods, 
assuming 5 working days per week and considering that a year has 53 weeks (see tables 
6.3 and 6.4).  
 
In the French case, where high speed traffic is very intense at peak periods (from 12 to 25 
trains during the peak period –5h30 in total–), the estimated yearly increases at the peak 
period resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure charges to the level of the marginal 
cost of maintenance and renewals amount to 490.890 passengers in the Paris-Lyons link, 
and almost 690.800 passengers in the Paris-Lille link. In Spain, where high speed traffic is 
considerably lower than in France, the yearly increases at the peak period would 
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accordingly range from 150.000 to 265.000 passengers per year. The lower increases in 
the Italian network are mainly due to the fact that the peak period only lasts 3 hours, 
compared to the 5h30 and 5h in the French and the Spanish networks, respectively.  
 
 
TABLE 6.3 YEARLY IMPACTS (EXPRESSED IN PASSENGERS PER YEAR IN PEAK 
PERIODS) IN TRAFFIC VOLUMES RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF MARGINAL COST 
Country







(in pax. per 
year) 
Paris-Tours 25 23,84% 513.265 
Paris-Lille 24 33,42% 690.796 
Lyon-Marseille 13 18,57% 207.897 
Paris-Rennes 12 16,68% 172.407 
FR 6:30 to 9:00 
17:00 to 20:00 
Paris-Lyon 15 38,00% 490.890 
Madrid-Toledo  7 44,04% 265.511 
Madrid-Zaragoza  8 21,78% 150.082 
ES 7:00 to 9:29 
18:00 to 20:29 
Madrid-Sevilla  8 22,67% 156.174 
Milano-Genova  7 10,48% 63.162 
Roma-Napoli  9 11,56% 168.842 
Roma-Firenze  6 6,51% 33.638 
IT 6:00 to 9:00 
Firenze-Milano  1 6,95% 5.988 
Remarks:  
(1) Only countries that consider peak periods have been analysed with the exception of Belgium, since in 
this country the definition of time periods varies with the line and the running direction.  
(2) Only links shorter than 500 km have been considered, because for longer links the journey is almost 
twice the peak period and, therefore, journeys take place within different time periods. 
(3) Trains currently running during peak periods, both directions included. Calculated from Cook (2005) 
and assuming that departures and arrivals taking place within a 30-minutes margin outside the peak 
period are considered as trains in peak period. 
(4) Impact on traffic volumes resulting from a reduction of the level of charges to the marginal cost of 
wear and tear (2 €/train-km), assuming a price elasticity of demand of -0,50. 
(5) Assuming 265 working days per year (5 working days x 53 weeks/year). 
 
 
The impact of reducing the level of rail infrastructure charges to the optimal level of mark 
up would as well be important (see table 6.4)101.  
 
                                                 
101 For the Italian case, to equal the current level of charges to the calculated optimal level of mark ups 
would imply to increase the current level of infrastructure charges. Therefore, in this case, a loss of 
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TABLE 6.4 YEARLY IMPACTS (EXPRESSED IN PASSENGERS PER YEAR IN PEAK 
PERIODS) IN TRAFFIC VOLUMES RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF THE OPTIMAL 
MARK UP 
Country





∆Q/Q (ICOp.M.U). (4) 
∆Q(5) 
(in pax. per 
year) 
FR 6:30 to 9:00 
17:00 to 20:00 
Paris-Lyon 15 60,42% 780.551 
ES 7:00 to 9:29 
18:00 to 20:29 
Madrid-Sevilla  8 27,05% 186.375 
IT 6:00 to 9:00 Roma-Firenze  6 -18,76% -96.942 
Remarks:  
(1) Only countries that consider peak periods have been analysed, with the exception of Belgium, since in 
this country the definition of time periods varies with the line and the running direction.  
(2) Only links shorter than 500 km have been considered, because for longer links the journey is almost 
twice the peak period and, therefore, journeys take place within different time periods. 
(3) Trains currently running during peak periods, both directions included. Calculated from Cook (2005) 
and assuming that departures and arrivals taking place within a 30-minutes margin outside the peak 
period are considered as trains in peak period. 
(4) Impact on traffic volumes resulting from a reduction of the level of charges to the optimal level of 
mark up (6 €/train-km approx), assuming a price elasticity of demand of -0,70 (Crozet, 2007), in order 
to be consistent with the price elasticity used for calculating the optimal mark up. 




TABLE 6.5 EVOLUTION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN SOME HIGH SPEED 
LINKS (2001-2008)  
 Source: Own from data from Muñoz (2008)   
Links analysed 
Paris-Lyon Madrid-Sevilla Frankfurt-Köln Roma-Firenze Year 
€  €/train-km € €/train-km € €/train-km € €/train-km
2001 6.419,75 14,83          
2002 6.280,57 14,50          
2003 6.246,77 14,43 3.720,41 7,90 2.141,41 11,90 959,17 3,67 
2004 6.295,13 14,54 3.720,41 7,90 2.147,65 11,93 972,60 3,73 
2005 6.566,68 15,17 4.650,85 9,87 2.167,01 12,04 989,13 3,79 
2006 6.048,42 13,97 4.650,85 9,87 2.148,74 11,94 989,13 3,79 
2007 6.364,12 14,70 4.650,85 9,87 2.057,87 11,43 986,40 3,78 
2008 6.626,18 15,30 4.650,85 9,87 2.107,35 11,71 986,40 3,78 
Remarks:  
- The values presented correspond to the average between infrastructure charges for departures taking 
place at 8 a.m. from both O and D. 
- Charges for the Frankfurt-Köln link do not include the charges for the use of stations. 
- See chapter 3 for calculation hypotheses. 
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It is of special interest to mention that even though the calculations were made for the 
charging systems valid for 2006, the conclusions also apply to 2007 and 2008. Indeed, the 
analysis of the evolution of the level of rail infrastructure charges for European high speed 
links presented in annex A10 shows that the level of infrastructure charges for high speed 
links has remained fairly invariable (see table 6.5 and figure 6.4), France being the 
country where the variability is the highest. Furthermore, table 6.6 shows that it can as 
well be affirmed that the values of the infrastructure charges-to-revenues ratio, essential 
for determining the impact on traffic volumes of a variation in rail infrastructure charges, 
have not changed much in the last years. Therefore, the impact on traffic volumes of the 
pricing systems valid for the year 2007 and 2008 is in the same order of magnitude as the 



































































TABLE 6.6 INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES-TO-REVENUES RATIO (a) FOR SOME HIGH 
SPEED LINES IN 2006 AND 2007 
a = IC/Rev 
Country  Link 
Year 2006 Year 2007 
France Paris – Lyon  44,1 % 45,39 % 
Spain Madrid – Sevilla 28,2 % 25,62 % 
Germany Frankfurt – Köln 16,3 % 14,59 % 







222  PhD Thesis 
6.3. ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON THE MODE SPLIT 
RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION IN INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
 
The analysis of the possible effects on the mode split resulting from a reduction in 
infrastructure charges has been carried out on the basis of the assumptions presented in 
section 3.7, relative, on the one hand, to the establishment of a link between rail 
infrastructure charges and rail ticket fares and, on the other hand, the definition of a 
market share model for European high speed links. 
 
The assessment has been done in eleven links of the European countries with high speed 
lines in operation and where high speed railways compete with airways, namely six 
French links (Lyons–Marseilles, Paris–Rennes, Paris–Lyons, Paris–Strasbourg, Paris–
Bordeaux and Paris–Marseilles), two Spanish links (Madrid–Seville and Madrid–
Barcelona), two German links (Frankfurt–Cologne and Hanover–Frankfurt), and one 
Italian link (Rome–Florence).  
 
TABLE 6.7 AVERAGE FARE AND AVERAGE ACCESS COST. LINKS FOR MODEL 
VALIDATION 
Average fare (€) Access cost (€) 
Route Rail Air Rail Air 
Lyon - Marseille 32,33 78,87(*) 10 15 
Paris - Rennes 37,65 115,28(*) 10 15 
Paris - Lyon 44,03 123,34 10 15 
Paris - Strasbourg 34,65 138,42 10 15 
Paris - Bordeaux 47,78 103,70(*) 10 15 
Paris - Marseille 56,4 107,47(*) 10 15 
Madrid - Sevilla 52,35 165,9 5 10 
Madrid - Barcelona 47,25 49,4 5 10 
Frankfurt - Köln 41,3 72 5 10 
Hannover - Frankfurt 53,25 113,56 5 10 
Roma - Firenze 22,08 107,16 10 10 
Remarks: 
(*) Air ticket fares to which a factor of 1,8 has been applied in order to bring the fares 
found closer to the average ticket fare (see assumptions in section 3.7.2.5). 
 
 
For these links, the average fare and average access cost, the schedule related factors and 
the access time, as well as the quality factor scores are presented in tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, 
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respectively, following the same assumptions as the ones presented in section 3.7.2.5 for 
the links used for validating the market share model. 
 












R A R A R A R A R A 
Lyon - Marseille 107 60 9 7 55 59 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Rennes 135 65 33 9 20 55 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Lyon 115 65 33 27 20 24 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Strasbourg 284 60 17 19 38 29 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Bordeaux 191 70 19 43 29 17 0 50 30 45 
Paris - Marseille 183 65 24 45 25 18 0 50 30 45 
Madrid - Sevilla 140 60 22 13 26 38 5 45 30 45 
Madrid - Barcelona 305 75 7 64 59 15 5 30 30 30 
Frankfurt - Köln 72 45 32 4 20 108 0 45 30 45 
Hannover - Frankfurt 139 55 24 10 25 54 0 45 30 45 
Roma - Firenze 96 65 29 6 22 75 0 45 30 30 
Remarks: R stands for railways and A for airways. 
 
TABLE 6.9 QUALITY FACTOR SCORES (10 IS BEST) 




quality Scores Route 
R A R A R A R A R A 
Lyon - Marseille 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Rennes 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Lyon 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Strasbourg 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Bordeaux 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Paris - Marseille 6 5 2 10 5 5 7 3 20 23 
Madrid - Sevilla 10 6 0 10 0 5 9 5 19 26 
Madrid - Barcelona 10 6 0 10 0 5 9 5 19 26 
Frankfurt - Köln 9 8 6 10 7 9 6 5 28 32 
Hannover - Frankfurt 9 8 6 10 7 9 6 5 28 32 
Roma - Firenze 9 6 0 10 7 7 7 4 23 27 
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With the inputs above, the current charging and market share scenario has the 
characteristics presented in table 6.10. 
 
 
TABLE 6.10 CHARACTERISATION OF THE CURRENT CHARGING AND MARKET SHARE 
SCENARIO IN ROUTES SERVED BY HIGH SPEED SERVICES 
Market share 
Links 




Real Model Differ. 
V_Air - 
V_rail 
Lyon-Marseille 7,61 32,33 25,19%   86%   -84
Paris-Rennes 7,67 37,65 22,56%   92%   -115
Paris-Lyon 14,56 44,03 44,05% 92% 91% 1% -107
Paris-Strasbourg 3,06 34,65 13,64% 60% 66% -6% -31
Paris-Bordeaux 6,08 47,78 22,01% 68% 69% -1% -38
Paris-Marseille 10,30 56,40 41,93% 69% 69% 0% -37
Madrid-Sevilla 10,19 52,35 28,20% 92% 93% -1% -118
Madrid-Barcelona 7,19 47,25 29,92% 12% 5% 7% 140
Frankfurt-Köln 12,13 41,25 16,29% 97% 98% -1% -173
Hannover-Frankfurt 5,66 53,25 10,96%   85%   -81
Roma-Firenze 3,79 22,08 13,78%   96%   -150
Remarks: 
- IC: Rail infrastructure charges 
- F: Rail ticket fares 
- a: rail infrastructure charges-to-rail revenues from ticket sales ratio 
- Differ.: Difference between the real market share and the one predicted by the market share model 
- V_Air – V_Rail: Difference between air and rail utilities 
 
 
The next sections present how the current mode split would change under two scenarios 
with rail infrastructure charges:   
 
• Reduced to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals, i.e. a reduction 
of mark ups to zero. 
 
• Reduced to the optimal level of mark up. 
 
Before presenting the results, it is important to point out that: 
 
• The charges-to-revenues ratios (a) used for the calculations correspond to average 
ratios except for those countries where rail infrastructure charging systems 
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differentiate by time of day (peak, normal and off-peak periods): France, Spain, 
Italy and Belgium. In these countries, the ratio a is slightly higher than the average 
as a result of the assumptions on rail infrastructure charges calculations presented 
in table 3.7. According to these assumptions, charges are calculated for trains 
departing at 8 a.m., that is, departing at the peak period. This implies that at least 
the first 1h-1h30’ of the journey takes place during peak period, when the highest 
levels of charges are applied. 
 
• It has been assumed that the rail market share values available are not only 
representative for the link in its whole, but they are also representative of the mode 
split observed in the morning peak. This assumption may slightly underestimate 
the market share really observed in links for the morning period. 
 
• Only modal shift has been quantified. No consideration has been taken of the 




6.3.1. Impact on mode split resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure charges 
to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals 
 
Table 6.11 presents the utilities expected from a reduction of rail infrastructure charges to 
the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals, while table 6.12 summarises the 
impacts on mode split resulting from such utilities, according to f. 3.34 and f. 3.35. Those 
impacts, which translate into 0 to 19 points more in the market share, are analysed and 
commented in section 6.3.3. 
 
 
TABLE 6.11 UTILITIES RESULTING FROM REDUCING THE CURRENT LEVEL OF RAIL 
CHARGES TO THE MARGINAL COST OF WEAR AND TEAR (2 €/TRAIN-KM) 
∆F/F New F (€) V_Rail V_Air - V_rail
Route ∆IC/IC 
ε=-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7
Lyon-Marseille -74% -37% -62% 20,32 12,32 -115 -107 -95,82 -103,8
Paris-Rennes -74% -33% -56% 25,09 16,71 -112,5 -104,1 -128 -136,3
Paris-Lyon -86% -76% -127% 10,57 0,00(1) -86,94 -76,38 -140 -150,6
Paris-Strasbourg -35% -9% -16% 31,38 29,20 -207,4 -205,2 -34,48 -36,66
Paris-Bordeaux -67% -30% -49% 33,67 24,26 -155,6 -146,2 -52,38 -61,78
Paris-Marseille -81% -68% -113% 18,28 0,00(1) -133,9 -115,6 -75,2 -93,48
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∆F/F New F (€) V_Rail V_Air - V_rail
Route ∆IC/IC 
ε=-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7
Madrid-Barcelona -72% -43% -72% 26,84 13,23 -240,1 -226,5 119,1 105,5 
Frankfurt-Köln -84% -27% -45% 30,02 22,54 -69,55 -62,07 -184,6 -192,1
Hannover-Frankfurt -65% -14% -24% 45,70 40,67 -124,1 -119 -88,07 -93,11
Roma-Firenze -47% -13% -22% 19,21 17,29 -82,76 -80,84 -152,5 -154,4
Remarks:  
(1) The new ticket fares calculated have negative values. Since that would not make sense, they have been 
equalled to zero. 
 
 
TABLE 6.12 CHANGES IN MODE SPLIT RESULTING FROM REDUCING THE CURRENT 
LEVEL OF RAIL CHARGES TO THE MARGINAL COST OF WEAR AND TEAR 
(2 €/TRAIN-KM) 
Market share new scenario ∆Market share(1)  
Route 
ε=-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 
Lyon-Marseille 89% 90% 2,86% 4,48% 
Paris-Rennes 94% 95% 1,73% 2,67% 
Paris-Lyon 95% 96% 4,52% 5,45% 
Paris-Strasbourg 68% 69% 1,55% 2,56% 
Paris-Bordeaux 75% 79% 6,02% 9,55% 
Paris-Marseille 83% 88% 14,47% 19,23% 
Madrid-Sevilla 95% 97% 2,81% 4,09% 
Madrid-Barcelona 7% 9% 2,44% 4,66% 
Frankfurt-Köln 98% 98% 0,50% 0,78% 
Hannover-Frankfurt 87% 88% 1,96% 3,15% 
Roma-Firenze 96% 96% 0,22% 0,37% 
Remarks: 




6.3.2. Impact on mode split resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure charges 
to the optimal level of mark ups 
 
In order to assess the impact on mode split resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure 
charges to the optimal level of mark ups, the utilities expected from such a reduction have 
been calculated (see table 6.13). The impacts on mode split resulting from such utilities 
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are summarised in table 6.14. Those impacts, which translate into 0 to 13 points more in 
the market share, are analysed and commented in section 6.3.3. 
 
TABLE 6.13 UTILITIES RESULTING FROM REDUCING THE CURRENT LEVEL OF RAIL 
CHARGES TO THE OPTIMAL MARK UP  
∆F/F New F (€) V_Rail V_Air - V_rail
Route ∆IC/IC 
ε=-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7
Lyon-Marseille -21% -11% -18% 28,88 26,59 -123,6 -121,3 -87,25 -89,55
Paris-Rennes -22% -10% -16% 33,94 31,47 -121,3 -118,8 -119,1 -121,6
Paris-Lyon -59% -52% -86% 21,23 6,03 -97,6 -82,4 -129,3 -144,5
Paris-Strasbourg 96% 26% 44% 43,74 49,80 -219,8 -225,8 -22,12 -16,06
Paris-Bordeaux -1% -1% -1% 47,51 47,34 -169,5 -169,3 -38,53 -38,71
Paris-Marseille -42% -35% -58% 36,64 23,47 -152,2 -139 -56,84 -70,01
Madrid-Sevilla -41% -23% -39% 40,21 32,12 -132,8 -124,7 -130,2 -138,3
Madrid-Barcelona -17% -10% -17% 42,57 39,45 -255,8 -252,7 134,8 131,7 
Frankfurt-Köln -51% -16% -27% 34,45 29,92 -73,98 -69,45 -180,2 -184,7
Hannover-Frankfurt 6% 1% 2% 53,94 54,40 -132,3 -132,8 -79,84 -79,38
Roma-Firenze 58% 16% 27% 25,63 28,00 -89,18 -91,55 -146 -143,7
 
TABLE 6.14 CHANGES IN MODE SPLIT RESULTING FROM REDUCING THE CURRENT 
LEVEL OF RAIL CHARGES TO THE OPTIMAL MARK UP  
Rail’s market share new scenario ∆Market share(1)  
Route 
ε=-0,5 ε =-0,7 ε =-0,5 ε =-0,7 
Lyon-Marseille 87% 87% 0,88% 1,44% 
Paris-Rennes 93% 93% 0,55% 0,90% 
Paris-Lyon 94% 96% 3,37% 4,94% 
Paris-Strasbourg 62% 59% -4,49% -7,59% 
Paris-Bordeaux 70% 70% 0,12% 0,20% 
Paris-Marseille 77% 82% 8,28% 12,87% 
Madrid-Sevilla 94% 95% 1,60% 2,47% 
Madrid-Barcelona 5% 6% 0,48% 0,82% 
Frankfurt-Köln 98% 98% 0,32% 0,51% 
Hannover-Frankfurt 85% 85% -0,19% -0,32% 
Roma-Firenze 96% 96% -0,30% -0,50% 
Remarks: 
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6.3.3. Comments on the impact that a reduction in infrastructure charges can have 
on mode split  
 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 summarise the impact that a reduction in infrastructure charges 
equivalent to reduce mark ups either to zero or the optimal Ramsey mark up can have on 
mode split.  
 
According to the results obtained, for those links where the capacity of the line is enough 
to absorb significant increases of traffic volumes, the increases in traffic derived from 
reductions in infrastructure charges down to the level of the optimal mark up or lower, are 
expected to have different impacts on the mode split between railways and airways.  
Indeed, similar changes in the level of infrastructure charges (e.g. reduction of about 80%-
85%) do not cause similar changes in mode split. For instance, with initial market shares 
of about 70%, a reduction of the rail infrastructure charges of about 80%, gives rise to 
changes in rail market share comprised between 15 and 19 points (e.g. Paris-Marseilles), 
while those changes are lower than 1 point for a similar change in infrastructure charges in 
links with an initial market share of 98% (e.g. Frankfurt-Cologne). Even if the value of the 
charges-to-revenues ratio was the same for both links, the same conclusion would apply: if 
the charges-to-revenues ratio of the Frankfurt-Cologne link had a charges-to-revenues 
ratio equal to the one observed on the Paris-Marseilles link (44,93% instead of the current 
16,29%), the change in market share would still be considerably low (1 to 1,5 points) 
compared to the 15-19 points expected on the French link. 
 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8, in which the change in market share has been represented as the 
dependent variable and the change in infrastructure charges (reductions from -100% to 
0%102) has been represented as the explanatory variable, give more information on the 
impact on mode split resulting from a reduction in rail infrastructure charges: 
 
• Links for which the rail market share is already very high (higher than 95%), the 
level of charges does not seem to play an important role in the competitiveness of 
railways. In other words, for initial market shares higher than 95%, changes in 
market share derived from a reduction on the level of rail infrastructure charges 
could be considered negligible, no matter what the level of the reduction in the rail 
infrastructure charges is. Indeed, reductions in the level of charges of about 50% 
and 85% (and even 100%) lead to changes in mode split lower than 1 point (see 
Frankfurt-Cologne and Rome-Florence links in figures 6.7 and 6.8). 
 
                                                 
102 Reductions of rail infrastructure charges have been limited to a maximum of 100%. Higher reductions 
make no sense, since it would imply reducing infrastructure charges to levels lower than charges set at the 
marginal cost of wear and tear. 
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• Links for which the rail market share is comprised between 85% and 95% (and the 
charges-to-revenues ratio ranges from 10% to 44%), the impact on mode split 
caused by a reduction in infrastructure charges reaches 5,5 points, assuming a 
maximal reduction of rail infrastructure charges of 100%103 (see Paris-Rennes, 
Hanover-Frankfurt, Madrid-Seville, Lyons-Marseilles and Paris-Lyons links in 
figures 6.7 and 6.8).  
 
• For similar initial market shares comprised in the interval 50% - 85%, the value of 
the charges-to-revenues ratio (a) has an important effect on the impact on mode 
split. Indeed, in the Paris-Strasbourg (a = 16,64%) and Paris-Marseilles (a = 
41,93%) links, which have an initial rail market share of 66% and 69% 
respectively, a change in the level of rail infrastructure charges (in absolute value) 
of 96% gives rise to a change in market share lower than 8 points, while the 
change in rail market share reaches 13 points for the Paris-Marseilles link with half 
the change in the level of rail infrastructure charges (42% compared to the 96% for 
the Paris-Strasbourg link).  
 
• For links with initial market shares above 90%, the maximal impact on mode split 
resulting from a reduction of rail charges seems to be at around 5-5,5 points 
(assuming a ≤ 40%). This impact threshold is reached when reductions on rail 
infrastructure charges are so that the change in ticket fares result in ticket fares 
equal to 0 €. 
 
• For links with initial market shares of about 70% the maximal impact on mode 
split resulting from a reduction of rail charges seems to be at around 17-19 points 
(assuming a ≤ 40%). This impact threshold is reached when reductions on rail 
infrastructure charges are so that the change in ticket fares result in ticket fares 
equal to 0 €. 
 
The previous remarks show that the impact on mode split resulting from a reduction of rail 
infrastructure charges to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals or to the 
optimal mark up seems to strongly depend on the initial commercial position of high 
speed railways, with the impact being higher in markets where the railways position can 
still be improved to a wide extent. This result was to some extent to be expected: on the 
one hand, because of the S-shaped relation of the logit probability to representative utility; 
on the other hand, because in the logit model, the point at which the increase in 
representative utility has the greatest effect on the probability  of its being chosen  is when  
                                                 
103 The higher reductions needed to equal current levels of charges to the marginal cost of maintenance and 
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FIGURE 6.5 IMPACT ON RAIL’S MARKET SHARE OF A REDUCTION IN RAIL CHARGES 
EQUIVALENT TO REDUCE MARK UPS EITHER TO ZERO OR TO THE 
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FIGURE 6.6 IMPACT ON RAIL’S MARKET SHARE OF A REDUCTION IN RAIL CHARGES 
EQUIVALENT TO REDUCE MARK UPS EITHER TO ZERO OR TO THE 
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FIGURE 6.7 IMPACT ON RAIL’S MARKET SHARE RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION OF 






































the probability is close to 0,5, meaning a 50-50 chance of the alternative being chosen, as 
presented in chapter 3. In addition, taking into consideration the results of chapter 5 
(which show that charges-to-revenues ratios are higher for new lines than for conventional 
lines), it can be affirmed that new high speed lines with initial market shares comprised 
between 50% - 85% are the links most penalised by the setting of charges above the 
marginal cost of maintenance and renewals and above the optimal level of mark up. 
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FIGURE 6.8 IMPACT ON RAIL’S MARKET SHARE RESULTING FROM A REDUCTION OF 








































Remarks: The impact threshold is reached when reductions on rail infrastructure charges are so 
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These results would be showing that even in countries where there seems to be a clear 
market-based pricing (for instance, France), mark ups would have not been imposed after 
careful consideration of the most efficient way of doing so and their consequences for the 
market position of the RU in the market segment in question. 
 
The first high speed lines built in Europe were characterised by optimal distances for high 
speed runs and, therefore, high rail market shares compared to airways. Contrary to these 
main links, the high speed links that should complement and allow the connectivity of the 
European high speed network, do not follow the same patterns and have, consequently, 
lower rail market shares. Therefore, the optimal use of the future high speed network, 
which is meant to promote sustainable development by allowing a modal shift from 
airways to railways, will require taking careful consideration of the level of mark ups 
above marginal cost applied to the infrastructure charges to be paid by trains running on 
the high speed network.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
7.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this PhD Thesis was to determine the impacts and, therefore, the consequences 
that current levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented in the European framework 
have on the competitiveness of the high speed passenger services that run on the European 
railway network.  
 
The structure of the PhD Thesis has been designed so that three intermediate sub-
objectives could be reached, namely: 
 
• To characterise the order of magnitude of rail infrastructure charges in European 
high speed lines/services based on the marginal cost, which is the charging 
principle required by the European legislation. 
 
• To characterise the rail infrastructure charging systems applied to European high 
speed services/lines, in order to detect whether mark ups above marginal cost of 
wear and tear are being applied to those services and if so, how they are applied. 
 
• To quantify the impacts on traffic volumes and mode split resulting from bringing 
the current levels of rail infrastructure charges (applied in the European high speed 
network) to the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals and to the 
optimal Ramsey mark up. 
 
Those sub-objectives allow answering three different aspects, the knowledge of which is 
essential for attaining the main objective of this piece of research.  
 
With regard to the first sub-objective, involving the characterisation of the order of 
magnitude of rail infrastructure charges for European high speed lines/services based on 
the marginal cost, the two principles allowed by the European legislation were considered: 
charges based on the principles of short run marginal social cost, and charges based on the 
same principles but with mark ups where necessary to satisfy financial requirements. To 
quantify the first one, the different types of marginal costs composing the short run 
marginal cost (namely marginal infrastructure costs, marginal environmental costs, 
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external marginal costs of accident, and marginal congestion and scarcity costs) were 
considered. In this regard, while external marginal congestion and scarcity costs and 
external marginal accident costs can be considered negligible for the European high speed 
network, there may be environmental costs of a magnitude of about 2 €/train-km. 
However, since at present air transport does not generally pay these costs, and therefore 
according to the legislation they should not be added to average rail charges, they were not 
considered. For the quantification of the second principle, it was assumed that there is 
generally considered to be a shadow price attached to public funds of around 1,3, and that 
regarding high speed railways the price elasticity of demand can be considered equal or 
higher than -0,70 (in absolute terms). 
 
With the abovementioned considerations it can be concluded that: 
 
 On the best evidence available, short run marginal social cost on high speed lines 
does not appear to be above 2 €/train-km. 
 
 The optimal level of charges based on marginal social costs should not exceed 6,4 
€/train-km (given that there is generally considered to be a shadow price attached 
to public funds of around 1,3 and assuming a price elasticity of demand equal or 
higher than -0,70 in absolute terms). 
 
Regarding the second sub-objective, involving the characterisation of the rail 
infrastructure charging systems applied to European high speed services/lines, in order to 
detect if mark ups above marginal cost of wear and tear are being applied to those services 
and if so, how they are applied, conclusions can be grouped into three categories: on the 
one hand, conclusions resulting from a global analysis of the pricing systems implemented 
in EU-25 (except for Cyprus and Malta) plus Norway and Switzerland; on the other hand, 
conclusions comparing the characteristics of the different pricing systems implemented in 
countries with high speed lines in operation; finally, conclusions on how mark ups above 
marginal cost are being applied by current European rail pricing systems. 
 
From the analysis of the pricing systems implemented in the European countries, it can be 
concluded that:   
 
 The cost categories detected in the 2006 rail pricing systems of the EU-25 
framework differ from the ones used for calculating the charges in the EU, which 
at the same time differ from the cost categories meant to be covered by European 
rail pricing systems. Those differences show the existing difficulties for quantifying 
the costs resulting from the use of the infrastructure and allocating them to the 
running of trains. 
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 The cost category “Mark ups” for the calculation of rail infrastructure charges 
gathers investment expenditures and financial costs. In the Network Statements, 
two different cost categories refer exclusively to “Mark ups”, namely: “Access” 
and “Capacity reservation”. Both of them are only found in the charging systems 
of countries with high speed lines in operation (except for Luxembourg, for the 
first cost category, and the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic for the second 
one). Consequently, high speed lines in operation are subject to two additional 
cost categories to which mark ups aimed at increasing the cost recovery of 
infrastructure charges are exclusively allocated. 
 
 There is a widespread tendency to apply higher charges to high speed lines than to 
the rest, i.e. of applying higher mark ups over marginal costs to high speed lines. 
 
From the comparison of the characteristics of the different pricing systems implemented in 
countries with high speed lines in operation, it can be concluded that:   
 
 Rail infrastructure charging systems implemented in European countries with high 
speed lines in operation correspond to a second-best charging strategy, either 
materialised with the application of mark ups to social marginal cost (MC+) or the 
collection of the full financial cost minus subsidies (FC-). 
 
 The charging systems based on the application of mark ups to marginal cost 
(CM+) have rail access charging based on additive charging components, with a 
fixed and a variable component, the latter representing more than 80% of the 
charges. 
 
 The charging systems based on the collection of the full financial cost minus 
subsidies (FC-) have a charging structure with a linear tariff: the rail access 
charging consists of a base price multiplied by different coefficients.   
 
 Major mark ups above marginal costs are applied to high speed lines with the aim 
of assisting with cost recovery (Italy is the only European country with high speed 
lines in operation that does neither partially nor totally recover maintenance costs 
through rail infrastructure charges). 
 
 The level of mark ups above marginal cost in high speed lines (HSL) differs from 
one country to another. This could be due to differences in the level of subsidies in 
each country (the level of subsidies really allocated to HSL is unknown) as well as 
to different applications of price discrimination.  
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 Mark ups applied to high speed lines seem to be higher than the optimal value of 
mark up except for the Italian case, the only one not aiming at recovering 
investment costs. Indeed, calculations for 2006 and a train supposed to leave at 8 
a.m. from the origin point and heading for the destination point (in the pricing 
systems considering the timetable period for the calculation of infrastructure 
charges) and without taking into account intermediate stops in order to ease the 
calculations, show infrastructure charges above 10 €/train-km for the main 
national links of the countries with high speed lines in operation (with the 
exception of the Italian link). 
 
Finally, with the assumptions made on charges calculations, one can come to the 
following conclusions on how mark ups above marginal cost are being applied by current 
European rail pricing systems: 
 
 Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is broadly applied in the countries charging mark ups to 
social marginal cost, differentiating by broad category of passenger train, location 
and time of day, although each country using different criteria. 
 
 Infrastructure charges for HSL seem to be a mix of recovery of the capital cost 
with a mark up on what the market could bear. Indeed, mark ups seem to be 
applied by means of three different common concepts: mark ups based on wear 
and tear costs, mark ups reflecting investment costs (i.e. set to recover part of 
investment costs) and mark ups reflecting commercial position (i.e. set at a level 
that the market can bear, taking into consideration the commercial position of high 
speed railways).    
 
 The mark ups based on marginal cost of wear and tear would be intended to 
recover part of the higher maintenance expenses for HSL that allow lower levels of 
marginal cost of wear and tear compared to freight services. 
 
 The available data does not allow knowing what proportion of the mark ups 
relates to what costs. However, the results suggest that where pricing systems are 
meant to partly cover investment costs, there is a correlation between rail 
infrastructure charges and the type of infrastructure, according to which the 
percentage in length of new lines in a link seems to be directly proportional to the 
amount of charge to be paid by a passenger train for running through a link of the 
European HS network (i.e. the longer the length of the link with new line, the 
higher the amount of infrastructure charges). 
 
 Mark ups considering the commercial position are only applied to new and 
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upgraded infrastructure: current charging systems do not apply any mark up on 
the ability to pay of railway undertakings (RU) offering passenger services on 
conventional lines; conversely, infrastructure charges for new high speed lines are 
very sensitive to an increase of their commercial position (there is a strong 
correlation between high infrastructure charges and infrastructure with high 
performance –expressed in terms of commercial speed–). 
 
 The consideration of the commercial position of the market by pricing systems may 
have an important influence on the value of infrastructure charges for HSL: 
charges for HSL seem to be strongly bound up with the total travel time. Indeed, a 
reduction of a journey from 2 hours to 1 hour brings for instance mark ups of up to 
7 €/train-km in France and 2 €/train-km in Spain. 
 
The results presented in the preceding points are of great interest, since the research 
carried out until now had neither related charges to infrastructure characteristics nor 
studied infrastructure charges for high performance passenger services in detail. 
 
With regard to the third sub-objective, involving the quantification of the impacts on 
traffic volumes and mode split resulting from bringing the current levels of rail 
infrastructure charges (applied in the European high speed network) to the level of 
marginal cost of maintenance and renewals and to the optimal Ramsey mark up, yield the 
following conrtributions (grouped into three groups): on the one hand, the establishment 
of a methodology for quantifying the impacts on traffic volumes and mode split of a 
variation in the level of rail infrastructure charges; on the other hand, the quantification of 
the impact on traffic volumes of reducing mark ups either to zero, or to the optimal level 
of charges; finally, the quantification of the impact on mode split of reducing mark ups to 
the abovementioned levels. 
 
The methodology proposed in this PhD Thesis to quantify the impacts on traffic volumes 
and mode split of a variation in the level of rail infrastructure charges assumes that the 
profitability must remain unchanged and that the mode split can be modelled by means of 
a bimodal logit model. This methodology can be summarised as follows: 
 














  (assuming profitability unchanged: ∆Rev = ∆IC) 
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where:  
- Q is the traffic expressed in passengers per train 
- ε is the price elasticity of demand 
- a is the rail infrastructure charges-to-revenues from ticket sales ratio 
- IC are the rail infrastructure charges 
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where:  
- F corresponds to the ticket fare expressed in euros 
- ε is the price elasticity of demand 
- a is the rail infrastructure charges-to-revenues from ticket sales ratio 
- IC are the rail infrastructure charges 
- HSijp  is the high speed railways market share with regard to airways 
- kijV  is the utility function for a link ij and a mode of transport k 
- VoT is the value of time (33 €/hour, except for the links crossing the 
Channel Tunnel, for which VoT equals 24,16 €/hour) 
- IVt corresponds to the “in-vehicle time”, that is, the journey time  
- Freq_tr_day is the frequency expressed as the number of trains (or flights) 
per day  
- MFP is the minimum frequency penalty, expressed in minutes 
- ChInt corresponds to the check-in time plus the terminal exit time (i.e. plus 
an allowance for time to exit the airport) 
- At is the access time, defined as the average time required to access the 
terminals 
 
The analysis carried out with the assumptions made on charges and revenues calculations 
leads to the following conclusions about the value of the charges-to-revenues ratio a: 
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 Links with new lines (the ones that respond to the technical definition of HSL) have 
the highest charges-to-revenues ratios (ratios ranging from 25% to 40% for links 
with new high speed lines at least along 40% of the total length of the link). 
 
 It would seem that the value of the charges-to-revenues ratio tends to increase with 
faster commercial speeds, following the same tendency observed between rail 
infrastructure charges and the commercial speed. 
 
 While no correlation can be established between the value of rail charges-to-
revenues ratio and the commercial speed for conventional lines, the correlation 
between these two parameters is very strong for links constituted by new 
infrastructure (new lines). However, the type of infrastructure does not allow 
establishing a clear correlation between the charges-to-revenues ratio and the 
travel time. 
 
 The charges-to-revenues ratio for RUs offering HS services is higher the shorter 
the travel time is. Exceptions to this tendency are Spain, where the value remains 
almost invariable for travel times up to 3 hours and only then increases, and Italy, 
where no tendency can be established.  
 
 The consideration of investment costs by infrastructure charging systems results in 
lower margins over infrastructure charges for RUs offering HS services than for 
airways carriers. As a result of that (and as opposed to RUs offering conventional 
services on conventional railway lines), RUs offering HS services on HSL lose 
their advantage with regard to airways in terms of margins over infrastructure 
charges. 
 
 The consideration of the railway’s commercial speed by railway pricing systems 
negatively affects the competitiveness of HS railways compared to airways, since it 
implies lower margins over infrastructure charges for RUs than for airways 
carriers.  
 
With regard to the results of the quantification of the impacts on traffic volumes of a 
variation in the level of rail infrastructure charges, the following conclusions apply (given 
the assumptions made for the calculations): 
 
 A reduction of the current levels of charges to the level of marginal costs would 
result in very significant increases in traffic volumes (even if according to the 
assumption made, they are supposed to correspond to the minimum expected 
change): In the French case, where HS traffic is very intense at peak periods, the 
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estimated yearly increases at the peak period resulting from a reduction of rail 
infrastructure charges to the level of the marginal cost of maintenance and 
renewals amount to 490.890 passengers for the Paris-Lyons link, and almost 
690.800 passengers for the Paris-Lille link. In Spain, where HS traffic is 
considerably lower than in France, those yearly increases at the peak period 
would range from 150.000 to 265.000 passengers per year. The lower losses in the 
Italian network are mainly due to the fact that the peak period only lasts 3 hours, 
compared to the 5h30 and 5h for the French and the Spanish networks, 
respectively. 
 
 It would seem that charging HSL only the marginal cost is not the optimal 
solution:  
- firstly, because the increases in forecasted traffic resulting from such a 
reduction (increases in traffic volumes up to 40% for the Paris-Lyons link) 
could result in insufficient infrastructure capacity and the ensuing raise in 
marginal congestion and scarcity costs that would result in the estimates of the 
marginal costs used for the calculations not being appropriate anymore.  
- secondly, one would be neglecting the high ability to pay that railway 
operators offering HS services on HSL seem to have and this would mean 
losing an important source of revenues meant for recovering part of the total 
infrastructure costs;  
- finally, one would as well be neglecting the opportunity cost of public funds, 
that is, the existence of budget constraints.  
 
 If mark ups were fixed at the optimal level of charges calculated for the main 
national European HSL, traffic volumes would increase 20-30%, or even 60% in 
the Paris-Lyons link. Therefore, an important percentage of passengers seem to be 
deterred from using HS railways (at least at peak periods) as a result of the 
influence that the current levels of mark ups exert on ticket fares, which 
correspond to the final price to consumers (users).  
 
Concerning the results of the quantification of the impacts on mode split of a variation in 
the level of rail infrastructure charges, it can be concluded that: 
 
 The impact on mode split resulting from a reduction of infrastructure charges to 
the level of marginal cost of maintenance and renewals or to the optimal mark up 
seems to strongly depend on the initial commercial position of HS railways, this 
impact being higher in markets where railways position can be improved to a wide 
extent. 
- For initial market shares above 95%, changes in market share derived from 
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a reduction on the level of rail infrastructure charges can be considered 
negligible, no matter what the level of the reduction in the rail infrastructure 
charges is. Indeed, reductions in the level of charges of more than 50% do 
not even change the mode split by 1 point. 
 
- For initial market shares comprised between 85% and 95% (and charges-to-
revenues ratios ranging from 10% to 44%), the impact on mode split caused 
by a reduction of rail infrastructure charges reaches up to 5,5 points 
(assuming reductions of rail infrastructure charges of up to 100%, which 
allow reaching the marginal cost level). 
 
- For initial market shares comprised between 50% and 85%, the impact on 
mode split strongly depends on the value of the charges-to-revenues ratio. 
For links with initial market shares of about 70% the maximal impact on 
mode split resulting from a reduction of rail infrastructure charges seems to 
be at around 17-19 points (assuming charges-to-revenues ratios lower than 
40%). 
 
 New HSL with initial market shares comprised between 50%-85% are the most 
penalised links by the setting of charges above marginal cost of maintenance and 
renewals and above the optimal level of mark up. 
 
Considering the previous conclusions, the answer to the main question raised in this PhD 
Thesis, “Which consequences do current levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented 
in the European framework have on the competitiveness of the high speed passenger 
services that run on the European railway network?”, can be answered as follows: 
 
Current levels of rail infrastructure charges implemented in the European 
framework have a negative impact on the competitiveness of the high speed 
passenger services that run on the European railway network, particularly 
in the cases where the rail market share is currently low (below 80%-85%). 
These negative impacts correspond to reductions in potential traffic 
volumes of 20%-60% and to reductions in market share of up to 13 points 
for reductions of mark ups to the optimal level and for runs taking place in 
the morning peak.  
 
Governments have succeeded in implementing charging systems that allow recouping part 
of the high capital costs of high speed lines through charges, by considering the 
commercial position of high speed railways. However, the results obtained show that even 
in countries where there seems to be a clear market-based pricing (for instance, France), 
mark ups would have not been imposed after careful consideration of their consequences 
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on the market position of railway undertakings in the market segment in question.  
 
The first HSL built in Europe were characterised by optimal distances for HS runs and, 
therefore, high rail market shares with regard to airways. Contrary to those main links, the 
high speed links that should complement and allow the connectivity of the European HS 
network, do not follow the same patterns and have, consequently, lower rail market shares. 
Therefore, the optimal use of the future HS network, which is meant to promote 
sustainable development by allowing a modal shift from airways to railways, will require 
taking careful consideration of the level of mark ups above marginal cost applied to the 
infrastructure charges to be paid by trains running on the HS network. 
 
This PhD Thesis exhorts those responsible for the determination of the level of mark ups 
above marginal costs to take into account that current charges are reducing the social 
benefits of the new lines by reducing traffic and leading to rail having a smaller market 




7.2. FURTHER RESEARCH   
 
The results obtained in this PhD Thesis could be improved with further research in two 
main directions: 
 
• The estimation of marginal costs of wear and tear 
• The estimation of price elasticities of demand for links of the European high speed 
network 
 
The issue of the estimation of the marginal cost of wear and tear is of great importance 
given the legislation framework defined by the European Commission. Since rail access 
charges should be based on the principles of short run marginal social cost, it is essential 
to have accurate estimations of the marginal costs incurred on the different types of 
infrastructures (conventional lines, upgraded lines, new high speed lines) by the different 
types of services (long distance services, high speed services, sub-urban services, freight 
services…). Currently, estimates for high speed and other intercity lines, for other 
passenger services and for freight are only available for the French railway network. 
Consequently, important contributions are still to be made in this field. 
 
Regarding the issue of the estimation of price elasticities of demand for links of the 
European high speed network, very few estimates are available to date. However, as it has 
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been seen, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, consisting in pricing up more in those market 
segments which are least sensitive to price, is broadly applied in the countries with high 
speed lines charging mark ups to social marginal cost. Due to lack of data in this subject, 
in this PhD Thesis it has been assumed that the runs taking place on the high speed 
network can be considered to be part of a single market and, consequently, a single value 
of price elasticity of demand can be attributed to the whole network (the minimum value 
of price elasticity of demand available was used for the calculations of the impacts on 
traffic volumes and mode split resulting from a change in the level of rail infrastructure 
charges). Even if the assumptions made in this PhD Thesis when estimating the impacts 
on traffic volumes and mode split of a variation of charges give the minimal impacts to be 
expected, the conclusions of this PhD Thesis point to the fact that mark ups do not seem to 
have been imposed after careful consideration of their consequences for the market 
position of railway undertakings in the market segment in question. Not even in countries 
where there seems to be a clear market-based pricing. This could stem from a limited 
knowledge of the real price elasticity of demand of each high speed link. Therefore, 
further research in this field would be of great interest in order to improve the precision of 
the estimation of charges’ impacts on traffic volumes and mode split.   
 
The author also envisages further research in the European international framework. To 
this date, infrastructure charges for international services are the result of adding the 
different charges established by the different national infrastructure managers. In order to 
promote international high speed services, it would be convenient to develop a pricing 
system for international high speed services. The results obtained in this PhD thesis 
concerning the quantification of the impacts that the implementation of mark ups above 
the optimal level have on traffic volumes and mode split, should pave the way towards the 
definition of appropriate and efficient mark ups above marginal cost. 
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ANNEX A1 
THE EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED NETWORK 
 
 
A1.1. THE APPEARANCE OF HIGH SPEED RAILWAYS AND ITS CONTEXT 
 
During the last decades, the need to travel has incremented in a very significant way as a 
direct consequence of the multiplication of economical exchanges and the evolution of our 
ways of life. As a result of this reality, the different means of transport have developed 
their infrastructure and their services in order to face this need to travel and to maintain or 
increment their market share. 
 
The development of high performance road infrastructures and the use of the plane for 
medium and long distance routes, thanks to the introduction of jet planes, pushed railways 
in Europe into a declining situation in the late 1960s. As examples, we can remark the 
following realities: 
 
• In France, the railway lost around 15 percentual points of market share between 
1963 and 1967 in the Paris-Marseilles and Paris-Nice links (López-Pita, 1998), a 
loss that essentially benefited the plane, which won 11 of the 15 points mentioned 
above. Also, in the axis Paris-Southeast, and with a commercial speed of 128 
km/h, the Paris-Lyons link lost a market share similar to the previous ones. 
 
• In Spain, the number of travellers per kilometre came to a standstill at the 
beginning of 1965, remaining around 18.000 (data extracted from Casado Casado, 
1993) and, while passenger transport by road went from 40% in the year 1950 to 
80% in 1970, the railway experimented an opposite evolution, descending from 
60% in 1950 to only 14% in 1970. In that period, the plane incremented its share, 
without surpassing, in any case, 6%-7%. 
 
• In Italy, the situation was similar to the one of Spain. In only 5 years, from 1950 to 
1955, road traffic in Italy went from a situation of equality with railways to a 
situation where road infrastructures nearly doubled their traffic compared to the 
railway (López-Pita, 1998). The evolution of modal distribution of medium and 
long distance travellers traffic during the 1955-1970 period remained negative for 
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• In the seventies, the railway in Europe stood as the most affected transport mode 
against the advance of aviation and the private car, as a consequence of the 
extension of highways; indeed, the growth in modal distribution in the 1970-1980 
period was of +2,0% for car transport, -1,9% for railways, -1,1% for bus transport, 
and +1,0 for aviation (Sánchez-Borràs, 2004). 
 
Railway’s regression was sharpened by the European Community poor intervention to 
solve the problem (from a railway point of view), as well as the bad economic situation 
that railways were suffering, although it is necessary to mention the actions of some 
organisations such as the UIC, whose concern about the future of the railway, in medium 
and long distance intercity links, led to the creation of the Commission “Recherche 
Prospective”, with the goal of reflecting on the subject; as well as the appearance, in 1973, 
of the “European Outline Plan of Infrastructures”, probably established on the basis of the 
discussions of the above mentioned Commission, which stated some of the more relevant 
aspects in order to achieve a significant railway role in medium and long distance 
travelling. Amongst those aspects, some stood out, such as the “desirable criterion” in 
terms of speed, which established that speed needs to be such that: 
 
• “the railway is able to offer a shorter travel time than the one the automobile 
needs, 2/3, if possible, of the time the road makes possible”. 
 
• “inside the 500 km distance zone (considering terrestrial distances), if it is 
possible, the duration of the railway trip be equal to the one offered by the plane, 
taking into account the time spent in city-airport transportation and back, and the 
waiting time that the aerial mode requires”. 
 
In that period, commercial speed for roads was 90 km/h, therefore the first criterion 
translated into a desirable speed goal for railways of around 135 km/h, in the case of equal 
travelling distance, in a given route, for road and railways. 
 
However, as table A1.1 shows, these notable efforts, especially by some railway 
administrations such as the German, British and French ones, to improve the quality of 
their service, particularly in medium and long distance travellers’ services (300 to 800 
km), could not achieve the above mentioned “desirable criterion”, with the exception of 
the United Kingdom and France. In the latter, the practical application of the results of 
studies elaborated by a “Multidisciplinary Group”, created in 1967 with the goal of 
making experimentations towards the increment of the running speed, allowed for a major 
evolution in the maximum running speed in the French network during the 1970s, 
The European high speed network                            Annex A1 
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-9 
increasing from 10.000 km to 17.000 km the rail network adapted to maximum speeds of 
150 km to 200 km/h in only six years (from 1970 to 1976). 
 
 
TABLE A1.1 EVOLUTION OF THE MAXIMUM AUTHORISED AND COMMERCIAL SPEED 
(km/h) 
 Source: Author’s elaboration, with data from Arduin (1991), La Vie du Rail, 
López-Pita (2006) and other sources 
























































1944 140            
1945           120  
1950  100          76 
1957 150    120        
1960  128     150      
1965 160    140 96       
1967 200         120   
1970    110  95 180      
1972  145           
1973   200          
1975   200   98   200    
1976         200    
1979  152           
1980 260     102  120  140  114 
Remarks: 
- Author.: Maximal speed authorised  
- Comm.: Maximal commercial speed 
 
 
However, those increases on railway speed did not stop the tendency of loss of market 
share of the railway in France, already apparent in the 1960s, and that continued to occur 
in the 1970s especially in the links to the French southeast, (see figure A1.1), all of them 
surpassing the 400 km distance (Paris-Lyons: 410 km; Paris-Marseilles: 864 km; Paris-
Nice: 1.088 km). Therefore, it can be concluded that the increase of speed, up to 140 km/h 
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not an effective measure for the railway to cover distances of more than 400 km. The 
development of an interior French network of faster and more reliable jet planes explains, 
to some extent, the significant transference of travellers from first class railway travellers 
to the plane.   
 
 
FIGURE A1.1 EVOLUTION OF THE MODE  SPLIT IN SELECTED LINKS BETWEEN PARIS 
AND THE FRENCH SOUTHEAST 






































































































In the United Kingdom, the railway succeeded in achieving a significant market share in 
the late 1970s, for routes with a maximum distance of around 400 km (see figure A1.2). 
Nevertheless, in longer distances, the British railway was so helpless as the French in front 
of the plane’s competition.   
 
The helplessness of the railway in front of the plane’s competition accounts for the 
impossibility of the railway of increasing its services at a speed level, for reasons of 
magnitude of the curve radius, as well as the development experimented by aviation and 
the improvement of the road network, which stopped the rail from achieving the above 
mentioned “desirable criterion”. In fact, the maximum speeds achieved in the existing 
designs appoached the 200 km/h mark, and although these speeds were far higher than just 
a decade before, the development of aviation and the improvement of the road network 
resulted in the railway not being competitive against aviation and road transport in 
Paris-Lyon (410 km) Paris-Nice (1088 km) Paris-Marseilles(864 km) 
airways frailways road airways frailways airways frailways 
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medium and long distance services (distances above 300 km), and this explains its 
continuous loss of market share in transport until 1980. 
 
   
FIGURE A1.2 MODE SPLIT OF TRAVELLERS’ TRAFFIC IN SOME ENGLISH ROUTES (1980) 



















Therefore, the necessity of building new railway infrastructures to increase its commercial 
speed and turn railways into a competitive mean of transport was clear. In this context, at 
the beginning of the 1980s, Europe began to think out the new role of the railway, and 




A1.2. DEFINITION OF HIGH SPEED 
 
It is difficult to find a uniform definition of the term “high speed”. In fact, it seems that 
there is no single definition for such term, because the complex reality it covers allows for 
different interpretations, in case one wants to show its diversity or, on the contrary, to 
encompass its great diversity. 
 
From the technical point of view, which reflects the above mentioned diversity, the border 
between conventional services and high speed ones is determined by a speed oscillating, 
generally, between 200 and 250 km/h. This border is marked by: 
 
• the geometry of the rail, because of, among other factors, the limitation the 
existing cant imposes in terms of speed in the curves; and 
 
• the safety installations: not modernised conventional designs are not enough to run 
at more than 200 km/h. 
London London London 
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In some cases, additional differentiations are made, describing as “upgraded lines” 
(“lignes aménagées, in French”) the services that run in the above mentioned speed range, 
and as “high speed or very high speed” (“grande ou très grande vitesse”, in French) the 
ones that surpass 250 km/h or 300 km/h. 
 
Although the technical definition of high speed stresses the speed achieved and the 
geometry of the rail, high speed is something more than the existence of a design with 
favourable geometrical features. According to the International Union of Railways (UIC, 
2005), high speed can be defined as a new type of railway transportation, a system itself 
that encompasses at the same time: 
 
• New generations of high performance trains (high speed trains strictu sensu and 
fast titling trains).   
 
• The infrastructures dedicated to high speeds (300 km/h or more) or the upgraded 
existing infrastructures (for speeds of 200 km/h or even 220 km/h). 
 
• Highly sophisticated techniques for running and safety management, for instance 
the ERTMS/ETCS1 and GSM-R2 interoperable systems. 
 
• A great diversity of new high quality services (titling services, systems of 
information and reservation, restoration, on board and station services), adapted to 
customer’s needs, which help to reinforce the competitiveness of the train. 
 
According to López-Pita (2007), high speed can be considered as a system formed by 
different subsystems, the most important of which are: 
 
• The track: high speed requires a track geometry with special features (curve radius, 
cant…). 
 
• The material: the rolling stock for high speed runs has to allow for speeds higher 
than 200 km/h. 
 
                                                 
1 ERTMS is the European Rail Traffic Management System, which results of the merging of two complex 
systems, the European Train Control System (ETCS) and the GSMR-R, railway derivation of the civil 
standard of telecommunications GSM. The ERTMS is one of the pillars on which the future European 
railway interoperability will stand. For more detailed information, see ERTMS (2007). 
2 GSM-R is a communication system adapted to the necessities of trains. For more detailed information, see 
Rubio (?). 
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• The power collection: the system of reception of power has to resist the trains high 
speed. 
 
• The safety installations: high speed lines require specific safety installations in 
order to allow speeds above 200 km/h., at a running and brake level. 
 
• The commercial politics: performances of high speed railways are different from 
the ones offered by conventional railway services. As a consequence of this, it is 
necessary to adapt the commercial politics to the profile of a customer attracted to 
high speed services. 
 
On the other hand, the European Community prefers a definition that, contrary to the ones 
presented above, seeks to encompass the great diversity that encloses the term. In this 
sense, the concept of high speed railway is defined all over Europe in homogeneous and 
clear terms by the Directive on the Interoperability (EC, 1996), the Directive 96/0048/CE 
of July 23rd, 1996. According to this directive, lines have to fulfil the following requisites 
in order to be considered high speed (inside the Trans-European network):  
 
• In terms of infrastructure, these are the lines considered to be high speed: 
 
- Lines specially built for high speed, equipped for speeds generally equal or 
above 250 km/h. 
- Lines specially upgraded for high speed, equipped for speeds around 200 km/h. 
- Lines specially upgraded for high speed, with a specific character because of 
topographic, relief or urban difficulties, the speed of which will have to be 
adjusted case by case. 
 
• In terms of rolling stock, high speed trains of an advanced technology have to be 
conceived to guarantee secure and brakeless runs: 
 
- A minimum speed of 250 km/h on the lines specially built for high speed, 
allowing, in appropriate circumstances, to achieve speeds over 300 km/h. 
- A speed of around 200 km/h on the specially upgraded existing lines. 
- The maximum speed possible on other lines. 
 
• In terms of operation system, high speed services must have an excellent 
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A1.3. BRIEF HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED RAIL 
NETWORK 
 
In 1967, Louis Armand, SNCF’s3general director, declared that “the future of passenger 
transportation by railway cannot be conceived without the development of high speeds”. 
To develop them, he provided two options: 
 
• To modernise the existing lines, in order to surpass a certain level of speed, of 
around 160 km/h; or 
 
• To build new lines, as the Japanese had done with the Tōkaidō. 
 
After exhausting the possibilities to develop sufficient speeds to confront the competition 
of the plane for distances above 300 km, through the modernisation of existing or 
conventional lines (as remarked on the previous section), SNCF decided to develop the 
second line of action. 
 
This second line was concreted in a feasibility study of new high performance 
infrastructures in the Paris-Lyons, Paris-North and Paris-East corridors, which led to the 
approval, in 1974, of the project for the Paris-Lyons corridor by the French Board of 
Ministers, the subsequent opening of the Southern section of the line (Saint Florentin-
Sathonay) in 1981, and of the remaining of the line, two years after. The new 
infrastructure allowed to reduce travel time between Paris and Lyons from three hours and 
fifty minutes to just two hours, thanks to the geometrical features of the track, which 
allowed top speeds of 270 km/h. 
 
The technical, commercial and economical success of this new Paris-Lyons line showed 
the potential of high speed railways facing the growing demand of transport, and it led, as 




A1.3.1. Development of the proposal for a high performance European network 
 
The idea of developing a proposal for a European high speed rail network emerged on 
May 17th, 1985, during a meeting between a group formed by the 10 railway companies of 
the European Community and Mr. Signorile, Italian Minister of Transportation, who was 
then president of the board of transport ministers in the Community. 
                                                 
3 SNCF, Societé Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (National Society of French Railways). 
The European high speed network                            Annex A1 
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-15 
This idea took shape when the general directors of the networks assigned the binomial 
DB/SNCF, (Mr. Heinisich and Mr. Walrave, by then representatives of the German and 
French railways, respectively), to develop this proposal. 
 
The market share of the railway in European international traffic, which had been 
shrinking for the previous ten years, justified the need to proceed with this action. 
 
In addition, the process of liberalisation that would accompany the railway (see annex 
A2), anticipated an increase in competition from the other means of transport, in particular 
from the aerial ones.  
 
The idea of building a European high speed network progressed ahead: the European 
Commission presented its will to develop a high speed European network (final report 
COM/86/341, June 30th, 1986) and the European Parliament adopted, on September 16th, 
1986, a resolution in the same direction. 
 
In the socio-economical context of the European high speed network, the main issues 
(around which the network would have to be articulated) were (CENIT, 2004): 
 
• The localisation and situation of human and economic potential  
• The obstacles that could hinder their communications 
 
Regarding the obstacles, Western Europe presents the particularity of being split in two by 
the Alps. This geographic obstacle hinders, therefore, easy and fast relationships between 
two subgroups: 
 
• A first subgroup, in the North, inscribed in a quadrilateral encompassing London-
Hamburg-Munich-Zurich-Geneva-Lyons-Paris, characterised by the importance of 
its population (more than 140 millions), its huge demographic densities and the 
size of the agglomerations (see figure A1.3). 
 
• A second subgroup, in the South, inscribed in a triangle encompassing Turin-
Milan-Venice-Naples-Rome-Genoa, which groups more than 40 million of 
inhabitants, but is located (with the exception of the plain of the Po and the axis 
Milan-Bologna) in an area of relatively rugged terrain, due to the presence of the 








A-16  PhD Thesis 
FIGURE A1.3 DENSITY OF POPULATION IN EUROPE IN 1984 




These observations marked the issues around which a modern network of transportation in 
Western Europe had to be articulated, and which can be summarised in four points: 
 
• A Glasgow-Marseilles corridor. 
 
• An X-shaped double corridor, beginning in Amsterdam and Hamburg, with a 
converging point in the Frankfurt/Stuttgart region, and continuing, on one 
direction, towards Zurich, Milan and Naples, and on the other, towards Munich, 
Salzburg and Vienna.  
 
• A transversal corridor, joining the previous two, from London to Hamburg, 
passing through Lille, Brussels, Cologne, Hanover and Bremen. 
 
• Four demographic East-West axis: 




250 a 399 
100 a 249 
75 a 99 
50 a 74 
< 50 
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FIGURE A1.4 EUROPEAN NETWORK OF HIGH SPEED TRANSPORTATION (1988 
PROPOSAL) 



















This is how the proposal emerged for a European high speed rail network, presented by 
the European Community of Railways (see figure A1.4). This proposal included the 
construction, until the year 2015, of 8.000 km of new lines and the modernisation of 
11.000 km, with the goal of achieving speeds between 160 and 200 km/h. However, this 
network cannot be considered complete without adding the use of existing lines, be it for 
connecting high speed lines between them, or extending them towards the periphery to 
allow for the eccentric regions to have access to high speed. 
 
Subsequently, the changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
generated a strong increase of mobility needs. This fact favoured that the “European 
Outline Plan of high speed links” was completely revised to take into account the 
profound political evolution of the European continent, which required the development of 
an East-West axis, with the goal of developing a Pan-European network (figure A1.5). 
 
 
New high speed lines 
Upgraded lines for high speeds 
High speed network connection lines 
Extensions 
Non-existent links 
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FIGURE A1.5 MAIN EAST-WEST AXIS 




The new network that was proposed was composed by a central part corresponding to the 
more populated area, and it allowed to link, not only the main agglomerations in the area, 
but also eight regions located on the periphery through access gates: 
 
• Link between the British Isles and France through London 
• Link between Germany and Scandinavia through Hamburg 
• Link, through Warsaw, between Western Europe and the Baltic countries, Belarus, 
Russia and Northern Ukraine 
• Link between Western and Eastern Europe through Budapest, Southern Ukraine, 
Moldova and Russia 
• Link between Western Europe and Belgrade through the Balkans 
• Link between Central Europe and Southern Italy through Bologna  
• Link between Spain and France through two accesses: one through Catalonia 
(Barcelona-Portbou) and one through the Basque Country (Irun) 
 
This new proposal presented a highly meshed network which allows for a communication 
service in the whole of the European continent (figure A1.6). This network combines 





North-east/South-east axis  
Inhabitants
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FIGURE A1.6 RESULTING NETWORK FROM THE OUTLINE PLAN OF INFRASTRUCTURE 





• Completely new high speed lines 
• Lines upgraded to increase the speed up to 200-225 km/h 
• Existing lines that play a linking and dissemination role 
 
For the whole of Europe (not counting the ex Soviet Union), the considered network 
consists of 35.000 km, of which 20.000 km correspond to new lines. 
 
The implementation of the European network should allow achieving especially efficient 
railway running times between the main European cities, while reducing the duration of 
the journey an average of 50%, in a fairly homogenous way, for all European regions. 
 
 
A1.3.2. The European high speed network: evolution and sate of the art 
 
The figure A1.7 presents in a summarised way the evolution of the history of new 
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FIGURE A1.7 NEW HIGH SPEED LINES IN EUROPE IN THE YEAR 2008 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from UIC (2002 y 2006) and other 


















































































































































































































































































FIGURE A1.8 EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED RAIL NETWORK. STATE IN NOVEMBER 2008 
Source: Adapted from UIC (2006).              
European 
HS Network 
Situation as at 11.2008 
New lines 
Upgraded lines 
V ≥ 250km/h 
V < 250km/h 
Planned lines 
Planned lines 
V ≤ 200km/h 
V ≤ 230km/h 
 
 
At the end of 2008, the European network of new (purpose-built) high speed lines was 
constituted by 5.244 km, around 2.000 km more than in 2002, when the network consisted 
of 3.260 km according to data provided by the International Union of Railways (UIC, 
2002), and around 800 km less than the kilometres foreseen by the UIC (2005) for 2010. 
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TABLE A1.2 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEW RAILWAY LINES IN EUROPE (STATE 
IN DECEMBER 2008) 
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Sánchez-Borràs (2004), CENIT 
(2005), Barrón (2006), UIC (2006), Revue Générale des Chemins de fer (2006), 
Ministerio de Fomento (2007), Groupe SCNB (2007) and other sources. 
Extension  




TGV Sud Est (Paris-Lyon) 
TGV Atlantique (Paris-Le Mans) 
TGV Atlantique (Courtalain-Tours) 
TGV Rhône Alpes (Contournement de Lyon) 
TGV Rhône Alpes (Satolas-Valence) 
TGV Nord – Europe  
TGV Nord (Lille-Belgian border) 
TGV Jonction (interconnection) 
TGV Jonction Atlantique 
TGV Mediterrannée 





























































United Kingdom Channel Tunnel-Fawkham Junction 74 74 1,4 
France/UK Channel Tunnel 52 52 1,0 
Denmark/Sweden Öresund 18 18 0,3 
Denmark Store Bælt  15 15 0,3 
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The above mentioned 5.244 km of new high speed lines are roughly distributed as follows: 
36% in France, 28% in Spain, 19% in Germany, 11% in Italy, and the remaining 6% in 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden (see table A1.2). 
 
As it can be seen in the figures A1.7 and A1.8, the European dimension was achieved 
with the partial service implementation of the PBCAL network (Paris-Brussels-Cologne-
Amsterdam-London) in 1994, and subsequently with the opening in 2000 of the Öresund, 
which connects Denmark to Sweden. 
 
 
A1.3.3. The future design of the European high speed network 
 
The International Union of Railways, UIC, foresees that the European high speed network 
will evolve in the next years at a pace of 370 km of new lines per year (see figure A1.9), 
until forming in 2020 the high speed network presented in the figure A1.10. 
 
 
FIGURE A1.9 PREVISION OF THE EVOLUTION OF NEW HIGH SPEED LINES IN EUROPE 



















According to UIC (2005) previsions, in the 2020 horizon there will be around 6.000 km of 
new high speed lines through which new international services will run, among them 
Eurostar, Thalys and ICE on the PBCAL network, and Rhealys (the grouping of French, 

















































Moyenne : 170 km/an
Moyenne : 370 km/anAverage: 370 km/year 
Averag : /year 
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Furthermore, other high speed services will be implemented from Barcelona (or Madrid) 
to France (Toulouse, Marseilles, Lyons, Paris) and Switzerland (Geneva). 
 
FIGURE A1.10 EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED NETWORK FORECAST FOR 2020 




An extension of the high speed network in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the 
surmounting of the Alpine dorsal towards Italy, is forecast for the period comprised 
between 2010 and 2020. 
 
In the 2020 horizon, the more populated Swedish cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and 
Malmö) and the two most populated Portuguese cities (Lisbon and Porto) will be linked 
by high speed lines. In Central and Eastern Europe, the development of high speed will be 
done essentially on upgraded lines.  
 
 
A1.4. PROFITABILITY AND FINANCING OF THE EUROPEAN RAILWAY 
NETWORK 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, nowadays the development of the high speed 
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Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, not all the high speed 
projects, concluded, in construction or in a very advanced state of planning, are 
economically attractive (see table A1.3 as an example), because they present low IRR4 
values (less than 5%). Their implementation is nevertheless justified by the fact that the 
strictly financial profitability is not the only one to be considered. 
 
TABLE A1.3 PROFITABILITY OF THE FRENCH HIGH SPEED LINES INCLUDED ON THE 
OUTLINE PLAN OF HIGH SPEED LINES IN FRANCE, APPROVED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT IN 1991 
 Source: López-Pita (1998) with data from SNCF. 
IRR profitability (%) 
Project 
Financial Socio-economical 
Aquitaine 7,5 10 
Auvergne 3,1 6,7 
Bretagne 7,4 13,6 
Côte d’Azur 8,4 11 
Est 4,3 8,8 
Grand Sud 5 12 
Interconnexion Sud 8,2 9,6 
Lyon-Torino 6 10 
Limousin 2,4 4,4 
Languedoc-Roussillon 6,1 9 
Midi-Pyrenées 5,5 6,5 
Normandie 0,1 3,0 
Provence 9,8 13 
Pays de la Loire 5,4 7,7 
Picardie 4,8 5 
Rhin-Rhône  5,9 10,7 
 
                                                 
4 The IRR (Internal Rate of Return) is the rate which makes the present net value equal to zero. 
Algebraically, PNV = 0 = Σi=i...n NBi / (1+IRR)i, where PNV is the present net value, NBi is the net benefit of 
the year i, and IRR is the internal rate of return. The rule to make or not an investment using the IRR is this: 
when the IRR is higher than the interest rate, the performance that the investor would obtain making the 
investment is higher than the one he would obtain in the best alternative investment, so the investment is 
convenient. If the IRR is lower than the interest rate, the investor is not inclined to make the investment. 
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Indeed, from a socio-economical point of view, be it at a national or European level, the 
implementation of a project can gain a great interest. Hence the importance of quantifying 
the socio-economical advantages of these new infrastructures. 
 
The consideration of socio-economical profitability in the evaluation of the convenience 
or inconvenience of constructing a new high speed line forces to resort to public financing 
(European Union, State, local administrations, public organisations, etc). 
 
From the above paragraphs it can be deduced that the profitability of high speed lines is 
very variable. Depending on it, high speed railway projects can be classified as (Arduin et 
al., 2002): 
 
• High speed railway projects with a positive and high global financial 
profitability  
 
• High speed railway projects with a low global financial profitability 
 
The features of both theoretical cases are specified in table A1.4. 
 
The low economical profitability of some of the high speed lines has led, in spite of their 
social profitability, to a delicate economical situation for the railway. 
 
With the goal of revitalising the railways of the European Union, and reorganising their 
economical situation, the European Commission has adopted several measures, which are 
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TABLE A1.4 THEORETICAL CASES OF PROFITABILITY OF HIGH SPEED RAILWAY 
PROJECTS 
 Source: Author’s elaboration with data from Arduin et al. (2002). 
Global economical profitability of high speed railway projects 
Positive and high Low 
- The revenues produced by the project in 
the future allow the investments, the 
operation and the maintenance of the 
infrastructure managers and the railway 
undertakings to be globally profitable. 
- The revenues produced by the project in 
the future do not allow the investments, 
operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure managers and the railway 
companies to be globally profitable. 
 
- No subsidies from the State nor the local 
government is required. 
 
- There are two variants: 
 
- A pure and simple financing of the 
project by loan from the capital markets 
is enough to approve the project within 
the limits of industrial and commercial 
risks.  
 
- Variant 1: The railway operation is 
enough to pay the investments, operation 
and maintenance of railway undertakings.  
In this case, a certain subsidy from the 
State and the local governments for the 
infrastructure investment is necessary to 
finish the project.  
It corresponds to the case of high speed 
lines projects with a medium volume of 
traffic and a high investment.  
- It corresponds to the case of high speed 
lines projects with a very high volume of 
traffic. 
 
- Variant 2: The railway operation is not 
enough to cover the investments, 
operation and maintenance of railway 
companies. 
It corresponds to the case of the projects 
of special high speed lines aiming to the 
European territory planning with a 




The restructuring of railways in Europe            Annex A2                
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-27 
ANNEX A2 




A2.1. THE TRADITIONAL ORGANISATION OF RAILWAYS IN EUROPE 
(1940s-1990s PERIOD) 
 
The traditional organisation of most railways all around the world in the post-war period 
(1940s), until the 1990s, corresponds to an integrated public monopoly, which manages 
railway transportation at a national level. In that period, the traditional railway companies 
were auto-regulated companies, that is, they worked as operators, national regulators and 
inspectorates, all at the same time. In fact, until the past decade, every European state 
organised and produced their own railway transport, without worrying about what the 
neighbouring states did. 
 
As a justification of why these services were offered through monopolies protected by 
their own states, Sala (2000) cites the following reasons: 
 
• High investment demands: Railway companies were considered until very recently 
natural monopolies, in that those companies have very high fixed costs that can 
only be recouped through a provision by a system of economies of scale, that is, 
with big companies that can end up having reduced marginal costs. 
 
• Market failures as the top economical justification for direct intervention of the 
State: It was argued that, without State intervention, services could not be provided 
because of the so-called “market failures”5. It was thought that no private 
entrepreneur would find incentives to invest in those sectors and to offer the 
products or services. 
 
• Justification of a political nature concerning people’s rights: It was considered 
that private organisations could hardly provide and guarantee people’s rights 
(which have to be provided in a universal manner and with no hint of economical 
                                                 
5 A market failure, in economy, is a situation where markets do not efficiently organise the production or the 
allocation of goods and services to the consumers. For economists, the term applies when inefficiency is 
particularly dramatic, or when it is suggested that an institution outside the market (as the government, a 
public institution or a collective of associated people) could be more efficient and produce better results than 
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discrimination in its allocation), because the final goal of such organisations is to 
obtain profits. 
 
Furthermore, the monopolistic position of the traditional railway companies of the EU was 
favoured by the existence of significant technical and legal obstacles to enter the market. 
Among them, Pietroantonio et al. (2004) cite the following barriers: 
 
• Fragmented licence scheme: Until the implementation of the First Railway 
Package (see the following section for more information on this subject), only 
already established national operators owned a licence to provide trans-European 
services. 
 
• Lack of interoperability6: Differences in the conception of the different national 
railway networks hindering the provision of uninterrupted services existed in the 
European Union until recently and, in some cases, remain existent. Among these 
differences there is the rail gauge, different electric voltages, signalling systems, 
the dimension of platforms, load parameters, operation norms and the professional 
certification.  
 
• The licences for driving staff of locomotives and trains: Until the last decade of the 
XXth century, licenses for driving staff of locomotives and trains were not 
recognised between European countries. 
 
• Locomotives and leasing: The high price of new locomotives and their lack of 
technical interoperability reduced the possibility of creating a new railway 
company. 
 
The traditional organisation of railways in Europe presented a series of inefficiencies, 
typical of the monopolist phenomenon. They can be summarised as follows (Petitbó, 1997 
and Sala, 2000): 
 
• The prices set by monopolist companies are higher than the prices the companies 
set in absolutely competitive markets.  
 
• The production of goods and services in monopolised markets is lower than the 
production in competitive markets.  
 
                                                 
6 Pietrantonio et al. (2004) define interoperability as “the ability of any railway company to run their stock in 
any part of the European railway network without interruption”.  
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• In monopolist markets there is a net loss of welfare for the whole of the society, 
because the producer’s surplus is positive (it reflects a rent transfer from 
consumers to companies). 
 
• Lack of innovation, technological as well as organisational. 
 
According to Obermauer (2001), those inefficiencies led to several economical problems: 
 
• Low productivity and low efficiency (the internal inefficiency translates into a 
slow reaction in front of the changes in consumers’ demands and preferences. 
• High wages costs. 
• Low market share, both in the passenger transport and freight transport markets. 
• Significant debts on the long run. 
 
Therefore, this structure was characterised by the low quality of the service provided and 
the mounting deficit that reached unsustainable levels. The report presented by the 
Commission to the Council about the application of a Community normative on railways 
at the end of the 1970s defined the situation of railway companies as economically and 
financially alarming, which forced railway administrations to increasingly depend on State 
subsidies. 
 
Calthrop (2005) gives two reasons to explain the low quality of service provided by big 
monopolistic companies in railway transport. Both refer to political implication: 
 
• On the one hand, the railways were traditionally managed as a part of a 
government’s ministry, with low incentives for infrastructure managers to adapt to 
market requirements. In addition, in some cases railway management had to face 
conflicting incentives coming from several branches of government. Indeed, the 
ministers of transport, economy, industry, regional development, etc, had all 
different interests in the railway sector. Local politicians were added to this 
picture, focused on promoting local interests above national ones. 
 
• On the other hand, in many cases politicians have tried to expand railway services 
without wanting to pay for them. The lack of funds resulted in the accumulation of 
debts by the railways. 
 
All these economical problems, derived from the bad functioning of the traditional 
organisation structure of the European railway and combined with technological 
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triggered the organisational change that the European Union decided to make, through the 
implementation of a railway legislation at a European level, which nowadays defines a 
significant part of the juridical framework of railway activities in the European Union.  
 
As a result of this, the rules of the game have substantially changed, and in most European 
countries, railway markets have been opened to competition.  
 
In the following section we will present the restructuring, on a legislative level, that the 
railways in Europe have undergone in the past few years. 
 
 
A2.2. RAILWAY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
A2.2.1. Railway policy of the European Union within the context of European 
Transport Policy  
 
The juridical framework of railway activities is presently defined in great part by the 
European legislation. This legislation is the result of the European Union railway policy, 
framed within the European Transport Policy, one of the axis of the present European 
policies, because of its economical and social significance. 
 
We can distinguish five stages in the Common Transport Policy (Calvo Soria, 2006): 
 
The first stage, which comprises the period between 1958 and 1972, begins after the 
approval of the constitutive Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, in 
1957, and marks the beginning of the Common Transport Policy. During this period a 
memorandum was published on Common Transport Policy, as well as an Action 
programme. For the first time, both documents considered the direct liberalisation of 
transport, as a tool to achieve the goals of the Treaty.7 The more significant achievements 
of the first stage are the limitation of State intervention in some fields, as well as the 
approval of a series of regulations that affected the different areas of the Transport Policy. 
 
The second stage of the common transport policy, that goes from 1973 to 1981, is 
characterised by the following goals: to achieve the free running of transport services, the 
harmonisation of the competition conditions and the creation of a Common Market of 
Transport based on a non-intervention functioning. During that period a series of political 
initiatives were raised towards that goal, pushing liberalising measures in road transport, a 
harmonisation of norms regulating the relationship between railways, railway 
                                                 
7 Among the objectives of the treaty in the transport field there is the free circulation of goods. 
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undertakings and States, some improvements in air transport and an improvement on 
infrastructure coordinating the different national plans while considering a transport 
network on a European level. 
 
The third stage, encompassing the period 1983-1992, marked the true impulse for the 
common transport policy, coupled with the great transformation of the European 
Community, which was born with the White Paper on Internal Market execution8, which 
formulates recommendations destined to guarantee the free provision of services. The 
Maastricht Treaty of 19929 and the approval of the White Paper10 on the “future 
development of the common transport policy” marked the essential impulse for the 
construction of transport policy. While the first one articulated the figure of trans-
European networks for the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, the second 
stated the transition from a sectorial structure of the different modes of transport to an 
integrated conception based on sustainable mobility, and engaged, in particular, to 
promote the trans-European transport networks, through the improvement of the 
connections between Member States and the interoperability between networks, while 
respecting the limitations derived from environmental protection. 
 
The fourth stage, beginning in 1993 and ending in 2000, started with the liberalisation of 
road freight transport in January 1993. It was followed by the liberalisation of regular 
passengers transport services in 1999. Also, an action programme was approved that 
contemplated three significant actions: in the first place, the improvement of the quality in 
order to create integrated transport systems with advanced technologies, taking also into 
account environmental protection and safety; on the other hand, the improvement of the 
single market functioning with the aim of fostering efficient and easy-to-use services; and 
finally, the development of the external dimension, improving the quality of transport 
connections between the European Union and bordering countries. Also significant was 
the appearance of the White Paper of 199611, where the revitalisation of the Community 
railway transport was established as a precise strategy. 
 
                                                 
8 Internal Market White Paper, point 137 (memorandum from the Commission to Parliament, the Council 
and the Two Sides of Industry). COM (88) 320, June 1988. 
9 The Maastricht Treaty corresponds to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), which constitutes a 
stepping stone in the European integration process, surpassing for the first time the initial economical goal of 
the Community (to build a common market) and providing a vocation of political unity to it. The Maastricht 
Treaty officially establishes the name “European Union”, which from 1992 substituted the name European 
Community. 
10 A Commission White Paper is a document containing proposals for Community action in a specific area 
and usually follows an extensive consultation process at European level. When a White Paper has been 
favourably received by the Council, it can become the action programme for the Union in the area concerned 
(CER, 2004).     
11 Commission White Paper, 30 July 1996, “A strategy for revitalising the Community’s railways” [COM 
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Finally, the publication of the White Paper of 200112 marks the beginning of the fifth 
stage, marked by the configuration of the present and future programme of transport 
policy. In this period, the transport policy of the Commission is articulated around the 
necessity of modifying the equilibrium between transport modes, with the aim of 
achieving a sustainable development. In this sense, one of its objectives is revitalising 
railway transport as a strategic sector. 
 
Regarding railway transport policy, the five stages mentioned above can be grouped in 
three periods: 
 
• A first stage that goes from 1958 to 1980. 
• A second stage that encompasses the period 1980-1990. 
• A third stage, from 1990 to the present. 
 
In the following sections each one of them is characterised. 
 
 
A2.2.2. First stage of the EU railway policy: 1958-1980 
 
The first stage of the EU railway policy is characterised by the situation presented in 
annex A1 and the introduction to annex A2. That is, on one hand, the small relevance of 
transport policy measures developed at a European level, and on the other, the delicate 
situation of railway companies, derived from the inefficiency of their monopolistic 
organisation. 
 
It is important to remark that this stage begins with the approval of the Treaty on European 
Community in 1957, which marks the beginning of a common transport policy, and saw a 
first impulse in The Hague Summit of 1969, which enabled to activate the coming into 
force of a common commercial policy. 
 
 
A2.2.3. Second stage of the EU railway policy: 1980-1990 
 
The second stage of EU railway policy encompasses the 1980s and is characterised by the 
definition of common transport policies, and in particular of the railway mode.  
 
                                                 
12 Commission White Paper, “European transport policy for 2010: time to decide” [COM (2001) 370 final].  
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In this stage, the new role of railways is raised, with the appearance of references to high 
speed, combined transport and infrastructure, the latter having been forgotten in the 
previous period. 
 
High speed railways, introduced in Europe in 1981 with the inauguration of the first high 
speed line, TGV Southeast, in France, gave a new direction to railways, which saw in this 
new technology, successful in the technical, commercial and economical fields, a way to 
face the growing transport demand. 
 
The considerable reduction of journey times that the high speed allowed in medium and 
long distance links helped the evolution of European passenger railway traffic between 
1980 and 1990, and led to the idea, at a Community level, of elaborating a proposal for a 
European high speed network in 1985, as seen on annex A1. 
 
 
A2.2.4. Third stage of the EU railway policy or the stage of Community legislation: 
1990 to nowadays 
 
The third stage of the EU railway policy could be christened as the stage of Community 
legislation, due to the significant number of directives that have appeared since the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
 
This stage has given rise to a very important railway reform at a European level, with the 
goal of “improving the efficacy, the quality and the economic efficiency of railway 
services and stimulating the growth of railway markets, guaranteeing a high level of 
performance in security terms” (CEMT, 2002). 
 
This reform also stresses the improvement of the quality of European railway services in 
favour of the competition game, as well as the framework of alliances, with the goal of 
substituting national borders with a commercial logic, creating railway markets at a 
continental level.  
 
The railway reform performed by the EU since the 1990s can be divided into four phases 
of regulation and liberalisation:  
 
• A first phase of reforms, starting with the approval of Directive 91/440/EEC on the 
separation of accounts between infrastructure management and transport 
operations, complemented with two other directives (Directive 95/18/EC and 
Directive 95/19/EC), on the licensing of railway undertakings and on the allocation 
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• A second phase, known as First Railway Package, with the improvement of 
competition, the creation of more and better international railway freight services 
and the improvement of the efficient use of infrastructure capacity as main 
objectives. 
 
• A third phase, marked by the implementation of the Second Railway Package in 
2004, which aims at opening all the European railway network to domestic and 
international freight traffic, and to reinforce the safety and facilitate 
interoperability as well.  
 
• A fourth phase, including future reforms, among them the Third Railway Package, 
with the intention of advancing in the process of configuration of the integrated 
European railway space, and starting the liberalisation process in passenger 
transport, in the whole of the Community context. 
 
In the following sections the main characteristics of each one of the regulation and 
liberalisation phases that constitute the reform process are summarised. 
 
A2.2.4.1. First phase of EU reforms: Directives 91/440/EC, 95/18/EC and 
95/19/EC 
The first phase of the European Union reforms started with the approval of Directive 
91/440/EC13 on the separation of accounts between infrastructure management and 
transport operations. 
 
This Directive was the first step towards the liberalisation of the railway sector, and 
consisted in giving a certain autonomy or independence to the railway companies, which  
in the member States were under public ownership, and beginning to develop competition 
in the field of international connections in railway freight transport (Trans-European 
networks). 
 
This Directive forced the introduction of a separation of accounts between infrastructure 
management and transport operations (see section A2.4.2.2 for more details), both 
activities in a monopoly regime. In addition, it settled the basis for the access of other 
operators to the railway networks, and recommended giving solutions to the debt problem 
of the railway sector, as well as the introduction of autonomy in the management of 
railway companies in front of their governments.  
                                                 
13 Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community’s railways, nº L 
237, of 24 August 1991, by which access right to railway infrastructure is granted in any place of the Union.   
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Four years later, in 1995, this directive was revised and complemented by two other 
directives, namely, Directive 95/18/EC14 on the licensing of railway undertakings and 
Directive 95/19/EC15 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the charging 
of infrastructure fees. With the revisions mentioned above, the European Union took the 
first steps to introduce free access in its limited expression of international access through 
“international groupings” of railway companies, especially the ones already established. 
 
These directives showed that, even if the proposed opening was limited, its organisation 
was not easy; indeed, Directives 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC showed that the opening of the 
market implied dealing with numerous problems (Bergougnoux, 2000), from the 
definition and procurement of licences, to the allocation of railway capacities, and the 
definition of charging principles for the use of infrastructure (see chapter 1 for more 
information on charging principles).  
 
The Community railway action programme can thus be summarised in this first phase as 
articulated around three main principles:  
 
• Independence at legal level 
• Freedom of management 
• Financial reorganisation 
 
CICCP (2006) summarises the final goal of the reform process launched in this stage as 
“being able to achieve real separation and not only the separation of accounts between 
infrastructure management and transport operations, so that public or private railway 
undertakings can manage transport operations with commercial criteria, paying in turn a 
charge to the infrastructure manager for the use of infrastructure”. 
 
This model of reform represented, in a certain way, the transposition on a European scale 
of the Swedish logic, the main orientations of which were (Crozet, 2004a): 
 
• Separation, at least on the accounting level, between infrastructure management 
and railway operation.  
 
                                                 
14 Council Directive 95/18/EC of 19 June 1995 on the licensing of railway undertakings (Official Journal of 
the European Union, nº L 143, 19 June 1995, pp. 70-74). 
15 Council Directive 95/19/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the charging of 
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• Clarification of access conditions of third parties to the network, both in the 
technical field (train-path allocation, candidate certification…) and in the 
economic one (public rates for infrastructure charges). 
 
• Support to accept competition between several railway undertakings. 
 
Even though in this first phase of reforms of the European Union the step towards the 
revitalisation of railways was important, because they meant a boost for the liberalisation 
and the introduction of competition in the railway field, the changes derived from the 
implementation of directives 91/440, 95/18 and 95/19 had a rather “marginal impact” 
(Bergougnoux, 2000). 
 
This fact led the Council to establish new strategies to accelerate the railways restructuring 
and revitalisation process. With this goal, the Commission presented three proposals of 
directives in 1998, which “should guarantee a higher transparency in charging and 
infrastructure allocation to railway undertakings” (Calvo Soria, 2006). The Commission 
clarified these proposals with the adoption of a White Paper on the charging of transport 
infrastructures16.   
 
The materialisation of these proposals led to the so-called “First Railway Package”, the 
implementation of which represents the start of the second stage of EU reforms in the 
railway sector. 
 
A2.2.4.2. Second phase of EU reforms: First Railway Package 
The First Railway Package represents an important attempt to reform the railway sector, 
although it only refers to railway freight transport.  
 
Its main objectives are: 
 
• To improve the competition 
• To create more and better international railway freight services 
• To improve the efficient use of the infrastructure capacity  
 
                                                 
16 Commission White Paper of 22 July 1998: Fair payment for infrastructure used – a phased approach to a 
common transport infrastructure charging framework in the EU (COM (98) 466).  
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All these goals have to be achieved with the liberalisation of the sector through the 
introduction of free access and forms of direct competition, at least in the TERFN17 in a 
first stage.  
 
This first package includes three directives: 
 
• Directive 2001/12/EC on the development of the Community’s railways  
(amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC), the objective of which consists in 
reinforcing the management autonomy of the infrastructure managers in front of 
the historic operators and establishing the figure of the railway regulator. 
 
• Directive 2001/13/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings (amending Council 
Directive 95/18/EC), which seeks to enable the opening of the market, allowing 
the concession of licences to all the railway operators established in the European 
Union. 
 
• Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the 
levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification. 
 
Section A2.4.2.1 studies with more detail the contents of Directive 2001/14/EC. 
 
A2.2.4.3. Third phase of EU reforms: Second Railway Package 
The third phase of European Union reforms started in April 2004 with the Second Railway 
Package. Its implementation aimed at promoting the application of the First Railway 
Package and filling the existing gaps, in order to reinforce railway safety and 
interoperability, as well as to accelerate the opening of the railway freight transport 
market. 
 
The Second Railway Package, with the title of “Towards an integrated European railway 
area” (COM (2002) 18), was approved by the European Union in January 2002, but it was 
not until March 2004 that the Parliament and the European Council reached an agreement, 
captured in the Official Journal  L164 of 30 April 2004. 
 
This second railway package has the objective of opening all the European railway 
network to domestic and international freight traffic. Among other significant proposals, 
the following actions, necessary to establish a regulating framework to revitalise railways, 
stand out (EIM, 2002): 
                                                 
17 TERFN corresponds to the initials of the Trans-European Rail Freight Network, which accounts for 50% 
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• A common approach to railways safety. 
 
• Updating of the directives on interoperability of the rail systems. 
 
• Creation of the European Railway Agency, as an efficient tool of the Community 
to unite and support the processes of safety and interoperability. 
 
• Adherence of the Community to the Intergovernmental Organisation for 
International Rail Transport (OTIF). 
 
In particular, the Second Railway Package translates into: 
 
• A Regulation by which a European Railway Agency is created: Regulation (EC) 
No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, 
establishing a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation). The goal of this 
regulation consists in finding common solutions of safety and interoperability; 
 
• A Directive by which the Directive 91/440/EC is amended: Directive 2004/51/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 amending Council 
Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community’s railways. With this 
amendment of Directive 91/440/EEC, already amended in the Directive 
2001/12/EC of the First Railway Package, Directive 2001/51/EC expands the 
access rights to the infrastructure; 
 
• A Directive by which the Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC are amended: 
Directive 2004/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-
European high speed rail system and Directive 2001/16/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the trans-European 
conventional rail system; 
 
• A Railway Safety Directive: Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community’s railways and 
amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licencing of railway undertakings 
and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and 
the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification. 
 
The European Railway Agency, with head office in Valenciennes-Lille, elaborates 
common safety goals, standardised methods that allow achieving these goals, and common 
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safety indicators that allow measuring them in a harmonised way on a European level. 
Therefore, it establishes common criteria to evaluate the demand of safety certificates 
from the European railway undertakings and to avoid the risks of competition distortion 
between States. 
 
The Directive 2004/51/EC expands the opening of the network to the railway undertakings 
that provide international freight services (1 January 2006). It also stipulates that the 
railway undertakings will have access rights to the railway network to operate all kinds of 
freight services, be it national or international (1 January 2007). 
 
On the other hand, Directive 2004/50/EC has the goal of advancing more rapidly in the 
way of interoperability, between the networks constituting the conventional network, and 
ensuring that the geography of the interoperability coincides with the one of the opening 
of the network (Calvo Soria, 2006). 
 
Finally, Directive 2004/49/EC seeks to guarantee railway safety through public and 
understandable norms. Standing out among these, there is the establishment of a clear 
procedure for the concession, contents and validity of the safety certificates that all 
railway companies must have in order to use the European network, as well as the creation 
of an authority responsible for safety. 
 
 
A2.2.4.4. Fourth phase of EU reforms: Third Railway Package 
The Third Railway Package can be considered to be the beginning of the fourth phase of 
railway reforms of the European Union, because it is expected to complete the 
liberalisation and regulation in the EU framework. 
 
The Third Railway Package was presented by the European Commission in March 2004. 
It includes a communication, two proposals of Directive and another two of Regulation, 
specifically: 
 
• Communication from the Commission to the Council: Continue the integration of 
the European railway system (COM(2004) 141 final). This communication 
contains new proposals of action with the goal of continuing the railways reform 
and completing the normative framework. 
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passenger services before January 1, 201018. This proposal of liberalisation of the 
passenger services complies with the intention of opening international passenger 
services to competition, as stated in the White Paper “European transport policy 
for 2010: time to decide’” (EIM, 2005). The general principle of this Directive is 
the opening to competition on the basis of free access to the networks and service 
provision, allowing Member states to limit that access if there is a public contract 
for a specific service, the economic equilibrium of which can be threatened 
(CICCP, 2006).  
 
• A proposal for a Council Directive on the certification of train crews19, that will 
entail the authorisation for the whole of the European Community network 
(general regulations) and specific certificates for the rolling stock, lines and 
Regulations that directly affect the operators. 
 
• A proposal for a Regulation on the rights of international passengers20 to reinforce 
railways’ appeal. 
 
• A proposal for a Regulation on the quality of freight transport services21.  
 
This third package also foresees the liberalisation of freight transport, both in the 
international as well as in the national contexts (from 1 January 2006). 
 
The liberalisation of passenger traffic, proposed in this Third Package, was not a priority 
of the First Package for reasons (according to Pietroantonio et al., 2004) of a purely 
political nature (because the passenger services come close to highly sensitive national 
areas such as the justification of general interest services and security worries) and for 
several economic reasons. 
 
 
A2.3. FIRST ATTEMPTS TO REORGANISE RAILWAYS IN EUROPE 
 
In many cases, given the inefficiencies of the traditional organisation of railways in 
Europe, some railway companies took a first step towards reorganisation, before the 
                                                 
18 COM (2004) 139. Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 91/440/EEC on the development 
of the Community’s railways. 
19 COM(2004) 142 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
certification of train crews operating locomotives and trains on the Community’s rail network. 
20 COM(2004) 143 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on international 
rail passengers’ rights and obligations.  
21 COM(2004) 144 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
compensation in cases of non-compliance with contractual quality requirements for rail freight services. 
The restructuring of railways in Europe            Annex A2                
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-41 
Directive 91/440/EC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community’s railways 
was implemented, expressing for the first time the will of the European Commission to 
restructure railways in Europe. 
 
The countries that decided to make a first attempt at reorganising railways essentially 
wished to achieve improved efficiency, a financial reconstruction, the reinforcement of 
competitiveness and a reduction of both obligations and long-term debts. 
 
The first attempts at railway reorganisation tried to reorganise the company into “business 
units”. This reorganisation consisted in going from a unitary and integrated organisation of 
all the activities to a functional arrangement and a system of territorial division of the 
service operation, with a decentralisation of the management and, therefore, of the 
accounting processes.   
 
More specifically, a business unit is defined as “an organisation unit that does all the basic 
business activities, such as supply, production and sales, regarding a product or a range of 
products that satisfy a certain market profile or a defined geographical area. The criteria to 
form business units can be: to group the similar products together in ranges or families, to 
group the markets together according to the customers needs, or finally, to create business 
units from a combination of the other two, that is, to group together the products that 
satisfy similar needs” (Sala, 2000). 
 
Some cases, such as the reform process of the railway system in the United Kingdom, 
went further, and a corporatisation of the company was applied. The corporatisation 
consisted in the creation of segments of integrated public services into business units, 
aiming explicitly at the business; these aims materialised into independent financial goals 
and specific organisational structures. That is, in corporatised state companies, the 
company operates under commercial law, where the State operates merely as a 
shareholder. In some cases, as in the United Kingdom, there was a clear break: the 
separate components of the old state-owned company were privatised, and even in some 
cases it was all privatised at once (Calthrop, 2005). 
 
In the Spanish case, that is in the case of Renfe, at the beginning of the 1990s management 
was decentralised through the creation of service units that would elaborate their own 
balance sheet and would have a specific balance. In this way, a greater flexibility and 
response capacity were obtained. 
 
The creation of business units took into account the recommendations of the European 
Union, and, for that reason, the service activities were split from the ones concerning the 
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was concentrated were delimited. As a result, Renfe’s new internal structure came to be 
the one represented in figure A2.1. 
 
 
FIGURE A2.1 RENFE’S ORGANISATION ARQUITECTURE 






















As can be deduced from the previous figure, the new organisation was structured in three 
fundamental pillars: 
 
• Infrastructure management: including the business units of Running, basically 
dedicated to the regulation and train-path allocation, and Infrastructure 
Maintenance, in charge of the track and catenary conservation, as well as the 
systems of safety signalling and train control. 
 
• Transportation market: the business units belonging to this group are in charge of 
selling the services. For that reason, they generate direct revenues from the clients. 
Until 1996, the business units were grouped in two general divisions: Integrated 






























- The Parcel business unit disappeared in 1996 as an activity and as a business  
- The Long Distance business unit changed its name to Great Lines (Grandes Líneas) at the end 
of the 1990s   
 
PARCEL 
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Alta Velocidad– and Parcel –Paquetería–) and Logistic Services (constituted by 
Long Distance –Largo Recorrido–, Freight –Mercancías–, and Combined 
Transport –Transporte Combinado–). Two other business units of the 
transportation market complete this group: Commercial Stations and Patrimony 
Management. 
 
• Units providing internal services: The Traction (constituted by the locomotives 
and some engine drivers), Integral Maintenance of Trains (a unit responsible for 
the maintenance of locomotives, cars, wagons and auto-propelled trains) and 




A2.4. REORGANISATION OF THE RAILWAY IN EUROPE 
 
A2.4.1. The reference of other “public utilities” 
 
Public utilities are services that can be defined as those activities that depend on a network 
of fixed infrastructures (tracks, cables, pipes, etc.) that enable the connections and 
transport systems of the service (Sala, 2000). They are also known as network industries, 
because they offer products and services to the consumers through a “network 
infrastructure”. 
 
This type of industries is mainly characterised by (EC, 2006): 
 
• Very high fixed costs to develop their infrastructures. 
 
• Decreasing average costs as production increases. 
 
• The existence of advantages derived from the joint production of different goods 
within a company. 
 
• Producing essential services and having certain non economical obligations 
imposed by the governments, due to the great importance of ensuring the 
continuity of the supply of services. 
 
As happens in other economical sectors, public utilities do not encompass a single and 
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many of which produce goods or services for its use in other activities. An example of 
components of the railway sector could be the infrastructure and the running of trains. 
 
Until a few years ago, the organisation of public utilities (railways, postal services, 
telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, among many other regulated industries) was 
the result of a vertical integration22 of a non-competitive component of the industry and a 




TABLE A2.1 INDUSTRIES WITH COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO BEING PROVIDED ON A 
COMPETITIVE REGIME AND WITH NON-COMPETITIVE COMPONENTS 
 Source: Sala (2000) and OECD (2001b). 
Sector Infrastructure (Non-competitive) 
Services  
(Competitive) 
Oil Transportation networks Extraction, refinery, distribution, 
service stations  
Air services Airports 
Traffic control centres 
Passenger and freight transport and 
complementary services  
Maritime transport Port facilities Pilot services, harbour services  
Electricity High-voltage networks Generation, local distribution, 
capillary network  
Telecommunications Long distance wiring 
Satellites 
Sound and image transmitters  
Gas High-pressure transmission 
of gas  
Production and storage  
Railways Railway network Passenger and freight transport 
 
 
In this context, a basic problem appeared: the owner of the non-competitive component 
could have the incentive and at the same time the ability to restrict the competition in the 
non-competitive component, controlling the terms and conditions with which the rival 
companies of the competitive component had access to the non-competitive component. 
 
                                                 
22 We talk about a vertical relationship when two goods or services are complementary in the production of 
the final good or service (OECD, 2001a). In the case of the railway market, the train services and the track 
are complementary in the delivering of railway transport services, therefore they are in a vertical 
relationship. 
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This was against the laws of free competition that should rule, according to the sentence 
enacted by the European Court of Justice in 1985, in all markets, including the 
transportation market too. 
 
The search of a solution to this problem has led to reorganise the structure of many public 
utilities in recent decades, liberalising and in some cases privatising the market, with the 
goal of allowing competition in the competitive components of the industries. 
 
 
FIGURE A2.2 CHRONOLOGY OF THE RESTRUCTURING OF SEVERAL NETWORK 
INDUSTRIES IN THE EUROPEAN NETWORK    
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Nowadays the restructuring of railways in Europe is still on its way. It combines 
liberalisation with market integration, and it follows similar lines to the ones adopted for 
the markets of other network industries, where the restructuring started several years ago 
(see figure A2.2).  
 
Given the possible similarities between railway liberalisation and those carried out by 
other industries, being familiar with the reform experienced in other public utilities is of 
interest. Therefore, the following sections explain the reasons of this restructuring of the 
public utilities and the tools used in different markets in order to carry it out. 
 
A2.4.1.1. Reasons for the reorganisation of the public utilities 
As advanced in the previous section, the public utilities were constituted until recently by 
a non-competitive component of the industry and by a competitive component. The main 
reason was the presence of traditional economies of scale that led to a natural monopoly. 
That is, it was considered that a single company could adjust to the demand in a more 
efficient manner than any combination of two or more companies. 
 
However, the introduction of competition in the competitive components of an industry 
may offer significant benefits, such as (OECD, 2001a; Sala 2000): 
 
• Stimulating innovation, efficiency and efficacy in the competition activities. 
 
• Ability to offer a wider range of alternatives to the consumer, increase the product 
differentiation and achieve a higher customer demand satisfaction. 
 
• Limitation of the regulation scope, allowing for more efficient and specific 
regulations. 
 
• Overcoming national markets borders and expanding the markets, adapting to the 
optimum dimension of the sector23. 
 
The tools that allow introducing and developing competition in the competitive 
components of a public utility are presented in the following section. 
 
                                                 
23 In this sense, the technological advances experienced in recent years have questioned the traditional 
geographical borders of certain network industries. For instance, the introduction of cellular technology 
marked the disappearance of the borders imposed by state companies based on fixed facilities. In the energy 
sector, new generation systems have appeared that are no longer strictly linked to the territory. On the other 
hand, relatively new telematic networks such as the Internet set off from an essentially international and 
global principle. 
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A2.4.1.2. Tools to protect and to promote competition in the competitive 
component of an industry with competitive and non-competitive 
complementary segments  
The promotion of competition in the competitive component of an industry with 
competitive and non-competitive complementary segments can be done, on a political 
level, through several tools: 
 
• The regulation of access to the non-competitive component of an integrated 
incumbent firm: this tool consists in regulating the terms and conditions of access 
of rival companies in the non-competitive services, through the participation of a 
regulator (see figure A2.3). 
 
• The vertical separation of the non-competitive activity and the competitive activity: 
this tool eliminates all possible incentives that the owner of the non-competitive 
part may have to discriminate the competing companies that act in the competitive 
activity (see figure A2.3). This elimination softens the need for a regulation and 
increases the level of competition. 
 
• The club or joint ownership of the non-competitive activity by firms in the 
competitive component: The club ownership consists of a structure where all 
competitive companies own a share of the non-competitive activity (see figure 
A2.3). 
 
• The operational separation (or unbundling) (separation of ownership and control, 
placing the non-competitive component under the control of an independent 
entity): This tool is a hybrid of the tools presented in the previous points. The 
nature of this tool depends on the government structure that assumes the control of 
the non-competitive component. In case this entity should be dominated by the 
regulator, the operational separation will be analogous in a certain way to the 
access regulation. In case the governing entity should have representatives of the 
competitive firms, the operational separation will be in a certain way analogous to 
the separation of ownership (see figure A2.3). 
 
• The separation of the non-competitive component into smaller reciprocal parts: 
This tool relies on the network effects to enhance interconnection. In the case of 
telecommunications, for instance, consumers are willing to pay more to be 
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FIGURE A2.3 ACCESS REGULATION, VERTICAL SEPARATION, SHARED OWNERSHIP, 
OPERATIONAL SEPARATION (FROM LEFT TO RIGHT AND TOP-DOWN)  







• The separation of the non-competitive component into smaller parts: this tool 
allows establishing a series of companies with a similar distribution, facilitating 
the regulation of these companies through comparisons (known as “yardstick 
regulation” –regulation through norms or criteria–). It also facilitates competition 
among distribution companies, at least in the regions’ edges.  
 
• The accounting, functional and corporate separation: In the first place, the 
accounting separation consists in the separate preparation of accounts, on the basis 
of predefined criteria, for some functions or specific services. On the other hand, 
the functional separation consists in separating different services into different 
divisions of the same company, possibly under a different management. Finally, 
the corporative separation consists in separating different services into different 
corporate entities, despite belonging to the same company. These three tools do not 
protect nor promote competition in themselves. However, they usually constitute 
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Control (but not ownership) of the 
non-competitive component is 
assumed by a non-profit entity 
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regulation. This happens, for instance, because information at hand thanks to an 
accounting separation allows determining the access fees and detecting cross-
subsidies. 
 
Table A2.2 presents the pros and cons associated to each of the aforementioned tools. 
 
 
TABLE A2.2 SUMMARY OF THE PROS AND CONS OF THE POLICIES TO PROMOTE 
COMPETITION  
 Source: OECD (2001a). 
Policy Pros Cons 
Access regulation · Certain economies of scope from 
integration can be preserved 
· Avoids a costly separation  
· Requires active regulatory 
participation  
· The regulator may not have enough 
information or instruments at its 
disposal to face all kinds of anti-
competition behaviour 
· Need to control the capacity  
Vertical 
separation of the 
ownership 
· Eliminates the incentive for 
discrimination between 
downstream firms 
· Alleviates the need for regulation  
· Potential loss of economies of 
scope from integration: may require 
a costly and arbitrary separation  
Shared ownership · Eliminates the incentive to 
discriminate and, therefore, 
reduces the need for active 
regulatory oversight and 
intervention   
· The downstream rivals collectively 
have an incentive to deter new 
entrants  
· Requires some form of intervention 
if there is the possibility that new 
entrants will wish to join the “club” 
· Only valid in cases where the 
number of potential members of the 
club is strictly limited (such as the 
allocation of take-off and landing 





· Can facilitate the control of 
discrimination and anti-
competition behaviours  
· Possible lack of benefits reduces 
incentives to provide innovative 
and dynamic services  
Separation into 
reciprocal parts  
· Anti-competition behaviour is 
counteracted by the incentives to 
interconnect 
· Stimulates competition both 
horizontally and vertically 
· By allowing vertical integration, 
economies of scope are preserved  
· Its usage is limited to certain 
industries, particularly those 
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The most suitable tool for each sector depends on a great variety of factors that, according 
to OECD (2001a), range from the magnitude of the economies of scale of the integration 
to the costs of separation, and also encompass the benefits and opportunities of the 
competition and the goals of the public policy for each industry. 
 
Of the tools mentioned above, the two main approaches adopted to promote competition 
are: 
 
• The vertical separation of ownership, that is, a structural approach that allows to 
reduce the incentives of the owner of the non-competitive component, to restrict 
competition in the component susceptible of being provided under a competition 
regime; 
 
• The vertical integration with access regulation, a behavioural approach that 
requires a more restrictive regulation than the vertical regulation of ownership, in 
order to counteract the incentives of restriction to competition that the owner of the 
non-competitive component may have over the component susceptible to being 
presented in a competition regime. 
 
 
A2.4.1.3. The reorganisation experience undergone by the network industries 
In the two last decades, the public utilities have suffered significant changes, aimed at 
introducing competition in the competitive activities, and achieving the beneficial goals 
that its introduction implies (see section A2.4.1.2). 
 
The introduction of competition has been basically done through the vertical separation of 
monopolistic companies, separating the activities susceptible to be provided in a regime of 
competition from the non-competitive ones, which are the ones that have kept natural 
monopoly features and for which a certain governmental intervention may be desirable. In 
other words, there has been a separation of the infrastructure (universal and common for 
all potential operators) from the operations or services of each industry, based on the 
separation of competitive and non-competitive components presented in table A2.1. 
 
As a result of that, there has been a liberalisation of the network markets, leading to a 
reduction of state regulation and, as a side effect, an increased competitiveness between 
companies, a greater productivity and efficiency, and a price reduction. 
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Below the reorganisation undergone in some network industries (electricity, natural gas, 
air transport) in Europe is presented, emphasising the tools used to promote competition 
and the repercussions that its adoption has had on the market. 
 
The reorganisation of the electricity sector 
In the electricity sector, electricity generation, its provision and commercialisation in the 
market are considered activities potentially competitive. For that reason, the restructuring 
of the sector to promote competition can be done with: 
 
• The separation of generation and transmission and distribution, for instance, 
through shared ownership or operational separation. 
 
• The separation of supply and transmission or distribution, for instance, through 
shared ownership or operational separation.  
 
• The separation of distribution and transmission. 
 
On a European level, the chosen option has been to disaggregate the systems of 
transmission and distribution, as well as a gradual opening of national markets, both 
regulated by the European Directives 96/92/EC and 2003/54/EC. This last one has entailed 
the legal disintegration24 of the operators of the transmission system and the operators of 
the distribution system from the rest of the industry, the free access to generation, the 
control of competition, the total opening of the market, the promotion of renewable 
resources, the reinforcement of the regulator’s role and the introduction of a single 
European market. 
 
The reorganisation of the natural gas industry 
In the natural gas sector, as in the electrical industry, production and supply are activities 
susceptible of being provided in a competition regime. Thus, the promotion of competition 
in the natural gas industry is generally done through: 
 
• The separation between production of gas and transmission/distribution. 
• The separation between supply and transmission/distribution. 
• The separation between gas storage and transmission/distribution. 
• The separation between distribution and transmission. 
• The separation between transmission/distribution of gas and generation of 
electricity. 
                                                 
24 For “legal disintegration” we understand, at least, the independence of the organisation and its decision 
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In the framework of the European Community, the reorganisation of the sector is defined 
by Directive 2003/55/EC25 on common rules for the internal market in natural gas, as well 
as by Regulation No 1775/200526 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission 
networks.   
 
Directive 2003/55/EC imposes the independence of the network management of gas 
transmission from the rest of activities not related to transmission, without forcing a 
separation between the ownership of the assets of the transmission system and the 
vertically integrated company, but forcing to an accounting separation. It also imposes the 
designation, by the Member States, of one or several competent organisms functioning as 
regulating authorities. This reorganisation would rather correspond to a vertical integration 
with access regulation. 
 
The reorganisation of the air services sector 
Traditionally, the organisation structure of the air services sector was formed by public 
companies of air navigation (also known as “legacy carriers”) that generally enjoyed the 
monopoly of air transport in the internal market and, backed by their respective 
governments, subscribed international agreements with other companies of the same 
nature in order to share the traffic developed between both countries, fixing the routes, 
frequencies and prices to be charged.  
 
This turned the air transport market into a group of national markets, preventing the profits 
of the possibilities and advantages of a single market. Furthermore, it did not contribute to 
the European integration nor the development of closer relationships with other parts of 
the world. Therefore, this regulation system of air transport in Europe did not benefit the 
general interests nor the consumers’ ones. For that reason, the European Community 
decided to start a restructuring process of the sector, with the goal of introducing a greater 
degree of competition in the air markets. 
 
At a world level, the main tool to promote the competition in the air market has been to 
vertically separate the operations of aircrafts and the infrastructural services, in particular 
(OECD, 2001a): 
 
• The separation between the operation of the planes and the provision of airport 
services (such as the provision of slots for take off and landing). 
 
                                                 
25 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC. 
26 Regulation (EC) nº 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005, on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks.    
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• The separation between terminal facilities and other airport services, with each 
terminal station operated by an airline or group of airlines. 
 
• The separation between land management service operation and other aspects of 
terminal services. 
 
On a European level, the restructuring started in 1987 and was carried out in stages 
through the approbation of three packages of measures, with the goal of introducing a 
Single Sky policy (or common European air space). This policy aimed at allowing the 
transition from a highly regulated market to a single liberalised market, carrying out: 
 
• The liberalisation of the sector, through the introduction of air transport policies 
(regarding prices, market access, capacity control and licensing for air carriers) and 
competition policies with the goal of protecting the competition from restrictive 
practices (such as for instance, public funding and traffic restrictions in the 
airports, among others). 
 
• The harmonisation of the norms concerning safety, environment, transport 
responsibility, protection of the consumers when denied boarding, etc.  
 
• The establishment of a control system of the capacity of airports and traffic. 
 
• The direction of exterior relationships where the agreements of Community 
countries with other countries for the liberalisation of markets are postulated.     
 
With the first package of measures, approved in December 1987 and in force since 1 
January 1988, a first step was taken towards the liberalisation, thanks to the introduction 
of measures such as the limitation of the countries rights to object to the introduction of 
new prices, and measures which allowed for more flexible bilateral agreements. The 
measures of the first air package only applied to air transport regular lines among 
Community countries, domestic and international flights being excluded.   
 
With the second package, approved in 1989, measures of transport policy and competition 
were introduced, which allowed increasing the liberties established in the first package 
regarding pricing and capacity allocation. The right to transport passengers from one’s 








A-54  PhD Thesis 
 
Finally, in 1992, a third air package was approved, in force since 1 January 1993. The 
package, which contained three regulations related to the concession of licences to the 
companies, the market access and services’ fares, was the last stage of the progressive 
opening of the air sector. In fact, this last package gradually introduced the right to 
provide services in a free manner within the European Community, that is, it opened the 
market to the companies which owned a Community license. This package of measures 
culminated with the adoption of the right of cabotage in April 1997, which enabled 
operating a route in a foreign country without the need to stop over at the country of 
origin. 
 
Nowadays, the European Commission is working on the revision of the third air package, 
because there are still some aspects pending liberalisation. Among others, one of these 
aspects are the prices, which are still very high for flights with flexible conditions. 
 
The application of the packages of measures cited above has allowed the air European 
market to be governed by common laws regarding licences, market access and free 
establishment of fares. In fact, all airlines of the Member States of the European Common 
Aviation Area can operate with full traffic rights and no restrictions of capacity in any 
route of the Area. 
  
The main consequences of the liberalisation of the air sector in the European sphere can be 
summarised in the four following points:         
 
• The increase in the number of companies and routes, as a consequence of the 
emergence of competition due to the liberalisation of the sector. Table A2.3 
summarises the key indicators of the liberalisation of air transport in the European 
Union, among which we find the increase in the number of companies and routes 
experimented since the liberalisation of the air market. The increase in the number 
of routes is explained by the appearance of low cost companies, which thanks to 
their reduced costs make certain secondary routes viable, which would not happen 
under other conditions. Many of the new companies are regional companies based 
in secondary airports and allied with the big airlines. 
 
• The price reduction as a consequence of the appearance of low cost carriers, which 
because of their special structure and working procedures offer very competitive 
rates, notably inferior to those of the conventional carriers. The price reduction has 
also been apparent in conventional carriers, which have introduced promotions 
with competitive prices but subject to a series of conditions, such as the purchasing 
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of a return ticket. However, the prices of the flexible tickets, that is, the tickets 
which give total freedom to make changes or cancellations, have increased. 
 
 
TABLE A2.3 LIBERALISATION OF AIR TRANSPORT IN THE EU: KEY INDICATORS 








Number of EU scheduled airlines  124 131 6% 
Number of EU domestic city-pair routes 813 910 12% 
Number of domestic routes with more than on carrier 106 199 88% 
Weekly seat on EU domestic routes (in thousands) 2.891 4.084 41% 
Yearly ASKs on EU domestic routes (in billions) 73.000 105.000 44% 
Yearly flights on EU domestic routes (in thousands)  1.486 2.220 49% 
Share of EU domestic ASKs on routes with more than one 
carrier  
34% 68% +34ppts 
Number of intra-EU (international) city-pair routes  692 1.202 74% 
Number of intra-EU routes with more than two carriers 61 217 256% 
Weekly seats on intra-EU routes (in thousands) 2.231 4.571 105% 
Yearly ASKs on intra-EU routes (in billions)  102.000 243.000 138% 
Yearly flights on intra-EU routes (in thousands)  1.109 2.080 88% 
Share of intra-Eu ASKs routes with more than two carriers  42% 52% +10ppts 
No-frills airline share of total EU domestic ASKs   0,0% 3,9% +4ppts 
No-frills airline share of total intra-EU ASKs 0,6% 12,9% +12ppts 
Change in business class fares on routes within the EEA 
(nominal)  
242€ 350€ 45% 
Change in normal economy fares on routes within the EEA 
(nominal) 
213€ 243€ 14% 
Change in promotional fares on routes within the EEA 
(nominal) 
147€ 125€ -15% 
Notes: 
- ASK: available seat kilometre (it measures the load capacity of a passenger transport dedicated carrier)
- ppts: percentage points 
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• The restructuring of legacy carriers in order to face the competition emerged from 
the liberalisation of the air market. The conventional airline carriers (legacy 
carriers) have adopted policies to increase their productivity and efficiency. 
Among them, two opposite policies, which nevertheless usually coexist in the 
same company, stand out. Firstly, the adoption of policies similar to those of the 
low cost carriers, such as not emitting tickets or the imposition of restrictions in 
ticket changes or refunds. On the other hand, the adoption of differentiation 
policies, which accentuate the differences between both types of operators (for 
instance, a greater comfort for the passenger, greater flexibility of the ticket, better 
onboard and airport services) to maintain a certain type of clientele willing to pay 
more to receive a better service. In some cases, the restructuring also includes 
structural measures such as the Hub & Spoke system. This measures consists in 
concentrating the traffic in a single destination of central localisation (called “hub” 
airport), so all the flights from and towards other cities pass through the Hub (see 
figure A2.4). This allows for the reduction of the number of direct routes and the 
use of planes with bigger capacity, increasing the load factor of the planes and 
their frequencies, and favouring the appearance of economies of scale. 
 
• The consequences on other modes of transport, such as road transport or high 
speed railway transport, consisting in a transfer of passengers towards aviation, 
forcing the competitors to adapt their pricing or commercial policies in order to 
compete with the air sector after the liberalisation. 
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A2.4.1.4. Balance of the restructuring of “public utilities” other than railways 
The balance of the restructuring of telecommunication, electricity, natural gas and air 
transport industries is, on the whole, positive. 
 
In the case of the air sector, the most interesting one in the context of this dissertation 
because it also belongs to the transport sector, the system reorganisation has promoted 
innovation and initiatives that have resulted in an increased routes’ offer and a greater 
competition within existing routes. In some cases, they have succeeded in attracting clients 
from other modes, such as railways. 
 
These positive results of network industries restructuring are reassuring for the railway 
sector, currently in the middle of a reorganisation process. In the following sections we 
show how this process is being carried out, which are the motivations to put it forward, 
and what situation it has given rise until now. 
 
 
A2.4.2. Separation between rail infrastructure management and operation 
 
Among the tools available to revitalise railways in Europe, the EU has opted for the 
vertical separation between infrastructure management and service operation as a previous 
condition to opening the markets and introducing competition, following a similar pattern 
to the ones adopted in other network markets. 
 
The motivations behind the choice of a separation in the European railway field are 
presented in the following section. 
 
A2.4.2.1. Reasons for a separation in the railway field 
In the last twenty years, the traditional railway premises presented in section A2.1 have 
undergone a notable change mostly due to the development experienced by other means of 
transport (road, aviation), as introduced in annex A1. 
 
During the 1990s, as shown in section A2.3, railways in Europe started to reorganise their 
traditional structure in order to improve their efficiency. However, the introduction of 
business units that allowed a functional classification and an operation territorial division 
system in services supplanting the previous unitary and integrated organisation of all 
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In 1996, CEMT (1996), in the conclusions of the Round Table 103 held in Paris, affirmed 
that “a transformation or a radical reform of the way in which railways were organised 
was inevitable in many senses, especially if the goal was to find a solution to the 
economical difficulties that paralysed most European railways as a result of their lack of 
commercial dynamism and low productivity”. 
 
Thus, this situation of decline of railways in Europe in the 1990s, both in economic deficit 
and market share terms, led the European Commission to publish, in 1996, a white paper 
entitled “A strategy for revitalising the Community’s railways” (CE, 1996). This white 
paper responded to the need of defining a strategy in order to revitalise Community 
railways, reorganising their economic situation, guaranteeing free access to traffic and 
public services as a whole, and promoting national networks integration and social 
aspects.  
 
Five years later, a new white paper was published, “European Transport Policy for 2010: 
Time to decide”, with the goal of conciliating economic development and the demands of 
a society that requires quality and safety in order to foster modern and sustainable 
transport (CE, 2001a). 
 
These publications show the motivation of the European Commission to modify the 
traditional organisation of railways, in order to modernise them. 
 
Free access guarantee to traffic and public services as a whole, mentioned in the White 
Paper of 1996, required the separation between infrastructure management (the case of a 
natural monopoly) and railway services operation (a competition-prone activity), because 
the vertical separation is, according to Obermauer (2001), an indispensable precondition to 
allow a non discriminatory access to new railway companies. 
 
With the goal of determining the long-term advantages that could be derived from 
separation between railways infrastructure management and operation, the European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) organised, in June 1996, a round table on 
this subject. The conclusions reached are summarised in table A2.4. 
 
On the other hand, the separation of railway infrastructure and operation should enable, 
according to CEMT (2005): 
 
• Rationalising internal and international transport and taking the social costs of 
transport into account: These two objectives (rationalisation and social benefits) 
seem to be the main preoccupation of the European Union and fuel the action of 
the European Commission not only in the transport sector, but also in every other 
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field. 
 
• Clarifying the role of public support to railways and fostering the development of 
competition in railways, especially on an international scale, and dismantling the 
old national border obstacles that hinder operators (infrastructure obstacles are less 
important as long as they do not prevent international traffic). 
 
 
TABLE A2.4 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF 
RAILWAYS UNIVERSE 
 Source: Author’s elaboration from CEMT (1996), Bergougnoux (2000), 
Petrantonio et al. (2004), Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs 
(2005) and EC (2006). 
Advantages Disadvantages  
- The tendency to specialise in the own 
competence field, and subcontract 
functions or tasks to the most efficient 
company, allows a significant 
improvement of productivity. 
 
- The fragmentation of responsibilities can 
have consequences on operation safety. 
For this reason, it will be necessary to do 
a specific planning and reflection, in 
order to counteract the lack of a “global 
vision”, found in the integrated railway 
companies. 
- The competition among companies 
should stimulate technical, organisational 
and commercial innovation, and therefore 
connect railway performances to the 
needs of the client. 
- Solving conflict situations (delay of a 
train or perturbations due to different 
reasons) can become extremely complex. 
In fact, it can lead to companies revising 
the contractual clauses initially agreed. 
- It increases cost transparency. This 
facilitates the competitive access and 
creates incentives for an efficient cost 
recovery, an improvement of capacity 
allocation and a maximum infrastructure 
use costs recovery. It also facilitates State 
subsidies allocation (an essential 
argument in favour of an accounting 
separation). 
- Loss of promotion opportunities for 
the staff on the whole of the tasks 
susceptible to develop in an integrated 
company, as a result of having to depend 
on a highly specialised company with 
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Advantages Disadvantages  
- The separation between infrastructure 
management and operation allows for a 
non discriminatory access to the network, 
that is, the neutrality towards all 
operators, since it reduces the incentives 
that infrastructure owners may have to 
restrict access to rival companies in 
competitive markets. 
- Economical risks linked to the risk that 
the infrastructure manager-owner may be 
in a situation of monopoly that can lead it 
to be economically weak. For instance, if 
it is connected to public authorities, its 
losses will be covered and it will not be 
forced to dynamise its management. 
- It favours the privatisation of 
commercial activities of the industry 
(generally, the privatisation of the 
competitive segments of the sector 
increases efficiency). 
 
- Risk of insufficient investments in 
infrastructure: The conservation of ties 
with the public protection by the 
infrastructure manager will always force 
it to overrate investment needs that he 
will present to public authorities. 
- The greater independence of network 
management and financing ensures that 
the decisions are made in the interest of 
the network (reliability) 
- Loss of economies of scale that result 
from the integrated execution of several 
activities in a railway company. 




• Providing the infrastructure supplier with economic stability: The European 
Commission has acknowledged that it is necessary to choose between the socially 
optimal access charging principle (charging based on social marginal cost) and the 
necessary financial stabilisation of the infrastructure supplier (by revenue 
perception integrally covering financial costs). It has also ascertained that certain 
Member States are not prepared to mobilise public capital in order to cover the 
difference between social marginal cost and global financial costs and has 
therefore accepted that the charge be increased (see chapter 1 for more information 
on the subject). 
 
• Underlining the company: The European Commission has specifically conferred 
the title of “company” to the infrastructure supplier and to operators. The structural 
split of railways clarifies the functioning of each one of its components and should 
place each of them in a position of better focusing on the needs of every particular 
market. 
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• Mobilising private investment: The European Commission does not take sides in 
favour of privatisation nor remaining in the public field, but it is clear that 
Community railways will have to face a hard competition from private companies 
of road and inland navigation transport, as well as low cost carriers (in the 
particular field of freight transport and long distance passenger transport). The 
functioning of railways in different elements, each focused towards its particular 
market should reinforce the competitive capacity of each of these elements, and 
provide even more possibilities of orienting private investments in a convenient 
direction. 
 
Due to the advantages derived from a possible separation between infrastructure and 
operation in railway services and with the preoccupations mentioned above, the European 
Union (EU) took another step towards the separation between rail infrastructure 
management and operation (Directive 2001/14/EC), discreetly initiated in Europe with 
Directive 91/440/EC, which marked the first stage in the reform of European railway 
systems. 
 
The theoretical framework of this separation between management and railway operation 
is presented in the following section. 
 
A2.4.2.2. Theoretical framework of the separation. The Directives of the 
European Commission. 
The theoretical framework of the European railways separation is defined by a series of 
directives approved by the European Commission between the 1990s and the first decade 
of the 21st century (see section A2.2), which mark the EU railway reform lines. 
 
The European directives that regulate this separation of the infrastructure and railway 
operation in the European Union have been summarised in the table A2.5. 
 
 
TABLE A2.5 LEGISLATION OF THE EU APPLICABLE TO THE RAILWAY SECTOR, 
RELATIVE TO MARKET ACCESS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Original directive Modification of the original directive 
 Directive 91/440/EEC - Directive 2001/12/EC 
- Directive 2004/51/EC 
- Corrigendum to Directive 2004/51/EC 
 Directive 95/18/EC - Directive 2001/13/EC 
- Directive 2004/49/EC 
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Original directive Modification of the original directive 
 Directive 95/19/EC - Directive 2001/14/EC  
- Commission decision 2002/844/EC of 23 October 2002 
amending Directive 2001/14/EC in respect to the date of 
changing the working timetable for rail transport  
- Directive 2004/49/EC 
- Corrigendum to Directive 2004/49/EC 
 
 
Directives 91/440/EEC, 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC, which herald the start of the European 
railway sector liberalisation process, determined the necessity and obligation of 
introducing an accounting separation between infrastructure and operations. In particular, 
Directive 91/440/EC said (Article 4 of Section II – Management independence of railway 
undertakings) that:  
 
 “Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that as regards 
management, administration and internal control over administrative, economic 
and accounting matters railway undertakings have independent status in 
accordance with which they will hold, in particular, assets, budgets and 
accounts which are separate from those of the State”. 
 
With this measure, compulsory from the accounting year 1995, the EU wanted to achieve 
a total transparency and comprehension of different cost concepts: the costs relative to 
public service obligations; the non recoverable costs for the construction of infrastructure; 
maintenance costs; and infrastructure management and train-path allocation costs. 
 
This first directive on the separation of railway infrastructure did not demand to explicitly 
separate infrastructure and operations in different companies. 
 
A few years later, Directive 2001/12/EC modified Directive 91/440/EEC on the 
development of Community’s railways, providing extra contents and introducing 
significant modifications, among them the extension of its contents relative to the 
separation of accounts of transport services operation provided by railway undertakings 
and infrastructure managers. On this subject, in its Article 6, Directive 2001/12/EC says: 
 
 “Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that separate 
profit and loss accounts and balance sheets are kept and published, on the one 
hand, for business relating to the provision of transport services by railway 
undertakings and, on the other, for business relating to the management of 
railway infrastructure. Public funds paid to one of these two areas of activity 
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may not be transferred to the other. The accounts for the two areas of activity 
shall be kept in a way that reflects this prohibition”. 
 
“Member States may also provide that this separation shall require the 
organisation of distinct divisions within a single undertaking or that the 
infrastructure shall be managed by a separate entity”. 
 
Therefore, with the approbation of Directive 2001/12/EC, the European Union proposed 
three models of separation, the application of the first one of which was compulsory. 
These three models are: 
 
• Accounting separation: It is the separation imposed by Directive 91/440/EEC to 
the European Union countries. It consists in the accounting separation between the 
activities related to infrastructure management and the activities related to the 
operation. This separation enables knowing the railway infrastructure management 
unitary costs in each country. These costs have to be the basis to establish a charge 
for the use of the tracks, equal for each one of the members. 
 
• Organisational separation (operational separation or holding separation): (also 
known as “integrated model”):  In this separation, separated business units with a 
high degree of operational freedom are created. In this case, business units may 
operate either as a part of a railway undertaking (that is, they may have separated 
management and balance without having legal autonomy), or as autonomous 
business units within a holding company. 
 
• Institutional separation: The institutional separation is considered the real 
separation, because in this model “the owner of the infrastructure and railway 
undertakings are separated into separate autonomous entities with capitalisation, 
balance sheets and staff” (Profillidis, 2001). In the institutional separation, even 
when the infrastructure manager is public, the rules and laws that regulate private 
companies must be followed. In this structure there is a governmental regulator 
that mediates the disputes between the owner of the infrastructure and railway 
undertakings. 
 
On the other hand, Directive 2001/12/EC introduced the figure of the “Infrastructure 
Manager” (IM), understood as “any body or undertaking responsible in particular for 
establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure” (CE, 2001b). It also assigned to an 
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This equitative and non-discriminatory access for all railway undertakings was reinforced 
by Directive 2001/13/EC, amending Council Directive 95/18/EC, on the licensing of 
railway undertakings. This new Directive tried to generalise the concepts of licensing to 
all active companies of the sector27. 
 
The contents of Directive 2001/14/EC are analysed in chapter 1, because it mentions the 
introduction of the charge for the use of railway infrastructure, a consequence of the 
process of reorganisation and vertical separation of the railway sector. 
 
In the following section the situation that has given rise to the application of the 
theoretical framework of the separation in the EU is analysed. 
 
A2.4.2.3. Present state with regard to the separation between management 
and operation in the European railway field 
The application of the EU normative in relation to the separation between management 
and operation in the European railway field has resulted in two standard structural models, 
and a third one placed in between (see figure A2.5). Namely: 
 
• Integrated model: This model results from the organisational separation (or 
holding separation), characterised by a combination of accounting separation and 
access regulation. In an integrated model, the railway undertaking (RU) and the 
infrastructure manager (IM) are legally separated entities that work together in the 
same common holding structure or that are part of a same company. The other RUs 
can compete by means of standard contracts with the IM of the integrated 
company, on the basis of a non-discriminatory access regulated by a regulatory 
body and/or a competence authority. Because European law requires the separation 
of RU’s and IM’s accounts that compose an integrated model of railway 
organisation, the existing financial flows between the operator and the manager in 
an integrated company have to be transparent in the annual accounts. 
 
• Separated model: This model results from the institutional separation. It introduces 
a real vertical separation between the entities responsible for the competitive 
components and the entities responsible for the non-competitive components of the 
railway industry. In this model, the infrastructure manager hires independent 
                                                 
27 The companies that provide urban and suburban passenger transport services, or in isolated local and 
regional networks, were excluded from the scope of this directive. The companies that operate regional 
freight transport services or the ones that develop their own freight transport operations in a network 
exclusively designed for that end were excluded as well (CICCP, 2006). 
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railway undertakings, which provide the operation of the service, because the IM 
cannot directly supply the transport services. 
 
 
FIGURE A2.5 STANDARD STRUCTURAL MODELS OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 








































 State Regions 
Separated model 
Partially separated model 
Integrated model 
- The area delimited with dotted lines represents the 
holding structure or the company that encompasses
both operation and management activities.   
- The link between RUs and the IM belonging to the 
holding has been drawn with a continuous line 
because the Managing Director of an integrated 
company, facing competition in operations, can 
ensure that the IM works under commercial pressure 
to serve clients (without remaining a bureaucratic 
administration under the direct influence of the 
Minister of Finance of the government). 
RU: Railway Undertaking 
IM: Infrastructure Manager 
Link by means of a contract 
Link between companies of a single holding 
- The partial separation is an institutional separation 
although in fact it works almost as an integrated 
company. 
- There are many variations of this basic structure, 
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• Partially separated model (or hybrid system): This model is still a separation 
model (institutional separation), although in fact it almost operates as an integrated 
company. At an operational level, the railway system is indeed integrated, because 
the RU still owns the network, as well as the network traffic management and 
operation. However, the maintenance and the management functions are carried 
out by means of a contract of a completely separated IM that owns the 
infrastructure and is responsible for the network development.  
 
Nevertheless, there are several variations on the basic models (integrated and separated 
models), especially with regard to the property, since the European Commission does not 
venture into this subject28. 
 
With regard to the integrated model, the following variations are found: 
 
• Case where the company is mainly of private ownership (e.g. Estonia).  
 
• Case where the Government is the only shareholder of the integrated company 
(e.g. in Switzerland there are two integrated public ownership companies, with 
their respective railway undertakings competing in their own network and in other 
networks). 
 
Concerning the separated model, these are the cases that can be found:   
 
• Exclusive operation of private ownership railway undertakings, both in passenger 
and freight markets (e.g. the United Kingdom). 
 
• Existence of at least one public passenger or freight operator (e.g. the rest of 
European countries). In this case, the competition in the network is provided by 
other operators under private or public ownership. 
 
The situation of the European countries on the basis of the models previously presented is 
summarised in table A2.6.        
 
This diversity of practices in the European railways organisation field shows that the 
debate on integration versus separation is still much alive in Europe. The main arguments 
used by different countries to adopt either one or another of the models are summarised in 
table A2.7. In spite of this, the EU liberalisation aspirations reflected in Directives 
                                                 
28 Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome says that “This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member 
States governing the system of property ownership”. 
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2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 2001/14/EC “indicate that in a near future the institutional 
separation will be compulsory in the countries of the Union” (Ramos Melero, 2002). 
 
 
TABLE 3.6 RAILWAY MODEL INTRODUCED IN DIFFERENT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
 Source: Author’s elaboration from NERA (2004), Calthrop (2005), Thompson 
































- The arrow indicates the direction promoted by the European Commission, which has opted for 
the companies to go from an integrated structure (top of the table) to a separated structure 
(bottom of the table).   
 
 
It is important to mention that the degree of separation (or integration) constitutes a good 
indicator of the market’s competition, because, as previously seen, the separation between 
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TABLE A2.7 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EACH STRUCTURAL MODEL OF 
SEPARATION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION   
 Source: Own from Obermauer (2001) and Calthrop (2005). 
Integrated model Separated model 
Arguments for  Arguments against Arguments for  Arguments against 
A single management 
structure at a 
company or holding 
level ensures a higher 
degree of 
coordination between 
the IM and the RU 
than any other 
contract can provide. 
Therefore, it ensures 
the long term 
development of the 
railway system as a 
whole. 
 
If the integrated 
company is subject to 
the competition in 
operations, it can be 
affirmed that the IM 
works under 
commercial pressure 
to serve its clients 
(without remaining a 
bureaucratic 
administration under 
the direct influence 
of the Minister of 
Finances of the 
government). 
It constitutes a 
substantial barrier 
for competition, 
because it is not 
sensible to market 
services demands. 
 
It is the simplest 
structure capable 
of ensuring the 
non-discrimination 
by the IM when 











adapts to market 
needs. 
The government 
still acts as a link 
between the public 









It hampers the 
elaboration of 
timetables, train-




A2.4.2.4. Organisational situation of the railway field outside Europe 
Although in Europe, in recent years, the separation between infrastructure and operation as 
a tool to introduce competition in the railway market has prevailed, it is surprising that in 
the rest of the world almost every railway is integrated and that in some cases they belong 
to private hands. 
 
The restructuring process of railways undergone in the United States and Japan is 
summarised in the following sections. This process started with the same goal as the 
reorganisation of European railways: to revitalise the railway mode, improving the 
economical situation of the companies and introducing competition into the sector. 
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Railway reform in the United States 
If railways in Europe were in a situation of decline at the end of the 1960s because of the 
development of high performance road infrastructures (motorways) and of the plane in 
medium and long distance journeys, as seen in annex A1, in the United States this was 
already happening in the mid 1950s. By the 1970s, the railway system was considerably 
enfeebled and many railways were on the brink of bankruptcy. 
 
To stop the decline and to revitalise intercity passenger railway services, the Rail 
Passenger Service Act of 1970 created the public company National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak). With its creation, the Government decided to nationalise the 
passenger railway market sector, with the goal of increasing the service standards, which 
had declined due to the strong competition of both the plane and the automobile. With this 
action the Government wanted to ensure the viability and expansion of long distance 
passenger railway transport, performing at the same time a restructuring and an adjustment 
of the existing resources. On the other hand, with the creation of Amtrak, the private 
railway industry liberated itself from a big share of the economical losses derived from 
passenger trains operation. 
 
But the creation of Amtrak did not solve railways delicate situation: while in 1972 
Amtrak’s market share was 0,8% of all passengers who did long and medium distance 
travels, in 1997 it had fallen to a meagre 0,4%.   
 
As a result of that, in the 1990s Amtrak found itself in a precarious financial state, and was 
highly dependant on operation funds and federal capital. To make matters worse, between 
1991 and 1997, the number of passengers transported by Amtrak decreased by 10%, while 
that of aviation increased by 28%. 
 
According to Vranich (1997), Amtrak’s failures were mainly due to the fact that the 
company was a public monopoly, “the type of organisation less inclined to innovate”. In 
any case, Amtrak operated routes that responded to political needs but not to market 
demand, so it did not earn enough money to pay the operation expenses and lost 
disproportionate quantities of money in the long distance trains. 
 
For that reason, the Working Group on Intercity Rail, created in 1997 by the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, considered that Amtrak monopoly should 
terminate and that it was time to open passenger railway service to competition. Along 
these lines, the Congress passed the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, 
which established that if by December 2002 Amtrak was not financially self-sufficient, the 
company should be restructured and liquidated. Given the case, “an action plan to 
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the Congress, and “Amtrak should deliver a plan for its complete liquidation” (Vranich et 
al., 2001). 
 
Between 1998 and 2000, Amtrak received 3.910 million dollars, more subsidies than in 
any other three-year period in its thirty years of existence. In spite of this, Amtrak did not 
manage to be financially self-sufficient. For this reason, in April 2005 Amtrak explained 
the initiatives for its strategic reform (Amtrak Strategic Reform and Initiatives and FY06 
Grant Request, Amtrak, 2005). In particular, it proposed the creation of five business 
lines: long distance trains, short distance trains, Northeast Corridor operations (NEC), 
NEC infrastructure and auxiliary business (in particular operation contracts of suburban 
trains outside the NEC). 
 
In relation to railway freight transport, in 1970 the six railway companies of the East, 
which were facing bankruptcy, were nationalised and merged into a new company under 
the name Conrail. On the other hand, between 1979 and 1982, air, truck and railway 
transport were deregulated. The railways deregulation took place in 1981 with the decree 
known as “Staggers Act”, which significantly reduced the governmental participation in 
fare-setting and railway freight transport services. The developments were positive, and by 
the 2000s railway freight transport was profitable again, although at a lower level than 
other industries. Therefore, it may be said that the deregulation and state financing turned 
Conrail into a profitable company, which was sold to private hands in 1987. 
 
To summarise, the American model is characterised by a distinct treatment between: 
 
• Long distance passenger services: Managed by the public company Amtrak, 
subsidised both by the federal government and the states of the Union. 
 
• Freight services: Managed by more than 500 private railway companies, although 
90% of the market is divided among seven companies, known as the “super 
seven”. The railway freight companies integrate in their ownership the network 
and terminals, and they have running and freight transport regulation functions. In 
every case, these companies guarantee the free circulation of other companies 
provided they pay a charge for the use of the tracks. 
 
• Suburban services: These services are managed by public companies or mixed 
ones with public subsidies, generally from the corresponding local entities. 
 
The reforms performed in order to improve the situation of American railways, and which 
led to the railway model summarised in the previous paragraphs, were, according to 
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Thompson (2005b): 
 
a) Eliminating cross subsidies, directly paying the economical aids to the passenger 
services operator (Amtrak). 
 
b) Encouraging competition and improving service through the transport sector 
deregulation. 
 
c) Leaving freight operators and infrastructure within the private sector, with the goal 
of keeping railways and trucks in the same competitive basis. 
 
d) Adopting a pragmatic and mixed approach, regarding ownership and structure. 
Therefore, freight railways are under private ownership and managed by private 
companies, with little public participation. On the other hand, Amtrak, the 
passenger services operator, is a public company, financed with public funds. 
 
Railway reform in Japan 
The development of high performance road infrastructures also had negative repercussions 
on the Japanese railways market share. In this case, the Japanese National Railway (JNR), 
created in 1949 as a public company in charge of both the railway services management 
and operation, started to suffer losses in 1964, which raised the necessity of undertaking a 
reform in the railway transport field. 
 
Between 1964 and 1979 there were several failed attempts of reform. Finally, in 1981 the 
Government constituted the Second Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform in 
order to stop the significant losses of JNR. This Commission decided to create the JNR 
Reform Commission in 1983, which issued a series of recommendations in 1985. As a 
result, in May 1986 two laws were passed, the JNR Reform Act, and an Act concerning 
Passenger Railway Companies and JR Freight. This reform, which was purely financial, 
marked the separation and partial privatisation of the old Japanese National Railway 
(JNR). 
 
In particular, the JNR Reform Act statutorily dissolved JNR in April 1987, and its assets, 
operations and debts were distributed among new companies conforming a new business 
group, known as Japan Railways Group, JRs. The distribution of the infrastructure, the 
assets and the activity of passengers JNR was made following geographical criteria. In 
particular, it was divided into six private regional companies: three in Honshu Island (JR 
Higashi Nihon or JR East; JR Tokai or JR Central; JR Nishi Nihon or JR West) and one in 
each of Hokkaido (JR Hokkaido), Shikoku (Shikoku) and Kyushu (JR Kyushu) islands. 
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name of JR Kamotsu (or Japan Freight Railway Company). Therefore, there was a 
regional separation and a vertical integration of the railway passengers companies.  
 
Besides the six companies mentioned above, the Shinkansen Holding Company was 
created for the main island (Honshu Island), a governmental entity that owned the high 
speed railway infrastructure and inherited part of the debt of the old JNR. The debt had to 
be amortised with the revenues obtained from leasing the infrastructure to the three new 
private companies that operated in Honshu Island. However, nowadays the infrastructure 
belongs to the three JRs of the island, because the Shinkansen Holding Company 
transferred it to the JRs after being dissolved. For the lines of the three smaller islands a 
management stabilisation fund was created in order to help the three private companies 
that operated them amortise part of the JNR debt that was transferred to them. Finally, a 
liquidating corporation was also created, Settlements Corporation, which absorbed all 
JNR’s rustic and real-estate goods, all the workers who did not want to join the new 
private companies, and a great part of the debt that the old state company had incurred. 
This volume of debt had to be amortised through the exploitation of transferred properties 
and goods and the sale of shares of the JR group. 
 
On the other hand, the Railway Companies Act allowed railway companies to adopt the 
functions of one of the three types of company defined by it: 
 
• Type 1 company: All the companies which own railway infrastructure and operate 
trains like it was traditionally done, were defined as Type 1 companies.  
 
• Type 2 company: The companies that only do operation tasks were defined as Type 
2 companies. 
 
• Type 3 company: The companies that only own infrastructure belonged to this 
type. 
 
Therefore, this Act allows railway infrastructure operation and ownership to be divided 
between Type 2 and Type 3 companies, respectively. This model differs from the 
European Union model because in the European countries where ownership and operation 
are separated the railway infrastructure belongs to public entities, which do not have to 
refund construction costs. On the contrary, Type 3 Japanese companies have to refund 
construction costs to Type 2 companies through charges for the use of infrastructure. 
 
Under this Act, the six JR’s railway passenger transport companies were defined as Type 
1 companies, and the railway freight transport company, JR Kamotsu, as Type 2 company. 
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Therefore, JR companies are vertically integrated companies, with the exception of JR 
Freight. 
 
After the separation of JNR, the next step was the privatisation of the companies of the 
new JR group, which constituted the fundamental goal of JNR dissolution. Between 1993 
and 1999, private investors bought 87% of JR East, and the remaining 13% was sold in 
2002. On the other hand, in 1996 JR West sold 68% of the company, and in 2004 they 
sold the remaining 32%. The sale of JR Central started in 1997 with 60% of its shares, the 
rest being completed in 2006.  
 
The reform presented in the previous paragraphs constitutes the biggest railway reform 
that has taken place in the world since World War II. Its results are positive, given that 
since the restructuring of the old Japanese National Railways and the privatisation of 
railway passenger transport companies, the biggest railway companies (JR East, JR West 




In the previous paragraphs, it has been showed that there is no single reform model to 
revitalise railway markets: while the European Union has chosen a system aiming at free 
access to railways, requiring (at least on the accounting field) the separation between 
infrastructure management and operation, in the United States and in Japan a model of 
vertical integration has been followed, with ownership and interconnections. 
 
So, while Europe is following a path towards the dissolution of railway monopolies, in 
Japan the reform has culminated in the creation of regional vertically integrated 
monopolies with interconnection and measures that promote free access29, but do not 
strive to introduce competition in the market, at least in medium and short distance 
journeys. Similarly, in the United States the model of vertically integrated companies, 
where railway companies must offer free (and equal) access to their competitors, also 
prevails. 
 
Other reform options have been adopted in other countries. One of them is the option of 
considering vertically integrated long term concessions, based on concessions to regional 
monopolies for long periods of time, of around 30 years, for instance. Examples of this 
measure can be found in countries such as Argentina and Brazil. 
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These three models have positive and negative effects. For that reason it cannot be 
affirmed that any of them is the best per se. 
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ANNEX A4 
RATES OF EXCHANGE 
 
 
The rates of exchange used in this study for comparing the amounts of rail infrastructure 
charges are the ones provided by the European Central Bank (ECB), valid on January 16, 
2006 (see table A4.1).    
 
TABLA A4. 1 RATES OF EXCHANGE VALID IN JANUARY 16, 2006 
 Source: ECB (2006)  
Currency name Abbreviation  1€ = 
Czech koruna CZK 28,80 
Danish krone DKK 7,46 
Estonian kroon EEK 15,65 
Pound sterling GBP 0,69 
Hungarian florint  HUF 250,32 
Lithuanian litas LTL 3,45 
Latvian lats LVL 0,70 
Polish złoty PLN 3,81 
Swedish krona SEK 9,33 
Slovenian dolar SIT 239,51 
Slovak koruna SKK 37,48 
Swiss franc CHF 1,55 
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ANNEX A5 
ADJUSTED UNIT RATES APPLICABLE TO 
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ANNEX A6 
OUTPUTS FROM THE CALCULATIONS OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES AND REVENUES 
 
 
In table A.6.1 are presented the results from the calculations of infrastructure charges and 
revenues done with the methodology and assumptions presented in chapter 3.    
 
TABLE A.6.1 OUTPUTS FROM THE CALCULATIONS OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
AND REVENUES  
Railways Airways  
Link 
IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC
1.Frankfurt – Köln  2.184,28 13.406,30 16,29% 11.222,02 - - - - 
2.Wien – Salzburg  803,40 10.432,50 7,70% 9.629,10 - - - - 
3.Bruxelles – Liège  1.083,15 3.022,50 35,84% 1.939,35 - - - - 
4.København – Esbjerg  839,79 9.702,57 8,66% 8.862,78 - - - - 
5.Bratislava – Zilina  310,68 1.743,07 17,82% 1.432,39 - - - - 
6.Ljubljana – Maribor  417,45 3.012,75 13,86% 2.595,30 - - - - 
7.Madrid – Sevilla  4.798,47 17.013,75 28,20% 12.215,28 2.344,24 17.419,50 13,46% 15.075,26
8.Tallin – Narva  781,73 1324,17 59,04% 542,44 - - - - 
9.Helsinki – Turku  110,85 5.703,75 1,94% 5.592,90 4.071,45 10.830,23 37,59% 6.758,78 
10.Paris – Lyon  6.302,84 14.308,13 44,05% 8.005,29 3.795,06 12.950,18 29,31% 9.155,12 
11.Athinai – Thessaloniki  - 8.11,88 - - 2.828,62 11.333,75 24,96% 8.505,13 
12.Amsterdam – Breda  230,46 4.387,50 5,25% 4.157,04 - - - - 
13.Budapest – Debrecen  605,30 2.298,06 26,34% 1.692,76 - - - - 
14.Belfast – Dublin  - 8.409,38 - - - - - - 
15.Roma – Firenze  989,13 7.176,00 13,78% 6.186,87 5.218,09 11.251,28 46,38% 6.033,19 
16.Riga – Recekne  746,77 833,63 89,58% 86,86 - - - - 
17.Vilnius – Klaipeda  1.090,40 2.760,26 39,50% 1.669,86 - - - - 
18.Belgian border – 
Kleinbettingen – 
Luxembourg – 
Bettembourg – French 
border  
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Railways Airways  
Link 
IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC
19.Oslo – Trondheim  0,00 24.135,76 0,00% 24.135,76 2.774,96 14.647,50 18,94% 11.872,54
20.Warszawa – Katowice  776,65 5.694,94 13,64% 4.918,29 2.151,49 6.644,40 32,38% 4.492,91 
21.Lisboa – Porto  471,80 5.728,13 8,24% 5.256,33 2.298,93 13.064,10 17,60% 10.765,17
22.London –Newcastle  4.054,17 37.516,41 10,81% 33.462,24 4.202,46 21.193,20 19,83% 16.990,74
23.Praha – Brno  284,21 1.531,90 18,55% 1.247,69 - - - - 
24.Göteborg – Stockholm 277,16 28.818,48 0,96% 28.541,32 3.838,74 6.741,00 56,95% 2.902,26 
25.Genève – Lausanne – 
Bern – Zürich  
521,13 12.111,22 4,30% 11.590,09 2.503,23 9.301,43 26,91% 6.798,20 
26. København – Malmö  242,96 - - - - - - - 
27. Madrid – Toledo  1.071,00 2.023,13 52,94% 952,13 - - - - 
28. Bratislava – Wien  180,23 - - - - - - - 
29. Lille – Bruxelles  1.157,74 5.850,00 19,79% 4.692,26 - - - - 
30. Warszawa – Lódz  321,70 1.815,98 17,71% 1.494,28 - - - - 
31. Manchester - 
Birmingham 
1.809,66 7.823,34 23,13% 6.013,68 - - - - 
32. Praha – Ostrawa  347,39 3.385,89 10,26% 3.038,50 - - - - 
33. Ljubljana – Trieste  447,52 3.656,25 12,24% 3.208,73 - - - - 
34. Milano – Genova  726,81 3.997,50 18,18% 3.270,69 - - - - 
35. Lyon – Genève  568,91 9.579,38 5,94% 9.010,47 - - - - 
36. Strasbourg – Stuttgart  762,60 8.263,13 9,23% 7.500,53 - - - - 
37. Paris – Tours  2.618,37 9.165,00 28,57% 6.546,63 - - - - 
38. Paris – Lille  3.405,86 8.848,13 38,49% 5.442,27 - - - - 
39. Roma – Napoli  1.051,10 5.079,75 20,69% 4.028,65 - - - - 
40. Amsterdam – Bruxelles  958,81 10.725,00 8,94% 9.766,19 - - - - 
41. Hannover – Berlin  1.332,35 12.918,75 10,31% 11.586,40 - - - - 
42. Wien – Nürnberg  1.571,80 18.086,25 8,69% 16.514,45 4.925,72 7.811,48 63,06% 2.885,76 
43.Warszawa – Poznań  1.104,02 5.694,94 19,39% 4.590,92 2.133,78 5.692,05 37,49% 3.558,27 
44. Madrid – Zaragoza  2.854,61 10.286,25 27,75% 7.431,64 - - - - 
45. Firenze – Milano  1.122,10 7.049,25 15,92% 5.927,15 5.356,78 11.707,50 45,76% 6.350,72 
46. Lyon – Marseille  2.646,53 10.505,63 25,19% 7.859,10 3.350,37 14.905,28 22,48% 11.554,91
47. Warszawa – Gdańsk  786,28 5.758,93 13,65% 4.972,65 2.087,67 4.961,78 42,08% 2.874,11 
48. Hannover – Frankfurt  1.895,95 17.306,25 10,96% 15.410,30 4.854,30 11.923,80 40,71% 7.069,50 
Outputs from the calculations of infrastructure charges and revenues  Annex A6                  
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-119 
Railways Airways  
Link 
IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC
49. Bruxelles – Köln  875,87 9.750,00 8,98% 8.874,13 - - - - 
50. Paris – Rennes  2.760,64 12.236,25 22,56% 9.475,61 3.744,42 21.788,03 17,19% 18.043,61
51. London – Bruxelles  18.430,14 54.478,13 33,83% 36.047,99 4.773,51 30.858,45 15,47% 26.084,94
52. Warszawa – Wrocław  800,33 2.459,70 32,54% 1.659,37 2.848,30 16.056,60 17,74% 13.208,30
53. Praha – Berlin  1.077,88 13.113,75 8,22% 12.035,87 3.918,90 45.014,03 8,71% 41.095,13
54. Bratislava – Košice  699,34 3.369,07 20,76% 2.669,73 - - - - 
55. Praha – Wien  517,33 - - - 4.544,78 23.352,00 19,46% 18.807,22
56. Amsterdam – Berlin  2.432,65 23.692,50 10,27% 21.259,85 5.861,85 28.436,63 20,61% 22.574,78
57. Paris – Strasbourg  1.535,52 11.261,25 13,64% 9.725,73 3.694,40 14.534,10 25,42% 10.839,70
58. Paris – Amsterdam  4.211,09 23.765,63 17,72% 19.554,54 4.737,99 36.830,33 12,86% 32.092,34
59. Paris – Genève  5.527,86 16.818,75 32,87% 11.290,89 4.402,26 18.338,78 24,01% 13.936,52
60. Warszawa – Berlin  2.178,86 9.506,25 22,92% 7.327,39 4.439,77 35.503,13 12,51% 31.063,36
61. Paris – Bordeaux  3.417,43 15.526,88 22,01% 12.109,45 3.795,46 19.598,78 19,37% 15.803,32
62. Praha – München  2.202,65 18.963,75 11,62% 16.761,10 4.003,67 40.675,43 9,84% 36.671,76
63. Stockholm – Oslo  262,00 16.773,77 1,56% 16.511,77 2.117,15 15.292,20 13,84% 13.175,05
64. Madrid – Barcelona  4.594,91 15.356,25 29,92% 10.761,34 2.427,69 5.187,00 46,80% 2.759,31 
65. London –Edinburgh  4.821,39 39.472,24 12,21% 34.650,85 4.424,08 19.982,03 22,14% 15.557,95
66. Lisboa – Madrid  772,67 13.528,13 5,71% 12.755,46 3.877,51 30.754,50 12,61% 26.876,99
67. Barcelona – Bordeaux  1.548,88 15.136,88 10,23% 13.588,00 - - - - 
68. Barcelona – Lyon  2.273,20 16.453,13 13,82% 14.179,93 3.720,29 39.256,88 9,48% 35.536,59
69. Oslo – København  536,50 22.025,37 2,44% 21.488,87 2.382,89 19.059,60 12,50% 16.676,71
70. Warszawa – Wien  1.374,91 - - - 4.672,72 38.411,10 12,17% 33.738,38
71. Paris – Marseille  7.686,59 18.330,00 41,93% 10.643,41 3.736,79 20.310,68 18,40% 16.573,89
72. Paris – Hannover  5.677,24 33.759,38 16,82% 28.082,14 4.590,55 44.497,95 10,32% 39.907,40
73 København – Köln  2.418,40 29.932,50 8,08% 27.514,10 - - - - 
74. Strasbourg – Nürnberg  1.146,17 15.819,38 7,25% 14.673,21 - - - - 
75. Milano – Köln  3.127,15 36.806,25 8,50% 33.679,10 - - - - 
76. London – Strasbourg  18.864,00 56.671,88 33,29% 37.807,88 - - - - 
77. München – Roma  2.476,63 29.932,50 8,27% 27.455,87 - - - - 
78. Hamburg – Stockholm  1.222,48 46.868,09 2,61% 45.645,61 - - - - 
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Railways Airways  
Link 
IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC IC (€) Rev (€) IC/Rev Rev-IC
80. London – Bordeaux  22.976,14 58.500,00 39,28% 35.523,86 - - - - 
81. Genève – Wien  2.437,57 46.653,75 5,22% 44.216,18 4.852,04 36.766,28 13,20% 31.914,24
82. Barcelona – Sevilla  7.912,18 20.182,50 39,20% 12.270,32 2.604,46 9.754,50 26,70% 7.150,04 
83. Barcelona – Paris 3.388,57 38.268,75 8,85% 34.880,18 3.929,30 36.389,85 10,80% 32.460,55
84. Hamburg – Wien  4.830,53 37.342,50 12,94% 32.511,97 4.764,63 7.773,15 61,30% 3.008,52 
85. Lisboa – Barcelona  3.940,83 28.884,38 13,64% 24.943,55 5.508,59 36.529,50 15,08% 31.020,91
86. Marseille – Amsterdam  11.243,56 42.095,63 26,71% 30.852,07 - - - - 
87. Praha – Paris  4.344,24 37.147,50 11,69% 32.803,26 4.479,20 47.416,43 9,45% 42.937,23
88. Paris – Wien  4.557,44 41.803,125 10,90% 37.245,69 5.393,21 23.248,05 23,20% 17.854,84
89. Luxembourg – Warszawa  6.330,75 39.243,75 16,13% 32.913,00 - - - - 
90. Paris – Roma  8.731,20 31.987,50 27,30% 23.256,30 4.409,93 63.653,63 6,93% 59.243,70
91. Glasgow – Rennes  27.896,32 88.140,00 31,65% 60.243,68 - - - - 
92. Paris – Warszawa  9.095,91 57.037,50 15,95% 47.941,59 5.149,10 41.411,48 12,43% 36.262,38
93. Zürich – Warszawa  3.635,40 42.363,75 8,58% 38.728,35 5.347,16 32.701,73 16,35% 27.354,57
94. Madrid – Zürich  6.715,57 52.650,00 12,76% 45.934,43 5.238,15 45.543,23 11,50% 40.305,08
95. München – Stockholm  5.257,71 66.368,09 7,92% 61.110,38 5.197,34 79.058,18 6,57% 73.860,84
96. Madrid – Bruxelles  5.059,47 57.159,38 8,85% 52.099,91 5.359,28 78.828,75 6,80% 73.469,47
97. London – Warszawa  23.128,60 94.209,38 24,55% 71.080,78 5.000,36 21.615,83 23,13% 16.615,47
98. Barcelona – Wien  4.743,63 83.947,50 5,65% 79.203,87 4.945,84 40.367,25 12,25% 35.421,41
99. Lisboa – Genève  5.747,42 66.178,13 8,68% 60.430,71 - - - - 
100. Madrid – Wien  7.334,25 99.303,75 7,39% 91.969,50 5.922,56 46.089,75 12,85% 40.167,19
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RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 


































A-122  PhD Thesis 
DE COUNTRY 
(Frankfurt - Köln)  





FORMULA APPLIED : 
(1) DB : Price*(train-path km) = (Base price) x (Product factor) x (Special factors) x (Regional factor) + (Stops at stations) 




















DE DB Netz 3603 DE-3603 Frankfurt (Main) Hbf  Frankfurt (Main) Gutleuthof F3 2 2,158 90 
DE DB Netz 3620 DE-3620 Frankfurt (Main) Gutleuthof Frankfurt-Niederrad  F3 2 2,199 90 
DE DB Netz 3520 DE-3520 Frankfurt-Niederrad  Frankfurt (Main) Sportfeld  F3 1 1,817 130 
DE DB Netz 2690 DE-2690 Frankfurt (Main) Sportfeld  Frankfurt(M) Flughafen Fernbahnhof  FP 2 5,377 300 
DE DB Netz 2690 DE-2690 Frankfurt(M) Flughafen Fernbahnhof  Lumburg (Lahn) Süd FP 2 58,762 300 
DE DB Netz 2690 DE-2690 Lumburg (Lahn) Süd Lumburg (Lahn) Süd HE/RP FP 2 7,194 300 
DE DB Netz 2690 DE-2690 Lumburg (Lahn) Süd HE/RP Willroth FP 2 41,385 300 
DE DB Netz 2690 DE-2690 Willroth Windhagen NRW/RP FP 2 15,724 300 
DE DB Netz 2690 DE-2690 Windhagen NRW/RP Siegburg/Bonn  FP 2 20,211 300 
DE DB Netz 2651 DE-2651 Siegburg/Bonn  Troisdorf  F6 2 4,305 200 
DE DB Netz 2651 DE-2651 Troisdorf  Köln Steinstraße (Abzw) F6 2 11,880 200 
DE DB Netz 2651 DE-2651 Köln Steinstraße (Abzw) Vingst F3 2 3,869 160 
DE DB Netz 2651 DE-2651 Vingst Köln-Kalk F3 2 1,727 160 
DE DB Netz 2651 DE-2651 Köln-Kalk Köln-Deutz  F3 2 2,200 120 
DE DB Netz 2639 DE-2639 Köln-Deutz  Köln Hbf F3 2 1,200 80 
 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES: 
 
- Type of train-path: Long distance regular interval path  
- Load factor: Not applicable⇒  Value equal to 1 
- Train without titling technology DB Netz 





RESULTS OF THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE CALCULATION: 
 
Link  Country IM Infrastructure charge 
Total 
Train-path charge (€) Charge for stops at stations (€) € €/train-km Frankfurt - Köln DE DB Netz 
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AT COUNTRY 
(Wien - Salzburg) 
 




FORMULA APPLIED : 
(1)   ÖBB : Infrastructure charge* = (Charge for train movement) + (Charge for stops at stations) 
















AT ÖBB 1 AT-1 Wien Estbahnhof Staatsgrenze N. Salzburg Westbahn 317 
 
 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES: 
 
- Train’s weight: 430 tonnes 
- Market segment: Passenger traffic 
- Traction unit category: Category A 
- Station category : 
• Wien Estbahnhof : Category 1 
• Staatsgrenze N. Salzburg : Category 1 
ÖBB 
- Hypothesis : 
• Without bottlenecks 
• Optimal performance regime : 0 minutes of delay 
 
RESULTS OF THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE CALCULATION: 
 
 
Link  Country IM Infrastructure charge 
















Wien - Salzburg AT ÖBB 
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BE COUNTRY 
(Bruxelles – Liège) 
 




FORMULA APPLIED : 
(2) INFRABEL : Rail infrastructure charge* = (Charge train path-line) + (Charge train path-facility)  




Segment Charging category 
 Points 
Line 
category Category H 











































































BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Bruxelles Nord Shaerbeek 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 - (4) 2,5 220 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Shaerbeek Y. Zaventen 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 - (4) 7,9 220 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Zaventen Leuven 1 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 - (4) 18,4 220 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Leuven Landen 1 2 1 3 3 2 2 3 - (4) 31,9 220 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Landen Liège-Guillemins 1 2 1 3 3(3) 3 3 3(3) 1 38,6 220 
(1) > : running direction start – end (Bruxelles – Liège). 
(2) < : running direction end – start (Liège – Bruxelles). 
(3) Without information in the Network Statement.  
(4) Intermediate stops not considered according to the calculations hypothesis. 
 
 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES: 
 
- Difference compared to the standard train-path : From 0,00% to 5% 
- Time at a station: 30 minutes 
Infrabel 
- Time period : Departure at 8h00 and comeback at 18h00 (applicable to Category H). Both running directions 
considered.  
 




Total charge Link  Country IM Running direction Charge train-
path line 
Charge train-
path facility € Average €/tr-km Average 
Departure at 8h 302,2 785,4 1087,6 10,6 Bruxelles
-Liège Departure at 18h 538,9 785,4 1324,3 12,9 
Departure at 8h 538,9 776,4 1315,3 12,8 
Bruxelles-Liège BE Infrabel 
Liège-
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FORMULA APPLIED : 
 
(1) RFF : Access charge(i) = (Charges for minimum services) + (Charge for access to facilities) 
(2) INFRABEL : Rail infrastructure charge (ii) = (Charge train path-line) + (Charge train path-facility) 
(3) DB : Price(iii)(train-path km) = (Base price) x (Product factor) x (Special factors) x (Regional factor) + (Stops at stations) 
  (i) Charges for additional services not considered in the calculations.   
 (ii) Shunting charge and administrative fees not considered in the calculation. 



















FR RFF 21002 FR-21002 Paris (Nord) St. Denis A  6,1 
FR RFF 21003 FR-21003 St. Denis Pierrefitte Stains A  4,6 
FR RFF 21004 FR-21004 Pierrefitte Stains Villiers-le-Bel-Gonesse A  4,1 
FR RFF 23001 FR-23001 Villiers-le-Bel-Gonesse Vémars N1  14,4 
FR RFF 23002 FR-23002 Vémars Croisilles N1  134,4 
FR RFF 23003 FR-23003 Croisilles Sainghin N1  49,1 
FR RFF 23018 FR-23005 Sainghin 
Wannehain Frontière - Esplechin 
Frontière N2  11,8 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Wannehain Frontière - Esplechin Frontière Y. Antoing C1=1, C2=1  13,4 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Y. Antoing Tourpes C1=1, C2=1  12,3 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Tourpes Y. Patard C1=1, C2=1  18,0 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Y. Patard Y. Beauregard C1=1, C2=1  3,5 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Y. Beauregard Halle-Ring C1=1, C2=1  26,3 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Halle-Ring Halle C1=1, C2=1  1,3 
BE Infrabel 1 BE-1 Halle Y. Noord Halle C1=1, C2=1  1,3 
BE Infrabel 96N BE-96N Y. Noord Halle Y. Ruisbroek C1=1, C2=2  7,1 
BE Infrabel 96N BE-96N Y. Ruisbroek Bruxelles-Midi C1=1, C2=2  4,9 
BE Infrabel 0 BE-0 Bruxelles-Midi Bruxelles-Midi-Gril JNM C1=1, C2=2  0,6 
BE Infrabel 0 BE-0 Bruxelles-Midi-Gril JNM Bruxelles-Chapelle C1=1, C2=2  0,4 
BE Infrabel 0 BE-0 Bruxelles-Chapelle Bruxelles-Central C1=1, C2=2  0,7 
BE Infrabel 0 BE-0 Bruxelles-Central Bruxelles-Congres C1=1, C2=2  0,9 
BE Infrabel 0 BE-0 Bruxelles-Congres Bruxelles-Nord C1=1, C2=2  1,0 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Bruxelles-Nord Bruxelles-Nord-Gril F C1=1, C2=3  1,0 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Bruxelles-Nord-Gril F Schaerbeek C1=1, C2=3  1,5 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Schaerbeek Haren-Sud C1=1, C2=3  2,9 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Haren-Sud Y. Diegem-West C1=1, C2=3  1,0 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Diegem-West Y. Diegem-Oost C1=1, C2=3  0,3 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Diegem-Oost Diegem C1=1, C2=3  0,6 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Diegem Zaventem Rooster P/Q C1=1, C2=3  1,8 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Zaventem Rooster P/Q Zaventem C1=1, C2=3  0,4 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Zaventem Y. Zaventem C1=1, C2=3  0,9 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Zaventem Nossegem C1=1, C2=3  1,6 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Nossegem Kortenberg C1=1, C2=3  2,7 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Kortenberg ERPS-Kwerps C1=1, C2=3  3,1 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 ERPS-Kwerps Veltem C1=1, C2=3  3,3 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Veltem Y. Herent C1=1, C2=3  2,3 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Herent Herent C1=1, C2=3  0,8 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Herent Y.Wilsele C1=1, C2=3  1,9 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y.Wilsele Leuven-Bundel M C1=1, C2=3  1,5 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Leuven-Bundel M Leuven  C1=1, C2=3  1,2 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Leuven  Y. Molenbeek C1=1, C2=3  2,5 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Molenbeek Vertrijk C1=1, C2=3  8,7 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Vertrijk Tienen C1=1, C2=3  7,4 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Tienen Ezemaal C1=1, C2=3  6,4 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Ezemaal Neerwinden C1=1, C2=3  3,0 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Neerwinden Landen C1=1, C2=3  3,9 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Landen Waremme C1=1, C2=3  13,8 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Waremme Bleret C1=1, C2=3  2,7 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Bleret Remicourt C1=1, C2=3  2,6 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Remicourt Momalle C1=1, C2=3  3,5 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Momalle Fexhe-Le-Haut-Clocher C1=1, C2=3  2,2 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Fexhe-Le-Haut-Clocher Voroux-Base Travaux LGV C1=1, C2=3  1,9 
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BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Voroux Y. Voroux C1=1, C2=3  1,3 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Y. Voroux Bierset-Awans C1=1, C2=3  0,7 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Bierset-Awans Racc. Bierset-Zone Fret C1=1, C2=3  0,3 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Racc. Bierset-Zone Fret Ans C1=1, C2=3  3,3 
BE Infrabel 36 BE-36 Ans Liège-Guillemins C1=1, C2=3  5,9 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Liège-Guillemins Y. Val-Benoit C1=2, C2=4  1,5 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Y. Val-Benoit Y. Aguesses C1=2, C2=4  0,7 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Y. Aguesses Angleur C1=2, C2=4  0,7 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Angleur Chenee C1=2, C2=4  1,3 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Chenee Trooz C1=2, C2=4  6,9 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Trooz Olne C1=2, C2=4  1,9 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Olne Fraipont C1=2, C2=4  0,9 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Fraipont Nessonvaux C1=2, C2=4  1,6 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Nessonvaux Pepinster C1=2, C2=4  5,1 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Pepinster Verviers-Central C1=2, C2=4  4,2 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Verviers-Central Verviers-Palais C1=2, C2=4  1,0 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Verviers-Palais Verviers-Est C1=2, C2=4  1,4 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Verviers-Est Dolhain-Gileppe C1=2, C2=4  4,7 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Dolhain-Gileppe Dolhain-Vicinal C1=2, C2=4  1,3 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Dolhain-Vicinal Ligne 37-Signaux 1394 C1=2, C2=4  1,9 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Ligne 37-Signaux 1394 Welkenraedt C1=2, C2=4  3,0 
BE Infrabel 37 BE-37 Welkenraedt 
Hergenrath (Frontière) - Aachen Süd 
Grenze C1=4, C2=3  9,4 
DE DB 2600 DE-2600 Hergenrath (Frontière) - Aachen Süd Grenze Aachen Hbf F3 2 6,8 
DE DB 2564 DE-2564 Aachen Hbf Aachen-Rothe Erde Pbf   F3 2 1,9 
DE DB 2600 DE-2600 Aachen-Rothe Erde Pbf   Düren Pbf  F3 2 29,2 
DE DB 2600 DE-2600 Düren Pbf  Köln-Ehrenfeld Pbf  F1 2 36,4 
DE DB 2608 DE-2608 Köln-Ehrenfeld Pbf  Köln Hbf F1 2 2,5 
DE DB 2639 DE-2639 Köln Hbf Köln Messe/Deutz F3 2 1,2 
DE DB 2653 DE-2653 Köln Messe/Deutz Köln-Mülheim F3 2 3,6 
DE DB 2662 DE-2662 Köln-Mülheim Köln-Mülheim Berliner Straße F5 2 1,5 
DE DB 2658 DE-2658 Köln-Mülheim Berliner Straße Köln Bruder Klaus Siedlung F3 1 1,4 
DE DB 2650 DE-2650 Köln Bruder Klaus Siedlung Langenfeld (Rheinl) F2 1 13,3 
DE DB 2650 DE-2650 Langenfeld (Rheinl) Düsseldorf-Reisholz Abzw F2 1 10,9 
DE DB 2411 DE-2411 Düsseldorf-Reisholz Abzw Düsseldorf-Lierenfeld F5 2 5,4 
DE DB 2410 DE-2410 Düsseldorf-Lierenfeld Düsseldorf-Derendorf Dnf F5 2 4,2 
DE DB 2401 DE-2401 Düsseldorf-Derendorf Dnf Düsseldorf-Derendorf Dn Z1 2 1,2 
DE DB 2416 DE-2416 Düsseldorf-Derendorf Dn Düsseldorf-Unterrath F5 2 0,5 
DE DB 2670 DE-2670 Düsseldorf-Unterrath Duisburg-Großenbaum F6 2 9,8 
DE DB 2310 DE-2310 Duisburg-Großenbaum Duisburg Hbf F6 2 7,1 
DE DB 2650 DE-2650 Duisburg Hbf Duisburg Kaiserberg F3 2 2,5 
DE DB 2184 DE-2184 Duisburg Kaiserberg Mülheim (Ruhr)-Styrum F4 2 2,9 
DE DB 2300 DE-2300 Mülheim (Ruhr)-Styrum Essen West F4 2 11,1 
DE DB 2300 DE-2300 Essen West Essen Hbf F4 2 2,4 
DE DB 2164 DE-2164 Essen Hbf Essen Hbf Ero F6 2 2,2 
DE DB 2160 DE-2160 Essen Hbf Ero Bochum Hbf F4 2 13,8 
DE DB 2150 DE-2150 Bochum Hbf Bochum Prinz von Preußen F5 2 2,4 
DE DB 2158 DE-2158 Bochum Prinz von Preußen Bochum-Lagendreer Lpf F4 2 4,8 
DE DB 7448 DE-7448 Bochum-Lagendreer Lpf Bochum-Lagendreer Bez Os F4 2 1,2 
DE DB 2151 DE-2151 Bochum-Lagendreer Bez Os Dortmund-Lütgendortmund Gbf F5 2 2,4 
DE DB 2151 DE-2151 Dortmund-Lütgendortmund Gbf Dortmund-Lütgendortmund F5 2 1,2 
DE DB 2125 DE-2125 Dortmund-Lütgendortmund Dortmund Hbf F4 2 5,4 
DE DB 2106 DE-2106 Dortmund Hbf Dortmund-Körne F2 2 4,3 
DE DB 2650 DE-2650 Dortmund-Körne Dortmund-Kurl F2 2 5,6 
DE DB 2650 DE-2650 Dortmund-Kurl Selmig F2 2 15,9 
DE DB 2910 DE-2910 Selmig Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hda F5 2 1,4 
DE DB 2913 DE-2913 Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hda Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hro F5 2 1,6 
DE DB 2920 DE-2920 Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hro Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hme F5 2 1,1 
DE DB 2913 DE-2913 Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hme Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hvn F5 2 0,9 
DE DB 2250 DE-2250 Hamm (Westf) Rbf Hvn Hamm (Westf) Pbf F5 2 0,3 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Hamm (Westf) Pbf   Neubeckum Pbf  F2 2 21,3 
DE DB 2990 DE-2990 Neubeckum Pbf  Oelde F5 2 8,9 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Oelde Rheda-Wiedenbrück F2 2 10,4 
DE DB 2990 DE-2990 Rheda-Wiedenbrück Gütersloh Hbf   F5 2 8,9 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Gütersloh Hbf   Brackwede       F2 2 13,1 
DE DB 2990 DE-2990 Brackwede       Bielefeld Hbf Pbf F5 2 4,3 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Bielefeld Hbf Pbf Herford F4 2 13,9 
DE DB 2990 DE-2990 Herford Löhne (Westf) Pbf                        F5 2 10,3 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Löhne (Westf) Pbf                        Porta Westfalica  F4 2 16,4  
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DE DB 2990 DE-2990 Porta Westfalica  Minden (Westf)  F5 2 4,2 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Minden (Westf)  Minden (Westf) Gbf    F4 2 1,4 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Minden (Westf) Gbf Minden (Westf) NRW/NI  F2 1 2,9 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Minden (Westf) NRW/NI  Haste   F2 1 31,8 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Haste   Wunstorf    F2 1 6,9 
DE DB 1700 DE-1700 Wunstorf    Seelze Pbf  F2 2 10,3 
DE DB 7602 DE-7602 Seelze Pbf  Seelze Rbf West  F5 2 0,0 
DE DB 7636 DE-7636 Seelze Rbf West  Seelze Rbf Swf F5 2 0,3 
DE DB 1750 DE-1750 Seelze Rbf Swf Seelze Rbf Sob F5 2 1,1 
DE DB 1701 DE-1701 Seelze Rbf Sob Letter F5 2 2,0 
DE DB 1701 DE-1701 Letter Hannover Kurve   F5 2 0,9 
DE DB 1701 DE-1701 Hannover Kurve   Hannover Hbf  F5 2 3,5 
 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES: 
 
RFF - Time period: Departure at 8h00 (applicable to the charge for reservation of capacity). One single running direction taken into account.  
- Difference compared to the standard train-path : From 0,00% to 5% 
- Category of running priority: Category 1 
- Category of admissible weight on track: Category 2 INFRABEL 
- Categoy H : Category 3 (> : running direction start-end) 
- Type of train-path: Express path 
- Load factor: Not applicable⇒  Value equal to 1 
- Train without titling technology 
- Regional factors: Not applicable ⇒  Value equal to 1 DB 
- Station category : 




RESULTS OF THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE CALCULATION: 
 
Infrastructure charge Link 
Country IM Charge for the French part 














(€) € €/train-km Index 100* FR RFF 
198,6 2.824,5 24,4 211,9 48,0 99,2 3.406,7 15,17 228 
       
Country IM Charge for the Belgian part  
Total charge BE Charge train path - line 
(€) 
Charge train path - facility 
(€) € €/train-km Index 100* BE Infrabel 
666,8 0,0 666,8 2,80 42 
       
Country IM Charge for the German part 
Total charge DE Utilisation charge 
(€) 
Charge for stops at stations  
(€) € €/train-km Index 100* DE DB 
1.577,5 26,3 1.603,8 4,08 62 
        
Total charge FR + BE+ DE 









Remark :  
* The 100 index is the one amounting 100 for the average rail infrastructure charge (expressed in €/train-km) 
for the analysed link, considering all countries or infrastrucure managers. 
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Cerbère La Plaine 















IM     
 
FORMULA APPLIED : 
 
(1) ADIF : Charge(i) = (Ch. for the use of infrastructure) + (Ch. for the use of stations) + (Security charge) 
(2) RFF : Access charge (ii) = (Charges for minimum services) + (Charge for access to facilities) 
(3) SBB : Charge(iii) = Charge for basic services 
(4) ÖBB : Infrastructure charge(iv) = (Ch. for train movement) + (Ch. for stops at stations) 
(5) DB : Price(v)(train-path km) = (Base price) x (Product factor) x (Special factors) x (Regional factor) + (Stops at stations)   
  (i)  The charge for the approval of railway staff training centres and the charge for the supply of additional, supplementary and ancillary services have not been 
considered in the calculation.  
 (ii) Charges for additional services not considered in the calculations. 
(iii) The charge for supplementary services and for miscellaneous services has not been considered in the calculation. 
(iv) The charges for shunting, parking, the use of other facilities and other services have not been considered in the calculations. 



















ES ADIF 200 ES-200 Madrid (Puerta de Atocha) Guadalajara-Yebes A.2  64,0 200 
ES ADIF 201 ES-201 Guadalajara-Yebes Calatayud A.2  157,0 200 
ES ADIF 202 ES-202 Calatayud Zaragoza (Delicias) A.2  86,0 200 
ES ADIF 203 ES-203 Zaragoza (Delicias) Lleida A.2  138,0 200 
ES ADIF 204 ES-204 Lleida Plana P. A.2  69,0 160 
ES ADIF 205 ES-205 Plana P. Reus A.2  21,0 140 
ES ADIF 206 ES-206 Reus Tarragona A.2  19,0 140 
ES ADIF 207 ES-207 Tarragona Sant Vicenç de Calders A.2  25,0 160 
ES ADIF 208 ES-208 Sant Vicenç de Calders Barcelona (Sants) A.2  60,0 160 
ES ADIF 209 ES-209 Barcelona Arenys de Mar C.1  44,0 140 
ES ADIF 210 ES-210 Arenys de Mar Maçanet C.1  37,0 140 
ES ADIF 211 ES-211 Maçanet Girona C.1  30,0 160 
ES ADIF 212 ES-212 Girona Portbou C.1  67,0 140 
ES ADIF 213 ES-213 Portbou Cerbère C.1  2,0 90 
FR RFF 54050 FR-54050 Cerbère Elne C  27,7  
FR RFF 54049 FR-54049 Elne Perpignan C  13,6  
FR RFF 52079 FR-52079 Perpignan Narbonne C  61,4  
FR RFF 52078 FR-52078 Narbonne Béziers C  25,5  
FR RFF 52077 FR-52077 Béziers Sète C  44,3  
FR RFF 52076 FR-52076 Sète Montpéllier C  27,6  
FR RFF 52075 FR-52075 Montpéllier Les mazes-le-crès B  6,5  
FR RFF 52074C FR-52074C Les mazes-le-crès St.-Césaire B  39,5  
FR RFF 52074B FR-52074B St.-Césaire Nîmes B  3,8  
FR RFF 52074A FR-52074A Nîmes Nîmes B  5,1  
FR RFF 54023 FR-54023 Nîmes Villeneuve-les-Avignon C  38,1  
FR RFF 54022C FR-54022C Villeneuve-les-Avignon Pont-St.-Esprit C  44,3  
FR RFF 54022A FR-54022A Pont-St.-Esprit La voulte-sur-Rhône C  68,6  
FR RFF 54021B FR-54021B La voulte-sur-Rhône Peyraud C  58,8  
FR RFF 54021A FR-54021A Peyraud Givors-Canal C  44,4  
FR RFF 52037 FR-52037 Givors-Canal Lyon-Perrache-Voyageurs C  19,8  
FR RFF 52006B FR-52006B Lyon-Perrache-Voyageurs Lyon-Vaise B  4,6  
FR RFF 52006A FR-52006A Lyon-Vaise Collognes-Fontaines C  6,9  
FR RFF 52027 FR-52027 Collognes-Fontaines Lyon-St.-Clair C  4,7  
FR RFF 52030 FR-52030 Lyon-St.-Clair Miribel B  8,2  
FR RFF 56055 FR-56055 Miribel Ambérieu B  34,8  
FR RFF 54040 FR-54040 Ambérieu Culoz C  49,9  
FR RFF 54041 FR-54041 Culoz Bellegarde (Ain) C  32,9  
FR RFF 52062 FR-52062 Bellegarde (Ain) Longéray-Léaz C  5,2  
FR RFF 54042 FR-54042 Longéray-Léaz La Plaine D  12,9  
CH SBB 0 CH-0 La Plaine State Border N. Charnitz (Buchs) SBB  391,0  
AT ÖBB 0 AT-0 State Border N. Charnitz (Buchs) Innsbruck Westbahnhof Other main lines  251,0  




   




   
DE DB 7902 DE-7902 Kufstein Kufstein Grenze Z1 2 0,0  
DE DB 5702 DE-5702 Kufstein Grenze Rosenheim Süd F3 2 29,9  
DE DB 5707 DE-5707 Rosenheim Süd Rosenheim Ost F4 2 1,7  
DE DB 5703 DE-5703 Rosenheim Ost Prien am Chiemsee F5 2 23,4  
DE DB 5703 DE-5703 Prien am Chiemsee Traunstein F6 2 28,3  
DE DB 5703 DE-5703 Traunstein Freilassing F7 2 24,4  
DE DB 5703 DE-5703 Freilassing Salzburg Grenze F8 2 1,0  
AT ÖBB 1 AT-1 Staatsgrenze N. Salzburg Wien Estbahnhof Westbahn  317,0  
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Cerbère La Plaine 















IM     
 
 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES: 
 
 
- Level of traffic: N3.B (Level 3B : Operators > 15 million km·train/year) 
- Type of service: V2 (Top speed < 260 km/h) 
- Time period: Departure at 8h00 from Madrid (applicable to B and D charge for the use of railway lines 
modalities. One single running direction considered.  
ADIF 
- Renfe (2004): 172 M km·train 
RFF - Time period: Departure at 8h00 from Madrid (applicable to the path reservation charge). One single running direction considered. 
- Type of traffic: Other than intermodal goods traffic (passenger traffic); traffic non requiring concession. 
SBB - Type of train: Intercity / Eurocity (Hypothesis: TGV Duplex of 430 tonnes). 
- Train’s weight: 430 tonnes 
- Market segment: Passenger traffic 
- Traction unit category: Category A 
- Station category: 
• Wien Westbahnhof: Category 1 ÖBB 
- Hypothesis:  
• Without bottlenecks 
• Optimal performance regime: 0 minutes of delay 
- Type of train-path : Express path 
- Load factor: Not applicable⇒  Value equal to 1 
- Train without titling technology DB 





RESULTS OF THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE CALCULATION: 
 
Infrastructure charge Link 
Country IM Charge for the Spanish part 
Lines utilisation Total charge ES 
Access (€) Reservation (€) Operation (€) Traffic (€) 
Station 
use  (€) 
Security 
(€) € €/train-km Index 100* ES ADIF 
6,6 163,8 458,1 2.076,8 250,3 97,5 3.053,0 3,73 139 
       
Country IM Charge for the French part 












(€) € €/train-km Index 100* FR RFF 
10,1 731,5 0,0 650,5 147,5 304,6 1.844,2 2,68 76 
       
Country IM Charge for the Swiss part 










for nodes (€) € €/train-km Index 100* CH SBB 
271,2 100,9 0,7 275,0 0,0 647,8 1,66 62 
        
Country IM Charge for the Austrian part 
Train movement Stops at stations Total charge AT 
Standard package (€) Mark ups and discounts (€) TOTAL (€) Standard package (€) € €/train-km Index 100* AT ÖBB 
755,5 -10,0 745,5 0,0 745,5 2,97 111 
        
Country IM Charge for the German part 
Total charge DE Utilisation (€) Stops at stations (€) 
€ €/train-km Index 100* DE DB 
245,8 0,0 245,8 2,26 85 
        
Country IM Charge for the Austrian part 
Total charge AT Train movement Stops at stations 
Standard package (€) Mark ups and discounts (€) TOTAL (€) Standard package (€) 
€ €/train-km Index 100* AT ÖBB 
805,2 -12,7 792,5 5,5 798,0 2,52 94 
        
Total charge ES + FR + CH + AT + DE + AT 









Remark :  
* The 100 index is the one amounting 100 for the average rail infrastructure charge (expressed in €/train-km) 
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ANNEX A8 
CHARACTERISATION OF THE PRICING SYSTEMS 




A8.1. BRITISH RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING SYSTEM 
 
The current British infrastructure manager, Network Rail, was created in October 2002 as 
a result of it taking over Railtrack plc, which was the owner and operator of the national 
railway network.  
 
The legal framework for rail infrastructure charges is defined in the Railways Act 1993, 
Statutory Instruments number 1340 of 1998 (The Railways Regulations 1998) and in the 
Transport Act 2000, which amended the Railways Act 1993. According to this legal 
framework, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) defines the structure and the amount of 
charging elements and reviews them periodically through its access charges reviews.  
 
The charging philosophy applied is MC+ for passengers (franchised train operators) and 
MC for freight and open access operators. With regard to the charging structure, the 
current structure of tariffs is two-part for passenger transport (franchised train operators) 
and linear for freight transport, designed for covering fully maintenance, renewal and 
traffic management costs. According to CEMT (2005), in terms of maintenance costs, 
fixed costs account for 77% whilst the remaining 23% is variable. For renewals costs, 
fixed costs account for 93% whilst the remaining 7% is variable. 
 
The structure and values of the fixed and variable charges have been summarised in annex 
A3.  
 
Variable charges for passenger transport are designed so that Network Rail recovers the 
costs which vary with the volume of traffic (Thomas, 2004). They are divided into:  
 
• Track usage charge: This charge, expressed in pence per vehicle mile and variable 
according to the type of vehicle, covers the marginal costs of operation 
(maintenance and renewal of track, signalling and structures assets). Its values are 
the result of the application of a top-down model analysis that estimates the 
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the whole network, and their subsequent allocation to individual vehicles by using 
engineering relationships describing the damage caused to the infrastructure for 
different operating characteristics, such as speed, axle load, unsprung mass, etc. 
(CENIT et al, 2007a).  
 
• Traction electricity charge: This charge covers the cost of electricity procurement 
and supply. It is composed by a base tariff, expressed in pence per kWh, that is 
multiplied by a coefficient that varies according to the season of the year and the 
geographical zone, as well as to the type of day (working day, weekend) and the 
time of the day (three time periods are distinguished). 
 
• Track capacity charge: This charge covers the marginal congestion cost and varies 
according to each service group for franchised passenger train operators. 
 
• Rail safety charge: This charge is calculated pro rata to the share attributed to the 
Train Operator of the aggregate total fixed track charge. 
 
With regard to fixed charges, the values (which are independent of traffic intensity) are the 
result of the calculations made by ORR for a five-year period by allocating to routes the 
total amount that Network Rail should recover and dividing it among the different 
franchised passenger train operators on the basis of vehicle miles operated. Fixed charges 
constitute therefore mark ups to ensure Network Rail recovers all its costs and, according 
to Thomas (2004), they are allocated based implicitly on ability to pay through the 
franchising process. According to Nash (2004), the fixed element covers the avoidable 
costs30 (i.e. not just variable costs but also any fixed costs that would be avoided if the 
particular set of devices were no longer running) plus a share of all remaining joint and 
fixed costs.  
 
In addition to fixed and variable charges, the charging structure is composed of 
supplementary access charges, which constitute the performance and possessions regimes, 
aimed at incentivising both railway operators and the infrastructure manager.   
 
The structure of charges presented in the precedent paragraphs gives rise to a two-part 
tariff structure where the fixed component of the charge has a very important weight: 
around 50% and above (almost 70% for the Manchester – Birmingham link), as can be 
seen in table A8.1. 
 
 
                                                 
30 The definition of avoidable costs is presented in chapter 1, section 1.2.1.3. 
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TABLE A8.1 WEIGHT OF THE FIXED AND VARIABLE CHARGES FOR BRITISH NATIONAL 
HIGH PERFORMANCE LINKS 
Source: Sánchez-Borràs from data from the official documents on rail 
infrastructure charging in the UK (see table 3.7)  
Fixed charge Variable charge 
Link  
In € % fixed/total In € % variable/total
London – Edinburgh  2.330,3 €  48,3 % 2.491,1 € 51,7 % 
London – Newcastle  2.017,3 € 48,6 % 2.130,6 € 51,4 % 
Manchester – Birmingham  1.235,7 € 68,3 % 574,1 € 31,7 % 
Remark: In order to allocate the fixed charge to each one of the links considered, the value given by the 
British IM was divided by the total train-km run each year in the corridor analysed and multiplied by the 




A8.2. DANISH RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING SYSTEM 
 
The current Danish infrastructure manager, Banedanmark (previously Banestyrelsen), was 
created in 1997 and is currently funded through State subsidies and infrastructure charges 
since 1999. 
 
The current legal framework for rail infrastructure charges is defined in the Railways Act 
n.155 of March 15th 2003 and in Act n. 1171 of December 12th 2004, which states the 
charging rates. 
 
The Danish charging system, which is aimed at covering the short-term socio-economic 
marginal costs, partly covers, according to ECMT (2005), investment expenditures, 
maintenance and traffic management costs. In addition, according to Elm-Larsen (2004), 
the political objective for infrastructure charges is to finance the fixed links (mainly the 
Great Belt and the Öresund bridges) by users. Nonetheless, since competition reasons 
against road transport did not allow to claim all charges at the bridge, higher charges have 
been implemented at connecting lines, especially the connection with Sweden and 
Germany respectively. As a result of this, trains running along the whole corridor (land, 
bridge and tunnel) pay approximately Banedanmark’s relative share of payment for the 
fixed links, and the charging system can be considered CM+ with a linear structure. 
 
The structure and the tariffs of the Danish pricing system are the ones presented in annex 
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Charges are composed of an infrastructure charge and a capacity charge, as well as 
environmental subsidies and a cancellation charge, and additional and auxiliary charges. 
 
The infrastructure charge is made up by two different charges: 
 
• A kilometres fee due by all trains (1,84 DKK/train-km), determined through an 
average train’s operation on the infrastructure (CENIT et al, 2007a, from 
Banedanmark’s 2006 Network Statement) and which includes supplementary 
charges for operating on the Danish network (except for the Korsør-Nyborg and 
Öresund Coast – Swedish border lines). 
 
• A tariff for the use of the Danish part of the Great Belt and the Öresund bridges, 
differentiated per type of traffic (passenger, freight) and levied per train. On the 
Great Belt, passenger trains pay more than freight trains, whilst on the Öresund 
bridge it is the opposite way round.  
 
The capacity charge is only levied in three sections of the network, per train and type of 
traffic (passenger, freight), reflecting the scarcity of capacity on those sections. 
 
Finally, environmental subsidies are only granted to conventional and combined freight 
transport between and to a Danish station as well as to intermodal freight transport in 
transit through Denmark.  
 
 
A8.3. SWEDISH RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING SYSTEM 
 
The current Swedish infrastructure manager, Banverket, was created in 1988 by the law of 
Transport Politics. 
 
The current legal framework for rail infrastructure charges is regulated by the Parliament, 
which is in charge of amending and approving the infrastructure charges calculated by the 
Ministry of Transports and Communications and Banverket.  
 
Infrastructure charges for the use of the Swedish railway network are based on the short-
term socio-economic marginal costs. Hence, charges partly cover maintenance and traffic 
management costs, as well as some external costs. Renewal and investment costs are 
wholly paid by the Swedish Government. The level of charges (marginal) is determined by 
means of an econometric model. The cost recovery rates are established comparing the 
average costs to the calculated marginal costs. In 2004, the cost recovery rate of charges 
was 5% and the pricing philosophy MC+, with a linear tariff structure. 
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In annex A3 the structure and the tariffs of the Swedish pricing system have been 
summarised according to the data published in Banverket’s Network Statement for the 
year 2006. Charges are divided into charges for the minimum package of services, charges 
for track access services, accident charge and charges for ancillary and additional services. 
 
The charge for the minimum package of service is composed of four different charges, 
namely: 
 
• Track charge: This charge, expressed in monetary value per gross tonne-kilometres 
and distinguishing per type of traffic (passenger, freight), is supposed to reflect the 
wear and tear marginal costs. Nevertheless, according to Ekstrom (2004), two-
thirds of the track charges is an “overall” mark up for the Öresund bridge 
(considered a high speed line). For secondary lines, infrastructure charges cover 
30% of the maintenance costs. 
 
• Charges for freight traffic on the Öresund bridge: This charge is a mark up applied 
to freight traffic using the Öresund bridge. It is levied per freight train crossing the 
Öresund bridge and is intended to recover part of investment costs. 
 
• Passenger information fees: These fees are charged to passenger trains in monetary 
value per gross tonne kilometre. According to its value, this charge could also 
contain a mark up for recovering part of the Öresund bridge’s investment costs. 
 
• Diesel charge: This charge, which varies with the consumed diesel litres and the 
type of traffic and vehicle, is intended to reflect the costs of emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and the costs of emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), i.e. the socio-
economic marginal costs in terms of environmental and health effects.  
 
With regard to the accident charge, variable with the number of train-km and the type of 
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ANNEX A9 
RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SERVICES RUNNING ON THE 





In chapter 4 we have seen that high speed or high performance services running on high 
speed or high performance lines are charged, in general terms, a higher amount in terms of 
use of the infrastructure than those running on conventional lines. As has been presented, 
these higher charges are often the result of the application, by pricing systems, of mark 
ups based on wear and tear costs and mark ups reflecting investment costs and/or the 
commercial position of the high speed railway market. The consideration of these aspects 
varies from country to country.  
 
Currently, infrastructure charges for an international European link are calculated as the 
sum of charges resulting from the application of the corresponding national pricing system 
to each national section, like it used to be the case for ticket fares before an integrated 
international tariff was introduced. The different ways of structuring charges in countries 
placed along international European corridors could therefore constitute an obstacle to 
international services on the high speed railway network. 
 
The present section is devoted to analysing and quantifying the differences in charges for 
international services running on high performance links, and seeing to what extent they 
can represent a barrier for international services. 
 
 
A9.2. ANALYSIS OF THE BARRIERS INTRODUCED BY THE CURRENT 
CHARGING SYSTEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL SERVICES 
 
Table A9.1 provides a first glimpse of how the amount of charges is distributed along the 
different national sections, by means of the average rail infrastructure charges index per 
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TABLE A9.1 AVERAGE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE INDEX (Base 100 = average 
infrastructure charge of the link, expressed in €/train-km) 
Source : Sánchez-Borràs for CENIT (2006) 












1 BORDER CROSSED 
 
1 DK – SE København  Malmö 176 
(DK)
3     
(SE)     
5,1 
3 SK – AT Bratislava Wien 100 
(SK) 
100 
(AT)     
1,9 
4 FR – BE Lille Bruxelles 87 
(FR) 
103 
(BE)     
10,4 
8 SI – IT Ljubljana Trieste 88  
(SI) 
150  
(IT)     
3,1 
10 FR – CH Lyon Genève 104 
(FR) 
56  
(CH)     
3,5 
11 FR – DE Strasbourg Stuttgart 94 
(FR) 
100 
(DE)     
4,6 
15 NL – BE Amsterdam Bruxelles 44 
(NL) 
201 
(BE)     
4,1 
17 AT – DE Wien Nürnberg 83 
(AT) 
123 
(DE)     
3,0 
24 BE – DE Bruxelles Köln 86 
(BE) 
123 
(DE)     
3,9 
28 CZ – DE Praha Berlin 40 
(CZ) 
138 
(DE)     
2,8 
30 CZ – AT Praha Wien 87 
(CZ) 
147 
(AT)     
1,3 
31 NL – DE Amsterdam Berlin 46 
(NL) 
121 
(DE)     
3,7 
34 FR – CH Paris Genève 102 
(FR) 
19  
(CH)     
10,1 
35 PL – DE Warszawa Berlin 100 
(PL) 
103 
(DE)     
3,9 




    4,1 




    0,5 
41 PT – ES Lisboa Madrid 113 
(PT) 
93   
(ES) 
    1,2 




    2,2 
43 ES – FR Barcelona Lyon 52 116     3,2 
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   3,0 




    2,1 




32   
(FR) 
   21,9 




    3,0 




    4,1 




    3,0 
65 FR – IT Paris Roma 173 
(FR) 
43    
(IT) 
    5,9 




45   
(FR) 
   18,7 
  
2 BORDERS CROSSED 
  








  48,3 
33 FR – BE – NL Paris Amsterdam 198 
(FR) 




   7,7 
44 NO – SE – DK Oslo  København 0  
(NO)




   0,8 
45 PL – CZ – AT Warszawa Wien 124 
(PL) 




   1,9 
47 FR – BE – DE Paris Hannover 228 
(FR) 




   6,6 






   3,4 






   2,7 








  1,2 






   3,8 
61 FR – BE – NL Marseille Amsterdam 122 
(FR) 




   8,3 




86   
(FR) 
   3,3 
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   3,3 




88   
(PL) 
   4,4 
69 ES – FR – CH Madrid Zürich 144 
(ES) 




   3,7 








  2,8 






   3,0 
  
3 BORDERS CROSSED 
 
56 CH – AT – DE – 
AT(4) 






   2,3 
67 FR – BE – DE – 
PL 
Paris Warszawa 279 
(FR) 
52   
(BE) 




  5,4 
74 PT – ES – FR – 
CH 








  2,6 
  
4 BORDERS CROSSED 
 
51 UK – FR – BE – 
LU – FR(2), (4) 











72 UK – FR – BE – 
DE – PL(2) 














5 BORDERS CROSSED 
 
68 CH – AT – D E – 
AT – CZ – PL(4) 













73 ES – FR – CH – 
AT – DE – AT(1) 
Barcelona Wien 69 
(ES) 









75 ES – FR – CH – 
AT – DE – AT(1) 
Madrid Wien 139 
(ES) 










-   For links 26, 69, 78 and 95, which cross the Öresund link, the charges to be paid for crossing this link are 
included in the charges to be paid to the Danish and the Swedish IM.   
(1) For the Barcelona – Wien and Madrid – Wien links, the average rail infrastructure charge index for Austria 
corresponds to the total charge to be paid for running in Austria. 
(2) For links crossing the Channel Tunnel, only the passage from one country to another was regarded as a 
border. Thus, for example, the London – Bruxelles link was classified with the countries crossing two 
borders, since it crosses the Anglo-Frech border and the Franco-Belgian border. Nevertheless, the Channel 
Tunnel could be considered as a border point, because of its charging characteristics.  
(3) The links crossing the border between Denmark and Germany by Rodby and Puttgarden have been classified 
with the links crossing one border. Nevertheless, because of the charging characteristics of the ferry between 
Rodby and Puttgarden, these links could have been described as links crossing two border points.   
(4) Same remark as for Madrid – Wien link(1).  
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FIGURE A9.1 RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING SITUATION IN THE MADRID-VIENNA 
LINK 
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FIGURE A9.2    RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING SITUATION IN THE PARIS-HANOVER 
 LINK  
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TABLE A9.2 BORDER POINTS ANALYSED 
Border  Border point ODs crossing the border point(1) 
1 DK-SE Öresund 26 69 78 95      
2 SK - AT Devínska Nová Ves štátna hranica-
Staatsgrenze N. Marchegg 
28         
3 FR - BE Wannehain Frontière/Esplechin Border  29 51 58 72 86 92 96 97 76 
4 SL - IT Sežana d.m./Villa Oficina 33         
5 FR - CH La Plaine 35 94 59 98 99 100    
a  Strabourg-Port-du-Rhin/Kehl Grenze 36 74 88       6 FR - DE 
b Stiring-Wendel- Saarbrücken Grenze 87         
7 NL - BE Essen-Grens 40 58 86       
a  Passau Grenze/State Border N. Pyret 42 84        
b  Kufstein Grenze - State Border N. 
Kufstein 
77 81 100       
c  State Border N. Lochau-Hörbranz – 
Lindau 
93 98        
8 AT - DE 
d  Salzburg Grenze   81 88 93 98 100     
9 BE - DE Hergenrath (Frontière)/Aachen Süd 
Grenze 
49 72 92 97      
10 UK - FR Eurotunnel 51 76 80 91 97     
11 CZ  - AT Břeclav St. Hr. - State Border N. 
Bernhardsthal 
55 70 93       
12 NL - DE Bad Bentheim Grenze 56 79        
13 PL - DE Frankfurt (Oder) Grenze - 
Kunowice(GR) 
60 79 89 92 97     
a  Cheb st. hr./Schirnding Grenze 62         14 CZ - DE 
b  Dolní Zleb (st. Hr) 87 53        
a  Kornsjö 69         15 SE - NO 
b  Charlottenberg 63         
16 PT - ES PK 428,5 (Frontera) 66 85 99       
a  Hendaye 96         17 ES - FR 
b  Cerbère 67 68 83 94 98 99 100   
18 PL - CZ Zebrzydowice (GR) 70 93        
19 DK - DE Puttgarden - Rodby 73 78 95       
20 IT - CH Chiasso 75         
21 CH - DE Basel St. Johann - Weil am Rhein 75         
22 AT - IT State Border N. Brenner 77         
a  St. Margrethen (State Border) 93 98        23 CH - AT 
b  State Border N. Charnitz (Buchs)         
 Buchs SG - State Border N. Schaan-
Vaduz 
100 81        
24 LU - BE Aubange Frontière - Rondange Frontière 76         
25 LU - FR Apach (Moselle) Frontière 76         
26 LU - DE Igel Grenze 89         
27 IT -FR Modane 90         
Remarks: 
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The differences in indexes are very variable, and in particular very noticeable in the links 
crossing the Channel Tunnel (British-French border), followed by the links crossing the 
Öresund connection  (Danish-Swedish border). In the links where there are no big civil 
works, the average rail infrastructure charge index per country varies to a lesser extent 
than in the abovementioned cases, even if differences in values are also observed, as it 
was to be expected from the characterisation of the national pricing systems presented in 
the preceding sections. 
 
In figures A9.1 and A9.2 the results for the Madrid – Vienna and the Paris – Hanover 
links have been outlined, in order to graphically present the differences to which reference 
is being made. The graphs placed at the bottom right hand corner of both of the 
aforementioned figures show the weight of the infrastructure charges per country and per 
type of infrastructure (new and upgraded line –NL– and conventional line –CL–).  
 
While in a single country infrastructure charges vary according to different variables (type 
of infrastructure, commercial speed, among other aspects), at the borders between two 
countries, the charge to be applied at both sides of the border would be expected to remain 
the same if there was a single IM managing all the European network. Therefore, it is of 
interest to analyse and quantify those differences at border points. 
 
Table A9.2 presents the border points analysed (35 border points, which correspond to 27 
European borders) and indicates the international links crossing them and for which 
infrastructure charges were calculated. 
 
In figures A9.3-a and A9.3-b the value of the rail infrastructure charge (expressed in 
€/train-km) in the border segments of the 35 border points analysed has been quantified. 
Table A9.3 and figure A9.4 numerically and graphically summarises the “gap” in rail 
infrastructure charges between one side and the other of the different border points 
analysed. For the links where the calculation of the rail infrastructure charge requires 
taking into account the time period, the values presented correspond to the ones obtained 
for a train departing at 8 a.m. from the origin point of the link crossing the border point 
analysed. 
 
The results obtained show that there is a great dispersion in the order of magnitude of the 
“gaps” in rail infrastructure charges in the border segments. It is to be noted that: 
 
• Differences in charges in the borders of the Southern European countries 
(Portugal–Spain, Spain–France) are about [5; 10[ €/train-km in the Spanish-
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Portuguese border, and about [2; 3[ €/train-km in the Spanish-French borders 
(Hendaye and Cerbère). 
 
• Differences in infrastructure charges in the Eastern French borders (borders with 
Italy, Switzerland and Germany) are below 3 €/train-km. In the Northern French 
borders, the differences in infrastructure charges are higher for the borders that are 
situated on the West side. 
 
FIGURE A9.3-a    “GAP” IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN THE BORDER POINTS 
ANALYSED 
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FIGURE A9.3-b   “GAP”  IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN THE BORDER POINTS 
ANALYSED 
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TABLE A9.3 “GAP” IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN THE BORDER POINTS 
ANALYSED 
Border  Border point “Gap”  (in €/train-km) 
1 DK - SE Öresund 10,6 (Danish side) 
10,2 (Swedish side) 
2 SK - AT Devínska Nová Ves štátna hranica-Staatsgrenze N. Marchegg 0,32 
3 FR - BE Wannehain Frontière/Esplechin Frontière  3,50 
4 SL - IT Sežana d.m./Villa Oficina 1,97 
5 FR - CH La Plaine 0,30 
a  Strabourg-Port-du-Rhin/Kehl Grenze 2,07 6 FR - DE 
b Stiring-Wendel- Saarbrücken Grenze 2,07 
7 NL - BE Essen-Grens 0,27 
a  Passau Grenze/State Border N. Pyret 1,22 
b  Kufstein Grenze - State Border N. Kufstein 0,75 
c  State Border N. Lochau-Hörbranz – Lindau 0 
8 AT - DE 
d  Salzburg Grenze   1,25 
9 BE - DE Hergenrath (Frontière)/Aachen Süd Grenze 2,73 
10 UK - FR Eurotunnel 309,6 (English side) 
313,36 (French side) 
11 CZ  - AT Břeclav St. Hr. - State Border N. Bernhardsthal 0,76 
12 NL - DE Bad Bentheim Grenze 2,01 
13 PL - DE Frankfurt (Oder) Grenze - Kunowice(GR) 0,70 
a  Cheb st. hr./Schirnding Grenze 2,61 14 CZ - DE 
b  Dolní Zleb (st. Hr) 2,61 
a  Kornsjö 0,60 15 SE - NO 
b  Charlottenberg 0,60 
16 PT - ES PK 428,5 (Frontera) 9,98 
a  Hendaye 2,00 17 ES - FR 
b  Cerbère 2,00 
18 PL - CZ Zebrzydowice (GR) 1,36 
19 DK - DE Puttgarden - Rodby (1) 
20 IT - CH Chiasso 5,09 
21 CH - DE Basel St. Johann - Weil am Rhein 2,72 
22 AT - IT State Border N. Brenner 1,36 
a  St. Margrethen (State Border) 0,06 23 CH - AT 
b  State Border N. Charnitz (Buchs)              
 Buchs SG - State Border N. Schaan-Vaduz 
1,22 
24 LU - BE Aubange Frontière - Rondange Frontière 38,89 
25 LU - FR Apach (Moselle) Frontière 0,82 
26 LU - DE Igel Grenze 2,78 
27 IT - FR Modane 0,26 
Remarks : 
(1) For the Puttgarden – Rodby border point, where the link is guaranteed by a ferry service, the charges to 
be paid for the use of the ferry service have not been counted in the total rail infrastructure charge. Its 
cost amounts approximately 25€ per occupied metre. The fact that the on-ferry track is only 118m long 
has not been taken into account when choosing the itinerary for the links crossing the German– 
Norwegian border. Nevertheless, is has to be pointed out that the standard train chosen for the analysis, 
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FIGURE A9.4  “GAP” IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN THE BORDER POINTS 
ANALYSED 
 Source : Sánchez-Borràs et al (2008b)  
 
 
• Differences in infrastructure charges in the German Western borders (with the 












* Ferry’s price not taken into account 
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• Differences in infrastructure charges in the Southern German borders (borders with 
Austria) are lower than 2 €/train-km. 
 
• In the Eastern German borders (borders with Poland and Czech Republic), 
differences in infrastructure charges are lower than 3 €/train-km. 
 
• In the Scandinavian borders (Norway, Sweden, Denmark), differences in 
infrastructure charges are all lower than 1 €/train-km, except for the Öresund 
connection, which corresponds to a section with a special charging system. 
 
• Crossing a maritime border (French-English border through the Channel tunnel, 
German-Danish border through the Rodby ferry, and Danish-Swedish border 
through the Öresund connection) involves differences in infrastructure charges 
higher than 10 €/train-km. 
 
• Borders between Eastern European countries (border between Poland and Czech 
Republic) have low differences in infrastructure charges (lower than 1 €/train-km). 
 
• All Austrian (studied) borders (Austria – Czech Republic, Austria – Slovak 
Republic, Austria – Italy, Austria – Switzerland, Austria – Germany) present 
differences in infrastructure charges below 2 €/train-km. 
 
• Differences in charges in the Italian-Swiss border (Chiasso) are about 5-10 €/train-
km. 
 
• The difference in charges in the Belgian-Luxembourg border is close to 40 €/train-
km. 
 
The first thing to be noticed is that the “gaps” in infrastructure charges can be considered 
rather high, since in some cases their value is as high as or even higher than the average 
charge of the link. This translates into important differences in the distribution of the 
charge along an international corridor, as we have seen in table A9.1.  
 
In order to try to explain the value of these “gaps” in infrastructure charges, as well as the 
differences in infrastructure charges indexes along international links, the following 
aspects will be subsequently raised: 
 
• Charging philosophies (marginal cost, full cost) and cost recovery rates: 
- Type of infrastructure and consideration of construction costs by pricing 
systems 
- Consideration of the commercial position of the market 
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TABLE A9.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BORDER POINTS ANALYSED 







DK - SE Öresund MC+ / MC+ L / L 20% / 5% NL / NL
SK - AT Devínska Nová Ves štátna hranica-
Staatsgrenze N. Marchegg 
? / MC+ L / L 25% to 50% / 
27% 
CL / CL 
FR - BE Wannehain Frontière/Esplechin 
Frontière  
MC+ / FC- TP / L 63% / 20% NL / NL
SL - IT Sežana d.m./Villa Oficina FC / FC- (1) L / TP 13% / 16% CL / CL 
FR - CH La Plaine MC+ / MC+ TP / L 63% / 30% CL / CL 
Strabourg-Port-du-Rhin/Kehl Grenze MC+ / FC- TP / L 63% / 60%(2) CL / CL FR - DE 
Stiring-Wendel- Saarbrücken Grenze MC+ / FC- TP / L 63% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
NL - BE Essen-Grens MC / FC- L / L 12% / 20% NL / NL
Passau Grenze/State Border N. Pyret MC+ / FC- L / L 27% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
Kufstein Grenze - State Border N. 
Kufstein 
MC+ / FC- L / L 27% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
State Border N. Lochau-Hörbranz – 
Lindau 
MC+ / FC- L / L 27% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
AT - DE 
Salzburg Grenze   MC+ / FC- L / L 27% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
BE - DE Hergenrath (Frontière)/Aachen Süd 
Grenze 
FC- / FC- L / L 20% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
UK - FR Eurotunnel MC+ / MC+ TP(3) / TP 50 à 100% / 63% NL / NL
CZ – AT Břeclav St. Hr. – State Border N. 
Bernhardsthal 
MC+ / MC+ L /L 60% / 27% CL / CL 
NL – DE Bad Bentheim Grenze MC / FC- L / L 12% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
PL – DE Frankfurt (Oder) Grenze – 
Kunowice(GR) 
FC / FC- L / L 91,4% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
Cheb st. Hr./Schirnding Grenze MC+ / FC- L / L 60% / 60%(2) CL / CL CZ – DE 
Dolní Zleb (st. Hr) MC+ / FC- L / L 60% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
Kornsjö MC+ / ? L / L 20% / 0,82% CL / CL SE – NO 
Charlottenberg MC+ / ? L / L 20% / 0,82% UL / CL
PT – ES PK 428,5 (Frontera) MC / MC+ L / TP 20% / ? CL / CL 
Hendaye MC+ / MC+ TP / TP ? / 63% CL / CL ES – FR 
Cerbère MC+ / MC+ TP / TP ? / 63% CL / CL 
PL – CZ Zebrzydowice (GR) FC / MC+ L / L 91,4% / 60% CL / CL 
DK – DE Puttgarden – Rodby MC+ / FC- L / L 20% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
IT – CH Chiasso FC- (1) / 
MC+ 
TP / L 16% / 30% CL / CL 
CH – DE Basel St. Johann – Weil am Rhein MC+ / FC- L / L 30% / 60%(2) CL / CL 
AT – IT State Border N. Brenner MC+ / FC- 
(1) 
L / TP 27% / 16% CL / NL 
St. Margrethen (State Border) MC+ / MC+ L / L 30% / 27% CL / CL CH – AT 
State Border N. Charnitz (Buchs) 
Buchs SG – State Border N. Schaan-
Vaduz 
MC+ / MC+ L / L 30% / 27% CL / CL 
LU – BE Aubange Frontière – Rondange 
Frontière 
? / FC- ? / L ¿ / 20% CL / CL 
LU – FR Apach (Moselle) Frontière ? / MC+ ? / TP ¿ / 63% CL / CL 
Charges for international services running on the European HS network  Appendix A9                   
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-151 







LU – DE Igel Grenze ? / FC- ? / L ¿ / 60%(2) CL / CL 
IT – FR Modane FC-(1) / MC+ TP / TP 16% / 63% CL / CL 
Remarks: 
* The charging philosophy, the tariff applied and the cost recovery rate of the country correspond to those 
applied in the whole of the country and all the market segments, according to CEMT (2005). 
(1) Traffic management only 
(2) Objective: 100% 
 (3) Passenger trains 
Abbreviations: 
- Concerning the charging philosophy: MC: Marginal cost; MC+: Marginal cost with mark ups; FC: Full 
cost; FC-: Full cost recovery after subsidies 
- Concerning the charging structure: L: Linear tariff; TP: Two-part tariff 
- Concerning the type of line: NL: New line; UL: Upgraded line; CL: Conventional line 
 
 
Some of the data needed to carry out this analysis has been summarised in table A9.4, 
which characterises the border points in terms of charging philosophy, charging structure, 
cost recovery rate and type of infrastructure for both sides of the border.  
 
 
A9.2.1. Charging philosophies and cost recovery rates: who finances an international 
link? 
 
The consideration of different charging principles or philosophies over an international 
corridor may lead to a dilemma; indeed, in an international corridor some problems may 
arise from the consideration of the different charging philosophies in two neighbouring 
countries. For instance, if one country charges marginal cost (MC) and the neighbouring 
one charges full cost after subsidies (FC-), for a given international common link the State 
budget of the first country will be financing a greater part of the social and economical 
benefits of this international link. In addition to this, the extent to which investment costs 
(and other infrastructure costs) are recovered by infrastructure charges and the 
consideration of the commercial position or the ability to pay by charging systems, will 
also lead to one State contributing to a higher extent than a neighbouring one to finance an 
international link. 
 
In table A9.5 the different border points analysed have been grouped according to the gap 
in the level of infrastructure charges, indicating in each case the type of infrastructure 
composing the line on both sides of the border (new line and conventional line). 
 
According to the information contained in table A9.5, most border sections are built with 
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conventional lines capital costs are mainly sunk, it can be affirmed that the “gaps” in rail 
infrastructure charges in border sections are, in principle, not due to differences in the 
consideration of investment costs by pricing structures between two neighbouring 
countries. 
 
TABLE A9.5 TYPE OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE FOUND IN THE BORDERS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE “GAP” OBSERVED IN THE LEVEL OF 
CHARGE 
[0;1[ [1;2[ [2;3[ [3;5[ [5;10[ [10;∞[ 
(2) SK – AT  (4) SL – IT  (6a,b) FR – DE  (3) FR – BE  (16) PT – ES  (1) DK – SE  
(5) FR – CH (8a,d) AT – DE  (9) BE – DE   (20) IT – CH  (10) UK – FR  
(7) NL – BE  (18) PL – CZ  (12) NL – DE    (19) DK – DE  
(8b,c) AT-DE (22) AT – IT   (14a,b) CZ – DE   (24) LU – BE  
(11) CZ – AT (23b) CH – AT  (17a,b) ES – FR    
(13) PL – DE   (21) CH – DE     
(15) SE – NO*   (26) LU – DE     
(23a) CH – AT       
(25) LU – FR       
(27) IT – FR       
Remark:  
[0;0[: value of “gap” in rail infrastructure charges in the border points, expressed in €/train-km. 
(0): border point considered according to the numeration in table A9.2. 
* Regarding the two border points between Sweden and Norway, the one in Körnsjö is built with 
conventional line on both sides of the border, whilst the one in Charlottenberg is composed of upgraded 




A few borders are exceptions to that tendency (conventional infrastructure at a border 
section). In them, the infrastructure corresponds to a new line on both sides of the border 
or to a mixture of infrastructure. Consequently, the consideration of construction costs by 
charging systems may have an effect on the amount of charges and therefore, on the 
“gaps” in charges at border points. These exceptions are found in: 
 
• Big civil works linking different countries: the Channel Tunnel, linking the United 
Kingdom and France, and the Öresund, linking Denmark and Sweden. 
 
• International high speed links, served by “international” operators: Dutch – 
Belgian border and French – Belgian border, both served by Thalys31, and 
                                                 
31 Thalys is a joint service offered by the Belgian, French, Dutch and German railways. It provides 
commercial passenger rail transport services on behalf of SNCB, SNCF and DB to the following 
destinations: Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Cologne (www.thalys.com/fr/en/). 
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English– French border, served by Eurostar32.  
 
• Two special cases, where the infrastructure has a different nature on one side and 
on the other side of the border: Austrian – Italian border and one of the border 
points between Sweden and Norway (Charlottenberg). 
 
With regard to big civil works linking different countries, namely the Channel Tunnel and 
the Öresund works, the great “gaps” in charges (more than 10 €/train-km -see table A9.3-) 
are due to the important construction costs (see table A9.6) and the charging schemes 
aiming at recovering them totally, in the case of the Channel Tunnel, or partially, in the 
case of the Öresund connection. 
 
 
TABLE A9.6 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECTIONS WITH SPECIAL CHARGING 





Construction cost Traffic (millions/year) 
Channel Tunnel Tunnel 160 14.680,13 millions €(1) 
(293,60 millions €/km) 
7,5(2) 
Öresund connection Tunnel + artificial island 
+ bridge 
200 1.565,68 millions € 
(41,20 millions €/km) 
 
Storebælt rail link Two bridges + tunnel 180 2.870,00 millions €(3) 
(160,00 millions €/km) 
7,3 (4) 
Remarks: 
(1) This cost includes the financing with shareholder funds and bank loans (Eurotunnel, 2006). 
(2) Eurostar rail traffic 2005. 
(3) 1998 prices. 
(4) Rail traffic in 2004. 
 
 
Since the Channel Tunnel is privately financed, its construction cost (€14.680,13 
million33) should be wholly recovered through the payment of infrastructure charges by 
railway operators using it. As a result of this, high infrastructure charges are imposed by 
Eurotunnel. According to Rail Professional (2008), these high charges result in Eurostar 
UK Ltd (which jointly owns the train business with the national railways of France and 
Belgium) reporting losses of about £100 million a year as a result of these. 
 
On the other hand, the gap in the charge index in the Öresund connection is also 
                                                 
32 Eurostar is a high speed rail service directly linking the UK to France and Belgium via the Channel 
Tunnel (www.eurostar.com).  
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remarkable, but lower than the one registered in the Channel Tunnel. In this case, the 
investment costs are not privately financed but they are met by the Danish and the 
Swedish States, as well as the Danish IM, which finances part of the construction costs 
charging 1.781 DKK per passenger every train going through the Öresund connection. The 
Swedish IM (Baneverket), on the contrary, does not charge passenger trains taking the 
Öresund connection. Therefore, the Swedish State would be financing the big civil work 
to a higher extent than the Danish State.  
 
Concerning the case of international high speed links served by “international” operators, 
the “gap” in charges at the French-Belgian border is comprised between 3 and 5 €/train-
km, while the one at the Dutch-Belgian border is lower than 1 €/train-km. In these three 
countries, the French IM partly covers investment costs. On the contrary, the Dutch IM 
does not recover investment costs through infrastructure charges and the Belgian IM’s 
pricing system covers the key drivers relating to marginal cost as well as other parameters 
that compose the social marginal cost of running a train. This information on recovery of 
investment costs could explain why the “gap” is higher in the French-Belgian border 
(where only one of the border countries partly recovers investment costs through 
infrastructure charges) than in the Dutch-Belgian border (where none of the border 
countries have charging systems aiming at recovering investment costs).  
 
Finally, with regard to the two special cases where the infrastructure has a different nature 
on one side and on the other side of the border (see table A9.5, in the case of the Swedish-
Norwegian border point, the “gap” below 1 €/train-km is the result of the low cost 
recovery rates in both countries (less than 5%) and the non recovery of investment costs 
through infrastructure charges. In the case of the Austrian-Italian border point, only the 
Austrian IM recovers part of the investment costs. Therefore, in this case, the 
consideration of investment costs by the charging systems does not explain the gap in 
infrastructure charge at the Austrian-Italian border point. 
 
In order to assess whether cost recovery rates could explain the order of magnitude of 
these gaps in infrastructure charges at the borders, especially in the cases where border 
sections are composed by conventional infrastructure on both sides of the border, figure 
A9.5 was produced. This figure shows the value of the border gaps in rail infrastructure 
charges according to the gap in the cost recovery rate (of total infrastructure expenditures, 
loans and subsidies included) and the infrastructure principle on each side of a border.  
 
It is to be noticed that higher “gaps” in cost recovery rates do not lead to higher gaps in 
rail infrastructure charges as it would seem reasonable to expect. This fact could be 
explained by the following reasons:  
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FIGURE A9.5   VALUE OF THE “GAP” IN RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES CONTINGENT 
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• The cost recovery rates used for the analysis correspond to national cost recovery 
rates for 2004-2005 as published by CEMT (2005). According to Steer Davies 
Gleave (2006), “subsidies and grants to IMs are usually given in lump sums, so it 
is difficult to identify the amount of infrastructure subsidy that is applied to each 
route. In addition, Crozet (2007), when commenting on the level of rail charges, 
says that “globally infrastructure charges are getting closer to costs, but this is not 
the case when considering different parts of the network. While on a large part of 
the network, the charge is below marginal cost, on the busiest high speed lines is 
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far above full cost”. Therefore, the value of the cost recovery rate for a given 
country could be different between the different types of services (high speed 
services, freight services, regional services, etc.) or different routes, according to 
the amount of infrastructure subsidy applied to each link. This fact would explain 
why higher “gaps” in (average) cost recovery rates do not lead (according to the 
data available) to higher “gaps” in rail infrastructure charges for high speed or high 
performance services.  
 
• A particular case of the aforementioned reason (cost recovery rates used for the 
analysis not homogeneously valid across all type of services) would be the 
application of cross-subsidies between freight and passenger transport or the 
application of a full cost recovery philosophy for freight services and a marginal 
cost charging for passenger services. This could be the case of the Polish – German 
and the Polish – Czech Republic borders, where the “gap” in cost recovery rate is 
around 30% but the “gaps” in rail infrastructure charges amount to 0,7 and 1,36 
€/train-km respectively. According to data published by CEMT (2005), average 
access charges for freight trains are almost three times the average charge for 
passenger trains; and such differences can only be explained by cross-subsidisation 
or the application of different pricing philosophies across different types of traffic 
(passenger, freight). 
 
• Cost recovery rates may vary from one year to another. Therefore, there is the 
possibility that the infrastructure charges calculated in this study (valid for 2006) 
do not lead to the cost recovery rates used for the analysis (valid for the year 2004-
2005). For instance, according to Infrabel, the current cost recovery is no longer 
20%34. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that great variations in cost recovery rates occur 
from one year to another. 
 
• Even with the assumption that the cost recovery rates available (CEMT, 2005) 
apply homogeneously to all the network and type of services, the values of cost 
recovery rates are not comparable among countries, since the total infrastructure 
expenditures (loans and subsidies included) differ from one country to another. As 
Nash indicated in Nash (2005), ground conditions, wage levels and types of traffic 
give rise to genuine differences in cost among European countries. Therefore, a 
30% cost recovery rate does not necessarily correspond to the same amount of 
money in two different countries. Figure A9.6 illustrates this same fact for 
maintenance and renewal costs in different European railway networks. 
 
                                                 
34 Information obtained from Infrabel’s Network Access Division. 
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Last but not least, the consideration of the commercial position and the ability to pay of 
the market for high speed links has introduced an added complexity to the calculation 
procedure, materialised in the definition of different time periods and categories of 
infrastructure. 
 
FIGURE A9.6   MAINTENANCE AND RENEWAL COSTS PER KILOMETRE OF MAIN TRACK 
AND YEAR 




With regard to the categorisation of the infrastructure, rail infrastructure is commonly 
classified into three different categories: conventional lines, upgraded lines and new lines. 
Nevertheless, in terms of infrastructure charging, IMs have divided their infrastructure 
into other categories. A detailed analysis of the network statements of the railway 
networks of the geographical framework analysed shows that, for instance, Portugal has 
defined 17 categories; Germany and France 12; Belgium, 7; Austria, 6; Spain, Italy and 
the Slovak Republic, 4; Latvia and the Czech Republic, 3; Slovenia, Sweden and 
Switzerland, 2. Each category is usually only valid in one country and is associated to a 
particular charge. This fact adds a complexity to the rail infrastructure charges calculation 
procedure. This complexity leads in some cases to the need to divide a given link, for 
which the infrastructure charge has to be calculated, into several segments (even more 
than 200). This complexity can be interpreted as a new barrier for HP passenger services. 
 
Maintenance 
[1000 Euro/main track km] 
Renewal
[1000 Euro/main track km] 
Average LCC 
[1000 Euro/main track km] 
1.000 € 
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The definition of timetable periods adds a new border as well, since it varies from one 
country to another.  
 
 
A9.2.2. Combination of linear tariffs with two-part tariffs: an economic border 
 
In 2006, the IMPRINT-NET Expert Group on rail transport (IMPRINT-NET, 2006) 
pointed out that differences in the structure of charges could be important in some cases. 
As an example, they mentioned that “whilst differences in structure between different 
single part tariffs might be of relatively little significance, the difference between a two-
part tariff and a linear tariff is likely to be significant, for instance in its impact on smaller 
operators and on international operators”. 
 
 
FIGURE A9.7   “GAP” (IN €/TRAIN-KM) IN THE BORDERS, ACCORDING TO THE CHARGING 
STRUCTURE (LINEAR TARIFF, TWO-PARTS TARIFF) AND THE CHARGING 














MC+/MC+ MC+/FC- FC/FC- MC/MC+
Linear tariff on both sides of the 
border (and same type of line) 
Linear tariff and two-part tariff 
(and same type of line) 
Two-part tariff on both sides of the 

















































New line on both sides of the border (for the rest of the links, conventional line on both sides of the border)  
 
 
In this section, the difference between a two-part tariff and a linear tariff was quantified in 
terms of “gap” in infrastructure charge in different border points and compared to the 
results obtained with linear tariffs on both sides of a border, as well as with two-part tariffs 
on both sides of a border. Figure A9.7 presents the results obtained, distinguishing at the 
same time by type of charging principle applied on each side of the border. The “gaps” in 
charges are expressed in euros per train-km and only border points where the type of 
infrastructure is the same on both sides of the border are represented (the Öresund 
connection and the Channel Tunnel were not considered for this analysis because of their 
particularities). Regarding charges resulting from a two-part tariff charging structure, the 
fixed part, if not specified in €/train-km in the Network Statement, has been wholly 
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attributed to the border section, since it will be paid by railway operators when they enter 
the network, regardless of the distance run along it. 
 
According to the results obtained it would seem that the implementation of a linear tariff 
on one side of the border and a two-part tariff on the other side of the border leads to 
higher “gaps” in charges than if the charging structure was linear on both sides of the 
border there where countries charge according to MC+ and FC-. This could be interpreted 
as the application of a two-part tariff in one country and a linear tariff in a border country 
introducing an economic barrier for HS railways, indirectly derived from the mark ups 
allowed by linear and two-part tariffs.  
 
 
A9.3. COMMENTS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES FOR INTERNATIONAL SERVICES 
RUNNING ON THE EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED NETWORK 
 
The European Rail Infrastructure Managers –EIM– had already expressed their concerns 
(EC, 2005) about the heterogeneity of the current rail infrastructure pricing systems in the 
Member states having negative repercussions on the organisation of international rail 
transport services as well as on their competitiveness. This statement is based on the fact 
that for a RU to be competitive, it must be able to plan its business, which is currently of 
great complexity in the European railway framework due to the heterogeneity of the 
infrastructure charging systems. In addition to the calculation complexity, the variability 
of those pricing systems can be seen as a time barrier. IMs and consequently RUs are 
faced with a certain instability (with very few exceptions): on the one hand, financing is 
not stable because it depends on how annual State budgets are structured; on the other 
hand, the structure of national rail infrastructure pricing systems are reviewed rather 
frequently (new elements are considered while others are eliminated). Therefore, planning 
becomes a very complicated task for RUs. 
 
In this annex, those international barriers have been analysed focusing on the “gaps” in 
charges at border points resulting from the application of different pricing schemes on one 
side and the other side of a border. Calculations have shown rather high “gaps”, since in 
some cases their value is as high as the average charge of the link or even higher.  
 
An attempt to classify the amount of those “gaps” according to the charging philosophies 
and cost recovery rates have shown that, at border points, the differences in charges in two 
neighbouring sections are mainly due to a different consideration of the commercial 
position of the market and, therefore, the ability to pay. This is considered by means of the 
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of different timetable periods, which are, on the whole, particular to each single country. 
The unavailability of cost recovery rates for high speed links has not allowed to correctly 
analyse the influence that the use of different charging principles and cost recovery rates 
has on the value of the “gaps” in two border sections. 
 
Finally, concerning the charging structure (linear tariffs and two-part tariffs), Nash (2004) 
and CEMT (2005) had previously reported on the barrier that the presence of two-part 
tariffs could mean to international services, i.e. to an operator from another country 
seeking a path, since it would be operating on a small scale in the country concerned. The 
calculations carried out in this annex for international high performance links show that 
changing from a linear tariff to a two-part tariff leads to higher gaps in charges (between 
two border sections) than if the charging structure were linear on both sides of the border 
there where countries charge according to MC+ and FC-, that is to say, where mark ups 
above marginal costs are applied or where the level of charges is set to collect the 
difference between state compensation and full financial cost. 
 
Evolution of the level of charges for HSL  Annex A10                   
 
Marta Sánchez Borràs, 2009  A-161 
ANNEX A10 
EVOLUTION OF THE LEVEL OF RAIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES FOR EUROPEAN 
HIGH SPEED LINKS 
 
 
A10.1. EVOLUTION OF THE LEVEL OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
FOR FRENCH HIGH SPEED LINKS 
 
In figure A10.1 the evolution of the level of charges of the different additive factors 
composing the final charge has been summarised.  
 
With regard to access charges (DA, Droit d’accès), it is difficult to establish their 
evolution from 2005 onwards, since the unit in which they are charged changed from 
€/train-km/month to €/train-km. However, it can be said that in 2007, access charges for 
all high speed lines were raised, whilst the ones applied to the rest of the lines were kept 
constant.  
 
Concerning train-path reservation charges (DRS, Droit de réservation du sillon), they 
experienced several changes in the period 2001-2008, increasing their value for high speed 
lines year after year for all time periods (off-peak, normal and peak hours). For the rest of 
the lines, changes introduced from 2003 onwards implied increases in the level of charges.  
 
With regard to reservation charges for stopping at stations (DRAG, Droit de réservation 
d’arrêt en gare), values for suburban lines with high traffic (A) at off-peak hours have 
undergone several increases and reductions, until being equalled to zero, as for the rest of 
line categories. In normal and peak hours, values were substantially modified in 2004 and 
since then, only high speed lines and suburban lines with high levels of traffic have seen 
increases in the level of charges.  
 
Finally, the running charge (DC, Droit de circulation), which is the one approximately 
linked to the marginal costs for using the infrastructure, has been substantially raised from 
2001 to 2008 for national passenger trains (from 0,235 €/train-km in 2001 to 1,400 €/train-
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FIGURE A10.1 EVOLUTION OF THE UNIT VALUES OF THE FRENCH INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGING SYSTEM (2001-2008) 
Source: Own from data collected by Muñoz (2008)  
 
Decrease with regard to previous year Increase with regard to previous year Unchanged with regard to previous year 




    
Suburban lines Main intercity lines High speed lines Other lines Year 
A B C C* D D* N1 N2 N2* N3 N3* N4 E 
2001 1.761,440 39,970 6.783,980 6.783,980 - 6.783,980 - - 0,000 
2002 365,880 365,880 3,050 3,050 0,000 0,000 5.294,550 5.294,550 3.384,370 5.294,550 3.384,370 -  
2003 373,124 373,124 3,110 3,110 0,000 0,000 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 - 0,000 
2004 773,124 373,124 3,110 3,110 0,000 0,000 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 - 0,000 
2005 773,124 373,124 3,110 3,110 0,000 0,000 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 4.475,912 - 0,000 
2006 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,000 0,000 0,946 0,946 0,946 0,946 0,946 - 0,000 




2001 to 2005 
- In €/train-km 
from 2006 on 
2008 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,000 0,000 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 0,000 
               
Suburban lines Main intercity lines High-speed lines Other lines Time period Year 
A B C C* D D* N1 N2 N2* N3 N3* N4 E 
2001 3,030 0,340 4,480 1,050 1,050 0,750 0,750 - 0,000 
2002 1,520 0,610 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 4,570 1,070 1,070 0,760 0,760 - 0,000 
2003 1,550 0,622 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 4,813 1,122 1,122 0,806 0,806 - 0,000 
2004 1,550 0,622 0,010 0,010 0,010 0,010 4,800 1,142 1,142 0,816 0,816 - 0,000 
2005 1,550 0,622 0,380 0,380 0,010 0,010 5,187 1,213 1,213 0,867 0,867 - 0,000 
2006 1,550 0,650 0,650 0,650 0,010 0,010 5,366 1,255 1,255 0,896 0,896 - 0,000 




2008 1,850 0,750 0,750 0,750 0,010 0,010 5,600 1,310 1,310 0,940 0,940 0,890 0,000 
2001 6,660 0,340 9,270 2,180 2,180 1,570 1,570 - 0,000 
2002 4,880 1,220 0,080 0,080 0,000 0,000 9,300 2,290 2,290 1,600 1,600 - 0,000 
2003 4,977 1,244 0,082 0,082 0,000 0,000 9,780 2,407 2,407 1,683 1,683 - 0,000 
2004 4,970 1,244 0,130 0,130 0,050 0,050 9,843 2,700 2,700 1,713 1,713 - 0,005 
2005 4,970 1,244 0,380 0,380 0,050 0,050 10,435 2,864 2,864 1,822 1,822 - 0,005 
2006 4,970 1,244 0,650 0,650 0,050 0,050 10,739 2,949 2,949 1,894 1,894 - 0,005 
2007 5,034 1,250 0,650 0,650 0,050 0,050 11,103 3,510 3,510 1,905 1,905 1,700 0,005 
Normal 
hour 
2008 5,034 1,450 0,750 0,750 0,051 0,051 11,400 5,100 5,100 2,610 2,610 2,490 0,005 
2001 15,140 0,340 10,760 4,480 4,480 2,990 2,990 - 0,000 
2002 14,030 2,440 0,080 0,080 0,000 0,000 10,980 4,570 4,570 3,050 3,050 - 0,000 
2003 14,308 2,488 0,082 0,082 0,000 0,000 11,544 4,813 4,813 3,202 3,202 - 0,000 
2004 14,300 3,280 1,250 1,250 0,050 0,050 11,710 5,100 5,100 3,250 3.250 - 0,005 
2005 14,300 3,280 1,250 1,250 0,050 0,050 12,437 5,426 5,426 3,458 3,458 - 0,005 
2006 14,300 3,280 1,250 1,250 0,050 0,050 12,870 5,586 5,586 3,565 3,565 - 0,005 
2007 14,500 3,280 1,500 1,500 0,050 0,050 13,310 6,320 6,320 3,604 3,604 2,980 0,005 
DRS 
(€ / km) 
Peak 
hour 
2008 14,560 3,280 1,550 1,550 0,051 0,051 13,900 7,300 7,300 4,400 4,400 4,290 0,005 
   
Suburban lines Main intercity lines High speed lines Other lines Time period Year A B C C* E D* N1 N2 N2* N3 N3* N4 E 
2001              
2002 21,950 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2003 22,385 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2004 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2005 5,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2006 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 




2008 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
2001              
2002 21,950 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2003 22,385 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2004 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 - 5,500 
2005 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 - 5,500 
2006 7,200 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 7,200 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 - 5,500 
2007 8,000 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 8,000 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
Normal 
hour 
2008 8,895 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 8,895 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
2001              
2002 21,950 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2003 22,385 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,000 
2004 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 - 10,000 
2005 24,350 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 24,350 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 - 10,000 
2006 24,350 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 24,350 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 - 10,000 














2008 25,000 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 25,000 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 10,000 
              
Suburban lines Main intercity lines High speed lines Other lines Year 

















DA: Access charge DRS: Train-path reservation charge DRAG: Reservation charge for stopping at a station DC: Running charge 
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A10.2. EVOLUTION OF THE LEVEL OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
FOR SPANISH HIGH SPEED LINKS 
 
In Spain, the structure and level of charges are defined in MFOM (2003), for the years 
2003-2005, and MFOM (2005), for 2006 to the present date. The charging structure and/or 
the units defined in each Decree of the Ministry of Fomento (MFOM) differ considerably 
from the other. Therefore, a comparison of the unit values in order to gauge the evolution 
of the level of charges is not possible (see figure A10.2). 
 
 
FIGURE A10.2 EVOLUTION OF UNIT VALUES OF THE SPANISH INFRATRUCTURE 
CHARGING SYSTEM (2003-2008) 




























Components of the formula 
(units) Categories  
     
Level of traffic Year 
N1 N2.A N2.B N3.A N3.B 
2003-2005 6,59 € 
Access tariff - Class A 
2006-2008 60.000 €/year 150.000 €/year 330.000 €/year 690.000 €/year 1.410.000 €/year 
               
Type of service Line 
type 
Time 
period Year V1 V2 M P 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Peak 
2006-2008 3,40 €/train-km 2,10 €/train-km - 0,84 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Normal 
2006-2008 2,20 €/train-km 1,05 €/train-km - 0,84 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) 
A1 
Off-peak 
2006-2008 0,75 €/train-km 0,70 €/train-km - 0,84 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Peak 
2006-2008 3,30 €/train-km 2,00 €/train-km - 0,75 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Normal 
2006-2008 2,10 €/train-km 1,00 €/train-km - 0,75 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) 
A2 
Off-peak 
2006-2008 0,70 €/train-km 0,65 €/train-km - 0,75 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Peak 
2006-2008 2,80 €/train-km 0,50 €/train-km 0,30 €/train-km 0,06 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Normal 
2006-2008 0,20 €/train-km 0,20 €/train-km 0,05 €/train-km 0,05 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) 
B1 
Off-peak 
2006-2008 - 0,10 €/train-km 0,05 €/train-km 0,06 €/train-km 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Peak 
2006-2008 - 0,20 €/train-km 0,30 €/train-km - 
2003-2005 1,10 €/train-km * (1 + 0,25*⏐540/Vt – 540/Vn⏐) Normal 
2006-2008 - 0,20 €/train-km 0,05 €/train-km - 













2006-2008 - 0,10 €/train-km 0,05 €/train-km - 
  
Type of service Line type Year 
V1 V2 M P 
2003-2005 0,57 €/fictitious tones-km + 0,15 to 0,33 €/dynamic tones-km + 0,05 €/pantograph-km A1 
2006-2008 2,00 €/train-km 0,75 €/train-km - - 
2003-2005 0,57 €/fictitious tones-km + 0,15 to 0,33 €/dynamic tones-km + 0,05 €/pantograph-km A2 
2006-2008 1,90 €/train-km 0,70 €/train-km - - 
2003-2005 0,57 €/fictitious tones-km + 0,15 to 0,33 €/dynamic tones-km + 0,05 €/pantograph-km B1 
2006-2008 0,60 €/train-km 0,06 €/train-km 0,06 €/train-km - 
2003-2005 0,57 €/fictitious tones-km + 0,15 to 0,33 €/dynamic tones-km + 0,05 €/pantograph-km 
Operating tariff - Class C 
 
C1 
2006-2008 - 0,06 €/train-km 0,06 €/train-km - 
    
Time period Line type Year 
Peak Normal Off-peak  
2003-2005 In €/100 seats-km according to commercial speed and length of the journey A1 
2006-2008 1,25 €/100 seats-km 0,70 €/100 seats-km - 
2003-2005 In €/100 seats-km according to commercial speed and length of the journey A2 2006-2008 1,20 €/100 seats-km 0,65 €/100 seats-km - 
2003-2005 In €/100 seats-km according to commercial speed and length of the journey B1 2006-2008 - - - 
2003-2005 In €/100 seats-km according to commercial speed and length of the journey 
Traffic tariff - Class D 
 
C1 2006-2008 - - - 
      
Distance Class Year 
A B C D 
2003-2005 13,17 € - 32,93 € 1st 
2006-2008 0,77 €/pax 0,43 €/pax 0,20 €/pax 0,08 €/pax 
2003-2005 Not specified 2nd  
2006-2008 0,48 €/pax 0,30 €/pax 0,15 €/pax 0,06 €/pax 
2003-2005 Not specified 
iff for station use - Class A 
3rd  
2006-2008 0,04 €/pax 0,04 €/pax 0,04 €/pax 0,02 €/pax 
Capacity 
reservation 
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A10.3. EVOLUTION OF THE LEVEL OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
FOR GERMAN HIGH SPEED LINKS 
 
In Germany, where the charging system is structured as the product of several 
multiplicative factors, the base price has undergone several increases since 2004 (see 
figure A10.3). Exceptions to this tendency are urban rapid transit lines and the lines 
corresponding to category Fplus, which are, as presented in chapter 4, those of above-
average importance in traffic terms and the ones that can be run at speeds above 280 km/h 
for the most part. For category Fplus, the base price value was already significantly high 
compared to the other lines in 2003 and in 2008 it still amounts to twice the value of the 
second category with highest charges (namely, F1). With regard to the product factor for 
passenger traffic paths, which is a multiplier of the base price and is determined according 
to the willingness to pay, no major changes have taken place. 
 
 
FIGURE A10.3 EVOLUTION OF UNIT VALUES OF THE GERMAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
CHARGING SYSTEM (2001-2008) 
Source: Own from data collected by Muñoz (2008) 
 
Decrease with regard to previous year Increase with regard to previous year Unchanged with regard to previous year 
Components of the formula 
(units) Categories 
    
Long distance lines Feeder lines Urban rapid transit lines 
Year 
Fplus F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 Z1 Z2 S1 S2 S3 
2001 - 3,337 2,25 2,17 2,12 2,10 1,92 2,12 2,20 1,48 - - 
2002 - 3,38 2,25 2,14 2,12 2,05 1,93 2,12 2,20 1,48 - - 
2003 8,30 3,38 2,24 2,12 2,07 2,02 1,92 2,11 2,19 1,45 2,09 - 
2004 8,30 3,51 2,53 2,28 2,20 2,03 2,00 2,13 2,20 1,46 2,09 - 
2005 8,30 3,68 2,53 2,29 2,21 1,74 2,05 2,13 2,20 1,46 2,09 2,51 
2006 8,30 3,79 2,50 2,26 2,17 1,76 2,06 2,14 2,21 1,46 2,09 2,51 
2007 7,90 4,02 2,78 2,47 2,36 1,82 2,13 2,21 2,29 1,55 2,09 2,51 
Base price  
(€/train path-km) 
2008 8,09 4,12 2,85 2,53 2,42 1,86 2,18 2,26 2,34 1,59 2,14 2,57 
              
Year Express path Long distance regular interval path 
Local regular interval 
path Economy path 
LZ (light running) pax. 
service path 
2001 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 1,00 
2002 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 1,00 
2003 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 1,00 
2004 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 1,00 
2005 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 1,00 
2006 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 1,00 
2007 1,80 1,65 1,65 1,00 0,65 









A10.3. EVOLUTION OF THE LEVEL OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
FOR ITALIAN HIGH SPEED LINKS 
 
In Italy, the evolutions in the level of charges with regard to the ones applied in the year 
2003 are established in the Decree of 15 July 2003 for the year 2004 and in Decree of 24 
March 2005 for the year 2005. Values for 2006 are published in the corresponding 
Network Statement. The changes do not affect the pricing structure. They only stipulate an 
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increase in the level of all unit values equal to the inflation rate expected by the Decree in 
question.             
 
 
 
 
